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Welfare Professionals and the Reluctant Exercise of State Power
David Wainwright




This study employed the methods of critical ethnography to examine the phenomenon
of 'empowerment' as it occurred in a south London community project. The initiative
aimed to form a partnership between welfare professionals and local people, in order
to identify the health needs of the population, as a basis for collective action to address
the social, economic and environmental influences on health. However, this strategy
proved unsuccessful and the focus of the project shifted towards the psychological
empowerment of individual participants, and the provision of social support and
health advice at a Drop-in Centre.
By combining a detailed ethnography of the community project with a broader
historical and structural critique of empowerment, the study aimed to appraise the
emancipatory potential of the phenomenon. Key themes of the research were: the
extent to which such initiatives could produce emancipatory knowledge, whether the
exercise of professional power could be dismantled, and the effect that empowerment
would have on the consciousness and practical activity of participants.
It was found that despite their subjective commitment to an emancipatory agenda, the
welfare professionals' location within the state effectively neutralised the
emancipatory potential of empowerment. Rather than producing a highly mediated
social critique capable of informing emancipatory activity, the initiative produced a
positivist needs assessment aimed at influencing local statutory agencies. Instead of
generating critical consciousness amongst its lay participants, the project further
subordinated them to professional surveillance and regulation, and created a culture of
low expectations and authoritarianism. It was concluded that the professionals' self-
identity made them the unwitting bearers of state-power, and that despite their
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This study originated in my experiences as a public-health researcher with a south
London health authority. My work brought me into daily contact with a range of
welfare professionals, including: public health doctors, health promotion officers,
social workers, and advocates for ethnic minorities. Like all wage-labourers, welfare
professionals are concerned with earning a living and preferably advancing their
careers. However, subjectively at least, it seemed that many of the people I met also
had more idealistic reasons for working in the welfare sector; put simply, they wanted
to do 'good-works'.
Altruism is not uncommon amongst members of the caring professions, but here
'good-works' appeared to have a political meaning, rather than simply referring to the
provision of welfare services. As well as trying to meet their clients' immediate
needs, there was also a common commitment to the pursuit of an emancipatory
agenda; to enabling people to gain greater control over the social and economic factors
that influenced their lives, and transforming them into more effective agents of social
change. It is important to note that this emancipatory agenda was not viewed as
something that lay outside of their professional role, for instance, as membership of a
political party would, but rather as an integral part of their job. The assumption
appeared to be that welfare professionals could use the intellectual and material
resources, available to them as employees of the state, to facilitate the emancipation of
local people. As such, the phenomenon lies outside of the traditional modes of
political struggle, such as the labour and trade union movement, or even the new
social movements. The category I have used to describe this synthesis of professional
and political practice is empowerment.
With hindsight the claims of empowerment seem naïve, but then in the current
conjuncture any progressive political impulse appears utopian. Also, it would be
wrong to assume that welfare professionals who are committed to such an agenda see
it as a complete emancipatory strategy, rather they appear to see it as 'doing their bit'
or 'moving things in the right direction' whilst waiting for more fundamental political
change to occur. The aims of my study were, to record what happened when the
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welfare professionals I worked with attempted to put empowerment into practice, and
to appraise the emancipatory potential of such activities.
Fortunately, the political aspirations of the welfare professionals I worked with took
on a concrete organisational form in the Waterfront Health Action Project (WHAP).
WHAP began as a community development project, in which welfare professionals
attempted to forge a partnership with local people, to help them to identify their health
needs and take collective action to address the social, economic and environmental
influences on their health. As an employee of the health authority I was directly
involved in WHAP from its establishment in July 1991 until the spring of 1995. As a
founder member I shared the welfare professionals' aspirations for WHAP, and my
'insider' role enabled me to engage in a participant observation of the initiative, and
conduct a series of in-depth interviews with professional and volunteer members of
the project. Whilst such close proximity allowed for detailed observation and a high
degree of empathy, it was also a potential source of bias and distortion in the research.
The contradictory nature of my involvement in WHAP is explored in the discussion of
methodology in appendix I.
As well as conducting an ethnographic study of WHAP I also wanted to engage the
academic literature on empowerment from the perspective of critical social theory, in
order to place the phenomenon in an historical and structural context. Critical
ethnography offers a methodology that combines the two lines of inquiry, but it is an
uneasy synthesis, and the difficulties and opportunities offered by the approach are
also discussed in the appendix on methodology.
Chapter one sets the scene for the ethnographic study by providing a historical and
structural analysis of five modes of empowerment: 'consumerism', 'citizenship', 'self-
help', 'community participation', and 'community development'. The analysis aims
to reveal the conditions of existence for each mode of empowerment, and assess their
emancipatory potential. All of the modes of empowerment considered are constrained
by prevailing social and economic relations, but their capacity to transform such
relations, that is, their emancipatory potential, depends upon the extent to which these
relations are integrated within their internal logic. Thus, four of the modes were found
to have a self-limiting internal logic: consumerism because it is based upon the market
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relation, citizenship and community participation because they rely upon the state-
form, and self-help because it adopts a subjectivist approach to knowledge production.
Only community development appears to avoid the incorporation of alienation into its
internal logic. Whilst community development faces the same structural constraints as
the other modes of empowerment, its open ended internal logic means that the
potential for emancipatory practice is not automatically foreclosed. It is concluded that
unlike the other modes of empowerment the emancipatory potential of community
development initiatives cannot be predicted by theoretical deduction, but depends
upon empirical enquiry into a specific example - hence the rationale for studying the
Waterfront Health Action Project.
The second chapter presents a chronological description of the Waterfront Health
Action Project derived largely from documentary evidence. Interpretation and
theoretical analysis are kept to a minimum in this chapter, but an important transition
is noted; namely WHAP's transformation from a traditional community development
project into an empowerment initiative. A number of key themes are identified, that
were used to give a focus to the in-depth interviews, these include: the production of
knowledge, the relationship to the state and professional power, and the effect that
WHAP had on the consciousness of its volunteer members. This chapter also
provides a 'thick' description of WHAP to facilitate generalisation of the study's
findings to similar initiatives, and to provide a basis for potential alternative readings
of the ethnographic data.
Chapter three looks at the way in which WHAP's initial orientation was based upon
the production and articulation of what was believed to be emancipatory knowledge.
The basis of the approach is found to be a communicative model of knowledge and
action, that relies on the assumption that statutory agencies will act in the
community's interests, if they are presented with authentic information about local
people's needs. Consequently, WHAP focused on giving local people a voice with
which to articulate its demands to the local state. In effect this transposes the
structural alienation between the state and the community to the discursive level,
thereby disguising its political character. However, the problem of alienation re-
emerged as a series of problems, including: the difficulty of achieving cultural
synthesis between the professionals and representatives from the community,
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epistemological difficulties, and problems with the mediation of research findings. It
is concluded that WHAP failed to produce emancipatory knowledge because it
overlooked the problem of the welfare professionals' structural location within the
state, and because a positivist methodology was employed rather than critical social
research.
The fourth chapter considers WHAP's attempts to overcome the exercise of
professional power. Although the WHAP professionals subjectively subscribed to an
emancipatory agenda their location within the state obliged them to act as agents of
social control. The professionals attempted to overcome this contradiction by trying to
establish a more informal and trusting relationship with the WHAP volunteers.
However, despite their conscious efforts the professionals continued to exercise
surveillance and regulation over the volunteers. The problem lay in the intellectual
and material resources that the professionals brought to the project. Whilst these
resources were seen as essential to the project, their utilisation activated welfarist
frames of reference that tended to subordinate project members to the exercise of
professional power. In the discussion section, different theories of professional power
are examined, and the most adequate is found to be that which explains professional
power as a function of state-power. The question of why welfare professionals who
are subjectively committed to an emancipatory agenda are incapable of effectively
challenging their role in the exercise of state-power is answered by looking at the
managerial structure of control, and more importantly, by examining the process by
which professionals are interpellated into a self-identity that is structured by welfarist
frames of reference.
The apparent failure to produce a body of emancipatory knowledge, or, to effectively
challenge the exercise of professional power, contributed to WHAP's transformation
from a community development project into an empowerment initiative, and the final
chapter addresses the consequences of this transformation in terms of the project's
emancipatory potential. Essentially, this change of focus entailed moving away from
the attempt to produce emancipatory knowledge as a basis for social action, towards
the more introspective goals of raising the self-esteem and inter-personal competence
of the volunteers, and providing social support and health advice to the local
community at a Drop-in centre. Both goals were pursued by encouraging the
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volunteers to adopt a quasi-professional self-identity, in which they saw themselves as
the providers of welfare services to a needy community. Although this gave a boost to
the volunteers' self-esteem, it was based on a myth - rather than improving their life
chances or emancipating them, the adoption of a quasi-professional identity served to
subordinate the volunteers and their 'clients' more thoroughly to professional
surveillance and regulation. The discussion section examined the politics of
empowerment, and found that assumptions such as a pluralist model of oppression and
a subjectivist conception of knowledge, served to legitimate the intervention of
welfare professionals to directly mediate inter-personal relationships between
oppressed groups. Rather than creating critical consciousness amongst members of the
community, empowerment initiatives led 'clients' to internalise a culture of
victimhood, personal risk, self-regulation, and low expectations of the capacity for
autonomous collective action.
It was concluded that the claimed emancipatory potential of empowerment is largely a
myth. It provides a 'mask' for welfare professionals, enabling them to persuade
themselves and their clients that they are engaged in emancipatory activity, when in
reality their actions only serve to further subordinate people to the new
authoritarianism. A detailed summary of the conclusions drawn from the study is
presented at the end of the final chapter.
It only remains for me to acknowledge the debt I owe to the people who 'empowered'
me to conduct the study and complete my thesis. I was fortunate in receiving the
guidance and support of two supervisors; John Butler, who helped me to focus my
thoughts on a 'doable' project, and Frank Füredi, who set a standard for hard work and
intellectual rigour that I could only aspire to. That I was able to pursue a course of
graduate study is in no small part due to the support of my former boss, Dr Liz Dean,
who tenaciously clung to the value of staff development and academic inquiry in a
National Health Service that was losing faith in both - I am grateful. I would also like
to thank Catherine Adams for her forbearance and for shouldering more than her fair
share of domestic drudgery, particularly over the last year - I promise to make amends.
Finally, I suspect that should any of the welfare professionals or volunteers who
participated in WHAP ever read my thesis they will view its critical conclusions as a
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betrayal of their trust and friendship. In mitigation I can only point out that my
intention was not to portray them as gullible or disingenuous, but to show what
happens to reasonable people in unreasonable circumstances. If we are to develop a
new form of emancipatory politics the first requirement is that we are clear-sighted
about the failings of previous approaches, and I hope that this study will make a small
contribution to that objective.
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1. Five Modes of Empowerment
There will be no art, no literature, no science. When we are omnipotent we
shall have no more need of science. There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment
of the process of life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed. But always -
do not forget this Winston - always there will be the intoxication of power,
constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler. Always, at every
moment, there will be the thrill of victory, the sensation of trampling on an
enemy who is helpless. If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot
stamping on a human face -for ever.
George Orwell
Orwell's portrayal of the down trodden individual, oppressed, abused, and worst of all
in receipt of poor quality goods and services, is one of the more potent political icons
of post-war British culture. Whether 'Big Brother' is defined as the institutions of the
state, large corporations, Trade Unions, the professions, or simply one's neighbours,
the implication remains the same: the individual must be rescued from the oppressive
behaviour of the powerful, and enabled to exercise greater control over the forces that
affect his/her life.
The belief that the individual can and should be able to obtain freedom from
oppression and the capacity to control the forces affecting his/her life, rather than
simply accepting 'the will of God' or a subordinate position in the social hierarchy,
has a long lineage, but has taken a particular form under modernity. Eric Hobsbawm
(1962) has traced this impulse to the period between 1789 and 1848, marked by
political revolution in France and industrial revolution in Britain. This 'dual
revolution' opened up the possibility of exercising conscious control over nature
(through industrialisation) and social relations (through political struggle), in order to
maximise the satisfaction of human needs and ensure personal freedom. However, as
well as opening the door to popular freedom and happiness the dual revolution also
generated an acute awareness of the extent to which industrialisation and the emerging
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social and political order were failing to meet those high aspirations. Whilst
industrialisation was bringing dramatic increases in productivity it was accompanied
by the emergence of an impoverished urban proletariat who rather than exercising
greater control over their productive activity, were increasingly dominated by the
industrial process. Similarly, whilst the overthrow of the ancien regime often brought
freedom from absolute monarchy and the feudal system, for many it was replaced by
the wage-labourer's subordination to the owner of capital, without the reciprocal
claims that the peasant could make on the feudal lord.
Thus the modern society ushered in by the dual revolution immediately gave rise to
ambivalence. On one hand it challenged the certainties of the past, placing political
emancipation and freedom from want firmly on the agenda, but on the other hand it
also revealed the extent to which bourgeois democracy and the capitalist mode of
production were constraining the full realisation of these goals. This new and
ambivalent form of social consciousness manifested itself in the arts with the rise of
the rather vague and inconsistent creed of Romanticism. As Hobsbawm has noted,
Romanticism represented both left and right wing extremes of the response to
modernity, containing the socialist impulse towards a more radical political and
economic transformation, and the reactionary desire to return to a 'golden' pre-
capitalist age. What the Romantics shared was a common sense of estrangement or
'alienation' from the modern world, and it is this concept that also lies behind
Orwell's fear of 'Big Brother', and which is essential to our analysis of empowerment.
Unfortunately, for the Romantics alienation was more of an ethereal sensibility than a
rigorous theoretical concept. And whilst we need to retain the sense of alienation as
an amorphous theoretically under developed frame of mind, it is equally important that
we trace its origins as a sociological concept. The genealogy of alienation can be
traced back to Fichte (if not further), but it was Hegel who introduced the concept to
the world (Jordan, 1971). For Hegel the knowable world was nothing more than
externalised human consciousness, and alienation resided in the failure of Spirit (or
self-consciousness) to recognise the world as its own creation. Instead the products of
human consciousness confronted the individual as alien entities over which s/he had
no control. The historical process entailed humanity recognising the world as its own
creation and thereby overcoming alienation.
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The idealist conception of alienation advanced by Hegel continues to influence
contemporary sociology, but it contains a flaw; if alienation simply comprises the
individual 'forgetting' that the world is his/her own creation, then a simple reminder
should suffice to overcome it. It was Marx who recognised that alienation also resided
in material circumstances, objects, institutions, and social relations, that had to be
physically changed if alienation was to be overcome. Rather than conceptualising
history as a one sided unfolding of Spirit, Marx identified the dialectical relationship
between the human organism and the material and social world. Key to this dialectical
process is production, by which Marx meant not just the manufacture of goods and
services, but the much broader process of practical activity in which human
consciousness both transforms and is transformed by the objective world. The process
of production necessarily entails the individual entering into relationships with other
humans. Crucially these 'social relations' are not created from scratch by each
generation, they have a history as well as a material existence, which the individual is
born into and which shapes his/her consciousness. It is the ahistorical appearance of
social relations, (or their phenomenal forms) that leads the individual to perceive them
as both alien and immutable. Thus, overcoming alienation entails the dual process of
recognising that phenomenal forms are socially constructed (and therefore amenable to
change) and the practical activity of transforming those phenomena or social relations.
It is this struggle to overcome alienation both in consciousness and in practical activity
that lies at the heart of Marx's emancipatory project, and his early writings strive to
reveal the alienation inherent in religion, the family, the state, law, morality, science
and art. David McLellan has noted that:
In all fields the common idea was that man had foifeited to someone or
something what was essential to his nature - principally to be in control of his
own activities, to be the initiator of the historical process. (McLellan,
l98O:p.l 18).
It is important to note that Marx's point of departure was the social subject struggling
to gain consciousness of the historically constructed limitations on personal freedom
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and human potential in order to transform those social relations. That Marx went on
to focus on alienation in the relationship between labour and capital should not
obscure the relevance of his approach to other strands of emancipatory activity, for
example, those organised around race or gender. That all forms of alienation can be
studied from a Marxist perspective, does not mean that Marxism contains a universal
theory of emancipation. For Marx, alienation and the struggle to overcome it was
always particular and historically specific, and always required empirical study. Most
obviously because the phenomenal forms of the social relations in which alienation
inheres are constantly changing over time and between places. The capacity to
challenge alienation also varies, giving rise to different historical agents with equally
varying degrees of critical consciousness. Whether one chooses to challenge racism,
sexism, social class, a combination of the three, or an entirely different form of
alienation, remains a subjective matter dependent upon one's personal and historical
circumstances. However, the fact that Marx chose to focus on production relations is
instructive, not least because his analysis reveals the extent to which the production of
commodities distorts and constrains the development of other social institutions (see
chapter 4 for an account of the relationship between capitalism and state formation),
and forms of consciousness. It is not that the project of overcoming alienation and
oppression is exhausted by a challenge to capitalism and the state, nor that worthwhile
political gains cannot be achieved under capitalism, but rather that the persistence of
capitalism must ultimately constrain the scope of any emancipatory initiative.
The foundational character of the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist state
form means that they provide a litmus test of the emancipatory potential of any
political initiative. It is not that in order to be emancipatory all political initiatives
must contain an overt challenge to capitalism and the state, but rather that if the
internal logic of a political initiative is dependent upon either the market mechanism
or the state-form then its emancipatory potential must be limited. Thus, when
evaluating the emancipatory potential of a political initiative it is reasonable to ask:
'Does it require the capitalist market in order to function?', or, 'Does it depend upon
the capitalist state to achieve its objectives?'. The purpose of this chapter is to ask
those questions of five modes of empowerment, by examining the ways in which they
have conceptualised alienation, and the historical development of their internal logic.
First, it is necessary to account for our use of the term 'empowerment', and why its
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genealogy can be traced in five modes of political practice, none of which bear its
name.
Big Brother (or alienation) may be everywhere, but his opponents are equally
widespread, and a diverse bunch they are. Whilst the rhetoric of empowerment might
traditionally be associated with socialists striving to emancipate the working class, or
with the efforts of 'new social movements' to liberate other oppressed or minority
groups, today there is no limit to the range of individuals and groups claiming the right
to empower us. Social workers, school teachers, health promoters, community
workers, architects, planners, even police officers, can all be heard mouthing the
mantra of empowerment. Even the Government is getting in on the act; the
privatisation of public utilities, the introduction of an internal market to the National
Health Service, the establishment of grant maintained schools, and the 'rights'
conferred under the Citizen's Charter, have all been legitimated by the claim that they
would empower the consumer or recipient of services.
In the face of such a widespread and multi-faceted campaign for empowerment, Big
Brother, (whomever he may be), must be concerned that the days of oppression are
drawing to a close. But need he worry? Empowerment may be a common
phenomenon, but it is also poorly defined, and the label is often applied to activities
without regard to their emancipatory potential. The various advocates of
empowerment may all pay lip-service to the sovereignty of the individual subject and
the pursuit of personal freedom and choice, but what do such abstractions mean in
practical terms?
As we shall see, 'empowerment' is an amorphous category, and any attempt to derive
a generally applicable definition is always likely to be refuted by specific examples.
One solution is to provide an empirical description of an empowerment initiative, that
can be generalised to other projects that share its characteristics. This is the approach
taken in chapter five, where a description of empowerment is derived from the WHAP
case study and generalised to other initiatives that are characterised by the same social
relations. The problem with this approach is that it is by definition ahistorical, and
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therefore conceals insights gained from studying the development of the phenomenon
over time.
A further complication arises from the poor fit between the observable characteristics
of empowerment as a phenomenon and application of the label. This is a two
dimensional problem. First, the category of empowerment was not used to label the
phenomenon prior to the 1960s, and did not enter common usage until the 1970s,
giving the appearance that empowerment has no history prior to this. Secondly, the
characteristics of empowerment can be found in phenomena that are not labelled as
such and which have a different structural character, for example, consumerism aims
to empower the consumer, but the phenomenon is clearly different to that described in
chapter five. Despite such differences, study of these other phenomena does shed light
on the type of empowerment we are concerned with.
In effect there are different modes of empowerment, which do not bear the label, and
which have evolved over time. This chapter traces the genealogy of five modes of
empowerment, identifying their conditions of existence, their internal logic, and
attempting to theoretically assess their emancipatory potential. They are:
'consumerism', 'citizenship', 'self-help', 'community participation' and 'community
development'. This may not be an exhaustive list of the categories in which
characteristics of empowerment can be found, but their selection can be justified on
the grounds that they appear most frequently in the literature, and that the insights they
reveal are representative of the field as a whole. The categories are presented in
ascending order of their relevance to the mode of empowerment discussed in chapter
five, and the space assigned to them varies according to the same principle.
Consumerism
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of consumerism in Britain is the 'Which?'
magazine, published monthly by the Consumers Association. The Association was
established, (by the sociologist Michael Young), as a non-profit making company,
independent of government or industry. The need for independent consumer advice
had been argued by groups across the political spectrum, some of which are quoted in
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the first edition of the magazine in 1957. For instance, the Labour Party had embraced
the consumerist cause in 1949:
Most housewives are good buyers. But it is often impossible for them to know
the true value of many articles until they have tried them, and it may then be
too late. An independent and publicly financed Consumer Advice Centre will
therefore be set up. This will conduct expert tests and examinations of the
various consumer goods on the market. (Labour Party, 1949, p.2)
As the quotation suggests, the provision of reliable information based upon objective
research and evaluation of commodities was seen as the key to empowering the
consumer. However, it was also noted that by improving the efficiency of the market
mechanism consumerism would also benefit the producer of goods. Thus, the
President of the Board of Trade had argued that more discerning consumers in Britain
might enable British firms to compete more effectively in foreign markets:
The more discriminating and capricious the public is, the better for us,
because unless we can meet the demands of that kind of public at home, we
shall never hold on to export markets abroad. (President of the Board of
Trade, 1956, p.2)
When the first edition of Which? appeared with its reviews of electric kettles,
sunglasses, Aspirin, cake mixes, and scouring powders, it aimed to empower the
'housewife' by giving detailed information on the relative quality and performance of
different brands of goods, whilst simultaneously feeding back to manufacturers the
shortcomings of their produce. Initially then, the key mechanism of consumerism, at
least in its Which? manifestation, was purchasing power, that is, the ability of
consumers to express their needs and preferences by making informed choices about
what to buy. The condition of existence for this form of consumerism is the
production of commodities to be exchanged on the free market. However, this does
not mean that the scope of consumerism is limited to the pursuit of good value for
money.
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In fact, consumerism has been adapted as a means of pursuing broader political
objectives. Extra-parliamentary pressure groups have used the 'consumer boycott',
and Government has invoked the rights of the consumer as a rationale for introducing
privatisation or market style reforms into the public sector. The consumer boycott has
been invoked by a number of groups, for example, prior to the political changes in
South Africa the Anti-Apartheid movement urged a boycott of that country's produce,
and of Barclays' Bank, because of its substantial investment in the South African
economy. Environmental groups have also encouraged consumers to buy
'environmentally friendly' produce; a stimulus to which many producers have
responded, (at least in terms of advertising and marketing). The environmental
pressure group 'Greenpeace' has also encouraged consumer boycotts as a means of
applying pressure to national governments and multi-national corporations, for
example, consumers have been urged to boycott mahogany products in order to
preserve the tropical rain forest. Similarly, in 1995 the Shell oil company was
persuaded to abandon its plans to dispose of the Brent Spar oil installation at the
bottom of the North Atlantic off the west coast of Scotland and Ireland. Greenpeace
published (what proved to be erroneous) figures about the quantity of pollutants
contained in the oil platform. This provoked a public outcry and a consumer boycott
of Shell petrol, which was particularly effective in west Germany. As well as Shell's
climb down, the campaign also led to a European ban on the disposal of oil platforms
at sea. However, despite such 'successes' the consumer boycott remains a rather blunt
instrument for achieving political or economic change, relying on the capacity to
influence government and corporate policy by inflicting economic sanctions, rather
than on a direct challenge to the basis of political and economic power.
The British Government's championing of consumer sovereignty throughout the
1980s is even more suspect as a means of empowerment or emancipation. The term
has been used to legitimate the introduction of market style reforms into a wide range
of institutions that were previously primarily regulated by bureaucratic models of
social and economic planning, for example, in the National Health Service, and the
rail network. However, it is important to observe two caveats when considering this
apparent transformation. First, it would be wrong to describe the former arrangements
as independent of the market, or as free from alienation. For example, whilst
nationalisation may overcome some of the irrationality associated with a free market,
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it does not enable the recipients of goods and services to exercise direct control over
their production and distribution. Hence, the electoral support for Conservative
policies amongst the dissatisfied customers of often unresponsive state monopolies.
Secondly, the extent of the transformation should not be over estimated. Whilst the
reforms of the 1980s extended the use of market mechanisms, robust government
regulation meant that this was always a 'managed market', particularly for example, in
the National Health Service. Despite these qualifications the policy of extending
consumer sovereignty did serve to reinforce a pro-capitalist ideology, in which social
planning was presented as inevitably leading to bureaucratic domination and
inefficiency, and the free-market was claimed as a guarantor of personal freedom and
choice.
Belief in the emancipatory power of the free market was not an invention of the
consumer movement; it has been a fundamental element of liberalism from Adam
Smith onwards. Hayek, for instance, in The Road to Serfdom (1944) praised the
regulation of production and distribution by what Smith called the 'hidden hand of the
market', in preference to the tyranny and oppression that he believed were the
inevitable consequences of a planned economy.
This theme has been taken up by Milton Friedman (Friedman and Friedman, 1980),
who suggests that the market facilitates the voluntary exchange of goods and services.
This voluntary exchange is governed by the price mechanism, which according to
Friedman: provides information on what goods are available and what they can be
exchanged for, provides incentives by indicating where demand exceeds supply, and,
distributes income (what people receive for what they sell).
For simple commodities such as fruit or vegetables price may also indicate the quality
of the goods on offer; poor quality vegetables are easily recognised by the purchaser
and are, therefore, likely to have a lower price than fresh vegetables. This mechanism
begins to break down as commodities become more complex, How, for instance, is a
consumer to know whether one washing machine is more efficient than another? This
is where the Which? style of consumerism comes in; by providing such information it
aims to increase the efficiency of the market mechanism.
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But no matter how efficient the market mechanism can be made there are limitations
on the extent to which it can empower consumers to influence the production and
distribution of goods and services, for example, the environmental impact of
production, the claims made by advertising, and rights of redress if goods prove faulty
or dangerous, cannot be fully addressed by the traditional form of consumerism. Thus,
during the 1960's the consumer movement came to recognise that there was a growing
'disequilibrium' between business and consumer that could not be resolved simply by
providing better quality product information. The perceived solution to this problem
was to lobby for greater regulation of production and distribution by central
government.
Gardiner-Jones & Gardiner (1976) writing about the American consumer movement,
describe consumerism in terms of a triangular series of relations between consumers,
business and government. Gardiner-Jones uses the analogy of a farmer who needs to
club the donkey to get his attention. Government is in effect the club used to gain the
attention of business which will respond by extending consumer influence over the
production and marketing process. The belief that government regulation should play
a role in protecting the consumer has also influenced the British consumer movement,
for example Which? now regularly carries articles lobbying government for, amongst
other things, better crash testing of motor cars (Which?, January 1993) and more
accurate food labelling (Which?, May 1993).
Superficially, calls for government to regulate the relationship between business and
consumer may appear to be a departure from liberal belief in the free market. Hayek,
for instance, implies that the emancipatory nature of the free market lies in the fact that
it does not need to be consciously regulated by a plan, thereby avoiding the need for
coercion of individuals by state or bureaucracy. However, Hayek is not opposed to
government intervention per se; only to that which would interfere with the free
working of the market, for example, if government were to intervene to prop up an
ailing business. But Hayek is a keen supporter of the rule of law, thus legislation
which applies to all producers, without favouring one group over another, is
acceptable.
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a free system does not exclude on principle all those general regulations of
economic activity which can be laid down in the form of general rules
specifying conditions which everybody who engages in a certain activity must
satisfy. They include, in particular, all the regulations governing the
techniques of production. (Hayek, 1960, p. 224)
It would, therefore, be incorrect to view the transition from producing consumer
research and information, to lobbying for government regulation in favour of the
consumer, as in any sense a radicalisation of the consumer movement, or a move away
from the ideology of the free market. The forms of government regulation urged by
the consumer movement in fact serve to strengthen market relations by reinforcing the
claimed legitimacy of commodity production. The appearance of 'fair' exchange, the
production of high quality goods and services, environmental protection, and legal
redress for faulty goods, can all be contrasted with the absence of such mechanisms in
the former Soviet Union, in order to support the claim that the free market is superior
to social & economic planning.
The consumer movement can lobby government to encourage it to tighten the legal
framework in which the market operates, and thereby obtain marginal benefits for the
consumer. But ultimately this can only strengthen the efficiency and legitimacy of the
market mechanism. According to its own internal logic consumerism cannot
challenge the basic principle of the market; that the production and distribution of
goods and services are regulated by the law of value rather than by conscious social
and economic planning. It is this acceptance of market relations that limits
consumerism's emancipatory potential, because no matter how effective consumerism
becomes, it can never empower people to satisfy their needs by exercising direct
control over the production and distribution of goods and services.The internal logic
of the category is based upon the assumption that the production and distribution of
goods and services is best governed by the market mechanism, rather than by
democratic social planning. Thus, although consumerism may enable people to
express their preferences by exercising their right of exit, (i.e. by refusing to purchase
particular products), the potential for obtaining a more fundamental form of economic
emancipation or empowerment is effectively capped
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Citizenship
As David Held (1991, p.19) has pointed out, for most of the last two decades,
discussion of 'citizenship' has more often than not arisen in relation to the immigration
question. More recently both left and right have scrambled to rehabilitate the term.
The Conservatives, first with Douglas Hurd's 'active citizen', and then with John
Major's 'Citizens Charter', have invoked the term in an attempt to temper the
individualistic ethos of Thatcherism. Thus, for the Government citizenship not only
confers entitlement to good quality public services, but also the obligation to be a good
neighbour and a public spirited member of the community:
The Citizen's Charter is about giving more power to the citizen. But
citizenship is about our responsibilities - as parents, for example, or as
neighbours - as well as our entitlements. The Citizen's Charter is not a recipe
for more state action, it is a testament of our belief in people's right to be
informed and choose for themselves. (Citizen's Charter, 1991, p.2)
For all the resonance of one nation Toryism to be found in the Conservative
rediscovery of citizenship, there is little practical evidence of a radical departure from
the policies of the 1980's. The entitlement side of citizenship has blended with the
consumerist agenda to become entitlement to good quality services, (for example
trains that run on time, shorter NHS waiting lists), to be brought about by further
privatisation, performance related pay, and new complaints procedures. Whilst, on the
other hand, the duties and obligations of citizenship have amounted to little more than
the substitution of unpaid labour for services that were previously provided by the
state, for example in caring for the elderly.
Whereas the Right attempted to appropriate citizenship as a means of reasserting
social responsibility and countering the claim that the individualistic ethos of the '80s
had weakened the social fabric, the Left have used it to exorcise an altogether different
ghost - that of the Stalinist regimes of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European
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satellites. Again, the image of the dissident demanding his rights from an
undemocratic and authoritarian state is at work here. Citizenship is for certain
sections of the British Left a convenient means of theorising the activities of East
European dissidents, in a fashion which can be brought to bear against western
governments. Thus citizenship was a central concept in the British Communist Party's
attempt to re-define its political project in the pages of its now defunct journal
Marxism Today.
As David Selbourne (1991) has indicated, this sudden conversion to Citizenship is
based upon the claim that western parliamentary democracy amounts to a form of
dictatorship which is essentially the same, (though not as severe), as that exercised in
the former 'Communist' bloc. For Selbourne, this claim is little more than a 'lie'
stemming from political desperation:
...at a time of left frailty, when its projects lie around its feet in political ruins,
and its intellectual pretensions seem to those not on the left to be more suspect
than ever, the burden of truth rests particularly heavily upon the lefts
shoulders as it tries - in any way it can - to resurrect its ideological fortunes.
(Selbourne, 1991, p.91)
Selbourne's analysis has two valuable elements: first, that demands and forms of
activity which have grown up in opposition to Stalinist regimes cannot simply be
transposed to the struggle against the capitalist state; clearly the two social formations
are quite different. Secondly, that the attempt to do so is an act of political and
theoretical desperation that cannot be achieved within a recognisably Marxian
framework.
Unfortunately Selbourne is not content to leave his argument there, and in his attempt
to atone for his own youthful dalliance with Marxism, by burying the Marxist project
entirely, he becomes increasingly ahistorical and contradictory. For example,
'Marxist' becomes a catch all category that can be applied consistently to anyone who
lays claim to it, irrespective of their political position or historical location. This
enables Selbourne to perform an intellectual sleight of hand. Having exposed the
opportunism of those who would claim Citizenship for a renewed Marxist project, he
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generalises this observation to all the diverse strands of Marxist theory and practice,
implying that the entire Marxist project can be despatched by reference to the
revisionism of a handful of British 'Communists'.
This is a contradictory position for Selbourne to hold, having indicated earlier that he
sees the appropriation of Citizenship as a departure from Marxism, rather than a
revision of it. However, his final argument is yet more contradictory. Having
correctly severed the link between Citizenship and Marxism, and noting the
inappropriateness of importing Eastern European campaigns for Citizens rights into a
bourgeois democratic context, Selbourne goes on to argue, not that these so called
Marxists should abandon the politics of Citizenship, but that Citizenship really would
possess emancipatory potential in a Western democratic context, if only it could be
purged of Marxist or even socialist influences.
Selbourne's analysis tells us much about the degeneration of the New Left of the
1970's and 80's, which by his own admission he is a lapsed member of. Ironically
though, in attempting to distance himself from his former colleagues, he only
succeeds in revealing their shared trajectory towards bourgeois liberalism, and the role
that Citizenship plays in that progress.
Arguably, Selbourne's ideal of a Citizenship stripped of any socialist pretensions, has
already been recognised in the Charter 88 movement, founded 300 years after the
'glorious revolution' of 1688. Again the spectre of Stalinism is at work, with Britain's
Chartists drawing their inspiration from the dissident civic movements of Eastern
Europe, particularly Vaclav Havel's Charter 77 movement in Czhekoslovakia.
However, unlike the British Communist Party, the Chartists make no attempt to
harness Citizenship to a broader socialist agenda. As with their Eastern European
counterparts the Chartists seek to change the relationship between the state and the
individual by constitutional reform. These reforms include: civil liberties enshrined in
a Bill of Rights, freedom of information, electoral reform, democratic government,
and a written Constitution. (Charter 88, 1991)
The absence of any economic dimension to the Charter has made it particularly
attractive to the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, who have added many of its
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demands to their respective manifestos. However, unlike its eastern European
equivalent, Charter 88 has failed to obtain mass support, and remains an instrument by
which its liberal intellectual membership can lobby the establishment Parties.
As we have noted above, this failure to attach citizenship to a popular movement is
also true of Conservative and New Left attempts to appropriate the category.
However, the same cannot be said of the New Social Movements many of which have
successfully built support for elements of the Citizenship agenda within their own
constituencies. For example, the women's movement, anti-racism, gay rights and
more recently the disability movement, have successfully mobilised grass roots
support in their campaigns for equality before the law, equal opportunities, and anti-
discrimination legislation.
Citizenship in the 1990's is then, a contested category to which an apparently disparate
range of groups lay claim. But what are the differences between these alternative
claims, and do they share a common denominator? Again these questions can only be
answered by historical and theoretical analysis. The most influential attempt to provide
a sociological account of Citizenship is found in the work of T H Marshall,
particularly his Citizenship and Social Class (1950).
Marshall argues that Citizenship is fundamentally concerned with the rights and
responsibilities associated with membership of a common society. The nature of these
rights and responsibilities varies between societies and over time, however, in the
western democracies the notion of equality has been a key element. Marshall
identifies three aspects of Citizenship: civil rights, in which the freedom of the
individual is protected by the rule of law, political rights in which the development of
parliamentary institutions facilitates participation in the exercise of political power,
and social citizenship which includes:
the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life
of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society. (Marshall,
1950, p.11)
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According to Marshall, the three elements of Citizenship were linked during the feudal
period but developed separately thereafter. Broadly, civil rights evolved during the
eighteenth century as the bourgeoisie established the freedoms associated with
capitalist production. Political rights emerged during the nineteenth-century in
response to working class pressure, but the working class were unable to wield the
political power delivered by the nineteenth-century Reform Acts, and so developed the
trade union movement to press for social rights that emerged in the form of the welfare
state during the twentieth century.
The development of civil rights facilitated the growth of capitalism by challenging the
ascribed status of the aristocracy under feudalism, and leaving all citizens 'free' to
enter into market relations. However, the development of political and particularly
social rights increasingly brought the egalitarian principle of citizenship into conflict
with the essentially unequal nature of social class on which capitalism is based.
Marshall is not suggesting that this conflict can or even should be resolved. Social
citizenship cannot totally remove class inequality, however, it can reduce the scope of
its operation, for instance by removing ability to pay as a criterion for access to
education or healthcare.
The value of Marshall's analysis, is that it reveals citizenship as an historically
developing category, (in fact three categories), associated with the interests of different
social groups and the development of specific institutions. Moreover he demonstrates
that the egalitarian principle of citizenship must eventually be constrained by, or at
least come into conflict with, class inequality. The great failing of Marshall's
approach is that it is based upon an uncritical conceptualisation of the state as simply
the repository of rights, independent of class relations. As we shall see, this is not the
case, and the institutionalisation of rights in the state-form involves both a gain and a
loss for the working class. However, for this analysis we must turn to Marx.
For Marx genuine power resided in control of the means of production. Under
capitalism the mass of the population is alienated from such control, and is, therefore
incapable of exercising genuine power. The rights of citizenship enshrined in the
institutions of the state are a manifestation of this alienation, giving an appearance of
equality and freedom to a system that is essentially based on inequality and the
powerlessness of the masses.
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The state does away with difference in birth, class, education, and profession
in its own manner when it declares birth, class, education, and profession to
be unpolitical differences, when it summons every member of the people to an
equal participation in popular sovereignty without taking the differences into
consideration, when it treats all elements of the people's real life from the
point of view of the state. Nevertheless the state still allows private property,
education and profession to have an effect in their own manner, that is as
private property, as education, as profession, and make their particular
natures felt. Far from abolishing these factual differences, its existence rests
on them as a presupposition, it only feels itself to be a political state and
asserts its universality by opposition to these elements. (Marx, 1843, pA-5)
And again,
When the political state has achieved its true completion man leads a double
life, a heavenly one and an earthly one, not only in thought and consciousness
but in reality, in life. He has a life both in the political community, where he is
valued as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a
private individual, treats other men as means, degrades himself to a means,
and becomes the plaything of alien powers. (Marx, 1843, p.46)
In this sense, the pursuit of rights through the state apparatus is inevitably
contradictory; on one hand it may confer greater access to resources, but on the other
hand it must also reinforce the legitimacy of the state and alienation from the means of
genuine social power. This applies not just to civil and political citizenship, to use
Marshall's terminology, but also to the social element. For example, obtaining the
right to free education and healthcare might well, as Marshall suggests, reduce the
realm of inequality by giving the masses greater access to vital resources, but it also
transforms the struggle for genuine social power into calls for ever greater state
intervention.
Marx was not suggesting that citizens rights were illusory, or that they were not worth
having, but simply that they could never go far enough and that genuine emancipation
depended on more fundamental structural change:
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Political emancipation is of course a great progress. Although it is not the
final form of human emancipation in general, it is nevertheless the final form
of human emancipation inside the present world order. (Marx, 1843, p.47)
But what do the insights of Marx and Marshall tell us about citizenship in the 1990's?
First, that citizenship is essentially concerned with reforming the state apparatus, and
in fact that the state is the condition of existence for citizenship. This dependence on
the state limits the emancipatory potential of citizenship because the state itself is a
manifestation of the masses alienation from genuine social power, and also because
the state is unlikely to introduce reforms that might significantly interfere with the
accumulation of capital, for example, the recent Disabled People's Civil Rights Bill
was dismissed on the grounds that it would entail costs to industry. Thus, where the
emancipatory potential of consumerism was found to be limited by its incorporation of
alienation in the form of market relations, citizenship is found to be constrained by a
self-limiting internal logic based on the alienation inherent in the state-form.
The above points were true in Marx's time and remain so today. There is however, a
fundamental difference between the citizenship described by Marx and Marshall, and
that which currently prevails. We know from Marshall's historical analysis that
citizenship has previously entailed an ascendant class attempting to use the state
apparatus as a means of improving its position in relation to a dominant class, for
example, in the 18th and 19th centuries the bourgeoisie used citizenship as a means of
wresting power from the Aristocracy, whilst in the late 19th and 20th centuries the
extension of citizenship represented the state's response to working class pressure.
Clearly this is no longer the case in Britain where none of the new advocates of
citizenship can claim mass support. Instead citizenship has become for the most part a
minority interest.
This change in the social nature of citizenship has robbed the category of any clearly
discernible political imperative, with the result that it can be appropriated by almost
anyone. Thus the Government, lapsed Communists, petit bourgeois Chartists and the
disability movement can all lay claim to citizenship either to atone for old policies or
to legitimate new ones.
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Self-Help
As with the categories discussed above, self-help appears to be a politically ambiguous
concept, evoking both right and left wing libertarianism. In the latter this comprises a
critique of the state as an instrument of class domination, whilst the former reflects a
much broader anti-collectivism and a reiteration of bourgeois individualism and
morality. Suspicion of state intervention would superficially appear to be a common
theme of both, however, since the late 1970's central government and Local Authority
Social Service Departments have increasingly sought involvement in the facilitation of
self-help initiatives. In fact different self-help initiatives can be classified according to
their relative independence from the state.
Self-help initiatives also vary according to their point of intervention; some are
concerned with the self improvement of the individual, for example through education
or moral instruction, whereas others are more concerned with the identification of
common problems and the organisation of collective action to overcome them. Self-
help initiatives can, therefore, be modelled along two continua: their relative
autonomy from the state, and their point of intervention between the individual and
society. Unfortunately, such a model cannot represent the tensions and contradictions
that exist within phenomena and the extent to which they are transformed over time.
For example, it could be argued that historically the state has pursued a dual strategy
of subordinating autonomous/social self-help initiatives to regulation and control,
whilst simultaneously encouraging the voluntary sector to develop semi-
autonomous/individualistic self-help initiatives, in order to reduce demand for more
expensive statutory services.
These tensions or contradictions can be traced back to the nineteenth-century. It is
obviously a methodological error to ascribe causality to a text, or even to see it as a
summary of the dominant ideological themes of a given period. Even so, two
particular texts can add to our understanding of the emergence of the ideological
theme of self-help in the nineteenth-century. First, Samuel Smiles' Self Help, (1859),
secondly, Peter Kropotkin's Mutual Aid, (1901, but based on articles written during
the 1880's and '90's).
Smiles' work contains many themes from Victorian liberalism and laissez faire
economics, for instance, the suggestion that economic success, (both personal and
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national), is dependent upon the inner resources of the individual, and that assistance
by the state can only render the individual incompetent:
The spirit of self-help is the root of all genuine growth in the individual; and,
exhibited in the lives of many, it constitutes the true source of national vigour
and strength. Help from without is often enfeebling in its effects, but help from
within invariably invigorates. Whatever is done men or classes, to a
certain extent takes away the stimulus and necessity of doing for themselves;
and where men are subjected to over guidance and over government, the
inevitable tendency is to render them comparatively helpless. (Smiles, 1859.
P. 1)
Thus Smiles' book comprises a series of mini-biographies of eminent men, in the
hope that readers will seek to emulate their virtues of self-improvement, enterprise and
thrift. From this it might be deduced that Smiles' self-helping individual is in some
way the practical arm of citizenship; a forebear of Douglas Hurd's 'active citizen'.
However, Smiles' approach includes a critique of parliamentary democracy that is
almost Leninist in its vigour:
To constitute the millionth part of a Legislature, by voting for one or two men
once in three or five years, however conscientiously this duty may be
peiformed, can exercise but little active influence upon any mans life and
character. Moreover, it is every day becoming more clearly understood, that
the function of Government is negative and restrictive, rather than positive and
active; being resolvable principally into protection - protection of life, liberty
and property. (Smiles, 1859, p.2)
Like Marx, Smiles recognised the way in which the state-form reduces personal
freedom and limits human potential, but unlike Marx, he was incapable of
conceptualising a collective alternative. Although Smiles did not object to mutual aid,
this was essentially a basis for individual advancement within the existing social and
economic order, rather than a means of overthrowing it.
Kropotkin was equally critical of the state, though for different reasons. Where Smiles
saw the state as a threat to personal initiative and enterprise, Kropotkin was concerned
at the extent to which the rise of the modern state had eroded the social cohesion and
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mutual support that he believed were characteristic of small village communities
during the medieval period. In writing his book Mutual Aid, Kropotkin sought to
challenge the claims of social Darwinism which implied that the process of natural
selection which Darwin theorised as the driving force of evolution, could be applied to
human relations, thereby naturalising the existing order, which it was argued was
based on competition and the survival of the fittest. Kropotkin aimed to debunk this
myth by revealing the role played by co-operation, both in the process of evolution and
in the development of human relations. Progress depended on overthrowing the
existing order and returning to the fraternal social relations that had characterised
earlier societies. Kropotkin saw the re-emergence of mutual aid in the cohesion of
'slum' neighbourhoods and the growing number of friendly societies and trade unions:
neither the crushing powers of the centralised state nor the mutual hatred
and pitiless struggle which come, adorned with the attributes of science, from
obliging philosophers and sociologists, could weed out the feeling of human
solidarity, deeply lodged in men's understanding and heart, because it has
been nurtured by all our preceding evolution. What was the outcome of
evolution since its earliest stages cannot be overpowered by one of the aspects
of that same evolution. And the need of mutual aid and support which had
lately taken refuge in the narrow circle of the family, or the slum neighbours,
in the village, or the secret union of workers, reasserts itself again, even in our
modern society, and claims its right to be, as it has always been, the chief
leader towards further progress. (Kropotkin, 1901, p.284)
We might scoff at Kropotkin's romantic anti-modernism and his essentialist claims
concerning human nature, but his analysis does highlight what might be termed the
collectivist strand of nineteenth-century self-help, that is, the ability of oppressed
groups to identify a common problem and collectively struggle against it. Kropotkin
also recognised that the increasing solidarity of the working class was potentially a
threat to the state.
This alternative strand of the self-help tradition is examined in PHJH Gosden's study
of nineteenth-century voluntary associations (Gosden, 1973). Gosden begins his
analysis with an account of the emergence of friendly societies prior to the nineteenth-
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century. The friendly societies offered a range of benefits, including sick pay and
funeral expenses, funded from regular contributions by members.
The idea of workers collectively setting aside part of their income for use in times of
hardship had a double appeal for the ruling classes. First, it was seen as a means of
reducing the cost of poor relief on the wealthy. Gosden cites an anonymous pamphlet
published in 1728 urging magistrates and the governing classes to encourage the
establishment of friendly societies in order to reduce the burden of the poor on the
rates. Secondly, the friendly societies were seen as an extension of liberal notions of
self-help and thrift. For instance, Smiles felt able to support this example of mutual
aid; even defending the fact that many societies held their meetings in public houses
where a proportion of the fund was spent on beer, on the grounds that the social aspect
was a necessary addition to the practical benefits of membership. But this belief in the
benign nature of the growing number of voluntary associations, expressed by Smiles
in 1859, was not shared by members of the ruling classes earlier in the century, many
of whom, with the French revolution fresh in their memories, saw the potential threat
posed by organised labour. Gosden notes:
The attitude of some of the governing and influential groups to friendly
societies was coloured at the opening of this period, by fears of possible
subversion of a revolutionary nature... In an era when the Combination Acts
were regarded as an essential defence against revolutionary upheaval, the
friendly societies seemed to offer an obvious way round the difficulties placed
in the way of combination for trade union purposes. (Gosden, 1973, p.30)
Thus, the ideology of self-help posed much more of a dilemma for the ruling classes,
particularly in the early years of the nineteenth-century, than might initially be
assumed. On one hand notions of individual advancement through enterprise and
thrift, legitimated the position of the capitalist entrepreneur who could claim to have
achieved his success through personal effort and initiative. In addition, the extension
of the self-help principle to mutual aid, promised to reduce the burden of providing for
the poor. However, on the other hand, it was feared that workers who combined to
address their welfare needs might also seek to improve their position by more radical
means.
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This dilemma was resolved by a process of containment and registration, in which
successive governments throughout the nineteenth-century brought the voluntary
associations under greater statutory regulation; whilst at the same time encouraging
their development as financially sound agents of mutual aid.
By the 1930's the nature of mutual aid had substantially changed. The institutional
development of the labour movement had long since diminished the political aspect of
the voluntary associations, and the state was increasingly taking responsibility for
welfare provision, culminating in the establishment of the welfare state in the post war
period. Although this marked the demise of self-help as a mass movement, the
essential components of the perspective re-emerged in a multitude of single issue
support groups.
Alcoholics Anonymous, founded in the United States in 1935, established the model
for this form of voluntary self-help organisation. Since then the number of such groups
has rapidly increased and now includes organisations for: drug addicts, rape victims,
ex-mental patients, the physically disabled, fat people, anorexics, stutterers, short
people, people with eczema (Robinson & Henry, 1977, appendix), in fact it seems that
for virtually any human ailment or adverse experience there is a self-help group in
which members can share their grievances with other victims.
Essentially, such groups aim to provide support or therapy for minority groups whose
needs are not adequately met by the statutory sector. Whereas Smiles had sought to
use the example of successful Victorian men to inspire thrift and personal endeavour
in those seeking social mobility, self-help in its modern manifestation employs the
experiences of ex-alcoholics, ex-drug addicts, ex-mental patients, etc. to restore the
afflicted to 'normality', or at least enable them to accept their alienation. Unlike the
universally applicable key to social mobility envisaged by Smiles, or the basis for
working class solidarity and emancipation advanced in Kropotkin's formulation of
mutual aid, modern self-help has a much narrower focus and substantially lower
expectations. However, although modern self-help groups lack the high aspirations
and universality of their nineteenth-century equivalent they are firmly rooted in the
same self-help/mutual aid ideology. Thus in their attempt to account for the recent
growth in the number of self-help groups Robinson and Henry (1977) espouse an anti-
modernism and romantic nostalgia for the 'good old days' of social cohesion, that
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almost exactly mirrors the views expressed by Prince Kropotkin in the above
quotation:
There is a growing rejection of a society that demands that unsupported
individuals ought to be 'successful' and socially, psychologically, and
emotionally competent. The erosion of the family and religion, while justified
by an ideology that stresses the importance of the individual and his freedom
to make his own unfettered choices, is producing a population of rootless
people who are unsure about how to cope or how to fulfil themselves. In this
situation of 'cultural rudderlessness', with traditional forms of security
missing, self-help groups are held to be one aspect of the attempt to grope
toward a replacement and redefinition of the meaning of life. (Robinson &
Henry, 1977, p.1 1)
Much here is resonant of Kropotkin, but it is worth noting that this account of mutual
aid is based on a reinterpretation of collectivism that the Prince would have found
alarming. Rather than a means by which working people can organise to amplify their
individual powers and bring about radical social and economic change, collectivism is
reduced to a kind of psychological prop in the absence of which individuals lose their
social, psychological and emotional competence.
As well as the pull of mutual support, modern self-help groups are also pushed by
dissatisfaction with statutory services; both the quantity of services and the way in
which they are delivered. Robinson and Henry (1977) note that many of the
participants in self-help initiatives express a virulent anti-professionalism, particularly
towards the medical profession. This anti-professionalism is often matched by a
subjectivist approach to social and personal problems, according to which only fellow
sufferers can understand, and therefore help, the afflicted.
The origins of this tendency are easy to identify in people's everyday encounters with
welfare agencies. Whilst many are obliged to enter into a relationship with the state in
order to gain access to resources, such as, housing, healthcare, benefits, etc., these
resources are often quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate, and recipients have no
control over their production and distribution. Moreover, access to these resources
does not come without strings attached. In order to gain access to services recipients
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are obliged to expose themselves to surveillance and disciplining by welfare
professionals; which further increases their feelings of powerlessness and dependence.
In the light of this the desire to turn away from statutory services and organise a
collective alternative with the support of fellow sufferers can be understood.
However, the subjectivist tendency that this gives rise to cannot be considered
progressive. First, because it takes the inadequacy of statutory services out of its
social and economic context and places it in an epistemological one. Rather than
being the product of inadequate funding and lack of democratic control, the failings of
the welfare state are explained in terms of the inability of others to understand the
subjective experiences of those in need, which it is argued leads to professional
insensitivity and paternalism. Secondly, the subjectivist perspective is inherently
fragmentary. Tabloid jokes about one legged black lesbians may be distasteful, but
they do indicate the trajectory of subjectivist movements towards endless sub-
division, the ultimate destination of which is the isolated individual left alone with
his/her subjective experiences which according to subjectivist logic only s/he can
comprehend.
From the subjectivist perspective there is no such thing as objective need which can be
collectively identified and satisfied by social planning, and there is, therefore, little
point in engaging in attempts to change the existing social formation. The only viable
strategy left is to accept one's alienation and seek solace in the company of fellow
sufferers. Gartner and Reisman (1977), in describing the characteristics of Alcoholics
Anonymous, identify the inward looking perspective of many self-help initiatives:
..the focus on behaviour; the attention to symptoms; the importance of the role
of the group and the value of the knowledge and experience of the old timers'
(long time members); and the viewing of the problem as chronic (the alcoholic
is viewed as never being cured). (Gartner & Riessman, 1977, p.2'7)
The defeatism inherent in this orientation is highlighted by Robinson and Henry:
Concentration on individuals and their problems is, of course, an essential
feature of the self-help process. It is the basis upon which sharing and project
work can begin to displace the problem and construct a more bearable life.
But it means as well that self-help groups rarely explicitly focus their attention
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on any broader structural features of the shared situation in which they find
themselves. (Robinson & Henry, 1977, p.126)
Up to now we have characterised modern self-help groups as anti-professional and
independent of the state. Whilst this may be true of the ideology of self-help groups
and a reflection of the views of many of their participants it is increasingly not the case
in practice. As Gartner and Reisman (1977) point out, although self-help groups are
often hostile to professionals and statutory agencies, many of them are established by
or receive funding from the statutory sector. For example, in Britain the Government's
commitment to 'welfare pluralism', (manifest in the policies of Care in the Community
from the mid 1980's onwards), led to the establishment of a number of national
institutions to fund and co-ordinate the development of self-help initiatives (Humble,
1989).
Many Social Workers based in Local Authority Social Service Departments are also
involved in instigating and participating in self-help initiatives. Helping others to help
themselves is viewed as a move away from paternalism and the limitations of the
traditional social work model. However, as Adams (1990) has noted, their
involvement may have negative consequences:
The more effective self help activities become, the more they are at risk of co-
option by professionals. Self appointed experts, media personalities,
researchers, writers and practitioners in many fields appear from time to time,
riding on the backs of self helpers. Professionals can make only a limited
contribution to self help endeavours before they begin to take over and reduce
other people's belief in their ability to break out of constraints and take control
of their own circumstances. (Adams, 1990, p.118)
There is then a strong tendency for the relationship between social workers and self-
help groups to reproduce the relationship between existing statutory services and their
recipients, that is, dependence on professional expertise and resources and a
consequent loss of autonomy and self determination on the part of the volunteers.
In conclusion, although the modern manifestation of self-help shares a common
ideological core with its nineteenth-century equivalent, in practice the two phenomena
are quite different. This becomes apparent when their conditions of existence are
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examined. Nineteenth-century self-help may have had one foot in the laissez faire
liberalism of Smiles, and the other in the anti-modernism of Kropotkin, but its most
important practical manifestation was based on neither the free market as a means of
social mobility, nor a return to pre industrial social relations. Instead it depended on
the emergence of a class of autonomous wage labourers whose welfare needs were
not fulfilled by crumbling feudal ties, or by the welfare state of the future. In this
vacuum members of the working class had little option but to collectively set aside
part of their surplus against future hardship, and in so doing entered into forms of
organisation that possessed substantial political potential.
The modern manifestation of self-help is dependent upon a different set of social
imperatives. Whereas the voluntary associations of the nineteenth-century had a class
base, the modern equivalent is organised around the grievances of a diverse range of
single issue groups, whose only common denominator is a belief that their needs are
not adequately satisfied by statutory welfare agencies. Superficially this adds a radical
gloss of anti-professionalism and opposition to welfare state paternalism, to the
traditionally conservative ideology of self-help. However this radical appearance is
only skin deep; masking a movement whose social character is essentially
conservative. This essential conservatism stems not just from the fragmentary
composition of the movement, but also from its adoption of a subjectivist
epistemology which renders it politically harmless. In addition, the claimed anti
professionalism and critique of welfare paternalism is largely rhetorical, in practice
many self-help groups are dependent on the state for financial support and are
increasingly reliant on the input of welfare professionals. Rather than posing a threat
to the welfare state, the new self-help groups offer an opportunity to transfer
responsibility for welfare provision from increasingly costly statutory bodies to the
voluntary sector whilst maintaining surveillance and control through professional
regulation. Thus the condition of existence for the modern self-help movement is a
welfare state whose services are insensitive to the needs of many of its clients, and
which is going through a process of restructuring to save costs.
In the nineteenth-century the conservative strands of the self-help ideology cloaked a
movement which was potentially progressive; in the twentieth century a radical variant
of the same ideology masks a movement which is essentially conservative. The form
taken by modern self-help initiatives may have been largely determined by the
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relationship of alienation that prevails between professionals and their clients under
the welfare state, but unlike consumerism and citizenship, it is not the internalisation
of structural relations that gives self-help a self-limiting internal logic, but the
adoption of a subjectivist epistemology. From this perspective knowledge becomes a
means of differentiating the individual and 'fellow sufferers' from the rest of society,
rather than a way of creating the kind of shared inter-subjectivity required for a broad
based emancipatory struggle. The assumption appears to be that our particular needs
and preferences can never be understood by others, which in effect denies the
possibility of social solidarity and collective action. As we shall see, this is also a
characteristic of the form of empowerment described in chapter five.
Community Participation and Community Development
Community participation and community development are sufficiently different to be
treated as discrete phenomena. However, both are grounded in the ideology of
community, and it is important to address this theme in its own right before turning to
the associated categories of participation and development.
In its most neutral sense 'community' is little more than a generic term describing the
people of a district, or, those with common interests (Williams, 1988, pp.'75-76).
Unfortunately, since at least the beginning of the nineteenth-century 'community' has
also been the bearer of a more ideological meaning. As Robert Nisbet (1966) has
noted, the emergence of community as a sociological category, (during this period),
had much to do with the conservative backlash against the enlightenment and the
social changes that accompanied it.
The enlightenment had challenged the belief that social relations should be regulated
by tradition, or, by irrational concepts, such as: kinship, religion or monarchy. In
modern society the individual would be free to choose which relations s/he entered
into. This would be governed by contract in accordance with natural justice. Initially,
this belief in the sovereignty of the individual, unfettered by traditional obligations or
duties, fitted well with the expansion of industrial capitalism, with its dependence on a
free labour market. But, by the beginning of the nineteenth-century, enthusiasm for
the enlightenment project had turned into fear of the consequences of modernity.
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Industrialisation had been accompanied by population migration from small rural
villages to large modern cities, and it was felt that urbanisation had led to the decline
of traditional forms of social control, which in turn might allow political unrest to
blossom.
This fear of atomisation and alienation, that it was felt characterised modern urban
life, led to the rediscovery of 'community' and calls for a reaffirmation of the ties of
family, religion and fellowship. As Nisbet has pointed out, calls for a return to the
mythical village communities of the medieval period were not made exclusively by
conservative commentators; in fact a broad range of politicians, philosophers and
theologians, across the political spectrum expressed similar views. The only
significant dissenting voice was that of Marx who pointed out that traditional village
communities, for example in India, had stifled personal freedom and inhibited human
development.
We must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though
they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism,
that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass,
making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional
rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies......We must not
forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinction of caste
and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of
elevating man to the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-
developing social stage into never changing natural destiny..... (Marx, 1853,
pp.350-35 1)
In spite of Marx's critique, the ideology of community is still referred to in order to
explain both the causes and effects of social malaise. Slum clearance, pit closures and
the development of out of town shopping malls are blamed for the destruction of
'traditional working class communities', and 'the loss of a sense of community' is
blamed for violent crime, joy riding and drug addiction. There is of course
considerable irony in this. Two hundred years ago the rediscovery of community was
prompted by the rise of industrial capitalism and the accompanying population
migration from village to city. Today this process is in reverse, manufacturing
industry is in decline and the working classes are leaving the cities, and yet Bishops,
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politicians and sociologists are still to be found condemning loss of community for the
upward march of crime statistics and other social problems. The only consistent
theme here is that social arrangements that existed in the past are automatically
preferred to those of the present or future.
In his book on middle class perceptions of crime Geoffrey Pearson (1983) identifies a
tendency to view the past as a 'golden age' when houses could be left unlocked, and
people could walk the streets at night without fear of molestation. Each generation
'rediscovers' this golden age locating it before the war, or before the 1960s, or before
1979. The same could be said of the mythical 'sense of community', which throughout
the last two centuries has always existed somewhere in the recent past, slightly out of
reach, but obtainable if we could just turn the clock back a few years.
Calls for a return to the spirit of community, even when made by politicians or the
clergy, rarely go beyond moral exhortation, and the few specific policies that have
emerged tend to be modest in scope, for example, opening the occasional youth club
or community centre, or pedestrianising the high street. However, this is changing and
a consortium of academics, community workers and clergy in the US have
transformed 'Communitarianism' into a detailed political programme comprising a
specific and far reaching set of social policy objectives. The Communitarian agenda is
defined and promoted in Amatai Etzioni's The Spirit of Community (1993).
Like the nineteenth-century advocates of community, Etzioni begins with a description
of social malaise in which atomised individuals and special interest groups pursue
selfish goals by lobbying the state to grant them an increasingly diverse and
fragmentary range of 'rights'. This pursuit of self interest is matched by a lack of
social responsibility, reflecting a concern for personal entitlement and disregard of
obligations to others.
According to Etzioni, this tendency to take from the community without giving back
must inevitably lead to crisis, and it is revealing that he uses an environmental
metaphor to illustrate the point:
Comm unitarians are dedicated to working with our fellow citizens to bring
about the changes in values, habits, and public policies that will allow us to do
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for society what the environmental movement seeks to do for nature: to
safeguard and enhance our future. (Etzioni, 1993, p.3)
This 'shoring up of our moral foundations' is to be achieved by a number of measures,
including: (i) the revival of the family, (for instance, by slowing the divorce
procedure), (ii) moral education, (both in schools and through compulsory national
service for the young), (iii) careful adjustment of individual rights which have negative
consequences for public health and safety, (for example, the introduction of random
sobriety checks to catch drink drivers), (iv) limiting the ability of vested interests to
buy political influence, and, (v) a moratorium on the minting of new rights that might
be socially divisive, or, devalue the currency of existing rights.
It has been suggested that Communitarianism is nothing more than moral
majoritarianism repackaged in a form that is acceptable to Etzioni's liberal audience
(D'Antonio, 1994, p.16). But Etzioni is not advocating a wholesale return to what he
sees as the coercive and oppressive forms of moral regulation that prevailed in the
1950's. Instead, the communitarians argue that their reforms will generate a 'change of
heart' amongst the American people, that will facilitate the informal regulation of
public morality and thereby lessen the need for state intervention:
The best way to minimise the role of the state, especially its policinR role, is to
enhance the communit'9 and its moral voice. If most of us, most of the time,
observed the speed limit, especially near schools and where children play,
there would be much less need for police. If we basically paid our share of the
taxes due, there would be less need for IRS agents and auditors. If divorced
fathers paid agreed-upon amounts of child support, there would be no need for
the state to go after them. There are always some who violate what is right,
and hence the state is unlikely to wither away, at least until very far reaching
and fundamental changes occur in human nature. (Etzioni's emphasis).
(Etzioni, 1993, pA4)
The Communitarian agenda has not gone unchallenged, but many critics of the
movement have concentrated on questioning specific proposals such as restricting
divorce, (D'Antonio, 1994, p.16), without addressing the broader theoretical basis of
the approach. This is a mistake because the detailed proposals could be changed or
even abandoned according to public opinion, but leaving the ideological basis of the
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movement intact. To understand Communitarianism we must begin by asking what
problem it sets out to solve, Etzioni states his problematic as the tendency for
Americans in the 1990's to have a strong sense of entitlement, but a very weak sense
of social responsibility or moral duty, leading to social problems. The widespread
appeal of Etzioni's approach is that he accounts for this tendency by synthesising a
right-wing moral panic with its left-wing equivalent:
In the 1960s we went way too far with psychological self-interest.... Then in the
1980s it was greed; then Freud ran amok, and Adam Smith. lam suggesting a
third way that reminds us we are all brothers and sisters, but we can't wait for
government to take care of us. We all must sacrifice, take care of our
responsibilities, do our share. (Etzioni, 1994, p.1 6)
Thus Etzioni tips his hat in two directions. First, he raises the spectre of the '1960s';
(this is an important moral panic for modern conservatism as it evokes images of
promiscuity, civil unrest, the counter culture, welfare dependency, progressive
educational policy et cetera). Secondly, Etzioni makes use of a more recent moral
panic concerning the monetarist policies and economic individualism of the '1980s',
that evokes equally strong images of welfare cuts, unemployment, and widening social
inequality. That Etzioni is able to weld together both ideological themes into an
apparently consistent approach which appeals to both left and right is a remarkable
political feat. However, this synthesis can only be achieved by abandoning any
attempt at a sociological analysis, and returning to moralistic explanations of human
behaviour.
Thus Etzioni makes no attempt to explain either the '1960s' or the '1980s' by reference
to economic forces or structural arrangements, instead he explains both phenomena in
terms of poor moral choices on the part of the individual. Superficially this enables
Etzioni to present himself as the voice of liberal moderation: hence, he does not reject
the challenge to authority that he believes characterised the 1960s, nor does he reject
the pursuit of economic self interest under the free market capitalism of the 1980's,
rather, according to Etzioni, the problem is that both tendencies simply went too far,
and the reason that they went too far was that the rigid and sometimes
discriminatory/oppressive forms of moral regulation and civic duty that were
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justifiably challenged during the 1960s were not subsequently replaced by a new order
of Communitarian values:
The problem is that the waning of traditional values was not followed by a
solid affirmation of new values; often nothing filled the empty spaces that were
left when we razed existing institutions. The result is rampant moral confusion
and social anarchy. (Etzioni, 1993, p.24)
Although this reduction of social phenomena to the level of personal morality is
politically convenient its explanatory range is lamentably short. For instance, Etzioni
ascribes a great deal of explanatory power to the supposed challenge to the old moral
order during the 1960s, but how does he account for this challenge? Did a generation
of Americans simply wake up on the morning of the 1960s with a commitment to
cultural revolution mysteriously embedded in their consciousness?
The explanatory weakness of Etzioni's approach undermines even his more accurate
observations. For example, he notes disdainfully, that minority groups and individuals
increasingly pursue their interests in the form of 'rights', or more precisely, through
litigation claiming the infringement of such rights. He cites (amongst others) the
example of death-row inmates who sued to protect their reproductive rights through
artificial insemination, and a New York mother who sued her son's High School for
failing to admit him to the school's honour society, on the grounds that such exclusion
would damage his future prospects and was, therefore, a violation of his rights.
Etzioni correctly notes that the pursuit of an ever growing range of such 'rights' is
problematic; it devalues the currency of existing rights and may increase state
oppression, for example when pressure-groups seek to use constitutional reform as a
means of silencing people whose views they find offensive. However, although
Etzioni's observations may be accurate in these instances, he is not able to account for
the social divisions and economic contradictions that give rise to such claims, nor,
why it is that they are articulated in the form of rights. The absence of any
sociological understanding of the 'rights' phenomenon leads Etzioni to see it as a
question of personal morality; of people expecting their needs to be met as a 'right',
but not recognising their responsibility for meeting the needs of others.
Ii fact, this apparent blindness to the reality of genuine structural and economic
divisions within society is characteristic not just of Communitarianism, but of middle
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class paternalism generally. Rather than recognising their sociological and economic
origins, social problems are reduced to moral fecklessness, usually on the part of the
working classes, but occasionally amongst avaricious capitalists who allow the pursuit
of profit to override their civic responsibilities, or public servants who are insensitive
to the needs of their clients. The unspoken implication is always the same: 'if only
everyone else were a little more civilised, a little less selfish, a little more moral, a
little more public spirited, in fact a little more like the liberal intelligentsia'.
This is the nub of the problem with Communitarianism, not simply that it proposes a
few reactionary social policies, for instance limiting divorce, or introducing sobriety
checks, such proposals could easily be modified or even abandoned, but rather that it
fundamentally rebuts the project of gaining a sociological understanding of social
problems and replaces it with moral sanction. Thus personal morality is seen as the
panacea for all social ills, and social policy is simply seen as a means of rebuilding
this moral outlook, rather than a direct means of changing social relations. More
specifically, such an approach posits the state, in the guise of the welfare professional,
as a moral guardian, responsible for regulating the inter-personal relations of an
amoral populous. As we shall see, this phenomenon arises in the mode of
empowerment discussed in chapter five.
Both the nineteenth-century advocacy of 'community-spirit' and its modem equivalent
are based on the belief that social ties have been eroded by modernity. However, the
solution to the consequent social malaise is defined in terms of personal moral
rehabilitation, and overlooks the economic contradictions and structural divisions that
lie behind the fragmentation and alienation inherent in contemporary society.
Community may simply be used as a generic term for the people of a district, but, it
may also carry ideological baggage of a conservative nature. This ideological baggage
has consequences for both community-participation and community-development,
because both can entail assisting the agencies of the state in the administration and
moral regulation of everyday life, without enabling people to take direct control over




At face value community participation is such a broad category that it is theoretically
worthless. However, as Ann Richardson (1983) points out, since the late 1960s the
term has acquired a more specific usage that refers to the direct involvement of
citizens in the government and management of statutory services. Richardson locates
the rationale for community participation in the growth of the welfare state and the
belief that electoral representation through Parliament and local government is too
remote to ensure that services are responsive to the needs of service users.
Some participatory initiatives have developed in response to pressure from service
users, and many pressure groups and voluntary organisations have successfully
lobbied for a greater involvement in service planning and decision making. However,
here we are concerned with formal arrangements for community participation
established by the state. There are few areas of social policy in which participatory
mechanisms have not been introduced. Many of these were established during the
1970s, for example Community Health Councils were introduced in the 1974
reorganisation of the National Health Service, and arrangements for lay participation
in the provision of public sector housing, education and social services were also
introduced during this decade. Since the late l980s further initiatives have been
introduced, for example, facilitating greater parental involvement in the management
of state schools, and allowing council tenants to take responsibility for the
management of their estates. Before looking more closely at actual examples of
community participation it is important to obtain a conceptual grasp of the category
and the contradictions that exist within it.
Community participation can be theoretically unpacked in a number of ways; a useful
starting point is Sherry Arnstein's 'Ladder of Participation' (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein
suggests that different types of participatory initiative can be identified and ranked
according to the amount of power they confer on the participant, and proposes the
following typology or 'ladder':
8. CITIZEN CONTROL	 )




4. CONSULTATION	 ) Degrees of tokenism
3. INFORMING	 )
2. THERAPY	 ) Non-participation
1. MANIPULATION	 )
The first two types: manipulation and therapy, refer to programmes which seek either
to gain the support of community representatives for decisions that have already been
taken by politicians or bureaucrats, or else attempt to alleviate social problems by
changing the behaviour of members of the community, for example, housing
programmes in which tenants are asked to 'participate' in 'control your child'
campaigns, and are thus distracted from more pressing issues, such as arbitrary
evictions or lack of maintenance.
The next three types: informing, consultation, and placation, constitute varying
degrees of tokenism, in which planning and decision-making agencies enter into a
limited dialogue with the community, but are not obliged to act upon the feedback
they receive. Genuine participation only begins at the sixth rung of the ladder.
Thus, partnership refers to arrangements where citizens have sufficient rights and
resources to influence the decision-making process, although a right of veto is
retained by the state. Delegated power refers to participatory initiatives in which
responsibility for the management of a project is delegated to community
representatives, but in which key guide-lines and budgets are determined in
advance by a statutory agency.
The final rung of Arnstein's ladder is citizen control, in which the planning and
management of a programme is carried out by the community without external
interference. Arnstein gives examples from the US where neighbourhood projects
have been directly funded without the interference of state intermediaries.
Although Arnstein's typology is a useful indicator of the centrality of power to any
evaluation of participatory initiatives, her approach is overly simplistic and can
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be criticised on a number of points. First, Amstein overlooks the difficulty of
ensuring that participants are genuinely representative of the community from which
they are drawn. There are basically two forms of representation: descriptive and
electoral, both of which are problematic. The former refers to attempts to recruit a
body of participants that reflects the composition of the community in terms of class,
gender, race etc. The problem with this approach lies in the fact that the number of
sub-groups in the community is potentially infinite, thus the legitimacy of a
participatory initiative can always be challenged by those groups that are excluded,
(Morone & Marmor, 1983).
The other alternative, electoral representation, is also problematic, because
individuals from powerful groups are more likely to possess the time and resources
necessary to stand for election, with the result that the views of less privileged
groups are excluded from the decision making process (Bates, 1983). As
Schattschneider has suggested:
the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a
strong upper class accent. (Schattschneider, 1960, p.35)
Related to the question of representation is that of co-option. Effective participation
depends upon the extent to which lay representatives have the power to influence
planning and decision making. This demands a close working relationship between
lay participants and statutory agencies. Paradoxically, however, this proximity to
the decision making process can lead lay participants to adopt the agenda, views
and interests of the agency they are dealing with, and lose touch with the
constituency they supposedly represent. There is a danger that lay representatives
become co-opted as unpaid 'managers' and lose their distinctively lay perspective.
Arnstein also overlooks what Steven Lukes (1974) has referred to as the 'third
dimension' of power. Whilst Arnstein recognises that power can operate through
coercion, or, through exclusion of the community's views from the agenda for
debate, she fails to take account of the unconscious exercise of power, in which a
group or community is unaware of its objective interests and, therefore, fails to
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oppose, or even actively participates in, actions that run counter to those objective
interests.
If the community is denied the resources to develop a rational evaluation of its
objective interests, or if those interests are masked by ideological mystification, then
even if the state does confer formal decision making power upon members of the
community the decisions taken are still likely to reflect the interests of the powerful.
Thus, the Education Reform Act (1988) superficially appears to extend parental
choice by enabling schools to opt out of Local Education Authority control.
Funding and curriculum decisions are centrally determined, but management issues
are delegated to a Board of Governors in each school.
According to Arnstein's typology the new arrangements occupy a position near the
top of the participatory ladder as they enable community representatives to take
decisions without the interference of bureaucrats. However, such an analysis
overlooks the current ideological climate and the effect that it is likely to have on the
consciousness of parents and school governors. Since the end of the 1970's
government ministers and the tabloid press have waged a moral crusade against
progressive teaching methods and multi-culturalism, typified in John Major's
address to the 1992 Conservative Party conference in which he called for primary
school teachers to restrict their activities to teaching children to read and write rather
than the politics of race, gender and class. Iii such a climate it is perhaps unlikely
that parents will be able to make an objective assessment of which educational
policies best serve the interests of their children. Thus what appears to be an attempt
to empower the community, may in reality serve to marginalise 'progressives' in the
teaching establishment and use the lay views of parent governors to implement
policies that may not be in everyone's long-term interests.
This is not an argument in favour of bureaucratic control, but an illustration of the
way in which arrangements that formally delegate power to the community, without
providing the economic and intellectual resources needed to develop conscious
awareness of the community's objective interests, can lead to ideological
manipulation.
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Thirdly, Arnstein's typology fails to take account of variations in the scale or scope of
participatory initiatives, or external constraints that limit policy options. Thus, the
state may encourage citizen control of small scale projects that are not likely to lead
to a radical change in existing power relations or structural arrangements. Similarly,
community representatives may be given 'freedom to choose' in situations where the
range of options are severely limited by external constraints, such as limited
funding. By contrast, more significant policy decisions, such as large scale changes
in structure or resource allocation, are unlikely to be delegated to community
representatives and participation is likely to be tokenistic at best.
Arnstein correctly identifies the power to influence planning and decision making as
the key variable by which participatory initiatives can be evaluated, but her analysis
fails to deal adequately with issues of representation, co-option, consciousness of
objective interests, the influence of external constraints, and the scope and scale of
participatory projects. When the above variables are brought into the analysis, the
ladder metaphor becomes inappropriate; suggesting as it does, a linearity between
types, in which one level is automatically preferable to that which precedes it. In
reality no such assumption can be made, for instance, the availability of accurate
information (level 3) concerning an important new policy, may be of greater value
to a community that is conscious of its objective interests, than being invited to
participate in the development of a less significant project (level 6) where the options
are limited by external constraints.
Arnstein is primarily concerned with the 'Model Cities' programmes developed
in the US during the 1960's, however, her typology can be usefully applied to an
evaluation of existing arrangements for community participation in NHS planning
and decision making, if the above variables are also borne in mind.
The following arrangements currently exist for community participation in
NHS planning and decision making: Community Health Councils, lay
representation on Health Authorities and Family Health Service Authorities, and
small scale non-statutory initiatives such as patients councils and health forra. In
addition the Joint Planning structure brings together senior officers from Health and
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Local Authorities with representatives from voluntary sector agencies to plan the
development of some community services.
When Community Health Councils (CHCs) were established by the NHS
Reorganisation Act (1973), Shirley Williams commented that they were:
the strangest bunch of administrative eunuchs any department had yet
foisted on the House, a seraglio of useless and emasculated bodies. (Williams,
1971, p.29)
Certainly their formal powers were, (and continue to be following subsequent
reorganisation), extremely limited. CHCs have the right to be consulted by a District
Health Authority on any proposals for substantial changes in NHS service provision,
and a right of appeal, first to the Regional Health Authority, and finally to the
Secretary of State. In addition, CHCs have the right to visit or inspect any NHS
facility, and to demand information regarding the provision of services.
In practice CHCs have had difficulty in using their powers to achieve substantial
influence over NHS decision-making, (Lee & Mills, 1982). Indeed, it has been
suggested that the power of the CHC lies chiefly in its ability to publicly disclose
sensitive information, and to threaten to delay the implementation of plans via the
lengthy appeals procedure. These limited powers have brought minor victories, most
often in single issue campaigns capable of motivating public support, for example, the
closure of cottage hospitals. However, for the most part CHCs have had difficulty in
influencing the planning process in its early stages, and their limited resources have
constrained their ability to develop counter proposals. To use Arnstein's typology, the
role of the CHC is one of placation rather than genuine participation.
Similarly, CHCs have only a very marginal claim to represent the community, as their
membership is often neither electorally, nor, descriptively representative of the
community. Co-option is also likely to be a problem. When CHCs are invited onto
Health Authority planning teams they are usually represented by their senior officer.
who as a paid professional is vulnerable to the adoption of a managerial perspective,
given that CHCs are not electorally accountable to the community.
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Lay members of health authorities face many of the problems encountered by
their CHC colleagues. They are not electorally or descriptively representative of the
community they serve. Their lack of independent resources and organisational
support leaves them dependent upon senior officers to frame the planning agenda
and compose different decision options. Thus, whilst non-executive members
formally have equal status to their executive colleagues, their position in the
decision making structure and their lack of accountability to the community render
them as little more than unpaid managers; a 'rubber-stamp' for bureaucratic decision
making. The introduction of general management into the NHS from the late 1980s
onwards has moved the role of lay members even further in this direction.
At least superficially, patient councils and health forra appear to possess greater
validity than the formal mechanisms discussed above as they facilitate the direct
participation of service users in, for example, the management of a mental health
day centre or a GP surgery. However, although such arrangements can often make a
substantial input into the management of a facility, they are not able to influence more
important strategic decision making; at best they offer substantial influence over
relatively minor concerns. Similar conclusions could be drawn about the involvement
of voluntary sector representatives in the joint planning mechanism. Although they
are more closely integrated into their constituency, their influence is limited to
relatively mundane issues, hemmed in by external constraints.
Before drawing general conclusions about existing arrangements for community
participation it is worth pausing briefly to consider likely future developments in
this area. Leaving aside the impact of the recent NHS reforms, the development
of techniques which seek to involve the community in the prioritisation or
rationing of services is perhaps the most significant likely development. For
example, the Oregon Formula (Klein, 1991), used limited studies to estimate the
health status of clients following a given medical intervention. Members of the
local community were then asked to rank the health outcomes in order of desirability.
This information was used to rank medical interventions in order of their perceived
utility. Available resources could then be allocated to those procedures that were
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considered to be most beneficial and funding withdrawn from procedures below a
certain point in the ranking.
The Oregon experiment is important because it demonstrates how instrumental
rationality and what appear to be democratic principles can be used to involve
members of the community in actions that are not in their objective interests - rather
than fighting for increased spending on health the residents of Oregon were persuaded
to participate in the rationing of existing resources. It is important to note that calls for
a more rational and democratic form of health care provision are not automatically
progressive.
If we adopt Arnstein's typology of participation, moderated by additional criteria
such as representation, co-option, external constraints, false consciousness, and
scale, then existing arrangements offer very little in the way of genuine
community participation in health sector planning and decision making. To adapt
(or mix) Arnstein's metaphor; there appears to be a glass ceiling halfway up the
ladder of participation which effectively bars the community from exercising
control over significant policy and resource allocation decisions. Whilst citizens
are sometimes able to exercise considerable influence over minor operational issues,
this influence quickly evaporates in proportion to the magnitude or significance of
planning or policy making decisions. Whilst existing arrangements appear to
empower the citizen, in essence they have the opposite effect; reinforcing existing
power relations and structural forms, channelling dissent into mechanisms of
containment, and giving an illusory gloss of democratic legitimacy to a decision
making process that is bureaucratic and professionally dominated.
As with self-help, the conditions of existence for community participation are a
welfare state over which the community has no direct control. However, self-help did
at least emerge in opposition to the statutory agencies, (even if it has since been co-
opted by them). But with community development there is not even the pretence of
opposition to the state, indeed, the internal logic of community participation is entirely
dominated by the state, with members of the community only able to exercise the
limited powers delegated to them by the statutory agencies. Whilst this might allow
for tinkering with the minutiae of everyday service provision, the scope for obtaining
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control over more fundamental aspects of funding and policy, let alone influencing
broader social and economic relations, appears to be non-existent.
• Community Development
The distinction between community development and community participation is
often far from apparent in many of the initiatives that use either label. Both categories
emerged in their modern form during the late 1960's, both refer, (more or less
obliquely), to the ideological theme of community discussed above, and in many
instances lay claim to the same raison d'être - namely the involvement of members of
the community in the resolution of social problems.
Although there are many similarities between the two categories, there is one
fundamental difference; community participation (at least in terms of the definition
given above), is exclusively concerned with bringing service users and other non-
salaried volunteers into the decision making mechanisms of various statutory agencies
and institutions. The form of these mechanisms is determined in advance, and the
scope and range of any delegated power is tightly constrained within structural,
financial and legal limits. Community development projects often amount to little
more than this, but there is nothing within the logic of the community development
model that automatically entails subordination to such constraints. Thus some
campaigns operating at the margins of the community development model have
operated outside of the institutions of the state, and even on the borderline of legality,
for example groups of local residents who have taken direct action to oppose what
they perceive to be adverse planning decisions.
This does not mean that community development initiatives are immune to social,
economic or structural constraints, or that the category is free from internal
contradictions that might undermine its emancipatory potential. What it does mean is
that unlike the modes of empowerment discussed above community development does
not appear to suffer from a self-limiting internal logic. Consumerism can never
transcend the constraints of the market mechanism, citizenship is inevitably limited by
the state-form, self-help by its subjectivist perspective, and community participation
by its reliance on existing institutional arrangements, whilst this does not foreclose the
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possibility of some worthwhile political gains being achieved by such methods, it does
mean that their capacity to overcome the alienation inherent in capitalist production
relations and the state-form is constrained. By contrast, at least at the level of its
internal logic, community development is a structurally, economically, and
epistemologically autonomous category.
This theoretical open endedness does not automatically render community
development a progressive political category, or ensure that it cannot be used by the
state as a means of social control. The transformation of a political category into an
effective form of practice is dependent upon the process of operationalisation or
mediation; which involves the development of: an organisational structure, an agenda
for action, and specific forms of activity. It is here at the level of operationalisation or
mediation that community development is vulnerable. This becomes apparent when
the history of community development is considered.
It was suggested above that community development in Britain emerged in its modern
form towards the end of the 1960's, but its origins lie in the efforts of the British
Colonial Office to transform third world demands for self-government into a means of
facilitating post colonial economic domination.
For the British... community development was an export model, first conceived
in the 1920's by colonial officials and educationalists to compensate for the
shortcomings of the conventional school system in the former British
dependent territories, as a vehicle for the progressive evolution of the peoples
to self government in the context of social and economic change. (Hodge,
1970, pp. 66-7)
T.R. Batten, writing in 1957, gives such a rich account of the origins and function of
community development in the late colonial period that it is worth quoting him at
length. He begins by identifying the founding fathers:
Enthusiasts for community development sometimes speak or write about it as if
it were something entirely new, and they irritate the very many people who feel
that community development is not new, but that its principles were in fact
applied by a multitude of individual government officers and missionaries long
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before anyone had thought of such a term as community development. (Batten,
1957, p.2-3)
Although Batten is an advocate of community development, describing it as a means
by which local communities can 'discuss and define their wants, and then plan and act
together to satisfy them', he is aware that community development might also operate
as a means of domination; he quotes a colonial administrator speaking at a conference
in Cambridge, England in 1948 who describes community development as:
A movement to promote better living for the whole community, with the active
participation and if possible on the initiative of the community, but if this
initiative is not forthcoming, by the use of technique for arousing and
stimulating it in order to secure its active and enthusiastic response to the
movement... It includes the whole range of development activities in the
districts whether these are undertaken b y government or unofficial bodies.
(Batten's emphasis). (Batten, 1957, p.1)
Batten identifies what is perhaps the fundamental contradiction of the community
development model - on one hand it claims to be about people identifying their own
objective needs and working together to meet them, but on the other hand it is also a
means by which vested interests, (in this case an imperial power), can obtain consent
to programmes that may not be in the interests of that community. This contradiction
becomes yet more apparent when Batten describes the problematic of community
development:
to find effective ways of stimulating, helping, and teaching people to adopt
new methods and to learn new skills: methods and skills which are 'better'
than the people's traditional methods and skills because they can help them to
grow more food, have better health, and possess more material 'goods' than
they have previously enjoyed......to help people to adapt their way of life to the
changes they accept, or have imposed upon them..... But as change takes place,
and new ideas are accepted by some but not by others... standards of conduct
tend to become uncertain, the sense of belonging is weakened, and the
community may begin to segment or disintegrate. The effects of this may show
themselves in various ways: in an increase of crime, such as theft; in a
weakening of family relationships; in resistance to traditional authority; in a
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growth of litigation; in a drift to towns; in unwillingness to co-operate for the
common good; and even in a general bewilderment and apathy. The
prevalence of such undesirable symptoms, and a growing awareness of their
cause, have begun to make us realise that to encourage material development
is to tackle only a part of the community problem. It is at least equally
important as change occurs to ensure that the feelin' or spirit of communit y is
not destroyecL (Batten's emphasis). (Batten, 1957, pp.5-6)
The theme of community crisis engendered by rapid social change is redolent of the
communitarianism discussed above, and the perceived need to equip the individual
with the personal skills required to survive under such circumstances, predicts the
account of psychological empowerment given in chapter five. But the community
development that Batten describes is that applied to the third world in the immediate
post war period, and reflects the concerns of the imperial powers at that time. The war
had created a crisis of legitimacy for the imperialist powers, who could no longer
claim the moral authority to 'civilise' the third world. There was particular concern
that the demobilisation of troops recruited from the colonies would lead to unrest and
create a wave of third world nationalism, (Furedi, 1994). In addition, the European
powers were economically in no position to use military force to impose order.
However, in spite of these difficulties the imperative towards greater economic
domination of the third world remained. As the above quotation from Batten indicates
this economic imperative demanded the reconfiguration of traditional forms of
production and consumption.
The problem facing the imperialist powers was how to maintain (and rapidly develop)
its economic domination of the third world, at a time when their moral and military
authority were believed to be exhausted beyond a point where the perceived nationalist
threat could be contained.
We noted above that a similar problem had faced the British ruling class at home
during the nineteenth-century. Rapid industrialisation coupled with the ideological
collapse of traditional methods of regulating social relations, generated the same
problem of how to maintain order in the face of a perceived threat of rebellion.
During the nineteenth-century these fears were articulated through the ideology of
community discussed above, and it is not surprising that faced with what was in many
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respects a similar problem, the post war defenders of imperialism should resort to a
similar ideology. However, history does not repeat itself - during the nineteenth-
century the ideology of community was for the most part rhetorical, (leaving aside a
few small scale experiments such as model communities etc.), but the post-war British
Colonial Office went far beyond this and gave the ideology of community an
operational arm with which it could intervene in the management of social relations -
that operational arm was community development.
From this perspective the community development model can be viewed as a
necessary addition to the imperial arsenal, however, it was not a weapon that could be
deployed without caution. To understand this we must return to the original
contradiction identified by Batten when he noted that community development
referred to both the self organisation of a community in identifying its needs and
striving to meet them, and to attempts by the state or an external agency to govern this
process and give it direction. This does not mean that community development is an
openly contested category, because the state has no interest in such a contest. On the
contrary, for community development to work effectively as an instrument of
ideological domination it must be seen to be about self-government, even though
vested interests are behind the scenes pulling the strings. Failure to perpetuate this
myth must inevitably render a community development programme ineffective as a
means of regulating social relations, again Batten provides an illustration:
communities will build a clinic or a school, not because they want it, but to
stop the community worker worrying them. They try to buy him off as it were,
by providing what he seems to want, but with no intention of altering their
existing ways. Thus it is easier to get them to build a school or a clinic than to
use it or maintain it. [...] all these agencies face the same problem in how to
get tile people to conform to what the government wants if the people
themselves do not really want it too. In such circumstances if the agency
wants quick results it must use pressure and go on using it or the people will
slip back into their old ways. The alternative is community education, but this
is apt to be a slow process, and the temptation to press on with change too fast
is very real. (Batten, 1957, pp. 39-40)
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Batten offers his own solution to this problem arguing that to be effective, community
workers must gain an in depth knowledge of the values, customs and social structure
of the community they are working with, and enable people to identify their own
projects - but there lies the danger. What if the community worker, (to use an
appropriately colonial phrase), 'goes native'? What if rather than pursuing the interests
of his paymaster, the community development worker really does enable a community
to identify its own problems and seek its own solutions? To be effective as an
instrument of ideological domination community development must convince people
that it is a process owned and controlled by themselves, that it is a means by which
they can identify their own needs and design collective strategies in order to meet
them, but at the same time it must ensure that such plans coincide with the interests of
the state. As we shall see, the development of organic links between community
worker and community, and the absence of any self limiting logic within the category
itself, make this a potentially dangerous strategy for the state to pursue. But this is to
anticipate our argument, and we must first return from the third world to examine the
ways in which community development was adapted for use at home.
Marjorie Mayo (1974) has noted that the emergence of community development in
Britain during the 1960's took two forms; first, grass-root initiatives which developed
more or less independently of the state, and secondly, what might be termed state
sponsored community development projects. Cowley et al (1977) suggest that part of
the stimulus for grass roots community development came from dissatisfaction with
the failure of the traditional labour movement to address the concerns of everyday life
outside the work place. The civil rights and anti war movements in the United States
also provided a model for alternative forms of organisation, that had been emulated in
Britain by CND and student protesters. During the late sixties these alternative forms
of organisation began to be applied to community concerns, such as housing and
poverty, giving rise to a range of voluntary organisations, such as claimant's unions,
squatter's groups, and tenant's associations.
Some of these organisations expanded beyond single issue campaigns to address the
broad range of concerns facing a particular community, thereby evolving into a
recognisable community development approach. One such initiative was the Notting
Hill People's Association which existed between 1966 and 1974. OMalley (1977) has
documented the groups experiences. The group managed to gain the support and
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active participation of a substantial number of local residents, in addressing
specifically local issues including: housing, motor way planning, and children's play
areas. A number of benefits accrued from the groups activity: concessions were won
from the Local Authority, self-help play groups were established, as well as a number
of facilities thought to be of benefit to local residents, such as a claimant's union, a
neighbourhood law centre and a community printing press. The organisers of the
group had more radical aspirations, but despite discussion in local workshops and the
establishment of links with a network of other local groups, they failed to achieve
much. O'Malley quotes a paper produced by the Camden Community Workshop
which identifies the central contradiction of community organising, and the desire to
overcome it:
In a very crucial sense there is a tension built into community organising: the
overall perspective is that of social revolution and yet the chosen site of
activity, the localised neighbourhood, is far removed from such a possibility.
This gives a provisional character to the workshop as a form of political work.
In fact it explains the adoption of the name workshop: the word encapsulates
the idea of experimentation, breaking new ground, developing projects
provisional in nature - so the Community Workshop experiments with the
elements of a new politics, encourages the mastering of the task of organising
and presents itself in its practice without the overall political direction a
revolutionary party provides. (Camden Community Workshop, 1972, p.l6'7)
From her experiences in North Kensington O'Malley identifies three of the factors that
limited the ability of the group to move beyond the relatively minor concerns of local
politics. First, such initiatives have a very limited range of sanctions: squatting,
auction busting, reasoned research, mass meetings, lock ins, none of which are likely
to be effective in anything but the most mundane local campaigns. Secondly,
O'Malley cites the difficulty of developing a stable organisational structure, in the
absence of which meetings tended to be dominated by the loudest voices, with people
withdrawing into sub-groups or cliques. Thirdly, the absence of a national network
created a tendency towards parochialism and isolationism. O'Malley suggests that
these shortcomings might be resolved by forging an alliance between struggle in the
community and in the workplace. In spite of these difficulties O'Malley, writing in
60
1977, remained optimistic about the political potential of community development, if
only as a means of raising critical consciousness:
• . . what was thought to be important was that local people gained a wide
experience of confronting the authorities and of all that this entailed -
bureaucratic indifference, professional incompetence and open bullying. It
was this experience offighting for control in one area of life which was a vital
political education for all involved and could well act as a spring board for
challenging the controls over the other parts of one's life. (O'Malley, 1977,
p.171)
With the benefit of twenty years hindsight, it can be noted that the 'vital political
education' afforded by grass roots community development amounted to little more
than the experience of defeat - instruction in the apparent futility of collective action
and the inevitability of alienation. Cowley et al, writing in the same year as O'Malley,
locate the problem of community politics not so much in the forms of organisation
adopted by community development, so much as its inability to transcend the
limitations of bourgeois ideology:
• why is it that, despite the development of direct action and the establishment
of parallel structures of power, there is still an ultimate acceptance of the
'rules of the game' such as language, pressure points, the formal processes of
government and so on? (Cowley et al, 1977, p.1 3)
Thus for Cowley the central contradiction of community development lies in its
inability to transcend the confines of state intervention. Rather than challenging the
state-form and the social relations that underpin it, grass roots community
development initiatives rarely aspire beyond lobbying for further state intervention or
minor changes in the way services are delivered. As a consequence, such initiatives
tend to be self defeating, or at least self limiting. Cowley suggests that this is due to a
lack of theory on the part of the initiatives, and argues for the need to develop a clearer
understanding of the capitalist social formation before the inter-relationships that
characterise it can be effectively challenged. Like O'Malley, Cowley also identifies
the need to link struggle in the sphere of consumption with that in the sphere of
production, and to develop forms of organisation that are capable of overcoming the
tendency towards fragmentation characteristic of existing community projects.
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Cowley's points about the role of theory, organisation, and the need to address the
relations between production and consumption, are valid. However, it is reasonable to
ask if his recommendations can be met within a framework that is recognisable as
community development. In fact, the tendency for community projects to develop
their practice within welfarist frames of reference, and therefore lose their
emancipatory potential, is a key theme of the empowerment phenomenon, and is
examined in detail below.
At the same time that the residents of Notting Hill were obtaining their 'political
education', the Wilson government was instigating its own experiment in community
development. A key imperative was the perception of an impending inner city crisis
stimulated by poverty and racial tensions. Martin Loney (1983) has documented the
development of this moral panic, imported from the U.S., and the impetus it gave to
the government's Urban Programme, of which the Community Development Projects
(CDPs) were a sub-set. The American government had responded to its 'inner city
crisis' with the 'War on Poverty' and 'Model Cities' campaigns, both of which made use
of community development/participation methods. It has been suggested that the
Urban Programme was a British equivalent of the American campaigns, however,
Loney points to evidence which suggests that those responsible for establishing the
CDPs were for the most part ignorant of the important lessons learned by their
colleagues in the states.
In any case, as we noted above, community development was not a novel concept to
the British government, which had experience of its application in a colonial context.
By the late 1960's proposals were afoot to facilitate community work in many areas of
government and service provision, including: social services, (Seebohm Report,
1968), Local Government, (Maud Commission, 1969), and planning, (Skeffington
Report, 1969). The similarities between the 'new' community worker of the 1960s and
the colonial community development officer of the 1940-50s, becomes apparent when
the following quotation from the Gulbenkian Report (1968) is compared with the
quotation from Batten above:
Community work is essentially about the inter-relations between people and
social change, how to help people and the providers of services to bring about
a more co?nfortable fit' between themselves and constant change, how to
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survive and grow as persons in relation to others. (Gulbenkian Report, 1968,
p.13)
Thus the problematic of community work in 1960s Britain was essentially the same as
that of its colonial predecessor - to maintain order through a period of rapid social
change. We noted above that fears of racial violence stimulated by immigration from
the third world were a key factor in the development of the Urban programme, which
in turn gave rise to the CDPs, Loney concludes:
What government was concerned about, in the wake of the Notting Hill riots,
was both the potential for violence contained in the growth of white racism
and the possibility of disturbances initiated by inner city blacks. In this
context the urban initiatives can be situated within a larger concern with
social control and social order. (Loney, 1983, p.35)
We noted above that the colonial deployment of community development was a
response to fears of rebellion amongst impoverished and politicised blacks who were
no longer regulated by traditional social relations. By the l960s this perceived threat
had been imported to Britain's inner cities, thereby provoking a similar response from
the state. This time the target of the panic expanded to include the white working
class of the inner city, but the objectives and the process remained the same - to pacify
and control an unruly population by incorporating it within programmes which would
define its needs in a way which could be met by the welfare state and that would,
therefore, defuse any threat to social order.
The CDP programme was announced in 1969 and continued throughout the 1970's.
During that time twelve CDPs were established in inner city locations across England
and Wales. The project was instigated by central government, and it was initially
envisaged that the projects would be centrally controlled by an inter departmental
steering group, but central direction rapidly declined and the local projects obtained a
high degree of autonomy.
Initially the objectives of the project reflected the pluralist assumptions of the
Seebohm Report - CDPs were supposed to establish a partnership between the local
population, Local Authorities, and other providers of welfare services, in order to
integrate service provision and make it more responsive to the needs of the
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community, as well as encouraging self-help initiatives amongst local people. We
noted above that the central principles of community development work were
established in the colonial context, however, the CDP model marked a significant
development in the technology of community work, in its application of social science
research to local problems. Thus each CDP comprised not just an action team, but
also a research team associated with a local university. The intention was that social
problems would be closely investigated in their local context by the research team,
which would then pass on a set of rationally derived recommendations to the action
team for implementation.
Although the application of scientific research to social problems is in many respects a
progressive step, Loney (1983) notes that the intended research paradigm was one of
social pathology, which locates the origins of social problems in working class culture
and behaviour, rather than in broader social and economic relations. The approach is,
therefore, inevitably a conservative one.
From the provenance of the CDP programme, and its initial set of objectives, one
might conclude that it was simply an exercise in social control, akin to the deployment
of similar techniques in the third world, however, the actual operation of the CDPs
proved quite different to the expectations held by the architects of the initiative.
Rather than imposing the governments agenda, some of the local projects developed a
radical critique of government policy, locating the origins of poverty, housing and
other problems in broader social and economic relations. Two national organisations
were established by CDP workers to facilitate co-operation between the local projects
and to develop a national perspective on their work; the CDP workers' Organisation
was established in 1974, closely followed by the 'neo-Marxist' Political Economy
Collective.
The effectiveness of a community development project as a means of social control is
dependent upon the project worker developing a close relationship with members of
the community and gaining a detailed understanding of their experiences, perceptions
and attitudes, in order to ensure that the interests of the state (or other development
agency) can be articulated in a way that is meaningful to the community. Indeed the
technique relies on the ability of the development worker to organise the development
process in such a way that members of the community believe that they are identifying
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their own needs and developing their own plans to meet them, when in fact they are
simply internalising and then articulating the state's agenda. We noted above that this
process is potentially a dangerous one for the state, because the relative autonomy and
close links with the community, that are essential to the development workers task,
may lead him/her to side with the community against the interests of the state. This
appears to have happened with a substantial number of CDP workers, with the result
that although they failed to bring about the radical transformation they hoped for, they
were at least able to counter the government's agenda of using the CDPs to pacify the
inner cities.
That the CDPs were able to diverge so drastically from their intended direction, is
largely attributable to the lack of managerial control exercised by central government -
Loney has catalogued the ineptitude and apathy of the Home Office in allowing this
situation to come about. Even so, the CDP experiment demonstrates that community
workers employed by the state are not automatically unwitting agents of social control.
Again, the way in which welfare professionals are interpellated by welfarist frames of
reference and regulated by managerial structures of control, are key themes in the
empowerment phenomenon, and are examined in detail in chapter four.
Whether the radicalism of the CDP workers came from an organic link with the
perceptions and experiences of the local community, or was simply the expression of a
preconceived political agenda, is difficult to judge from the available data - Loney's
analysis suggests a combination of the two, and he quotes from an interview with the
Director of the Coventry CDP, to support this claim:
the conversion of CDP workers to a marxist perspective was very rapid and
needs to be understood, partly as a resolution of dilemmas that CDP workers
found because of the ambiguity of their position. (Loney, 1983, pL38)
Whatever the cause of the development of political consciousness amongst the CDP
workers there is little evidence to suggest that such development occurred amongst the
communities they served, or that the CDPs found a means of transforming their radical
critique into effective forms of action. In any case the CDP model was virtually
abandoned by the state during the 1980s, (with the exception of small projects
sponsored by Local Authorities). This does not mean that state sponsored community
development disappeared with the demise of the CDPs - health promotion
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professionals have used the rhetoric of community development almost since the term
was coined by the Colonial Office, but it was during the 1980s that the community
development model really gained acceptance as a practical means of achieving health
promotion objectives.
The association between health promotion and community development may be rooted
in the colonial model discussed above, but its modern manifestation stems from the
World Health Organisation's critique of the traditional approach to health
development. From the mid-i 970s WHO began to advocate a new model of health
development culminating in the Alma-Ata declaration on Primary Health Care in 1978
and the 'Health for all by the year 2000' (HFA 2000) campaign. The key elements of
this approach include: the identification of basic health needs, the integration of health
policy within a broader social and economic development strategy, and community
participation in health planning.
Throughout the 1980's the HFA 2000 model of community development permeated
the British health promotion establishment and references to it appeared with
increasing frequency, not just in professional and academic journals, but in the policy
statements of Health Authorities, Local Authorities, Trade Unions and professional
bodies. The establishment of a voluntary organisation, initially called the National
Community Health Resource, but changing its name to Community Health UK in
1993, did much to support the spread of the approach, and a number of practical
campaigns and projects emerged in the latter half of the 1980's - most notably the
'Healthy Cities' movement.
Despite the enthusiasm with which the rhetoric of HFA 2000 has been taken up, the
approach has not lacked criticism. For example, it has been suggested that the WHO
philosophy tends to lift the health programmes of China and other countries out of
their political and economic context (Gish, 1979). The effect is to separate the
technical processes of a health intervention from the political forces that determined
them (Navarro, 1984). This de-politicised technique can then be applied in virtually
any context with little danger of disturbing the status quo.
The achievements of political struggles are reified as technical solutions,
which can be introduced within an unchangeable set of national and
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international power relations, and accomplished through co-operation and
collaboration rather than conflict and confrontation. (Farrant, 1991, p.429)
The agenda adopted by the advocates of a community development approach to health
promotion is not short of radical sounding phrases about challenging health
inequalities, addressing the social and economic influences on health, and enabling
people to recognise and collectively address their health needs. But the theoretical
weaknesses of the approach mean that it has no practical means of achieving these
objectives. The result is that such campaigns can easily be appropriated and used by
the state for ideological purposes as it seeks to restructure the welfare state. Davies
makes the point that 'self-help, new forms of volunteering, and community
empowerment are some of the terms in which a more limited statutory involvement is
being cast' (1987, p.315). There is certainly much in the community
developmentlradical health promotion canon that can be utilised to legitimate a shift
from the statutory provision of services to self-help and voluntarism, and Farrant is to
the point when she notes that:
as government social and economic policies served to intensify inequalities
in health, the basic principles of the NHS were being threatened, and the
burden of caring was being thrown even more firmly on the shoulders of
unpaid women in the family and the voluntary sector. Under such
circumstances, the notion of 'health by the people' begins to look like a
convenient cover-up for the erosion of health j the people. (Farrant, 1991,
pp. 425-6)
That the state has been able to hi-jack the health promotion approach to community
development and use it for ideological purposes, in a way that it was incapable of
doing with the CDP programme, is due to a range of factors too broad to discuss here.
However, some of these factors are relevant to our argument: first is the role of the
professions and their position within the welfare state. Unlike the CDP workers,
Health Promotion Officers are tightly integrated into the NHS, or, at a National level,
the Health Education Authority. They often undergo academic training to become
qualified members of their profession, and are able to pursue a career path to a
relatively senior position usually within a Health Authority or Self Governing Trust.
As a result they are tightly bound by the constraints of working within a bureaucratic
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organisation, for example, in terms of managerial accountability and career prospects.
Not only does this bind the profession to the corporate agenda of the agency for which
they work, it also encourages them to present their practical activity as the
implementation of professional or technical skills, rather than the pursuit of an overtly
political agenda.
The second factor concerns the way in which the health agenda is ideologically
constructed. We noted above, that the HFA 2000 approach to community
development presents the results of political struggles in the third world as a set of
technical processes that can be applied universally, irrespective of the socio-economic
context. This de-politicisation is compounded when the approach is applied within the
confines of the British National Health Service, which is dominated by a curative bio-
medical approach to health and illness. In this context there is a tendency to reduce
health to a personal idiom, and overlook the influence of structural relations.
Traditionally this has resulted in healthcare taking the form of direct medical
intervention to cure unhealthy individuals. Health Promotion has attempted to counter
this biological reductionist account of health with an understanding of the broader
psychological and sociological factors. However, the necessity of de-politicising this
alternative approach and presenting it as simply another form of technical intervention
has the consequence of placing the responsibility for health on the lifestyle and
behaviour of the individual. Thus, despite what is often quite radical sounding
rhetoric, the central tenet of community development, that it should enable people to
identify their own needs and take action to ensure they are met, often amounts to little
more than enabling people to recognise their need for a no-smoking campaign, or a
self-help group.
The role of professionals and the nature of health promotion ideology are more
important issues than their cursory treatment here implies. We shall return to them in
subsequent chapters, for the time being it is sufficient to observe that both factors are
problematic for community development and may enable the state to use such projects
for ideological purposes.
We noted above that the ruling class can give free reign to the consumer movement,
safe in the knowledge that its most radical demands can only strengthen market
relations; that calls to extend the rights associated with citizenship can only reinforce
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the alienation inherent in the capitalist state form; that the modern self-help movement
from its subjectivist paradigm can only reinforce the isolation of already marginalised
groups, and that community participation can only give a veneer of legitimacy to the
institutions of the welfare state. Community development faces many of the structural
and ideological constraints encountered by the other modes of empowerment, but
crucially, does not incorporate these oppressive social relations as an immutable
aspect of its internal logic. Therefore, at least at the level of theoretical abstraction,
the emancipatory potential of community development is not constrained by a self-
limiting internal logic.
The absence of a self-limiting internal logic does not ensure that community
development will be a successful emancipatory strategy; only that this question cannot
be answered by theoretical deduction. Instead, empirical study is needed to identify
how the structural and ideological constraints faced by other modes of empowerment
are addressed in the everyday practice of community development. As we shall see in
the next chapter, the Waterfront Health Action Project adopted the community
development model as its point of departure, arid therefore provides an interesting
case-study of this mode of empowerment. The analysis presented above suggests that
the empirical inquiry should focus on the project's relationship to the state,
particularly the extent to which the practical activity of the professionals involved is
determined by their location in the state, and whether or not the project adopts a
critical stance towards welfarist frames of reference.
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a context for the study of empowerment
presented in subsequent chapters. It was suggested that empowerment was a broad
phenomenon varying over time and place, and that a generally applicable definition of
the category would, therefore, possess little validity. Instead, five modes of
empowerment were examined, to reveal their conditions of existence, internal logic,
and emancipatory potential. An historical-logical approach was adopted to reveal
changes over time.
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It was found that the emancipatory potential of each mode of empowerment was
constrained by alienation in prevailing social and economic relations. However, only
community development avoided internalising these constraints as part of its internal
logic. Consumerism's attempt to empower the consumer has little emancipatory
potential because it bases its practical activity on improving the efficiency of the
market mechanism, rather than challenging the consumer's alienation from direct
control over the production and distribution of goods and services. Citizenship is
characterised by the pursuit of 'rights' granted by parliament, however, like the
market, the state-form is a manifestation of the masses' structural alienation from
social and economic power. The emancipatory potential of citizenship is, therefore,
limited by internalisation of this form of alienation. The emancipatory potential of
self-help is limited not so much by structural relations, but by the adoption of a
subjectivist approach to knowledge production, that in effect alienates its adherents
from collective emancipatory activity. Community participation is limited by the fact
that it takes place entirely within an ideological and structural frame-work dominated
by the statutory agencies, that denies participants the opportunity to define their own
emancipatory agenda. This is reinforced by a conservative ideology of community,
that stresses the need for moral regulation and statutory policing of inter-personal
relations.
Community development is influenced by the same conservative ideology of
community, but does not base its internal logic on the assumed immutability of
alienation in social and economic relations. Instead, community development focuses
upon enabling people to identify their needs and take collective action to ensure that
they are met. This does not guarantee the success of community development as an
emancipatory strategy, only that its limitations cannot be theoretically deduced from
analysis of its internal logic. The Waterfront Health Action Project (WHAP) provided
an opportunity to examine community development empirically and assess its
emancipatory potential in a specific case-study. As we shall see in the next chapter,
during the course of the initiative WHAP evolved into a recognisably different mode
of empowerment, but this transformation was at least partially driven by the
constraints of community development.
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As well as providing a context for the empirical study of empowerment, this chapter
also raised several issues to be addressed in the ethnography. They include: the
project's relationship to the state, epistemological assumptions about the production of
knowledge, the autonomy of participating welfare professionals, the stance taken
towards welfarist frames of reference, and fundamentally, whether WHAP enabled its
participants to effectively challenge the structural and ideological basis of their
alienation.
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2. Case Study: the Waterfront Health Action Project
The previous chapter examined the broad historical and theoretical terrain in which
this study is located, and identified key research themes. The Waterfront Health
Action Project (WHAP) provided the crucible in which those themes were examined,
and the aim of this chapter is to provide a description of WHAP, using case study
materials, prior to presentation of the ethnographic data and sociological analysis in
subsequent chapters.
The case study is drawn from a range of sources including: the minutes of the monthly
project steering group meetings, the community development worker's monthly
reports, a weekly newsletter produced by one of the volunteers, the project's written
constitution, operational plan, policy documents, bids for funding, research design
documents, the survey report, progress reports, written correspondence, and my own
research notes. Before presenting the case-study it is important to note that my dual
role in the group, as both an active member and a participant observer, was in many
respects contradictory. My attempts to address this contradiction are examined in the
appendix on methodology
Geographical location
The Waterfront Health Action Project covered six electoral wards in and around the
town of Thamesmead in South East London, on the Thames waterfront. Thamesmead
is a 'new town' developed in the late 1960's on what was formerly marshland.
Draining the marshes provided what was at the time the largest area of building land in
London. Initially, the development of Thamesmead took place under the auspices of
the now defunct Greater London Council, with the aim of providing rented
accommodation for the 'over-spill' from inner London boroughs (Chanan, 1992).
Like other public sector housing estates of the period Thamesmead has a mixture of
tower blocks and their low rise equivalent, all built from pre-formed concrete. Many
of the water features and green spaces of the original site have been preserved and
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integrated into the design of the town. By the standards of south-east London,
Thamesmead has a low population density. The site retains a substantial amount of
undeveloped land, and the clusters of housing are connected by a network of wide
roads, spanned by concrete walkways.
Following the demise of the GLC in 1986, a private company called Thamesmead
Town was established to manage the housing stock. Two Local Authorities, Bexley
and Greenwich are responsible for providing the remaining council services to the
area. During the 1980s many tenants purchased their homes under the government's
right to buy scheme. In addition, much of the new housing on Thamesmead has been
built by private property developers for sale rather than rent. Thus the balance of
tenure has changed to the point where half of the housing is now owner occupied.
There has been very little development of local industry, and Thamesmead is poorly
served in terms of shopping and recreational facilities.
The areas around Thamesmead, which are also covered by the Waterfront project,
namely Abbey Wood, Belvedere and Erith, are more typical of south London. Much
of the housing is of the brick built terraced variety, although there are some tower
blocks as well, particularly in Erith. These areas have been established longer and
have a comparatively well developed mixture of local industry and infrastructure.
Background to the Waterfront Project
Although the built environment of Thamesmead is quite different to that of the
surrounding neighbourhoods, the area as a whole shares a number of social and
demographic characteristics. Census data show that the Waterfront area has relatively
high levels of social deprivation compared with the Boroughs of Bexley and
Greenwich as a whole, and particularly in comparison with the south east region.
As one would expect in an area of high social deprivation the population also suffers a
much higher incidence of ill health and premature death than more affluent localities.
By the summer of 1991 awareness of these issues had been raised, partly by various
reports produced by the Health Authorities and Local Authorities serving the area, and
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partly by the reporting of subjective concerns in the local press. Asthma and
respiratory illness, particularly in children, were considered to be a growing problem
amongst the local population. Whilst there was no hard evidence concerning the local
influences on respiratory illness, air pollution was often suggested as a possible cause.
This is significant, because at the time, planning permission was being sought for a
sewage burning plant, to be situated in Belvedere, and a number of other industrial
developments to be constructed locally, all of which it was feared would further
contribute to air pollution.
It was in this context of concern over social deprivation, environmental pollution, and
their combined effects on the health of the local population, that the Waterfront Health
Action Project came into being. The origins of the project can be traced back to a
meeting of Thamesmead community workers in 1991. Dr Liz Dean, who was then the
Director of Public Health at Bexley Health Authority, gave a presentation on local
health issues, that reflected the subjective experiences of the professionals present at
the meeting. In the subsequent discussion it was agreed that the group should meet on
a regular basis to look at ways in which the health problems of the local population
could be addressed.
U Early membership of the group
The first few meetings of the group were not minuted, so there is no written record of
who attended them. The first minuted meeting took place on 12 September 1991, and
it is possible to ascertain from the minutes of this and subsequent meetings, who the
core members of the group were at this point. Some people only attended one or two
meetings and then dropped out; the regular attenders at this time were: the Director of
Public Health from Bexley Health Authority, the Director of Thamesmead Family
Services Unit (a social work organisation with charitable status), a retired social
worker who had been based in Thamesmead, the local vicar, the health advisor to the
London Borough of Greenwich, and from January 1992 onwards, the Director of
Health Promotion at Bexley Health Authority. I also attended in my role as a Public
Health researcher from Bexley Health Authority.
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In April 1992 a part-time community worker was appointed and began attending
meetings. Later in the same year workers from Bexley Council for Racial Equality
and the Social Services department of Bexley London Borough began attending the
meetings. Initially then, the project steering group exclusively comprised professional
and semi-professional workers, and it was not until February 1993 that volunteers
from the community began to attend the meetings.
• The initial orientation of the group
It is unfortunate that the first few meetings were not minuted, as it was then that the
original objectives and general perspective of the project were established. This gap
can be partially filled by looking at the various bids for funding that were produced
during this period. Such bids are written to appeal to potential funding agencies and
may, therefore, reflect their agenda, but they do give some indication of the projects
concerns. The first bid for funding was made in a letter from the Director of the
Family Services Unit, (who had been elected to Chair the WHAP meetings), to the
City Parochial Trust. The letter, dated 30 July 1991, defined WHAP as a community
health research project, aiming to involve local people in the identification of their
health needs.
One month later a more detailed outline of the project had been produced. As well as
identifying the aims and objectives of the survey, it also gave some indication of the
need for community action:
The Group's objective is to co-ordinate community action against the social
and environmental causes of ill health. A central element of this objective is
the empowerment of the local community. At the first meeting of WHAP it was
agreed that the first step in this process would be a community opinion survey,
followed by a public meeting to report the findings of the research and plan
future strategy. (Project Outline, August 1991)
Although these statements are brief and non-specific, the project's main aims at this
time are identifiable, namely: (i) that the project would address the social and
environmental influences on health, (ii) that this would entail the production of new
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knowledge about the population's health needs and the causes of ill health, and (iii)
that the project would attempt to develop a partnership between participating welfare
professionals and local residents, in order to develop a local health strategy.
The final point is an important one. The Waterfront project did not originate within
the statutory agencies, either at national, regional or local level, rather it was derived
from the experiences and concerns of health and community workers at the grass-roots
level. WHAP was not initially conceptualised as a health promotion project, nor as a
social work project, located within and constrained by the statutory agencies, but as an
independent, community based initiative in which the professionals involved would be
accountable to the local population rather than to their formal employers. At least in
the early stages, the Waterfront project appears to have had much in common with the
community development perspective discussed in the previous chapter. Certainly
many of the difficulties associated with community development work are applicable
to the Waterfront project, for instance: achieving genuine autonomy from the state,
establishing an effective partnership between professionals and volunteers, the
identification of the objective needs of the population, and the development of
effective strategies for meeting those needs.
The Attitudes to Health Survey
WHAP's first priority was to conduct research into the health status and attitudes to
health of the local population. It was agreed that this research should take the form of
an interviewer administered questionnaire, developed and conducted in partnership
with locally resident volunteers. Several statutory and charitable agencies were
approached for funding, but only one proved successful. The South East Thames
Regional Health Authority had requested bids for the funding of projects that would
improve the 'quality' of statutory health services. This was defined broadly and
included 'consumer involvement and empowerment'. A bid for £23,805 was
submitted to the fund in October 1991, and two months later the Regional Health
Authority agreed to provide the full amount.
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The next three months were spent recruiting a part-time community development
worker to assist with the survey, finding accommodation for the project, and
organising low key publicity. By the end of March 1992 an experienced community
worker had been appointed and office space had been rented at the William Temple
Church in Abbey Wood. An academic consultant from the University of Kent was
also enlisted.
Although the full research design was not written up and submitted to the steering
group until the beginning of June 1992, considerable discussion on this matter had
taken place prior to the submission for funding. There was an epistemological
dilemma at the core of the project; on one hand the group was committed to involving
members of the community at every stage of the project, and to producing information
that would accurately reflect the experiences of, and be meaningful to, local residents,
but on the other hand it was felt to be important that the research was carried out to
rigorous academic standards in order to give the findings credibility. Eventually a two
stage research design was agreed by the steering group.
During the first stage the community worker would conduct 'outreach' work amongst
the local population, in order to informally gather information on health concerns, and
recruit volunteers to help with the survey in stage two. It was hoped that this would
produce a research agenda that reflected local concerns, rather than the imposition of a
professional or academic perspective. It was also decided that this stage of the
research would concentrate on obtaining the views and active involvement of
marginalised groups, such as: the long-term unemployed, black and minority ethnic
groups, women and the elderly. This stage would last for six months, during which
time the questionnaire design, sampling and other preparatory work for stage two
would be conducted.
The second stage would entail a questionnaire based survey administered by volunteer
interviewers recruited in stage one. The survey would be designed and conducted to
academic standards and applied to a random sample of people aged 16 years or older
who were resident in the six electoral wards covered by the project.
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During the first stage of the project the community development worker made contact
with 'key informants' from a broad range of local groups, including: a project
concerned with the welfare of Vietnamese immigrants, an Asian women's group, an
elderly Asians group, staff and parents at a Nursery school, youth projects, the elderly,
schools, the mentally ill, the local Labour Party branch, local environmental pressure
groups, a patient group attached to one of the local Health Centres, Bexley Voluntary
Services Council, Thamesmead community workers group, and Health Visitors at the
Abbey Wood Centre. The local press and radio station gave considerable publicity to
the project, resulting in several local residents coming forward, either to give informal
information or to volunteer help for the second stage of the research project.
There are obviously problems with this type of ad hoc inquiry, the community worker
was not a trained researcher, the data were not gathered in a systematic way, and the
interviews and group discussions were not tape recorded, or detailed notes kept.
Under such conditions, there is no way of ensuring that the information gathered was
not systematically biased. However, the aim of part one of the project was not to
gather research findings, but to forge closer links with the local population as a
prelude to the research process. The objectives were to raise the profile of the project
with the local population, recruit volunteers, and to enable the professional members
of the steering group who were responsible for developing the research design to
improve their subjective grasp of the health concerns of the local population, (and of
minority and marginalised groups in particular).
The community development worker's findings were fed back to the steering group in
the form of monthly written reports, that were summarised at the end of the stage.
Many of the more common complaints made by local people might be considered
relatively trivial and likely to have only a marginal impact on health, for example dog
mess on the pavements and the smell from the sewage works. However, more
significant environmental issues were also raised, for instance, air pollution was
mentioned by many people, often in relation to respiratory illness. The quality of the
water supply on Thamesmead, and health problems associated with tower block
accommodation were also raised. Members of minority ethnic groups were also
concerned about the effects of racism on health, and felt that health service providers
were not sufficiently responsive to their specific needs. Several of the elderly people
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contacted reported problems of mobility and anxiety, particularly regarding the fear of
crime. Young mothers, as well as reporting a high prevalence of asthma amongst their
children, also spoke of their experiences of depression and dissatisfaction with doctors
whom they felt did not understand the nature of their problems.
The above information was synthesised with the existing concerns of the steering
group to produce a research agenda. After considerable discussion amongst the
professionals it was agreed that the survey should focus on the following issues: self
reported accounts of ill health, definitions of health, perceptions of the influences on
health, how people currently manage their health, attitudes to existing health service
provision, views regarding community health action, and personal information about
the respondent, for example, housing tenure.
Constructing the questionnaire was a difficult exercise for a number of reasons. First,
the research agenda was very broad, necessitating a long and detailed questionnaire.
Secondly, it was decided that the questionnaire should comprise mainly multiple
choice questions, although some open ended questions were also included. There
were practical reasons for this; volunteer interviewers were to administer the
questionnaire and it was felt that a multiple choice design would be easier for them to
conduct, and easier to collate. It was also felt that open ended questions might
generate relatively superficial responses, whereas multiple choice questions, with the
different options drawn from the informal evidence gathered in part one of the study,
might stimulate a more considered response.
The questionnaire design also caused conflict within the steering group. From the
beginning of the project it had been agreed that the survey should be conducted to
rigorous 'academic' standards, in order that the data yielded would have credibility
with the local population and with statutory and voluntary agencies. This placed
constraints on the type of questions that could be included, and on the way in which
they could be phrased. Unfortunately, this principle often came into conflict with the
aspirations, or, 'common sense' assumptions of steering group members, and heated
discussion ensued.
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I was made responsible for drafting the questionnaire, this entailed consideration of:
the formal statistical data relating to the area, the concerns raised by the professionals
involved in the project, the anecdotal evidence gathered from the community in the
first stage, and questionnaires used in other studies that had looked at similar issues.
Each successive draft of the questionnaire, (there were four in all) was presented to the
steering group for discussion and moderation. It is important to note that although
volunteers from the community were involved in the project at this stage, they were
organised separately and did not attend the steering group meetings. The reason given
for this was that they would be intimidated by the professionals involved, and would
require training by the community worker to enable them to participate in joint
meetings. In effect this meant that the volunteers had a very limited role in the
questionnaire design and were only able to comment on the various drafts indirectly
through the community worker.
A sample of 702 names and addresses, (approximately 1 in 80 of the target
population), was randomly selected from the General Practitioner 'age/sex register',
held by Bexley & Greenwich Family Health Services Authority. Approximately ten
local residents were recruited as volunteer interviewers for the survey - it is not
possible to arrive at a precise figure, as different volunteers joined or left throughout
the survey period. All of the volunteer interviewers received training by the
community development worker.
The interviewers had been recruited by the community development worker during the
first stage of the project and the composition of the group reflected the decision to
concentrate on people from minority and marginalised groups - all of the interviewers
were working class women living in the locality. Several of the women were from
black and minority ethnic groups, or had suffered adverse life experiences such as
poverty, long-term unemployment, single parenthood, or, racial harassment.
The interviews were conducted over a six week period from the beginning of October
to mid-November 1992. The interviewers worked in pairs and were paid £15 for
every five completed questionnaires. An additional payment of fifty pence was made
for revisiting houses where the respondent had not initially been at home. Childcare
and travelling expenses were also paid where appropriate. At the end of the six week
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period 392 questionnaires had been completed giving a response rate of 55.8%. A
protocol for statistical analysis had already been developed, and the completed
questionnaires were despatched to the Centre for Health Services Studies at the
University of Kent for data processing. The basic frequencies for each question were
produced in January 1993, with the more detailed statistical data appearing in March.
The basic frequencies were presented and discussed at a day long meeting between the
volunteers and professionals involved in the project, in February 1993. Following the
release of the full data set in mid March, I spent six weeks writing a draft report on the
survey that was also presented and discussed at an away-day, that took place in May
1993. Preparing the report for publication took a further six months. The final report
was not circulated until January 1994, fifteen months after the survey had been
completed. During the intervening period a summary of the report was produced and
circulated in June 1993.
• The findings of the survey
The final report ran to 20,000 words, and contained information on self-reported
morbidity, lay beliefs concerning the main influences on health, local health priorities,
and attitudes towards community health action. The self-reported morbidity data
supported the anecdotal evidence of a high prevalence of respiratory illness, with 50%
of respondents reporting symptoms. Just under 50% of men, and over 60% of women
reported symptoms of stress. As we shall see, the latter finding was used to justify the
provision of social support and informal counselling of local residents by WHAP
members.
Respondents were also asked to rank different social, economic, environmental and
cultural factors in terms of their adverse affect on health. On average, drug abuse,
homelessness, heavy drinking, smoking and unemployment were considered to be the
most important negative influences on health. When combined with the morbidity
data and the findings of formal epidemiological studies these concerns could be
translated into a series of local health priorities. Stress, mental health, and respiratory
illness were felt to be the most pressing issues for WHAP to address, and they were
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considered to be largely influenced by poverty, environmental pollution, racism and
sexism.
The report also looked at different strategies for addressing local health issues, finding
widespread dissatisfaction with the management of statutory services, and a high level
of support for various forms of community action. Specific recommendations and
plans for action were not included in the report.
• Presenting the findings of the survey
The main purpose of conducting the survey was to produce an objective body of
knowledge about local health issues that could be used to raise the consciousness of
local residents and influence the providers of health related services. Promoting the
findings of the survey was, therefore, vitally important to the achievement of WHAP's
original objectives.
As mentioned above, the findings of the survey were written up in a full report and a
separate summary. The summary was circulated in June 1993 to: senior Local
Authority Officers, Councillors, local Members of Parliament, Health Authority
Officers and non-executive members, Community Health Councils, General
Practitioners, managers of local hospitals and community health services, and to
relevant voluntary sector groups. The full report was published in January 1994 and
circulated to the same list. An article based on the project was published in the Health
Service Journal, leading to sales of the report to various academic and health sector
organisations nationally (Wainwright, D. 1994).
Public meetings and a press launch were scheduled to coincide with publication of the
summary report. Unfortunately, neither were well attended, even though the group
had worked hard to contact the media and advertise the public meetings. Several
articles on the survey results did appear in the local press, and members of the group
were interviewed on local radio. The volunteers and professionals involved in the
project presented the findings of the survey and an account of their experiences while
conducting it to the following statutory agencies: Bexley Community Health Council,
Thamesmead Advisory Forum, Bexley and Greenwich Health Authority and Family
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Health Services Authority, Thamesmead Race Equality Forum, Greenwich
Community Health Council, and the South Thames Social Services Research Group.
A delegation of volunteers and professionals from the WHAP steering group also met
with Baroness Cumberlege, permanent under-secretary of state at the Department of
Health, at Richmond House, to discuss the findings of the survey and the subsequent
establishment of a Drop-in Centre.
A video was also planned to complement the written report. Two film students from a
local college were commissioned to produce the film, and the community worker
spent time directing their efforts, and conducting filmed interviews with people who
had participated in the project. A 'rough cut' of the film was presented at one of the
rehearsals for the public meeting; unfortunately it proved to be more 'art house' than
'social realism'. Much of the film comprised external footage of Thamesmead, shot
on black and white film, apparently from the back of a moving vehicle, accompanied
by a sound track of 'techno' music and sound bites from the interviews. The project
steering group was not impressed, (particularly by an often repeated shot of a
Thamesmead tower block apparently revolving on its own axis in a surreal fashion),
and asked the film's producers for a more conventional edit. The video was
mentioned again at various steering group meetings, and a revised edit was shown at
an away-day in December 1994.
Generally, WHAP's attempts to mediate the findings of the survey were not
conspicuously successful. The public meetings were poorly attended and did not lead
to broad based popular support for local community health action. The statutory
agencies were obliged to listen to the survey findings, but no significant changes in
health policy or service provision occurred as a result.
The Drop-in Centre
The establishment of a Drop-in centre was first proposed at a steering group away-day
in February 1993. This was the first formal meeting attended by both professionals
and volunteers. Part of the day was spent discussing the volunteers' subjective
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experiences of administering the questionnaire, and it was during this discussion that
one of the volunteers identified the need for a Drop-in:
There is a need for a Drop-in centre: a counselling service with interpreters
and help and advice from someone who could identify with the caller, help
with stress management, work on combating racism, something for small
children, summer play schemes, something structured for teenagers, and after
school provision. (From the minutes of a WHAP away-day, 15th February
1993, at Godden Green)
It is worth noting that the initial findings of the survey were presented later on the
same day, that is, after the establishment of a Drop-in centre had been proposed by
the volunteers. Whilst many of the findings of the survey could be used as a rationale
for the establishment of a Drop-in, (for instance, the high incidence of stress and the
perceived need for social support), the actual proposal came first and may have acted
as a filter through which the statistical findings of the survey were later perceived.
This raises the question of whether the Drop-in proposal emerged as a result of the
survey, or whether the survey was simply used to legitimate the Drop-in.
It could be argued that the experience of administering the questionnaire, gave the
volunteers an insight into the needs and preferences of the respondents that enabled
them to anticipate the statistical analysis of the survey findings and develop an
appropriate response. However, it could also be argued that as the Drop-in proposal
was articulated prior to the presentation of the survey findings, it may have been
driven more by the needs and preferences of the volunteers themselves. This question
is not easily resolved; on one hand, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters,
the volunteers gained from the Drop-in in terms of increased self-esteem, social
support, and the acquisition of small sums of money, but on the other hand the
findings of the survey appear to support the claim that the Drop-in was established to
address the needs of the population.
The Drop-in opened in May 1993 in rooms attached to the Church of the Cross in
Thamesmead, for one day per week, and was so well attended that the venue was too
small to accommodate it, therefore, after six weeks the Drop-in moved to the William
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Temple Church in Abbey Wood. The Drop-in was staffed by the volunteers, with at
least one professional in attendance. The main activity of the Drop-in involved a
combination of health advice and social support. Visitors were provided with tea,
(sometimes lunch), and participated in group discussions or individual conversations,
which gave them an opportunity to raise their own health concerns, and to receive
advice on personal health and welfare issues, like claiming benefits or housing. Some
of the volunteers attended training courses in accident prevention, stress management,
assertion skills, and counselling. The volunteers also provided facials, massages,
manicures, and simple craft activities.
Activity at the Drop-in was monitored and summarised in quarterly reports. Between
September 1993 and February 1994 attendance averaged 15 adults per session and 4
children. The majority of attenders, (on average 12 out of 15) were women. On
average, four newcomers attended each week. Quantifying the activity of a service
that was essentially qualitative was a difficult task, but the Drop-in workers kept a log
of the discussions that had taken place and attempted to categorise them. According to
these statistics 18% of discussions were about the experience of stress, 17% were
about situational problems (such as child rearing, poverty, and caring for the elderly),
a further 17% concerned specific medical conditions, and the remainder covered a
range of topics from alternative medicine to morality and social responsibility
(statistics taken from WHAP's quarterly report to the London Implementation Group).
It is important to note that the establishment of the Drop-in centre, and the issues it
addressed, marked a significant turning point for WHAP. The initial emphasis on
organising local people to identify their health needs and take social action to satisfy
them suggests that the project had taken the community development model as its
point of departure. But, the establishment of the Drop-in and the move towards the
provision of social support 'services' reflects the transition to a different mode of
empowerment. The reasons for this transformation, and its consequences for the
project's emancipatory potential, are examined in the remaining three chapters.
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WHAP's Constitution and Policy Statements
Constitutional matters were of importance to the steering group from the beginning of
the project. A provisional constitution had been adopted prior to the involvement of
the volunteers; this was later amended by a joint working party of professionals and
volunteers. The final draft, adopted by WHAP in July 1993, formally adopted the
name of the project, described the geographical area covered, and re-stated WHAP's
aims. Formal arrangements for membership, election to an 'executive committee, and
the organisation of meetings were also addressed. At this stage the 'official' aims of
WHAP continued to refer to community participation in health planning, collaboration
with statutory and voluntary agencies campaigning against adverse social and
economic influences on health, and conducting research. However, organising self-
help groups and Drop-ins was also included as an aim; reflecting the transition from a
community development model to a new mode of empowerment.
This transition was reinforced in October 1994, when the constitution was
complemented by a series of policy documents, including: an equal opportunities
policy, a specification of the differences between members, volunteers and workers in
WHAP, a volunteer recruitment procedure, a volunteer recruiter's charter, and a
volunteer's charter.
The document defining the different roles of member, volunteer and paid worker also
addressed the issues of contractual obligation, accountability, and participation in the
decision making process. Essentially member status conferred the right to attend and
help out with WHAP's activities, but without any formal commitment or contractual
obligation. Members had the right to vote in elections to the Executive Committee,
but not to stand for election themselves. Volunteer status, (including professionals
from the statutory agencies as well as local residents), involved a formal application
procedure and acceptance of the terms of a volunteer agreement. Crucially, volunteers
were to be 'accountable to the qualified paid worker who supervises recruitment and
training, and ultimately to the management committee of WHAP'. In return volunteers
had the right to receive training, claim expenses, and stand for election to the
Executive Committee. Paid workers were bound by a job description and a contract of
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employment. They were accountable to the Executive Committee, to which they
could not seek election.
The volunteer recruitment procedure and the volunteer recruiter's charter described the
process by which members of WHAP achieved volunteer status. Recruiters were
advised: to clearly define the 'job' to which they would recruit, (including the
production of a job description and person specification), to interview selectively, and
to agree a probationary period in order to 'see if the appointment is working, and to
allow either side to withdraw gracefully f it is not'. Potential volunteers, on the other
hand, were obliged to complete an application form, giving the names and addresses
of three referees, and be interviewed by a panel. Successful applicants would sign a
volunteer's agreement that stated, amongst other things, 'the hours and days on which
volunteering will take place', 'the name and position of the person to whom the
volunteer is accountable', and, 'the responsibilities of the volunteer as detailed in the
job description'. The volunteer's charter simply listed a series of rights and
responsibilities, for example the right to have someone to talk to about the work, to be
trained if necessary, and the responsibility to do the job reliably and to respect
confidentiality.
In short, the new policy documents set down the terms and conditions of membership
of what was essentially a charitable agency, defining the members as voluntary
workers rather than political activists. Again, this gave formal recognition to the
transition from community development to the new mode of empowerment.
WIIAP's relationship to the statutory sector
WHAP was established by welfare professionals, the majority of whom worked for
statutory agencies such as the Health Authority or Local Authority. However, WHAP
itself was not formally instigated by the statutory agencies; it was established on an ad
hoc basis by the participants themselves. This gave the group an unusual and slightly
ambiguous status. On one hand the professionals were simply doing their jobs, using
time and resources paid for by their employers, but on the other hand WHAP was not
accountable to any statutory agency, although agencies were able to limit their
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employees involvement in WHAP during working hours. This ambiguity extended to
WHAP's initial agenda; the objective of improving the health and well being of the
local population clearly fits in with the 'official' objectives of the statutory agencies,
but at the same time the professionals were critical of the statutory agencies and
sought to establish WHAP as an independent project under the direct control of local
residents, and capable of adopting a more critical, campaigning approach.
An important aspect of the autonomy of any organisation is its source of funding. The
minutes of the steering group meetings show that considerable time was spent
discussing this issue and in the preparation and submission of bids for funding. The
possibility of seeking charitable status proved a particularly contentious issue, mainly
because the Charity Commission forbids registered charities from engaging in work of
a political nature. Even so, the bid for funding under the 'Tomlinson' initiative,
committed WHAP to becoming a charity.
Even so, funding for the project came mainly from National Health Service sources.
The attitudes to health survey was funded by what was then the South East Thames
Regional Health Authority, under a scheme to support initiatives that would improve
the quality of health service provision. Fortunately the guidelines for application were
quite broad and included 'consumer involvement and empowerment'. This meant that
an application for funding could be compiled around the theme of involving local
residents in the assessment of health needs, gathering information on satisfaction with
existing health services, and facilitating community participation in health service
planning and decision making. Careful phrasing meant that the application for
funding could be tailored to fit the agenda of the funding agency, without departing
from the original objectives of the project. The funding agency did not request any
managerial control over the project; six monthly progress reports were requested, but
the total funding was paid in advance and was not dependent on the reports. When the
survey was completed, a successful application was made under the same scheme, to
fund the part-time community worker for a further year, in order to take forward the
findings of the survey.
The second major source of funding for WHAP was the agency established to
implement the recommendations of the Tomlinson Report (1992) on the re-structuring
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of secondary and primary health care in London. The Tomlinson agenda was much
narrower than that of the Regional Health Authority's Quality Fund, and applications
for funding were judged according to the extent to which they were likely to: meet
specific health needs, contribute to the development of innovative primary care, or,
reduce demand for acute services. Importantly, projects were funded on an
incremental basis, enabling the administrators of the fund to withdraw support from
projects that were felt to be ineffective, or which strayed from the Tomlinson agenda.
In its bid for funding WHAP was able to use the findings of the health survey to
identify specific health needs of the local population that could be met by community
based projects like the Drop-in centre. Much was made of the high levels of stress
related health problems reported in the survey, and the need for social support,
counselling and health promotion work. Of course, the more political aspects of the
community development approach lay outside the Tomlinson agenda, so in successive
bids for funding WHAP was obliged to propose: the establishment of new Drop-in
centres, the provision of an outreach service to housebound residents, support groups
for asthma sufferers and disabled people, and active liaison with statutory service
providers.
WHAP was successful in obtaining funds from the Tomlinson initiative, but not the
full amount requested. This enabled WHAP to continue with the Drop-in, but
severely limited the scope for expansion. The local statutory agencies did not attempt
to exercise direct control over WHAP through its professional members, but the role
of the professionals was contradictory, because they brought with them the
expectations beliefs and forms of behaviour that reflected their role in the statutory
sector. This contradiction was deepened by WHAP's dependence on statutory
funding. The contradictory nature of professional involvement in the initiative, and
the broader question of WHAP's relationship to the state, are addressed in subsequent
chapters.
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Other Issues Found in the Case Study Materials
In addition to mundane issues about the search for funding, conducting the survey, and
later, the day to day running of the Drop-in centre, a number of other issues can also
be identified from the case-study materials. Three such issues are briefly identified
below, followed by detailed analysis in subsequent chapters.
The first issue is racism and multiculturalism. Racism was a major issue in
Thamesmead and the surrounding area throughout the life of WHAP. The British
National Party had a book shop in nearby Welling, that distributed overtly racist
literature, and was allegedly used as a national headquarters for the organisation.
Reports of racially motivated crime in the area began to increase, culminating in two
murders in 1993. The incidents of racial violence, coupled with numerous
demonstrations against the BNP book shop, kept the issue of racism high on the
agenda of the local and national media.
From the beginning it was considered very important that WHAP should develop a
strong commitment to multiculturalism, and ensure that discriminatory practices were
avoided. During the first six months of the community development work links were
made with voluntary organisations and individuals from black and minority ethnic
groups, who were asked to participate in the project. The questionnaire used in the
survey was vetted to ensure that the questions were not ethnocentric, respondents
whose first language was not English were offered the opportunity to be interviewed
by someone who spoke their first language, and the findings of the survey were
analysed by ethnic group. A formal equal opportunities policy was not adopted by
WHAP until November 1994, but considerable discussion on this topic took place
throughout the duration of the project.
WHAP's concern to avoid racism in its day to day practice came to a head when one
of the volunteers produced a leaflet to advertise the Drop-in Centre without consulting
the community development worker. The leaflet was in English and did not contain
any mention of services for people from minority ethnic groups. The community
worker stopped the leaflet from being distributed, and (together with an ethnic
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minority social worker who was then involved in the project), circulated a letter to all
WHAP members complaining about the incident:
At the last full meeting of the committee, concerns were expressed about the
development of WHAP as a multi-cultural organisation. [...] We need to have
clear strategies and structures in place that are inclusive of all cultures; to
ensure that everyone in WHAP at present has a clear understanding of why
these are necessary. Events have taken place which if left unchecked could
create the very barriers we want to eradicate. There is confusion around
different roles and expectations of individual members, professional and
community, and how they work together. For example, the preparation of a
WHAP information leaflet which was given to a volunteer to do without any
long term thinking about:
(a) what WHAP can offer all cultures,
(b) who the leaflet is for,
(c) the fact that an English version is by itself exclusive of other cultures...
[...] We are writing this letter because neither of us want to see WHAP
develop like other community projects that tokenise cultures which are not
English... (Correspondence from the community worker and another
professional member of WHAP to all other members, 30th June 1993)
As a result of the concerns raised in the letter a decision was taken that all future
publicity materials should be examined by the community worker, or, presented to the
steering group, before publication. This caused some ill-feeling in the group and
brought into question the nature of the relationship between the professionals and
volunteers.
A second issue concerned smoking at the Drop-in and during steering group meetings.
Several of the volunteers involved in the project smoked, as did many of the people
attending the Drop-in. This created a dilemma; on one hand it was felt that as the
main objective of the project was to improve health, smoking should not be allowed,
but on the other hand, an outright ban might alienate or even exclude the smokers. In
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January 1994 the professionals involved in the project met without the volunteers, and
the smoking issue was discussed:
Appreciation of the work and services of the Drop-ins was expressed, as well
as some worries especially about the amount of smoking. Smoking should not
take place when there are children present and at Christmas there was a
positive pall of smoke when children were around. Kate hopes to borrow a
smokeliser - a machine which measures the levels of carbon monoxide and
oxygen in the blood - for use at the beginning and end of sessions to
demonstrate to people what is happening in the blood stream when people
smoke. She also wants to obtain a machine which measures blood pressure
and pulse rates. Working in this way and providing equipment will help
towards raising awareness of the dangers of smoking and eliminating it.
Meanwhile there is a need for clear rules about dividing smoking from non-
smoking areas. (From the minutes of the meeting held on 14th January 1994)
A month later the matter was discussed in the presence of the volunteers at a full
meeting of the steering group:
Smoking: This difficult subject led to constructive conflict but it was
eventually agreed that WHAP accepts that it IS very difficult. Many people
attending the Drop-in are very stressed and some are heavy smokers who
might not stay fs,noking were banned altogether. But WHAP is committed to
the spiralling down of smoking and helping people towards stopping. We will
have only one small area, with a sand tray, where people can go to smoke, on
the far rig/it of the bar counter. No smoking anywhere else, except outside.
And we must give the information about the effects of smoking and put up
posters so that people are clear about where they can, and cannot, smoke.
(From the minutes of the meeting held on 10th February 1994)
Despite this apparent compromise, the issue of smoking continued to arouse debate in
subsequent meetings, raising the question of how prescriptive WHAP should be in
attempting to modify the behaviour of its members and users of the Drop-in.
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In August 1994 a series of incidents occurred involving one of the volunteer members,
that caused WHAP to develop and implement disciplinary proceedings. The volunteer
concerned was experiencing difficulties in her personal life that caused her a great deal
of stress, and affected her involvement in WHAP. Matters came to a head during the
bank holiday weekend, when the volunteer began behaving manically, this involved
visiting or telephoning local statutory agencies and service providers to demand
resources for WHAP, thereby bringing the organisation into disrepute. Other
volunteers involved in the project where visited by the individual concerned, (some in
the middle of the night), and were subjected to anti-social behaviour and verbal abuse.
Eventually, a professional member of WHAP was called out in the middle of the night
and arrangements were made to have the volunteer 'Sectioned', that is, forcibly
admitted to a psychiatric institution.
The episode was very traumatic for the volunteers and professionals involved in
WHAP, and it was felt that WHAP's credibility with other local organisations had
been damaged by it. Under these circumstances, it was felt that WHAP needed to
examine the incident and take a decision about the volunteer's future involvement in
the project. The Steering Group met and agreed a procedure by which this could be
accomplished. Two volunteers and one professional were elected to hear evidence
from those affected by the incident, and to arrive at recommendations that would then
be voted on by the steering group.
At the end of this it was agreed that the volunteer should be suspended from WHAP
for a month, at which time the matter would be reviewed. At the end of this period,
many of the people affected by the incident expressed dissatisfaction with the way it
had been dealt with, and it was agreed that the volunteer could return to the project,
but would not be given responsibility for financial resources for a further three
months. A series of counselling sessions was also set up, in which a social worker
involved in the project chaired group discussions of the incident to enable those
involved in the incident to share their concerns. The volunteer was eventually
expelled from WHAP.
The incident and WHAP's response to it raised a number of issues concerning: the
disciplining of volunteers, the exercise of professional power, and the project's
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commitment to an emancipatory agenda. These issues are explored in subsequent
chapters, where a more detailed account of the incident is given.
This chapter has presented a case study of the Waterfront Health Action Project based
on documentary evidence. The intention was to describe the project, rather than give a
sociological explanation of it. Several important themes have emerged. WHAP began
as a community development project, aiming to empower local people by enabling
them to identify the structural, environmental, and cultural basis of their health needs,
and to take collective action to bring about change. The production of an independent
body of knowledge was considered to be an essential element of this process, that
dominated the first two years of the project. However, the case-study also reveals a
transition from community development to a qualitatively different mode of
empowerment, based on the provision of social support, and other 'services', at a
Drop-in centre. This transition, and other incidents recorded in the case-study, raise
questions about WHAP's emancipatory potential, particularly: its independence and
autonomy from the state, the contradictory nature of professional involvement, the
exercise of regulation and control over the volunteers and Drop-in users, and the
difficulty of producing emancipatory knowledge.
These themes, (along with those identified in chapter 1), informed the compilation of
questions asked during the in-depth interviews with WHAP's professional and
volunteer members. The remaining three chapters present a sociological analysis of
these themes, based on the interview transcripts and relevant academic literature.
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3. The Production of Knowledge
The case-study presented in the previous chapter showed that the production of an
alternative body of knowledge about local health issues was WHAP's most important
objective during the early stages of the project. The emancipatory potential of
knowledge is a key theme for many modes of empowerment. However, as we saw in
the first chapter, this potential is likely to be constrained, not just by external
influences, but by their incorporation into a self-limiting internal logic. Of the modes
of empowerment discussed in chapter one, only community development avoided the
adoption of a self-limiting internal logic, although it faced many of the same external
constraints. WHAP's initial adoption of the community development perspective,
provided an opportunity to study the phenomenon empirically, to find out how these
external constraints would be addressed in practice, and whether WHAP would be
able to produce a genuinely emancipatory body of knowledge.
The perceived importance of research
It is important to note that the rationale for conducting research, the general research
design, and a successful bid for funding were all in place before the volunteers became
involved in the project and before any out-reach work into the local community had
formally been conducted. Thus, at least in the early stages of the project the impetus
for research came exclusively from the professionals, rather from the volunteers or the
local community.
That the research process was professionally driven is apparent in the interview
transcripts. The professionals exhibited a greater tendency to cite the research element
as a reason for becoming involved in the project, than did the volunteers who even
when directly questioned about the purposes of the research, gave brief and
inconsistent answers. This variation may be an artefact of the interview process; the
turnover of volunteers was much greater than that for professional members of
WHAP, with the result that when I began interviewing, a full year after the survey had
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taken place, very few of the volunteers who had participated in the survey were still
involved in the project. It may be that the volunteers who had some involvement in
the survey would have shared the enthusiasm exhibited by the professionals who had
been involved from early on, but there is no available evidence to test this hypothesis.
Even so it can be concluded that the rationale for the research process came from the
professionals, and that even if they managed to transmit this to the volunteers who
participated in the survey, there is little evidence that they managed to pass it on to
subsequent generations of volunteers.
Giving a voice to local people
The rationale for producing new knowledge about health needs was based on the
belief that existing information overlooked the attitudes and beliefs of local people,
and effectively excluded them from the decision-making process. As one of the
professionals commented:
we thought people needed a local say, and we felt that the existing services
were quite often inappropriate. We felt that people, the ordinary people,
weren't sufficiently represented in decision making processes.
(Professional, November 1993)
The intention was, therefore, not just to provide information about the health needs of
the local population, but to open up a line of communication that would enable people
to identify and articulate their own needs and preferences. As the example quoted
above implies, it was assumed that the providers of statutory services were unaware of
the views of local people, and therefore provided inappropriate services. The aim may
have been to give local people a 'voice', but it was for the most part assumed that the
audience for this voice would be the statutory agencies.
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Knowledge and 'partnership'
The concept of a 'bottom-up' approach to social research described above, implies the
need to take on the perspective of the local population, in order to 'speak' with an
authentic 'voice'. This is a significant epistemological claim, suggesting that valid
knowledge of the attitudes and beliefs of the local population can only be obtained by
reducing the cultural distance between researcher and subject, or even by replacing the
traditional distinction between researcher and subject with the principle of interaction
or 'partnership'. The failure to achieve such a 'partnership' by local service providers
and decision makers is posited as an explanation of the inadequacy of their
knowledge, and a justification for WHAP's role as mediator of the community
perspective.
The rationale for establishing a partnership with local people in the production of
knowledge was two-fold. On one hand it was required to ensure that the knowledge
captured the authentic views of the different sub-groups of the population, but on the
other hand, compiling a 'community view' was seen as a means of creating inter-
subjectivity and galvanising solidarity:
• .. before you have a partnership with a group of people, which is local people,
then you actually have to find out what their issues are and what they want to
get out of it.
(Professional, September 1994)
To summarise the position so far. The rationale for the research came from the
professionals involved in WHAP during the first few meetings of the group. A key
objective was to produce a body of knowledge that represented the authentic views
and attitudes of the local population, to remedy the inadequate or incomplete
knowledge produced by local service providers and decision makers. This would be
achieved by forming a research based 'partnership' with members of the community.
Of course, the production of an 'authentic voice' is only one side of the conversational
equation. For a 'voice' to be heard it's message must be intelligible to the 'listener',
in this instance, local service providers and decision makers. As the following
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quotation implies, it was assumed that such an audience would only be prepared to
listen to quantitative statistical research:
if you 're going to be saying things to organisations, from Gory [an industrial
developer planning to build a waste burning plant locally] to the local Health
Authority, then you need to have a body of statistically agreeable and kind of
valuable statistics to use. If you don't have it, you can't use it. There's always
a difficulty when you've got it, is whether people want to listen to it, but I mean
you've got to have it in the first place if you want to get into that debate.
(Professional, September 1994)
It was also felt that local decision-makers would only be prepared to fund WHAP if
the research was relevant to their own agendas:
part of this game is that . . . it's helpful, to do these things, to have money, so
there are certain things you have to do for people that give you the money,
and so therefore you have to blind them with bull-shit if necessary. Do you
know what I mean, sort of like you have to give them stat's, they're going to
want Health of the Nation gear I should imagine. You've got to show that
you've somehow made a contribution to reducing unwanted pregnancies and
coronary heart disease and things like that. But those are necessary evils, and
you have to do all sorts of things to try and get resources, which will enable
you to do something a bit better.
(Professional, February 1994)
Essentially the argument is that statutory agencies will be prepared to fund community
projects if they present statistically valid data which address issues that are already on
the statutory agencies' agenda. Whatever we may think of the validity of this thesis
(more of that later), it is important to note that the production of statistical data to
elicit funding from the statutory agencies, cannot easily be reconciled with the desire
to present the authentic voice of the local population.
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A communicative model of knowledge and action
It is possible to derive a theoretical model that expresses the way in which the
professionals involved in WHAP initially conceptualised the process of producing
knowledge and achieving change. This is referred to as a communicative model of
knowledge and action, (illustrated in the diagram on page 89), because it assumes that
the role of the Waterfront project is to communicate authentic knowledge about the
health needs and preferences of the local population to the various statutory agencies,
which will then take action to improve the provision of services and address the wider
influences on health. It is important to point out that this is not intended to be a model
of what actually took place, but rather a representation of how the professionals
initially thought or anticipated the production of knowledge would bring about
change.
The diagram on page 89 represents the four main groups in the model as boxes.
Towards the centre of the diagram is the Waterfront Health Action Project, comprising
a 'partnership' between local volunteers and welfare professionals. To the right is the
local population, and to the left are the statutory agencies and service providers. The
final group comprises local industry and commerce.
The model suggests that WHAP was involved in two external relationships; the first
was with the local population, the second with the statutory agencies. WHAP had
very little direct contact with local industry, so the relationship with this group is
represented indirectly via the regulatory powers of the statutory agencies.
The relationship between WHAP and the local population was two-fold. First, it
entailed the gathering of information primarily through the out-reach work and survey,
(expressed in circles on the diagram), and through the direct input of the volunteers.
Secondly, the relationship also involved a feedback loop in which the findings of the
survey were mediated back to the local population. The nature of this relationship
would change with the development of the Drop-in centre which allowed the provision
of services to a small number of residents, based on needs identified by the survey.























































WHAP's relationship with the statutory agencies and service providers was also
twofold. On one hand the relationship was about communicating the findings of the
research in a form acceptable to the statutory agencies, this was to be achieved via the
report, by verbal presentations made by volunteers and professionals from WHAP, and
also by direct participation in the planning and decision making process. The other
side of the relationship was financial; the research was funded by the Regional Health
Authority, but it was hoped that following the presentation of the research findings
the statutory agencies would provide resources for WHAP to continue its role as
mediator of the articulated needs and preferences of the local community. Again, this
relationship changed over time, and the establishment of the Drop-in changed the
nature of WI-lAP's claim for resources from that of advocate/mediator to that of
service provider. But again, this was not seen as a central element of the model during
the initial stages of the project.
The model also identifies relationships between the statutory agencies and local
industry, and between both of these groups and the local population. The statutory
agencies are related to local industry in a regulatory capacity, which indirectly
influences the health of the local population, and to the local population via the
provision of services. These relationships were in place before WHAP was
established, but the model predicts that the information provided by WHAP would
lead to the provision of services that were more sensitive to the needs of the local
population, and to better regulation of the health damaging and health enhancing
activities of local industry.
To briefly summarise, the model attempts to show how the professionals, who
instigated the research process, conceptualised the processes by which the knowledge
produced would lead to action to improve the health of the population. Essentially the
model predicts that a partnership of professionals and volunteers will be able to carry
out research that will adequately grasp the health needs and preferences of the local
population, that the presentation of this information to the statutory agencies, in a form
that they find acceptable, will lead to the provision of better services and other health
benefits for the local population, and to continued financial support for WHAP in its
capacity as community advocate. 	 ,•;:7s
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Before examining the difficulties faced by WHAP in putting the model into practice, it
is worth briefly analysing its theoretical weaknesses, as this predicts many of the
difficulties encountered. The weaknesses of the model can be placed in two
categories; assumptions about processes that are external to the model, and its internal
tensions and contradictions.
• External assumptions
A fundamental element of the model is the prominence it gives to the statutory
agencies and service providers as agents of change. Although the process of reporting
back to the community is also included, the central focus of the research is on
producing information that will be acceptable to, and capable of influencing, the
statutory agencies. The model is, therefore, primarily concerned with bringing about
social reform within the existing framework of the welfare state, rather than building
critical consciousness amongst the population. This contrasts with the project's aims,
(presented in chapter two above), that point to the social and economic influences on
health and the need for direct community action. There is, therefore, a gap between
the project's written aims, and the way in which the process of knowledge production
and mediation was operationalised through the 'common sense' assumptions reported
in the ethnographic evidence.
Secondly, the model assumes that it is a lack of authentic information on the health
needs and preferences of the local population that is the main impediment to the
development of better services and other health benefits. The influence of structural
and economic factors, such as financial constraints and the distribution of formal
decision making power, is not represented in the model.
Thirdly, the model proposes a 'circulatory' or 'hydraulic' theory of change in which
the movement of knowledge through the system creates sufficient pressure to force out
better services, and other health benefits, elsewhere in the system. It is assumed that
there is a 'pump' capable of driving the 'hydraulic fluid' around the system, in other
words, an assumption that the statutory agencies will have a strong enough incentive
to listen to, and act upon, the information presented by WHAP. Iii this instance there
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are two potential 'pumps' or sources of pressure. The first is government policy; a
number of official policy documents compiled at both local and national level
emphasise the objective of listening to 'local voices' or 'putting the customer first'.
But, despite this commitment on paper there is no structural dynamic or organisational
mechanism that obliges local statutory agencies to listen to projects like WHAP. The
second potential source is direct pressure from the local population. The model does
allow for this source to be tapped into, with its proposal for reporting the findings of
the research back to the local population, but does not address the problem of
organising mass support, relying instead upon the recruitment of a small number of
volunteers to press for WHAP's objectives. Whether these rather weak sources of
momentum are sufficient to overcome the bureaucratic inertia of the statutory agencies
is a matter for empirical enquiry that is addressed below.
U Internal tensions and contradictions
As well as the external pressures listed above, the internal logic of the model is also
theoretically weak. First, the model implies that a 'partnership' between volunteers
and professionals is essential to the production of authentic emancipatory knowledge.
This partnership must be one of cultural synthesis, in which the professionals involved
adopt the worldview of the volunteers, and the volunteers are able to exert a high
degree of control over the production of knowledge. It is assumed that such a
relationship is viable, but as we shall see, there are structural obstacles that may be
insurmountable.
This leads on to the main internal contradiction of the model - the claim that the
authentic 'voice' of the community can be obtained by research, and that this process
is compatible with the presentation of research findings in a form that is acceptable to
existing statutory agencies. Accessing the subjective beliefs of the community implies
the need for a qualitative methodology, but the data yielded by such an approach might
not be acceptable to the statutory agencies which prefer quantitative statistical data.
WHAP attempted to overcome this difficulty by combining qualitative out-reach work
with a quantitative survey, but it cannot be automatically assumed that this
compromise was satisfactory. The epistemological issues raised by this contradiction
are considered below.
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Finally, the model assumes that the process of mediating the research findings to the
statutory agencies and the local population will be unproblematic. As we shall see,
WHAP encountered problems in involving both parties in deriving strategies for local
health action based on the survey results
The internal contradictions and tensions of the model are addressed below, under two
main headings: designing and conducting the research, and mediating the knowledge
produced. The issue of cultural synthesis will be addressed under each of these
headings. The second half of the chapter places the findings of the WHAP case study
in the context of a broader sociological debate about the production of knowledge and
the exercise of power, and it is there that the external assumptions of the model are
addressed.
Designing and conducting the research
• The research 'partnership'
We have already noted that the establishment of a close research partnership between
professionals and members of the local community was an essential element of
WHAP's approach to the production of knowledge. The rationale for this partnership
was noted by one of the volunteers:
you're doing this, cos you want more contact with people on the street, cos
you want to find out what the people on the street are on about. And this is
basically why I think the professionals are involved, because you don't know,
[...] say somebody like Kate... Kate couldn't possibly know ha If the things that
are going on, only the things that she might see on a report
(Volunteer, February 1994)
The argument implies that the professionals involved in the project did not have
sufficient exposure to the experiences of local people to adequately research their
subjective beliefs about local health issues. It was assumed that a close partnership
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with representatives of the community would enable the professionals to gain
sufficient insight into their everyday lives. Ethnographers achieve this by participant
observation or in-depth interviews, but these options were not open to the
professionals involved in WHAP, because they could only relate to the local
population in their capacity as welfare professionals, not as impartial observers, or
partisans. It was hoped that this deficiency would be overcome by the out-reach work
conducted by the community worker. But as we saw in chapter two, this only
provided fairly unreliable second-hand accounts of people's health concerns. The
professionals did not come face to face with the volunteers until after the survey had
been conducted, and as the following quotation suggests, this had negative
consequences:
they [the professionals] talked around the issues for too long and didn't
get the women involved. So I think, for example with the survey, it was a
professionally produced methodology, that the women were in effect paid to
apply, and, therefore, although the women did have a voice in the
understandability of or comprehensiveness of the questions that was
translated through the one paid worker [...] the professionals didn't see the
need to take those women in with them, so that they jointly owned the survey
[...] they were given a survey to administer, they were in effect paid to
administer the survey, they gave that over and lost sight of the results. In the
meantime they developed the drop-in. And when the results came out it was
not exactly 'oh yes that's very interesting but let's get on with the drop-ins', but
it wasn't far away from that, and I think t/zat dislocation is indicative of the
fact that they didn't own the survey and the results, because they weren't
involved early enough in the process.
(Professional, November 1993)
According to the professional quoted above, the failure to directly involve the
volunteers in the design of the questionnaire from the outset, not only led to a failure
to establish cultural synthesis, but also had the effect of alienating the volunteers from
the body of knowledge they were producing. The 'official' reason for not bringing the
professionals and volunteers together at this stage, was that the volunteers lacked the
necessary skills to interact effectively with the professionals and would, therefore, feel
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intimidated. As a result, the professionals were forced to rely exclusively on the
testimony of the community worker for information concerning the views of local
people. There is little evidence to suggest that genuine cultural synthesis occurred at
this stage of the project, rather it appears that the research agenda and questionnaire
design were for the most part professionally dominated and that the volunteers played
little part in the process.
• Subjectivity & objectivity
Professional dominance of the questionnaire design did not mean that the process was
free from controversy. The design of the questionnaire provoked heated debate, much
of which focused on the difficulty of reconciling the constraints of the quantitative
survey method with the desire to capture the authentic attitudes and opinions of the
local population. When interviewed about the strengths and weaknesses of the
methodology employed the WHAP members gave a range of answers. Some focused
on the perceived benefits of adopting a quantitative approach, either because it would
be acceptable to professionals and the statutory agencies:
I think the scientific, that would appeal to the professionals, so I think that is
good; otherwise you wouldn't be able to touch anybody if you didn't have a
scientific approach. So that is definite. It's made it more valid, hasn't it?
(Volunteer, June 1994)
...or, (from a different volunteer), because it would provide an objective basis for the
creation of inter-subjectivity:
I liked all the figures, 'cos that's important on any report, is the figures.
Because it said that this is actually happening, that it's not a figment of your
imagination. You 're not saying well there 's about twenty-five percent of this,
and seventeen of that, and that's about what we think This wasn't a think, this
was an actual, you know, happening. This was actually happening, and the




Others doubted that the quantitative approach had adequately captured the subjective
beliefs of the interviewees:
I can see the scientific aspect, but then you need to have a personal level as
well.
DW-WHY DO YOU THINK YOU NEED THAT PERSONAL APPROACH?
Because it gives you more information, a person like talking on a one to one,
you can find out much more, because like having a questionnaire, and it says
like, it gives you say three choices, you might not come into those three
choices, but you choose one, just to put a tick, so it's like misinformation
really.
(Volunteer, June 1994)
This dilemma can be read as a purely methodological dispute between the advocates
of qualitative and quantitative research, but there is a more fundamental reason for this
dispute that lies at the heart of the communicative model of knowledge and action.
The model demanded that WHAP capture the authentic voice of the local community,
and that the research findings must be presented in a form acceptable to the statutory
agencies, but these two imperatives are logically incompatible. Tapping into the
authentic voice of the community must entail enabling local people to produce inter-
subjective knowledge about their concerns and how they might be addressed, as such
it is a form of sensuous human activity, a process of communication and planning for
action - it is the production of knowledge by and for the community. Such knowledge
can never be acceptable to the statutory agencies because it assumes that the
identification of needs and strategies for meeting them are open-ended, and that the
community should choose which needs to address and how to address them. But the
state offers a limited range of services operating within tight structural and ideological
constraints, as such, the state may be interested in statistical data about the number of
people requiring such services, it may even respond to 'tips' on how the services can
be 'improved', but the assumption is always that the structural constraints are
immutable and that decision-making power resides with the state.
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Thus, presenting the authentic voice of the community in a form that is acceptable to
the statutory agencies is an irresolvable contradiction. The state is interested in
quantitative knowledge about the community, not in the process by which people
become conscious of their needs and take direct action to meet them. WHAP
struggled to overcome this contradiction by quibbling over the content of the
questionnaire in an attempt to embed the subjective beliefs of the community into a
quantitative methodology. Having failed to achieve a genuine partnership with local
people, that would have entailed integrating the research into their conscious practical
activity, WHAP attempted to compromise by trying to include a sensitive account of
people's individual beliefs, into what would inevitably be a lifeless statistical account.
As the following quotation suggests, such a compromise must inevitably be
unsatisfactory:
• . f you didn't have it statistically acceptable, it was useless, [...] It had to
have a kind of professionalism to it, and it had to have the back up you get
from people [inaudible], so the University of Kent, you know, Calnan, [the
academic consultant] that was absolutely needed, it needed that cache [...]
you are then asking [about the] making of that questionnaire, between people
who were on the scientific end of the scale, and those who were much more
[on the] community based end of the scale. And in the first period it was one
of the frictions within the steering group, [...] So it was a process of moving
conflict to a kind of working compromise, between involvement and
statistically relevant facts, that in some ways left a lot of people feeling they
didn't get quite what they wanted. And that's the problem with compromise - it
has that quality.
(Professional, September 1994)
WHAP failed to achieve an acceptable compromise because it was trying to combine
two quite separate and irreconcilable activities - the production of knowledge by and
for the community, with the production of knowledge about the community, but for
the state. The communicative model of knowledge and action is based on the
assumption that this contradiction can be resolved, however, the empirically grounded
analysis presented above suggests that this is not possible.
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U Science & ideology
Criticism of the methodology adopted by WHAP was not limited to the process of
data collection; as the following quotation suggests, the interpretation of research
findings was felt to be equally problematic:
I don't believe in all these so called surveys, [...] sometimes they sit there and
they take certain things from certain surveys and they put them together, and
it's all computerised [...] Let me give you an example, somebody had the
cheek to bring in a newspaper cutting, to show me about a survey that had
been done, [...] according to this survey, all Spaniards were dirty and didn't
wash, because they didn't buy soaps. What was the most aggravating and
annoying part of it was did they bother to find out [whether] they bought other
toiletries? [...] when I was in Spain in August 1 really made a big point of
going.. each family member I went to, I looked in the bathroom, and I thought
have they got any bars of soap, and I actually saw there are no bars of soap.
At the sink there was things like them bottles that you squirt - the soap squirts
out. In the shower it was all shower gels and things. Plenty of toiletries, but
no bars of soap. So..
(Volunteer, December 1993)
The essential point in the above quotation is that the interpretation of survey data may
not take adequate account of cultural variations, with the result that misleading or false
conclusions may be drawn. Partly this revisits arguments presented above, about the
need to develop cultural synthesis with the population being researched, and that
failure to do so may render quantitative methods insensitive to the respondents'
subjective meanings. However, when these concerns were raised earlier they related
to the process of data collection, the above quotation moves the argument into the
level of interpretation and theory construction. The following quotation, this time
from one of the professionals, makes a similar point, but refers directly to the WHAP
survey, and implies that such errors of interpretation may be more intentional than
accidental:
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• . . say we came across a finding that we didn't like, or that some professionals
didn't like, there'd be some like qualifying explanation, you know. Particularly
when it came to equal opportunities issues. Like when you didn't expect so
many women to be concerned about this, then suddenly there was a qualifying
statement, and that was not applied in other categories. [...] in the way it was
presented there was a bias [to] support the under dogs, the oppressed, to
ensure that it wouldn't be used against them and it could be used for them.
And! think the motives were justified, but [...] there is a danger that jf you do
that kind of thing it actually detracts from the objectivity of the exercise. [...]
And I think also, if I'd written the report I would have abandoned objectivity
all together (laughter) it would have been a propaganda document, because
that's the way I like to write them. You know there's a discipline about
scientjfic objectivity which I get bored with, partly because I want it to be
read by the people. I would be influenced more by journalism than by
academia. But fin aware that this was essentially an academic project.
(Professional, February 1994)
There is an important contradiction in this quotation. First, it is suggested that
professional concerns about equality led to a distorted interpretation or presentation of
the data, and that this undermined the validity of the research. But on the other hand it
is argued that the 'discipline about scientific objectivity' associated with the adoption
of an 'academic' perspective, limited the ability to draw political conclusions from the
research. This contradiction is not simply a logical inconsistency or slip of the tongue
on the part of the professional who articulated it, rather it reflects another fundamental
problem with the communicative model of knowledge and action.
The above quotation, and the one before it, both express doubts about the process of
interpreting and drawing conclusions from statistical data. On one hand it was
recognised that this process is vulnerable to manipulation and distortion. But on the
other hand, as the second quotation implies, it was recognised that interpretation is
essential if recommendations for action are to be derived. The process of moving
from raw data to recommendations for action was a problem for WHAP on two
counts: first, because the failure to establish a genuine partnership with local people
meant that interpretation of the data would have to be conducted in their absence, and
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therefore be open to accusations of manipulation or distortion, and secondly, because
the injunction to produce information in a form that was acceptable to the statutory
agencies ruled out a critical reading of the data.
Although the volunteers had met with the professionals by the time the survey data
had been processed, they did not take an active role in its interpretation. Several
reasons for this absence were advanced in the interviews, for instance, it was felt that
analysis and report writing were technical skills for which the professionals were best
equipped. Perhaps more importantly, as noted above, the volunteers and the broader
community had very little involvement in the research design, and it is therefore
hardly surprising that they showed little interest in interpreting the results.
Responsibility for analysing the survey data and writing the report fell to me, and
under the constraints outlined above, I felt that I could only give a description of the
basic frequencies for each question, disaggregated into population sub-groups, and
with some statistical correlation between variables. Inevitably, some interpretation
was given, but I tried to keep this to a minimum, and did not include recommendations
or plans for action in the report. My intention was to produce a fairly unmediated
base-line of statistical information from which proposals for action could be deduced.
However, despite the concerns, expressed above, about the ideological character of
interpretation, many of the WHAP members regretted the absence of firm proposals
for action:
I think it was emasculated really. I think it was presented as what was an
acceptable academic community development piece of work, and in a way that
was useful for references and for other, you know, used in libraries and by
other academics. I think it missed out some of the vividness, you know, and
perhaps the political points that could have been made out - there was a lot
more that could have been implied from the findings, and never was. It was
just presented as 'these are the findings' as if they were just objective reified
facts, you know, and the link between them and the reality is sort of lost.
(Professional, October 1994)
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We have already noted that the production of a political interpretation, and firm
proposals for action, was limited by the failure to establish a partnership with local
people and the injunction to produce information in a form acceptable to the statutory
agencies. But these are not the only reasons. It was also felt that such an analysis
would undermine the 'scientific' validity of the research, rendering it 'ideological'.
The following quotation highlights the dilemma:
I would have quite liked some kind of key points. I mean like definite
recommendations for action, highlighting some of the more striking findings
that came out [...] like we could have come out and said that we think this
clearly shows that this is what needs to be done, [but] that might not be the
nature of an objective scientific presentation.
(Professional, February 1994)
It seems then, that there was a further contradiction in the communicative model of
knowledge and action, between the need to produce findings which were scientifically
objective, and the need to produce the type of analysis that would yield concrete
proposals for action, but which would go beyond scientific objectivity and might,
therefore, be construed as ideological. This tension does not in itself explain the lack
of recommendations in the final report, which was also the product of the lack of
cultural synthesis between the members of the group, which led to an inability to
internally mediate the survey data, and construct a theoretical analysis capable of
yielding concrete proposals for action.
Mediation of the research findings
The previous section examined the ways in which the members of WHAP went about
designing and conducting their research, and the difficulties and contradictions they
encountered in doing so. This section is concerned with the processes by which that
body of knowledge was communicated, whether the 'message' was mediated
effectively, and the extent to which the research and mediation process benefited the
project. This distinction between the research process and the mediation of the
knowledge produced is slightly misleading, as it implies two discrete processes, when
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in fact the two are closely linked. The extent to which anticipation of the process of
mediation influenced the research process is discussed above, for example,
assumptions about what type of information would be acceptable to the statutory
agencies influenced the research design and data analysis. Similarly, the failure to
achieve a genuine partnership with either the volunteers or the broader population
during the research process, meant that the findings of the survey were encountered as
something alien, that is, as information about the community, that needed to be
communicated to them, rather than information by and for the community, that they
would already be conscious of and committed to.
The mediation process involved the publication of a 70 page report, a 27 page
summary report, the production of a video, public meetings to which local residents
and the press were invited, and presentations to statutory agencies and other local
groups.
U The report
Before considering the interview data concerning the report, it is important to note that
when I conducted the interviews I was in effect asking the WHAP members to
comment on a document that I had written. This is potentially a source of bias, in
terms of the questions I chose to ask, the respondents' willingness to be critical, and
also my selection of which quotations to include in this chapter. Whilst a degree of
distortion is inevitable under these circumstances, I was consciously aware of these
issues when conducting the interviews and analysing the findings, and attempted to
reduce bias to a minimum. These issues are discussed in the appendix on
methodology.
We noted above that according to the communicative model of knowledge and action,
the primary audience for the survey findings was the local statutory agencies. This
was reflected in the style and content of the full report and the summary:
I think it needed a short impact statement, written three or four sides,
written very accessibly. I think our marketing's looked very clearly at agencies
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and the professional classes; we've done it better on the 'Guardian' reader's,
the health and social services journals, than we have on local people.
(Professional, September 1994)
Whether or not the intended audience of 'Guardian readers' in the local statutory
agencies actually read or understood the report, is a question that lies beyond the scope
of this study. However, the interview transcripts do point out that the length of the
report, its statistical content, and the type of language used, meant that many of the
WHAP volunteers found it inaccessible. I also asked the interviewees if they thought
that other local people would read and understand the report:
No! because you fuckin', excuse my language, but its like you open it up and
there's [opens a copy of the summary report and chooses a word at random]
tizis 'dissonance' [pronounced dishonoursance] you know you could use a
different word.
(Volunteer, June 1994)
Whilst recognising the validity of the point that the length and linguistic style of the
report made it largely inaccessible to many of the volunteers and possibly to certain
sections of the local population, it does not automatically follow that a significantly
shorter and less complex report would have been more widely read - a point made by
one of the professionals in the following quotation:
.It 's a classic none book culture in which we are. There are some people
obviously who will read it, of course, but no, if it was a four page summary it
would not be read by the majority of people around here.
(Professional, November 1994)
That a formal statistical report of survey findings, no matter how short, is unlikely to
be read by members of a deprived community, is a valid point. There is also a danger
that in summarising and simplifying survey findings, their explanatory power and
epistemological status might be compromised. Whilst the summary of the report
could have been more concise, it was also important that the full report gave a detailed
account of the findings, the methodology, and the statistical analysis. This was
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particularly so because of the need to convince the statutory agencies that the research
had been conducted to 'scientific' standards.
It is also important to re-iterate the fact that the volunteers were largely alienated from
the research design and the data analysis - the report was not by them or for them, it
was about them, supposedly to enable the statutory agencies to act on their behalf.
This alienation extended to the mediation of the report, for example, one of the
volunteers I interviewed complained that WHAP had not engaged in extensive group
discussion of the report. In other words, little attempt was made to explain the
findings of the report to the volunteers, or to embed those findings in their
consciousness. One of the reasons that this mediation did not occur is because the
communicative model of knowledge and action assumes that the statutory institutions
will be the main agent of change. According to this model the findings should be
reported back to the local community, but this is merely a courtesy, it is assumed that
there is no need for the findings to influence the conscious practical activity of local
people, because they are not seen as the primary agents of change.
U The Video
To complement the report, and to provide a medium for the survey findings that would
be more accessible to the local population, the group decided to make a video, which
would include footage of the locality, interviews with the WHAP members, and
statistical data from the report. The community development worker was given
responsibility for producing the video, and recruited two film students from the local
college to assist her. Unfortunately, the finished product looked like a film school
project, although aesthetically pleasing, it said little about the survey, or the broader
project, and was not produced in a usable tape format until early in 1995. This meant
that the video could not be used to support the public meetings and presentations to
the statutory agencies, or to circulate amongst community groups. Given the difficulty
of mediating the survey results to the local population in a written form, the failure to
make use of this more accessible medium must be viewed as a missed opportunity.
The shortcomings of the 'official' video contrast strongly with a film made earlier in
the project by the volunteers themselves, using a hand held camcorder:
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one of the first things they'd done was, on their own volition, was to take a
video of all the things they didn 't like around the estate. It was a very good
video, much better than the one which is professionally produced, because it
was real, it had an immediacy. It was amateurish, but it showed the rubbish,
the dog mess - it was their eyes view, it was how they see it, and I think it was
very good for that, very fresh.
(Professional, November 1993)
This contrast between the 'official' video and the one produced earlier by the
volunteers, points again to a fundamental flaw in the way that WHAP went about
producing and mediating knowledge, namely the volunteers alienation from the
research process. Thus, the volunteers were able to produce a video which expressed
their own subjective perspective on some of the problems confronting them in their
everyday lives, but when it came to producing a video to illustrate the research
findings, they were not considered to be competent partners, because the failure to
achieve cultural synthesis during the earlier research process meant that the volunteers
could not make the connection between their own subjective perspective and the
findings of the research. if the video shows anything, it is the double alienation of the
volunteers, first in the production of knowledge, then again in its mediation.
U Public Meetings and Presentations to Statutory Agencies
Mediation of the research findings culminated in a series of public meetings and
presentations to the statutory agencies. Press briefings were also given, resulting in
some coverage in local newspapers and radio. Although the volunteers had very little
involvement in the report writing and video making, several of them played an active
role in the public meetings and presentations. However, their contributions tended to
focus on personal experiences, including their involvement in administering the
survey, and later on in the Drop-in, rather than on presenting the actual survey
findings, which tended to be left to the professionals in the group.
Despite WHAP's best efforts to advertise them, the public meetings were poorly
attended, and did not lead to popular campaigns to act on the survey findings, or to a
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significant increase in recruitment to WHAP. Many of the interviewees blamed the
poor attendance on situational factors like poor advertising, choice of venue, or as the
following quotation suggests, public apathy:
you need good speakers that people want to come and hear, or it's got to be
an interesting subject. But on the whole people are more interested in
watching the television or going to the pub. I mean, to be honest, there's no
shortage of public meetings to go to, and I find that they can be very turgid
and for a lot of people it's seen as an opportunity for people to pontificate.
They actually feel right from the start that this is not for them, it's above their
heads, unless it's something that particularly angers or motivates them.
(Professional, February 1994)
There is some value in this viewpoint, and a more reactive issue, like opposition to a
hospital closure, might have provoked a greater public response. However, as we have
already noted, the difficulty that WHAP encountered in mediating the research
findings cannot be divorced from the process by which the knowledge was produced.
Thus, the local population were not interested in the findings of the research because
they were alienated from its production, and because it was not designed to inform
their conscious practical activity, but to guide the statutory agencies in the provision of
services.
One of the benefits of presenting the research findings to the statutory agencies was
that they were in many senses a captive audience. Thus the attendance and quality of
debate were an improvement on the public meetings, enabling the WHAP members to
engage directly with their target audience. But much more was expected from them;
according to the communicative model of knowledge and action, the presentation of
research findings to the statutory agencies should have provoked a whole series of
concrete actions, including genuine improvements in the provision of health related
services, and additional funding for WHAP. According to this criteria the success of
the presentations was more questionable, as the following quotation suggests:
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I think it was a reasonable attempt. It's the sort of thing that you would do with
those sort of results, as a way of disseminating the information from that
survey. Whether it was effective or not - I would have to say I thought it
probably wasn 't, cos apart from the ones I've mentioned I don't know of any
great initiatives that have flowed from that...
(Professional, October 1994)
As the above quotation suggests, representatives of the statutory agencies may have
listened attentively to WHAP's message, but they were under no obligation to actively
address the issues raised by the survey. Again this refers to a problem with the
communicative model of knowledge and action, which is based on the assumption that
the state fails to address the needs of the population through lack of adequate
knowledge, and that merely providing that information will be sufficient to prompt
positive action. But without the popular support needed to enforce demands for
change, the state can easily ignore them, and this appears to have been the case here.
WHAP's efforts to mediate the research findings to the local population and the
statutory agencies were largely unsuccessful. The failure to achieve cultural synthesis
with local people in conducting the research, meant that they were for the most part
uninterested in the findings of the survey. The statutory agencies were prepared to
give WHAP a hearing, but were reluctant to take significant action. These findings
confirm the theoretical weakness of the communicative model of knowledge and
action adopted by WHAP.
Re-thinking the agenda
As the following quotation suggests, many of WHAP's members were aware that their
attempt to influence the statutory agencies had for the most part failed.
I think we've had our day, we've said it, and having said it and everybody
thinking it's been interesting for a month, it seems to have sort of become part
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of the mire of previous reports, and I don't know what's happening to it, or
what good it's done us or anybody else...
(Professional, September 1994)
Not only had WHAP failed to significantly influence statutory service provision, they
had also not obtained the funding required to expand the project. In effect, this
amounts to recognition that the communicative model of knowledge and action was
not a viable means of achieving WHAP's original aims of enabling local people to
exercise greater influence over the social, economic and environmental influences on
health. We have already noted that this original agenda was established by the
professionals at the beginning of the project, before the volunteers became involved.
Indeed, many of the volunteers never came to share this agenda, for example when I
asked the volunteer quoted below if she thought that the survey was worth the time
and resources invested in it, she replied:
Well I really don't know David. For me personally, I enjoy coming here I
enjoy doing this, I enjoy whatever bit of responsibility I'm getting, I like all
that. But I mean, as for what people who designed the questionnaire, what
they wanted out of it, I don't know jf they've got it. But me personally, I mean I
got my kids bikes from doing that questionnaire, so for me, it's benefited me.
Now whether it's benefited anybody else, I think only time will tell.
(Volunteer, June 1994)
Thus, the benefit of the research is conceptualised in terms of personal financial gain
and raised self-esteem. Partly, this might be expected from one of the volunteers, in
that they did not instigate the research process, they did not share the professionals
commitment to the communicative model of knowledge and action, and even those
who participated in gathering the data did so in an alienated fashion, as paid workers.
However, the failure to achieve change through the statutory agencies led the
professionals to significantly re-think their original agenda, subordinating their
aspirations for broader social change, to the more individualistic approach favoured by
the volunteers:
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the survey confirmed to local people, and particularly the volunteers in
WHAP, the [prevalence ofi stress and mental illness; and their response of
establishing a Drop-in, a talking shop for people, where they could have their
nails manicured, and facials, and all that Sort of thing, I think was their way of
saying this is something concrete, this is something we can do, this fulfils our
needs to actually be doing something, to be meeting the people, to be offering
a service, [...] the amount of mental stress and distress that came out, and the
consequent behaviours of heavy drinking and all the rest of it, was the top of
the list really, it was the main issue - which I thought was quite a significant
finding. And I think the Drop-in can be seen to have been WHAP's response to
try and do something, you know to deal with, to offer a facility for people that
were [at] their wits end.
(Professional, October 1994)
Whether the research findings inspired the Drop-in, or were simply used to legitimate
it's continued existence is immaterial to the argument; the failure to use the findings of
the survey to influence the statutory agencies led to the development of an
individualised conceptualisation of the projects objectives, which in turn brought
about a fundamental shift in the focus of the project away from the achievement of
change at the social level, towards the establishment of a self-help ethos. These points
are emphasised in the following quotation from one of the professionals:
I think that the information gathered.. has had a very limited impact on the
local population. [...] I think what we've basically done is to focus in on stress,
and we've homed in on the Drop-in. Not least because it's something we can
actually do [...] I think it's had an impact in bringing about the Drop-in and
the reduction of stress levels to people, calling in there perhaps. I think that it
has energised and facilitated the people who conducted the survey, I'm
thinking of the volunteers, and therefore Pauline say, will be emboldened,
more than she was before, to speak up for people who are disabled. They're




By the end of the research and mediation process it was apparent to many of the
professionals involved in WHAP that the original objectives had not been met and
were unlikely to be so, however, rather than bringing the project to a close, this failure
led to a re-definition of the project. Instead of intervening at the social level to
improve the health of the local population as a whole, WHAP would increasingly
focus on the direct provision of 'services' to a small number of individuals attending
the Drop-in. Much of this work focused on the reduction of stress and depression by
providing informal social support and counselling. This re-thinking of WHAP's
agenda also signalled a change in the relationship between the professionals and
volunteers; rather than being 'partners' in the pursuit of change, the volunteers were
increasingly seen as 'clients', to be developed and guided by the professionals. This
reflects a fundamental change in the nature of the project away from community
development towards the new mode of empowerment examined in chapter five.
Provisional Conclusions
In chapter one I attempted to assess the emancipatory potential of five modes of
empowerment, and found all but one to be constrained by a self-limiting internal logic
that led to an uncritical acceptance of oppressive social relations, or, in the case of the
'self-help' category, to the adoption of a subjectivist approach to epistemology that
denied the possibility of producing emancipatory knowledge.
The exception was the 'community development' category, which had no such self-
limiting internal logic, even though in practice it's advocates would confront many of
the structural, institutional, and epistemological constraints encountered by the other
modes of empowerment. The lack of a self-limiting internal logic meant that the
outcome of this confrontation could not be theoretically deduced, and that empirical
enquiry was required to assess the emancipatory potential of community development.
The description of WHAP presented in chapter two revealed that it had initially
adopted an agenda that was characteristic of the community development perspective,
thus enabling the above issue to be studied. This chapter is specifically concerned
with the way in which WHAP produced and mediated a body of knowledge on local
attitudes to health.
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WHAP's decision to produce an alternative body of knowledge was taken by the
professionals before the volunteer members had been recruited. Examination of the
professionals' assumptions and expectations of the research process led to the
construction of a model, referred to as 'the Communicative Model of Knowledge and
Action', (CMKA). The model is based on the assumption that the statutory agencies
offer the most viable means of addressing the main influences on the health of the
local population. However, this potential was thought to be inhibited by inadequate
knowledge of the health needs and preferences of the community. According to the
model, WHAP would remedy this inadequacy by acting as a conduit through which
the authentic views of local people could be communicated to the statutory agencies
in a form that they would find intelligible and valid. It was assumed that the
production of such knowledge would lead to provision of more appropriate services,
closer regulation of the potentially health damaging and health enhancing activities of
other groups, such as local industry, and continued financial support for WHAP in its
role as mediator.
The first thing to note about the model is that although it rejects the use of existing
institutional arrangements for community participation, such as the Community Health
Councils, or non-executive membership of Health Authorities, it shares much of the
internal logic of the 'community participation' category. Fundamental to this
perspective is the assumption that the statutory agencies are the legitimate agents of
change, and that the role of the local population is simply to clearly express its needs
and preferences via representatives. As such the model is one of social reform, rather
than radical transformation; seeking the amelioration of health and social problems via
an extension of existing welfare state provision.
The study revealed that the CMKA was underpinned by a tacit acceptance of the
alienation inherent in the state-form, with the result that even if the model had worked
according to plan the outcome would have been the improved performance of existing
statutory agencies rather than a re-distribution of social and economic power,
therefore, it can be concluded that the model possesses a self-limiting internal logic.
The most that the model could offer the local population was the opportunity to soften
the impact of alienation rather than an opportunity to challenge it.
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In the event even this modest objective could not be realised. Essentially the model
overlooks the material basis of the contradiction between the local population and the
statutory agencies, and assumes that the question of alienation can be addressed
discursively within the project itself. There are two problems here, (or rather two
aspects of the same problem), first, the assumption that the authentic health needs and
preferences of the population can be identified by research and presented to the
statutory agencies in a form that they will find intelligible and valid, secondly, that the
statutory agencies will have any incentive to act on this information.
The reason these two factors are described as aspects of the same problem is that they
both represent manifestations of the underlying problem of alienation. The second
factor is relatively transparent and easy to grasp; the local statutory agencies are not
obliged to act on the information they receive from the project, because, (despite the
election of local councillors), they are ultimately accountable to the Treasury for the
money they spend, (even that which is raised from local taxation). Whilst there may
be some scope for making marginal changes in the distribution of resources, in the
current economic situation it is unlikely that the overall level of funding will increase
in real terms. This does not mean that the statutory agencies must inevitably reject
every proposal put forward by a project like WHAP, for example, such proposals may
coincide with the agencies objectives, particularly if they involve the possibility of an
overall reduction in costs, such as the funding of voluntary services to lessen the
demand for expensive statutory provision, or the recommendations may be
implemented as a relatively inexpensive legitimation exercise. But the important thing
to grasp is that the statutory agencies are not obliged to implement such
recommendations, particularly in the current conjuncture when the traditional means
of pursuing such claims, (for example, industrial action), have become less effective.
The statutory agencies may choose to implement a recommendation, if it fits an
existing agenda, and if it can be accomplished within the increasingly narrow
parameters for change allowed by central government, but there is little incentive to
act upon any but the smallest demands, no matter how authentically they represent the
views of the local population, or how rationally they are articulated.
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The first factor is more difficult to grasp, because it involves a transformation from the
material basis of alienation to the discursive level. Put more simply, instead of
addressing the fact that local people have virtually no control over the production and
distribution of goods and services provided by the statutory agencies, the model re-
defines this problem as one of communication, implying that all the local community
needs to do in order to have its needs and preferences met is to rationally identify them
and articulate them to the statutory agencies in an intelligible form. Of course, this
transformation does not resolve the real material problem of alienation, because as we
noted above, the statutory agencies have no obligation to act on the knowledge
produced, but also because the alienated social relationship between the local
population and the statutory agencies must inevitably re-surface within the process of
producing and mediating knowledge. However, because the CMKA transposes
alienation from material social relations to the level of discursivity, the phenomenon
presents itself as a series of forms or appearances that are not immediately intelligible.
Thus the problem faced by the local population of obtaining control over the
production and distribution of goods and services, re-presented itself as a series of
epistemological and methodological difficulties, namely: (i) the problem of creating
cultural synthesis between the professionals involved in WHAP and representatives of
the local population, (ii) the problem of developing a research design that was
sensitive to the subjective views of the population, but also yielded 'objective'
quantitative data, (iii) the problem of using 'scientific' data to inform an analysis and
set of recommendations that might appear 'ideological', and therefore invalidate the
claim to scientificity, and (iv) the problem of finding effective ways of mediating the
knowledge back to the local population.
It could be argued that rather than being manifestations of alienation the above
problems are simply technical difficulties that could be resolved within the parameters
of the CMKA, for example, the difficulty of achieving cultural synthesis might have
been reduced if the professionals had directly participated in the out-reach work at the
beginning of the project, or if the volunteers had been brought into the steering group
meetings earlier than they were. Similarly, it might have been possible to find a
methodology that more adequately grasped the subjective beliefs of the local
population, or to give more time for group discussion of the research findings and the
development of concrete recommendations, or to draw more people into the public
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meetings by better advertising. Whatever the merits of such arguments, it is worth
noting the extent to which the political objective of enabling people to exercise greater
control over the factors that influence their health, becomes de-politicised by adoption
of the CMKA, which transforms the struggle for power into a series of technical
difficulties. In this sense, the CMKA is ideological, even though the intentions of the
professionals whose views it represents were relatively critical.
Returning to the four key themes mentioned above: cultural synthesis, subjectivity and
objectivity, science and ideology, and, the mediation of knowledge; it was suggested
above that the difficulties presented by each of these themes were in fact a
manifestation of alienation, or more precisely, of the attempt to overcome alienation at
a discursive level, rather than simply technical difficulties that could be remedied
within the confines of the CMKA. The case study materials and interview transcripts
analysed above, suggest that WHAP failed to arrive at a satisfactory solution to any of
the above themes: there was little evidence of cultural synthesis between the
professionals and volunteers either in the planning, conduct, analysis or mediation of
the research, the tension between adopting a qualitative approach which would be
sensitive to the subjective beliefs of the local population and adopting a quantitative
approach which it was hoped would be acceptable to the statutory agencies was not
resolved, similarly, the tension between 'scientific' objectivity and the production of
the type of analysis from which firm recommendations and a plan of action could be
derived was also not adequately addressed, and the attempts to communicate the
findings of the survey to the broader population seem to have enjoyed only limited
success.
The question is, were these failings specific to WHAP, either because of the
incompetence of the people involved or because of other context specific factors, or
were they the inevitable product of the CMKA's inability to address alienation, and
therefore, generalisable to any situation where the model is applied. The first step in
answering this question is to look more closely at the four themes.
The creation of a research partnership, between the professionals in the project and the
local population, was considered to be essential to the success of the initiative. One of
the defining goals of the CMKA was to produce knowledge that represented the
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authentic views of the local population. This would entail the professionals adopting
a close understanding of the experiences, concerns and opinions of local people, and
by the same token, the active involvement of local people in the design conduct and
analysis of the research. This partnership can more precisely be referred to as 'cultural
synthesis', because it entails the professionals adopting the worldview of local people,
and local people obtaining access to the skills and resources of the professionals. We
noted above that this partnership or cultural synthesis failed to materialise, both in the
planning of the research and in the analysis of the findings. We also noted some of the
practical reasons for this: that the out-reach work was done by the community worker,
rather than by all of the professionals, and that the volunteers were not brought into
the steering group until after the research had been conducted. But the question
remains; if these technical difficulties had been overcome, would cultural synthesis
have occurred?
To answer this question we need to look at why it was considered so important in the
first place. If we return to the CMKA it can be seen that cultural dissonance between
professionals working in the statutory agencies and members of the local community
plays a central explanatory role - in short the model assumes that the failure to
adequately meet the health needs of the population results from a failure to adequately
understand the nature of those needs and preferences, a deficiency that the CMKA
aims to remedy. Thus, according to the model, the role of the professionals was to
obtain a clearer understanding of local people's needs, in order that they could be
reported back to the statutory agencies for action. But what was the basis of this
cultural dissonance? There are a number of potential factors, including: income,
educational attainment, ethnicity, and experience of adverse life experiences.
However, even if the professionals involved in the project had been able to witness
first hand what it means to live on a low income, or to live in poor quality housing, or
to experience racism on a daily basis, and see for themselves the impact of those
factors on people's health, they would still be incapable of adopting the perspective of
the community members.
The reason for this inevitable failure to achieve cultural synthesis stems from the fact
that the CMKA does not address the objective factors that limit the professionals'
ability to adopt a community perspective, namely, their location within the statutory
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agencies. No matter how closely welfare professionals observe the local population,
or how sympathetic they are to their problems, or even, how critical they become of
the statutory agencies, they are still in the last instance paid employees of the state and
must conduct themselves accordingly. Several practical consequences flow from the
objective location of the professionals within the state: first, is the injunction against
becoming involved in overtly political activity, second, is what might be termed
professional responsibility, this includes responsibility for ensuring that budgets and
resources under their control are used lawfully and in accordance with the objectives
of their organisation, and an obligation to perform professional duties. In some
instances, for example, social work, this might entail responsibility for child
protection, more generally it means that professionals have a job description and that
they must be able to show that their time is spent on activities relating to that job
description. There is, of course, some scope for flexibility, but for the most part the
professionals are obliged to do the job they are paid for.
The extent to which the structural location of the professionals influenced their
relationship with the volunteers is discussed in chapter four, for now it is sufficienìt to
note that it created an insurmountable obstacle to cultural synthesis; while ever
professionals retain their position in the statutory agencies, they must act within the
constraints of a professional role. This effectively drives a wedge between welfare
professionals and the community that no amount of direct contact and subjective
empathy can eradicate. In this sense attempts at cultural synthesis can never amount to
more than cultural reconnaissance - professionals may obtain an understanding of the
perspective held by local people, but they cannot actively side with the community in
opposition to the interests of the state.
In summary, the impulse to achieve cultural synthesis between local people and
professionals working for statutory agencies represents a transformation from the
objective level of material social relations, to the subjective level of discursivity - it is
an attempt to resolve by talk the alienation that is embedded in the state-form. The
extent to which professionals can obtain an understanding of the beliefs and
experiences of local people is variable, depending on the extent of their exposure to,
and interaction with, community groups. However, no matter how successful this
process is, it can never lead to cultural synthesis, because the location of the
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professionals within a statutory agency means that while ever their involvement in a
community project is in a professional capacity they cannot objectively side with the
community in opposition to their employer. Thus the CMKA is fundamentally flawed
because it mistakes the structural basis of alienation for cultural dissonance, which it
assumes can be resolved through interaction.
The second theme was the methodological tension between the use of qualitative
methods to capture the subjective beliefs of the local population and the desire to
produce objective quantitative data that would be acceptable to the statutory agencies.
It would be possible to construct a vulgar reading of this tension, in which the attempt
to use qualitative methods to gain an authentic grasp of the subjective beliefs of the
local population was sacrificed in order to produce the type of quantitative data that
would be acceptable to the statutory agencies. Indeed there is some truth in this
argument, but again it fails to recognise the extent to which this methodological debate
represents a transformation from the material basis of alienation. This becomes
apparent when we look at the ambivalence to methodological issues exhibited by
many of the WHAP members when interviewed. Many of the interviewees were
aware of the epistemological strengths of quantitative data, in terms of
generalisability, validity, and crucially as a basis for creating inter-subjectivity. At the
same time, the strength of qualitative methods in obtaining a more in-depth
understanding of subjective attitudes and beliefs was also recognised. But why was it
considered so important that the research process should synthesise both approaches,
and why was there so much concern that the movement from a qualitative approach in
the out-reach work, to a quantitative approach in the actual survey would entail a
movement from subjective to objective knowledge?
Again, the answer lies in the way in which the project addressed the problem of
alienation. We noted above that the achievement of cultural synthesis was considered
to be a key element of the approach, and that the out-reach work in the first six months
of the project was meant to achieve this, by the application of qualitative methods. As
we noted above, the process of achieving cultural synthesis failed, as it was inevitably
bound to, given the structural location of the professionals. This meant that rather
than having a research partnership in which the professionals and volunteers jointly
designed, conducted and analysed the research, the project remained professionally
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dominated, with the volunteers having very little input. However, professional
dominance could not easily be accommodated within the CMKA, which cites the
adoption of a community perspective as the key criteria of research validity. Thus in
order to preserve the validity of the research the WHAP members sought to
compensate for the lack of cultural synthesis by trying to embed a qualitative element
into what was essentially a quantitative survey. This proved controversial because it
came close to undermining the 'scientific' validity of the survey, which was
considered equally important.
The quantitative/qualitative debate, therefore represented a further transposition of the
objective alienation of the professionals from the local population. Initially, the
professionals attempted to overcome their alienation by striving for cultural synthesis
with the local population, when this attempt to form a genuine partnership with the
volunteers failed, as it inevitably would, the professionals further transposed their
alienation to a methodological level - having failed to access the subjectivity of the
population by the adoption of a community perspective, they sought to compensate by
making that subjectivity an object of the research process.
Again this attempt to overcome alienation was bound to fail. This becomes apparent
if we consider what would have happened if the decision had been taken to abandon
the quantitative research and adopt a qualitative approach instead, for instance, by
conducting in-depth interviews with a sample of the population, in order to more
adequately grasp their subjective experiences of health and illness. Whilst this might
well have given the professionals a clearer insight into the everyday lives and
experiences of local people, it would not have increased their ability to act on that
information, indeed it may even have reduced their ability to act. As employees of the
state the professionals would still be obliged to present their research findings to the
statutory agencies, in the hope of encouraging reform, but with purely subjective data
they would not have been able to conduct statistical tests of association between, for
instance, socio-economic variables and self reported indicators of health status, nor
would they be able to claim that the findings were representative of the population as a
whole, such limitations would hardly have made the statutory agencies more likely to
act. This is what lies behind the ambivalence expressed by the WHAP members, they
wanted to preserve the benefits of the quantitative method, in terms of its statistical
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rigour and the ability to totalise individual experiences as a basis for inter-subjectivity,
but they also wanted to use the research process to overcome their alienation from the
local population. The important point is, that even if they had sacrificed the former
objective in an attempt to achieve the latter, they would inevitably have failed, because
no matter how much they learned from the research about the subjective beliefs of the
population, their structural location within the statutory agencies would have stopped
them from adopting a community perspective in objective terms.
The third theme is the tension between the production of 'scientific' knowledge and
'ideology'. This problem had two facets: first, the extent to which the interpretation of
the research findings had been distorted by ideology, and secondly, the difficulty of
conducting a political analysis of the data capable of yielding concrete proposals for
action, without compromising the 'scientificity' of the research. Again the interview
transcripts revealed a degree of ambivalence on this issue; on one hand the findings of
the research were criticised on the grounds of interpretive bias, and on the other hand,
it was suggested that the analysis failed to draw conclusions or make
recommendations.
It was noted above that analysis of the research data and the writing of the report were
largely my responsibility, and that I had been reluctant to introduce analytical
concepts that had not been derived from group discussion, or to draw firm conclusions
for action. As neither the volunteers nor, (for the most part), the professionals, were
actively involved in the analysis of the research data, it would seem reasonable to
conclude that alienation was a key factor, however, it does not provide a full
explanation of the difficulty. It could be argued that if the volunteers and
professionals had played a greater role in the analysis of the research data they would
have been less suspicious of the findings produced, and also that as a group we would
have been able to produce a set of firm recommendations, but this would not have
resolved the tension between science and ideology.
The question would still remain as to whether the analysis and recommendations
represented an objective interpretation of the data or whether they were distorted by
ideology. The answer must inevitably be the latter. The reason for this is that the
production of knowledge intended to inform action must involve much more than the
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objective presentation of research findings, it must also include a set of aspirations for
change; it must reflect political will as well as rational inquiry. It is here that ideology
is at its most apparent. For example, the epidemiological evidence linking tobacco
consumption to lung cancer has a high degree of scientific validity, and is unlikely to
be considered ideological. But, this research finding is of no intrinsic value, until we
derive proposals for action which are based on it, and it is at this point that the
ideological aspect of knowledge becomes apparent, because proposals for action must
inevitably express assumptions about what it is possible to achieve using the research
findings.
To continue with the example of smoking and lung cancer, a number of possible
recommendations for action could be deduced from this observation: for instance,
further biological research into the ways in which the chemical constituents of tobacco
smoke effect changes in the reproduction of human cells, with a view to either
preventing the development of cancer or finding a cure, or alternatively, the search for
a harmless tobacco substitute. At a different level of intervention we might seek to
stop people from smoking by making it illegal, or by banning advertising, or by
conducting mass campaigns of health education. More critically, we might attempt to
alleviate the social factors that lead some people to smoke, or we might conclude that
a focus on smoking is a distraction from more important influences on health like
poverty or powerlessness and that we should, therefore, concentrate on tackling these
issues rather than smoking.
The point is that whichever course of action we choose the decision must inevitably be
a political one, shaped by factors like our understanding of what is viable at a specific
point in time, or estimates of who will benefit from the course of action and who will
lose out. Knowledge which is orientated towards action must, therefore, comprise an
element of political will as well as the distilled logic of rational inquiry, and to this
extent it must inevitably be ideological.
Recognising that all action orientated knowledge is ideological does not entail the
adoption of a relativist position in which all forms of analysis and sets of proposals are
accorded equal status - there are still criteria by which the adequacy of action
orientated knowledge can be judged. First is the extent to which analyses and
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conclusions are logically consistent with the research data. Secondly, such knowledge
can be judged by its emancipatory potential; this refers to the extent to which an
analysis either challenges oppressive social and economic structures or accepts them
as immutable. This criteria of emancipatory potential has both an objective and a
subjective element, both of which are historically specific; the former refers to the
material conditions effecting the viability of a set of proposals, for example, the level
of development of productive forces, and the latter refers to the will to achieve change,
(including the will to overcome the objective limitations on emancipation). The
evaluation of action orientated knowledge must, therefore, comprise the following
questions: are the recommendations for action logically consistent with the research
data?, and what is their emancipatory potential, given existing objective conditions
and the consciousness of the proposed agents of change?
Returning to the WHAP case study, the concerns expressed by the interviewees about
whether the analysis was scientifically valid and whether it developed adequate
recommendations can be re-conceptualised in the above terms, rather than as a tension
between science and ideology. We noted above the conditions under which the
findings of the survey were analysed and the extent to which this limited the process
of interpretation and the production of recommendations for action, and that this may
have given rise to the concerns expressed by the interviewees, but the question is,
could these concerns have been adequately addressed under different circumstances?
The first concern, about whether the research findings were logically consistent with
the research data is perhaps the easier issue to address. The rules of formal logic are
relatively transparent, and it is possible to imagine that if the professionals and
volunteers entered into sufficiently detailed discussion they would be able to identify
any instances where the findings of the analysis were not consistent with the research
data.
The second criteria, relating to emancipatory potential, is more problematic, because it
involves moving beyond the application of formal logic to the internal relationship
between data and proposals for action, towards a consideration of the objective
potential for change, and the articulation of the subjective will to bring about change.
There are three factors limiting the emancipatory potential of the knowledge produced
by WHAP, which would have prevailed even if the professionals and volunteers had
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played a more substantial role in the analysis. First, as the professionals were
structurally located within the statutory agencies they would have been obliged to
articulate proposals that were acceptable to their employers, and indeed the CMKA
explicitly states the need to produce knowledge in a form that is acceptable to the
statutory agencies. Limiting the range of potential analyses to those which would be
acceptable to the statutory agencies would of course be profoundly de-politicising,
and is an example of the way in which the professionals' structural alienation from the
volunteers and the broader local community serves to limit the emancipatory potential
of the project.
Although alienation is an important limitation on the production of emancipatory
knowledge, it is not the most important factor in this instance. Even if the
professionals had resigned en masse from the statutory agencies and developed a
genuine cultural synthesis with the local population there is no guarantee that the
knowledge produced would have been more emancipatory. The second factor limiting
the emancipatory potential of the knowledge produced by WHAP is that an adequate
appraisal of the objective conditions for change is not automatically available either to
unaided common sense, or to the model of social research employed by the project. A
key problem here is that many of the things we might seek to change actually present
themselves to experience as immutable natural laws, rather than as historically
specific social relations that can be transformed. Identifying the social nature of
phenomena can only be achieved by the application of critique. The constituent
elements of social critique are examined in the discussion section below, but in very
simple terms critique entails studying: the historical development of a phenomenon, its
relationship to other phenomena, its internal assumptions and contradictions, and the
conditions that must prevail for it to exist. Not only does the application of critique
reveal phenomena to be socially constructed, it also demonstrates their historicity or
tendency to change over time, and crucially, by revealing the dynamics of change,
critique indicates where, when and how we can intervene to consciously direct the
process of change.
Without the process of critique existing social and economic relations present
themselves to experience as ahistorical and unchangeable, leading us to scale down
our aspirations and seek minor reforms within the existing social and economic order,
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rather than pursuing our interests by consciously intervening in the process of change.
The absence of social critique must, therefore, act as an extreme limitation on the
production of emancipatory knowledge. Clearly, the location of the professionals
within the statutory agencies renders them incapable of engaging in social critique, or
even of being involved in a project that does. The CMKA dictates that the knowledge
produced by WHAP should be in a form acceptable to the statutory agencies, what this
means in practice is that the knowledge must be produced according to the
conventions of positivist social science, which excludes the application of social
critique. But, even if the obstacle of alienation was removed, for instance, if the
professionals resigned from the statutory agencies, there is no indication that they or
their colleagues in the local population would engage in social critique, or be able to
relate their experiences to the results of critique conducted by others. The assumption
is that if the community employs the techniques of positivist social scientific enquiry
to study its own experiences of health and illness emancipatory knowledge will result,
however, without the yeast of social critique to leaven the analytical bread it is
unlikely that the knowledge produced will amount to more than the call for minor
reforms within the existing social order.
The third factor relating to emancipatory potential is the extent to which action
orientated research is related to the political will of the population. It was suggested
above that the emancipatory potential of research findings depended upon relating the
results of empirical enquiry to an understanding of the objective conditions for change
derived from social critique, however, this would amount to very little unless the
recommendations for action stemming from such analysis were both constitutive of,
and expressive of, the political aspirations of the agents of change. Put simply, the
research process must begin from a position of the expressed concerns of the
population, and use the intellectual resources of research and social critique to enable
the population to obtain consciousness of the means by which those concerns can be
addressed. This does not mean, identifying the communities concerns, doing the
research, and presenting the community with a set of recommendations or proposals
for action. Nor does it mean conducting the analysis and then drafting
recommendations which reflect the communities current aspirations. Rather, political
will must be incorporated into the analytical process in a much more interactive way;
it must inform the analysis, but it must also be informed by it. Thus the assessment of
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the objective conditions for change must also take account of the political will (or
consciousness) of the community, but the political will of the community must also be
informed by the assessment of the objective conditions for change.
The point is that the production of emancipatory knowledge cannot be a linear process
in which the concerns of the community are identified, research is conducted and
recommendations are made, rather it must be a dialectical process in which new
recommendations for action are constantly being produced from the synthesis of
empirical research, social critique and political will. Rather than the production of
knowledge preceding action for change, it must be deeply integrated within it,
constantly informing and being informed by the struggle to achieve change. In
practice this means that the process of mediation between the producers of knowledge
and the population must be constant, and on-going. However, despite WHAP's
commitment to 'partnership' or cultural synthesis, the political will of the local
population, (or even that of the volunteers), was not brought to bear on the analytical
process. Instead, the production of knowledge was considered to be completed with
the writing of the report, which was then presented to the community as 'the results'
rather than as the basis for a mediated analysis capable of yielding a plan for action.
This brings us to the final theme, the problem of mediating the findings of the research
to the local population and to the statutory agencies. When presenting the analysis of
the interview transcripts above, it was noted that there was a conceptual difficulty in
separating issues around the presentation of research findings to the local population,
from earlier issues in the research process. Thus the failings of the mediation process
are in many respects representative of the project as a whole. For instance, the
mediation process was primarily focused on the statutory agencies rather than the local
population, not just in terms of the greater number of presentations, but also in the
style of the report and the type of language used. The failure to achieve cultural
synthesis with the volunteers was reflected in their lack of participation in the
production of the report and the video. But most importantly the mediation process
reflected the adoption of a positivist research perspective, in terms of the absence of
social critique and a failure to engage the political will of the local population. Rather
than producing emancipatory knowledge which informs and is informed by
community action, WHAP produced alienated knowledge designed to inform the
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activities of the statutory agencies. In line with the positivist model of research the
process of mediation was defined as the presentation of research findings, rather than
an on-going process of dialectical interaction with the local population.
The provisional conclusions presented above are drawn from an analysis of the issues
raised by consideration of the case study materials and interview transcripts. WHAP
adopted a communicative model of knowledge and action that gave rise to four
analytical themes: the principle of achieving partnership or cultural synthesis between
the professionals involved in the project and representatives of the local population,
the controversy over subjective and objective methods of inquiry, the tension between
science and ideology, and the problem of effectively mediating the research findings.
Analysis revealed that although there were situational, or, context specific factors
associated with each of these themes, they also reflected more fundamental
contradictions which are likely to be generalizable to other instances where a similar
approach is applied. The two key contradictions were found to be alienation in the
relationship between the professionals and the community, and the adoption of a
positivist epistemology. The combination of these two factors served to limit the
emancipatory potential of the project.
Thus, if community development is defined as the attempt to form a partnership
between professionals from statutory agencies and representatives of a community,
with the objective of using research to identify the needs and preferences of the
population, and develop a strategy for meeting those needs, then it can be concluded
that, as with the other modes of empowerment discussed in chapter one, community
development has a self-limiting internal logic that blunts its emancipatory potential.
The analysis also showed that the failure to achieve change through the CMKA led
WHAP to abandon community development in favour of a more individualistic mode
of empowerment; which is examined in chapter five. Before that it is necessary to
place these provisional conclusions in the context of other empirical studies and
sociological theory, firstly to deepen the analysis, but also to test its validity by
looking for alternative readings of the material.
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Discussion
In the analysis presented above it was suggested that the approach adopted by WHAP
was initially characterised by the adoption of a communicative model of knowledge
and action. The model was operationalised under specific circumstances that gave the
project its particular form and character. However, there are general characteristics of
the model that might be found in other initiatives. These essential elements include:
the attempt to establish a partnership between members of the local community and
welfare professionals with particular expertise and access to resources, the attempt to
produce a new body of knowledge based on a synthesis of lay experience and
professional expertise, and the attempt to use that knowledge to inform action which
benefits the local population.
Even in the broad terms listed above, the model adopted by WHAP cannot be viewed
as a universal definition of community development. The category is a broad one, and
despite several attempts to deduce a logical taxonomy (Checkoway 1995, Miller et al
1990), or examine changes to the category over time (Meekosha & Mowbray 1990,
Miller & Bryant 1990, Craig et al 1990), there is no precise definition of what
constitutes community development. Fortunately, the availability of a closely defined
category is not essential to this analysis, it is sufficient to note that there are many
other initiatives in which partnership (or solidarity), knowledge production, and action
for change, figure strongly and are seen as part of an inter-dependent process. Not all
initiatives adopting this approach describe themselves as community development, nor
do all projects adopting the community development label practice the process
described above. Even so, it is not difficult to identify a broad range of projects that
do share the three characteristics of the approach adopted by WHAP, for example: the
British Community Development Project of the 1970s (Green & Chapman 1992), the
Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program in New Mexico (Wallerstein 1993), the Adult
Education and Community Development Project in Nicaragua (Lammerink 1994), and
the Exercise in Citizenship against Hunger and Absolute Poverty in Brazil (Schlaepfer
et al 1994). All of these initiatives subscribed to a common process, even if the
specific conditions under which they operated vary.
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As well as descriptions of practical projects, attempts to develop the theoretical basis
of the approach can also be found in the literature. Jnanabrata Bhattacharyya (1995) in
his attempt to derive a universal theory of community development grasps the essence
of the relationships between partnership, knowledge and action, even though he uses
slightly different terminology. Thus for Bhattacharyya the key components of
community development are solidarity and agency. Solidarity is used in the
Durkheimian sense, (similar to the conservative definition of community discussed in
chapter one), and refers to a shared identity and common code of conduct. Agency is
defined as 'the ability of people to order their world', or to be able to act on the world
directly without dependence on external agents. The process by which these
objectives are to be brought about is, according to Bhattacharyya, characterised by
three elements: self-help, felt-needs, and partnership. The three elements combine in a
process that entails people working together to identify their needs and produce
collective meanings or a shared body of knowledge capable of informing their self-
activity. Bhattacharyya contrasts the knowledge produced by such a process with the
'agency-robbing knowledge' produced by positivist research which is characterised by
a top down approach that imposes definitions and solutions onto a passive and
dependent population.
There is much in Bhattacharyya's approach that fits with the communicative model of
knowledge and action employed by WHAP, for example, the emphasis on establishing
partnership with the local population in order to access their subjective knowledge and
experiences, and the process of using this partnership to construct a shared body of
knowledge capable of supporting action. Moreover, Bhattacharyya gives a detailed
critique of positivist research methods, noting the extent to which they lead to forms
of domination or dependence; this supports the conclusion that WHAP failed to
produce emancipatory knowledge partly because of its inability to adopt a critical
research methodology.
Unfortunately, there are also lacunae in Bhattacharyya's account, most notably
concerning the relationship between community representatives and professional
community development workers (or other statutory sector workers involved in
community development work), and the relationship between a community
development initiative and the state. Nor, having identified the problematic nature of
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positivist research as a means of producing emancipatory knowledge, does
Bhattacharyya offer a convincing account of how a more critical and agency affirming
methodology might be arrived at - instead it is assumed that the adoption of a lay
perspective will inevitably lead to agency enhancing knowledge, without the need to
address epistemological problems of subjectivism / relativism, and without the need
for social critique. As the analysis of WHAP demonstrates, these three issues are
essential to an understanding of this type of community development work,
particularly in societies where the state apparatus is well developed. As with the
communicative model of knowledge and action adopted by WHAP, alienation is for
Bhattacharyya, an issue that can be resolved at a discursive level through the adoption
of an appropriate methodology, the problem of a projects relationship to the state and
the location of many community workers within statutory agencies is not addressed as
a material barrier to solidarity and self-activity. Whilst Bhattacharyya's account sheds
some light on the theoretical assumptions of initiatives that strive to produce
emancipatory knowledge through partnership with lay representatives, the omissions
detailed above render his analysis unsatisfactory.
The process that Bhattacharyya attempts to describe, is underpinned by the theory and
practice of the Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire, in fact Freire's name permeates
the literature on community development, providing a rare point of reference in an
otherwise intellectually diverse body of knowledge. Although the main texts (Freire
1972, Freire 1973) were published in the early 1970's, it is worth returning to his
work, not just because of its influence on the field, but also because it addresses some
of the issues that are overlooked by Bhattacharyya.
At the core of Freire's work lies a commitment to the emancipation of the oppressed
masses of South America. Education was seen as a key element in the revolutionary
struggle, however this did not refer to the 'banking concept' of education deployed by
the ruling class to deposit alienated and disempowering knowledge in the mind of the
student, but rather to the development of critical consciousness, in which the student
would come to recognise obstacles to the fulfilment of human potential as historically
specific and obtain the self-confidence to participate in their transformation:
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A deepened consciousness of their situation leads men to apprehend that
situation as a historical reality susceptible of transformation. Resignation
gives way to the drive for transformation and inquiry, over which men feel
themselves in control. (Freire, 1972, p.58)
For Freire the 'conscientisation' of the masses came neither as an inevitable result of
social and economic contradictions, nor as a response to top down revolutionary
leadership, but through the establishment of a dialectical relationship of 'cultural
synthesis' between the masses and the educationalist or revolutionary leadership.
Genuine cultural synthesis entailed an eradication of the traditional distinction
between teacher and student, instead both parties were engaged in a learning process
directed towards the identification of problems and the development of action
strategies to overcome them. The students brought to the educational encounter their
direct experiences of oppression, which were then explored and contextualised using
'problem posing' techniques and 'generative themes' introduced by the educationalist:
The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself
in dialogue with the students, who in their turn while being taught also teach.
They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. In this
process, arguments based on 'authority' are no longer valid; in order to
function, authority must be on the side offreedom, not aRainst it. Here, no one
teaches another, nor is anyone self-taught. Men teach each other, mediated by
the world, by the cognizable objects which in banking education are 'owned'
by the teacher. (Freire's emphasis). (Freire, 1972, p.53)
Freire's belief in the necessity of establishing cultural synthesis between the masses
and revolutionary leaders does not entail subordinating political strategy to the
immediate demands of the people. Following Lenin's critique of 'economic
spontaneity in the Russian Social Democratic Party (Lenin 1902), Freire illustrates his
argument by reference to the issue of pay claims:
if at a given historical moment the basic aspiration of the people goes no
further than a demand for salary increases, the leaders can commit one of two
errors. They can limit their action to stimulating this one demand or they can
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overrule this popular aspiration and substitute something more far reaching -
but something which has not yet come to the forefront of the people's attention.
In the first case, the revolutionary leaders follow a line of adaptation to the
people 's demands. In the second case, by not respecting the aspirations of the
people, they fall into cultural invasion. The solution lies in synthesis: the
leaders must on the one hand identify with the people 's demand for higher
salaries, whilst on the other they must set the meaning of that very demand as
a problem. By doing this, the leaders pose as a problem a real, concrete,
historical situation of which the salary demand is one dimension. It will
thereby become clear that salary demands alone cannot comprise a definitive
solution. (Freire, 1972, pp.149-50)
In short, Freire's work details a process by which critical consciousness can be
developed as a prelude to revolutionary activity. His objective is to close the gap
between the consciousness of the masses and that of the intellectual/revolutionary
leadership by arriving at a form of mediation that allows individual subjective
experiences of oppression to be synthesised with the analytical skills of social critique.
We noted above that Bhattacharyya's theory of community development left
unanswered questions about the relationship between community work and the state,
and the methodology needed to replace 'agency-robbing' positivism. By grounding
the processes of cultural synthesis and conscientization in the historically specific
context of revolutionary struggle Freire answers the above questions. First, the
conscientization process is conceptualised as a process which is independent of the
state, indeed its ultimate objective is the overthrow of the state. This oppositional
stance towards the state also has consequences for the structural location of the
community worker, (or educationalist, to use Freire's term). If the role of the
community worker is to foment critical consciousness amongst the oppressed, it is
unlikely that this process can be sponsored by the state, even in countries where the
state is relatively under-developed and state employees have greater 'room to
manoeuvre' than their counterparts in contemporary Britain. Finally, Freire's account
of the relationship between the masses and a revolutionary leadership indicates the
methodological perspective to be deployed in place of positivism. Reference is
repeatedly made to the objective of revealing the transitoriness of existing social and
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economic relations, (what Freire terms 'limit-situations'), by pointing to their
historical and structural specificity, in order that such barriers to the fulfilment of
human potential might be effectively challenged and over-thrown. Although this
process is not examined in detail, it is recognisable as a form of social critique, or
more specifically, as historical materialism.
Bhattacharyya's theorisation of community development comprises an attempt to
extract the processes of cultural synthesis and conscientization from their social
revolutionary context, in order to find a democratic means of stimulating solidarity
and agency within the existing social order. But this intellectual sleight of hand leads
to a contradiction. The rationale for community development is, according to
Bhattacharyya, the pursuit of solidarity and agency in order that people might achieve
satisfaction of their felt needs, but his failure to address the problematic relationship
between community work and the state, or to articulate a clear methodological
alternative to positivism, hides the structural and epistemological obstacles to
achieving this aim. Without the intellectual resource of social critique how can the
participants in community development initiatives recognise the historical and
structural specificity of the barriers to needs satisfaction. If a community development
initiative is funded or staffed by the state then how will it be able to push the demand
for needs satisfaction beyond the limited confines of statutory provision? The answer
to both questions must be that Bhattacharyya's model of community development is
not concerned with transcending the structural constraints on needs fulfilment and
emancipation, but with small scale self-help initiatives and minor reforms to the
existing order. As such it is a means of adapting to alienation rather than a method for
overcoming it.
Whatever the shortcomings of Bhattacharyya's approach, it is very close to the
communicative model of knowledge and action adopted by WHAP. Both share a
commitment to partnership, the articulation of felt needs, self-help, and a critical
approach to existing knowledge. But, both approaches are also characterised by an
absence of social critique in their methodology of knowledge production, and a failure
to recognise the extent to which dependence on the state for professional input and
resources limits the potential for cultural synthesis, or emancipatory praxis.
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This tendency to de-politicise Freire's approach by borrowing some of the methods of
cultural synthesis, but locating them in a different structural context can be found in a
broad range of initiatives that claim a Freirian lineage whilst engaging in very different
forms of practical activity. As noted in chapter one, this is often the case in state
sponsored community health projects, for example, Freire is invoked as the inspiration
for a programme teaching health promotion to Canadian schoolchildren (Kalnins et al,
1994) and an alcohol and substance abuse prevention programme in New Mexico
(Wallerstein, 1993).
The co-option of community development by the state, often as a means of stimulating
self-help and voluntarism in the name of 'welfare pluralism', has led to a re-
assessment of its potential as a means of bringing about political change (Dixon,
1990). However, rather than focusing on the relationship between community
development and the state, or the absence of social critique, such accounts tend to
focus on external factors, for instance, citing the conservative political climate of the
1980s and 1990s (Miller & Bryant, 1990), or the demise of 'left-wing' Local
Authorities (Diamond, 1993), as reasons for the failure to achieve progressive change.
By contrast the 1970s are often invoked as a kind of 'golden age' of radical
community work against which the current pragmatism can be contrasted (Meekosha
& Mowbray, 1990). Undoubtedly, the changed political climate in which modern
community development is situated might have diluted the resolve of politically
committed community workers as it has so many other potential activists. But such
factors do not offer a complete explanation of the political impotence of community
development work, if we look back to the 'radical' community development projects
of the l960s and 1970s, we find that although they were characterised by radical
aspirations and the pursuit of political transformation, they failed to achieve anything
but the smallest local concessions or reforms. Despite this historical fact, the radical
advocates of community development still cling to the notion that they are pursuing a
form of emancipatory practice, based on sound Freirian principles, that might
eventually deliver progressive social change if the broader political climate becomes
more conducive.
Why is it then that the advocates of state sponsored community development in the
West are able to delude themselves that they are engaged in essentially the same form
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of practice as Freire's Latin American revolutionaries? It was suggested above, that
structural alienation and absence of social critique did not operate as self-limiting
factors in Paulo Freire's model of emancipatory activity. This stems from Freire's
point of departure, his emancipatory subject, (the educationalist or community
activist), rather than being integrated within the state, stands in open opposition to it,
and is therefore able to side with the community in the struggle to transform it. By the
same token, the oppositional stance adopted by Freire's educationalist, informs his/her
epistemological stance - the objective is to create critical consciousness by revealing
the historical specificity of the existing social order, this is facilitated not just by
exploring the subjective experiences of community members, but also by exposure to
the analytical techniques of a revolutionary leadership. The only obstacle to this
process is reliance on traditional educational methods, which Freire rightly considers
to be disempowering and uncritical. However, his/her location outside the state leaves
the educationalist free to adopt the radical, emancipatory educational practices
advocated by Freire.
Thus, the two factors which undermined the emancipatory potential of WHAP and
other similar initiatives, are barely addressed by Freire, because writing in a context of
social revolution, the autonomy and critical perspective of the educationalist could be
taken for granted. However, the absence of any overt discussion of these themes in
Freire's writings has led advocates of community development in the West to
erroneously assume that his techniques of mediation can be applied effectively by
people who are employed by the state and who may not have access to the methods of
social critique.
As the need to establish a relationship between community workers and their
constituency that is not impeded by structural constraints, is virtually absent from
Freire's approach, we need to examine the work of other political theorists to deepen
our understanding. This relationship is the main subject of chapter four, and is only
addressed here in terms of its effect on the production of knowledge. Before that, we
need to clarify the terminology employed. In the above discussion the terms
'professional', 'community worker', and 'educationalist' are used rather loosely, as if
they refer to the same subject. Whilst in common usage the terms are far from
synonymous, in the contexts in which they appear above they do refer to a common
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social relation; what might be termed the relationship between the intellectual and
society. The members of WHAP felt that the main benefit of having professionals
involved in the project was their access to material resources and the 'official' status
their involvement conferred. However, for an emancipatory model of community
development the essential contribution of the 'professional', (or educationalist, or
community worker), is an intellectual one, or more specifically, the ability to organise,
mediate and analyse. Thus for the following discussion the terms 'intellectual', or,
'intelligentsia' will be substituted for community worker, professional or
educationalist.
Many theorists have addressed the relationship between intellectuals, the production of
knowledge and political activity; one of the more valuable contributions is made by
Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks (1971). The key to Gramsci's perspective
lies in the distinction he drew between intellectual activity and the socially constructed
role and function of intellectuals as a specific group. The former was a competence
available to all:
Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of
intellectual activity, that is, he is a 'philosopher', an artist, a man of taste, he
participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of
moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world
or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought. (Gramsci,
1971, p.9)
However, not everyone adopts the role and function of an intellectual. Gramsci drew a
distinction between two types of intellectual, first was the 'traditional intellectual', for
example the artist, philosopher, or cleric, who owes his position to the patronage of an
earlier ruling class, but who now presents himself as above class relations and political
conflict. 'Organic intellectuals' on the other hand, are characterised by their social
and cultural proximity to a particular class, and the role that they play in articulating
the collective consciousness of that group.
More specifically, Gramsci pointed to the way in which the organic intellectuals of the
ruling class contributed to the subordination of other classes:
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The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern
functions of social hegemony and political government. (Gramsci, 1971, p.12)
The role of the intellectual is not simply to manage the coercive apparatus of the state
in the interests of the ruling class, but also to win the consent of the majority of the
population to what Gramsci describes as: 'the general direction imposed on social life
by the dominant fundamental group' (Gramsci, 1971, p.12). Thus, the knowledge
produced by the intelligentsia serves to subordinate the population to the ideas of the
ruling class, a process that Gramsci refers to as hegemony. In order to attain the
position of hegemonic dominance the organic intellectuals of the ruling class must
supplant the traditional intellectuals, in order that the interests of their class can be
identified as 'common sense' rather than political ideology.
From this perspective the production of knowledge is not the gradual unfolding of
'objective truth', nor is it a mechanistic expression of ruling class interests, rather it is
the product of intellectual struggle structured by class interests. Gramsci refers to this
struggle as the war of position, which forms an essential complement to the war of
manoeuvre in which state-power is seized. For Gramsci, the emancipation of the
working class depended upon its ability to generate its own organic intellectuals
capable of producing a theoretical interpretation of working class experience to be
used in counter-hegemonic activity as well as guiding the war of manoeuvre.
The WHAP case study, and other similar initiatives, can be read from a Gramscian
perspective - the attempt to achieve cultural synthesis between professionals and lay
volunteers could represent the production of organic intellectuals, and the desire to
produce an alternative body of knowledge which expresses the interests of the local
population could be viewed as anti-hegemonic struggle. However, the location of the
professionals within the state must bring in to question their ability to objectively take
the side of the local population even if this is their subjective aspiration. Gramsci has
indicated the extent to which even the most remote employees of the state may be
implicated in the hegemonic process:
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The function of organising social hegemony and state domination certainly
gives rise to a particular division of labour and therefore to a whole hierarchy
of qualifications in some of which there is no apparent attribution of directive
or organisational functions [...] Indeed, intellectual activity must also be
distinguished in terms of its intrinsic characteristics, [...] at the highest level
would be the creators the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., at the lowest
the most humble 'administrators' and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional,
accumulated intellectual wealth. In the modern world the category of
intellectuals, understood in this sense, has undergone an unprecedented
expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise to a great mass
offunctions which are not all justified by the social necessities of production,
though they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant
fundamental group. (Gramsci, 1971, pp.12-13)
The most overtly hegemonic aspect of professional knowledge, (evidenced in the
WHAP case study), is the extent to which the needs of the population are transformed
into problems to be resolved by the state, rather than by emancipatory activity. Nick
Manning has noted this process and locates its origins in the transmission of
ideological themes from their academic producers to welfare professionals:
The ultimate intellectual production of language is of course not by
professional workers but by those upon whom their knowledge base rests:
academics such as the authors of this book If as we have argued, economic
and political conflicts become processed into social problems for the state to
solve, and f it is also the key to understanding which issues become social
problems, then to the extent that academics shape those processes, which they
do, we must consider academic work also as ideological. (Manning, 1985,
p.188)
Analysis of the WHAP case study reveals that the hegemonic function of state
professionals is not simply a reflection of their dependence on academic knowledge -
even when such professionals subjectively adopt a position in opposition to the
academy, and strive to provide alternative and emancipatory forms of knowledge in
partnership with the community, their efforts are severely constrained by their
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professional role as agents of the state. To make such an observation, does not entail
subscribing to a mechanistic model in which class location determines consciousness,
which in turn determines knowledge production, but rather that the everyday
experience of working for the state necessitates the acceptance of the rules (both
formal and informal) of professional conduct, which include: fostering the appearance
of political neutrality focusing on "social problems" for which the state has a technical
solution, and fundamentally, when it comes to the production of knowledge, the
adoption of a positivist methodology rather than one of social critique.
In short, Gramsci offers an account of the relationship between the intellectual and
society, which unlike that of Freire, overtly problematises the project of producing
emancipatory or counter hegemonic knowledge whilst operating in the role of a state
employed professional. The consequences of this contradiction are explored at greater
length in the next chapter.
The remaining piece of the jigsaw, constantly referred to in the analysis presented
above, but not yet described in detail, is the methodology of critical social inquiry, or
more specifically, social critique, the absence of which renders the production of
emancipatory knowledge an illusion. The elements of critical inquiry are diverse and
flexible and only take on a specific form when applied to the study of a particular
phenomenon. Although the methodology of critical research is constantly developing
the approach has several essential elements, and the intention here is to summarise
them in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of the approach and reveal the
difficulty of adopting it whilst in the role of state employed welfare professional.
At the core of a genuinely critical methodology lies the application of dialectical logic.
Dialectical reasoning is complex, and only a brief account can be given here.
Essentially, the approach addresses the relationship between objects and events in the
material world and their subjective representation in human consciousness. The
dialectical character of this relationship had been addressed by GWF Hegel, but he
took as his point of departure the realm of ideas, or human spirit, and was concerned
with the way in which human thought became materialised through practical activity.
From this perspective the individual's knowledge of the world was essentially
knowledge of materialised, and therefore alienated, human thought. Through practical
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activity the individual could overcome his alienation and re-appropriate the human
spirit as it had been externalised by previous generations. Jlyenkov gives an eloquent
account of Hegel's approach:
This world was the materialised thought of humanity, realised in the product,
was alienated thought in general; and the individual had to de-objectify, and
arrogate to himself the modes of activity that were realised in it, and it was in
that the process of his education properly consisted. In the trained mind
categories actually functioned as active forms of thought activity, forms of
processing the material of sense impressions into the form of a concept. When
the individual had them in his experience, and made them forms of his own
activity, he also possessed them, and knew and realised them, as thought-
forms. Otherwise they remained only Reneral forms of the things given in
contemplation and representation, and counterposed to thought as a reality
existing outside it and independently of it. (Ilyenkov, 1977, p.208)
Thus Hegel shifted the focus of logic towards consideration of sensuous human
activity, and indicated the extent to which the products of human thought and
intervention in nature take on a naturalised and ahistorical appearance. Much of
Hegel's logic is retained in modern dialectical thought, but for one fundamental
difference. By starting in the realm of ideas and examining their impact on the
material world, Hegel was unable to account for the origins of those thoughts, and was
obliged to rely on an essentialist and metaphysical account of the 'human spirit'.
Vulgar materialists, like Ludwig Feuerbach, noted that this amounted to little more
than religious belief, and sought to ground human consciousness in experience of the
material world. Thus for Feuerbach it was the real world that became imprinted on the
physical human brain, rather than the unfolding of the human spirit that gave rise to
the world.
Although Feuerbach's account of human consciousness dispenses with the idealism of
Hegel's approach, it only does so at the cost of perceiving humanity as the passive
recipient of data from the material world. It took Marx to combine the materialist
basis of consciousness identified by Feuerbach, with the dialectical insights of Hegel.
For Marx, consciousness came from the individual's experience of the real world, but
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this experience was one of practical activity, of conscious intervention to adapt nature
to meet human needs. From this perspective phenomena could still be identified as
socially constructed, that is, as the product of human will, without resorting to a
metaphysical account of 'human spirit'. Ilyenkov has noted the advance that this
represents over vulgar materialism:
Materialism in this case does not consist at all in identifying the ideal with the
material processes taking place in the head. Materialism is expressed here in
understanding that the ideal, as a socially determined form of the activity of
man creating an object in one form or another, is engendered and exists not in
the head but with the help of the head in the real objective activity (activity on
things) of man as the active agent of social production. (Ilyenkov, 1977, p.261)
Importantly, the human head is not seen as a purely physical entity, but as a social
head, full of socially constructed information on how to understand and act in the
world, for example, language, concepts and categories. The focus on conscious
human activity (production in its broadest sense), essential to the materialist
conception of dialectics, re-introduces Hegel's problematic, but sets it on a materialist
footing - effectively turning Hegel on his head, as Marx put it. The problem resides in
the gap between socially constructed phenomena as they exist in the real world, and
the equally socially constructed representations of those phenomena in the
consciousness of the individual. The key to this problem is the continuing process of
change over time. First, the world in which we find ourselves is in a constant state of
flux, requiring us to constantly act upon it, and constantly represent that process in
consciousness. Unfortunately, as we know from Hegel, the phenomenal forms
through which we grasp reality are constructed over generations, and may therefore
present themselves to the individual as static and immutable. The application of
dialectical logic enables us to recognise the historical specificity and social
construction of prevailing phenomenal forms, in order that we can act to consciously
transform them, and better satisfy our needs and wants.
The dialectical logic revealed by Marx reflected the largely unconscious technique
used by other scientists, for example, Darwin had been able to reveal an organic world
in a constant state of flux, where minute quantitative changes over time led to the
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qualitative transformation from one species to another. That we bother to assign fixed
labels to things which are constantly changing is a matter of practicality rather than
precision - we name things in order to understand them, so that we might use them to
meet our needs. However, the fixity of meaning implied in the act of naming cannot
keep up with a world that is constantly changing, leading us to continually revise our
knowledge of the world. In this sense a body of knowledge is always historically
specific. This does not imply the adoption of a relativist epistemology, because at any
given moment some truth claims will grasp reality more adequately than others. The
importance of dialectical logic is that it enables us to choose between alternative truth
claims without losing sight of their historical specificity and transitoriness.
The adoption of dialectical logic has a series of methodological consequences for
critical social research. First, it is essential to study the historical development of a
phenomenon to reveal changes in the way it has been conceptualised over time. The
purpose of studying a phenomenon over time is not simply to record changes in its
appearance or phenomenal form, but to reveal the nature of the relationship between
the phenomenon's appearance and its underlying essence. We noted above that the
production of knowledge involves abstraction from the material world to the
theoretical world, in order to better inform our practical activity. The dialectical
approach problematises this relationship between objective reality and our attempts to
represent it in knowledge. Part of the problem is that objective reality is in a constant
state of flux and our attempts to grasp it through categorisation and definition must
inevitably become out-dated or inadequate over time. The purpose of studying a
phenomenon over time is, therefore, to reveal the historical specificity of phenomenal
forms and the extent to which they are socially constructed.
The relationship between essence and appearance is not only problematic because
phenomenal forms become outdated in the face of constant changes in the material
world, but also because the historically specific categories through which we grasp the
material world also have a political dimension in that they enable powerful groups to
exercise domination over less powerful groups. Thus, the second element of social
critique is the deconstruction of categories or phenomenal forms. This does not
simply entail the production of a detailed description of the material contents of a
given category, but an attempt to reveal the extent to which the existence of a category
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depends upon a series of relationships with other phenomena in the social and
economic totality. For example, an uncritical definition of the category 'working
class' might produce a list of occupations, or an income band, or cultural
characteristics such as educational attainment or 'lifestyle choices'. A critical account,
by contrast, would attempt to locate the category in a series of social and economic
relations.
Viewing a phenomenon as the product of a whole network of social and economic
relations, does not mean that all of those social relations carry equal explanatory
potential. It may be possible to find a key relationship or 'overriding moment'; for
example, with the category 'working class' the key relationship might be that workers
are obliged to sell their labour power to the private owners of capital, thereby
forfeiting their right to exercise conscious control over the production and distribution
of goods and services. This process of deconstructing a phenomenal form or
explanatory category is fundamentally empirical; it is grounded in observation of
phenomena in the real world at a specific location in time and space, and cannot be
dogmatically generalised to a different context.
Critique of categories has a series of effects. First it shifts explanatory emphasis from
the categories themselves to the social relations that underpin them. This makes the
categories derived from such analysis more enduring over time, for example, if the
working class is defined in terms of particular occupations or cultural attributes, then
the term must inevitably become redundant as the labour market changes and different
cultural patterns emerge, for instance, it is often remarked that the working class has
declined as a result of the re-structuring of manufacturing industry (Gorz, 1982),
however, if the category is defined in terms of the relationship between labour and
capital, then the category continues to be of value while ever that relationship endures,
even though its demographic content may change over time.
A second effect of deconstruction is that in laying bare the essence of a phenomenon
by locating its conditions of existence in a specific network of social and economic
relations it also reveals political factors that cannot be grasped from its surface
appearance. The classic example is Marx's critique of the phenomenal forms of
bourgeois political economy (Marx, 1887), which revealed the essentially exploitative
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and coercive relations that lie behind the apparent freedom and equity of commodity
production. The hidden political nature of phenomenal forms is not only to be found
in class relations, but anywhere that knowledge is implicated in the domination of one
group by another, for example, around gender and race. The objective of critical
social research is to make such oppressive structures overt in order that they might be
challenged.
This relationship between critical social research and political activity is two-fold.
First, for the critical social researcher the distinction between the material world and
its abstract representation in knowledge is not absolute. As well as having an
existence as text or as ideas, knowledge is also externalised through our conscious
manipulation of material objects, for example, even a very basic manufactured object
like a spoon has more than a purely physical existence; as well as being a piece of
metal it is also a consciously designed instrument that can be used in a specific way to
solve a specific problem. This process of externalising conscious knowledge to give it
a material existence extends beyond the production of basic tools to include the built
environment, social and economic institutions, et cetera. Thus, the production of an
alternative body of knowledge entails much more than abstract re-conceptualisation of
the material world, or the production of a text, it entails the transformation of the
phenomenal forms of knowledge, that is the material objects, institutions and
processes in which previous knowledge is embedded. As Lee Harvey has noted:
Knowledge changes not simply as a result of reflection but as a result of
activity too. Knowledge changes as a result of praxis. Similarly what we
know informs praxis. Knowledge is dynamic, not because we uncover more
grains of sand for the bucket but because of a process of fundamental
reconceptualisation which is only possible as a result of direct engagement
with the processes and structures which generate knowledge. (Harvey, 1990,
p.23)
This unity between the subjective and objective world underlines the political basis of
critical social research. The point is not simply to reveal the oppressive aspects of
existing phenomenal forms as an end in itself, the objective is to embed this
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knowledge in the consciousness of the oppressed in order that they might engage in
practical activity to emancipate themselves. Füredi suggests that:
The power of Marxist theory is derived, not from the elegance of its arguments,
but from its capacity to make conscious the unconscious forces driving
towards social change. (Füredi, 1990, p.xxiii)
We noted above that the relationship between theory and practice is not uni-linear.
Whilst the objective of critical social research is to inform conscious activity, it also
derives its validity from active involvement in political struggle. From this
perspective the production of knowledge is deeply embedded in the process of social
transformation; both informing, and derived from, the struggle to consciously change
the material world.
To summarise, it is suggested that the production of emancipatory knowledge is
dependent upon the adoption of a critical social research methodology. Although
critical social research is diverse and constantly developing the following
characteristics are essential to the approach: the application of dialectical logic which
views the material and social world as in a constant state of flux, the study of
phenomena over time to reveal their historical specificity, the critique or
deconstruction of existing phenomenal forms and analytical categories that delves
beneath the superficial appearances available to unaided common sense to reveal the
network of social and economic relations that are the essential conditions of existence
for a phenomenon, the exposure of previously hidden oppressive structures, and a
praxiological orientation in which knowledge is considered to be inseparable from
conscious practical activity.
What we have presented above as critical social research will be recognisable to many
as historical materialism. But not everyone who considers themselves a critical social
researcher would claim to be an historical materialist. Partly the problem resides in
the identification of historical materialism with Marx's research agenda, which may
lead some to conclude that the approach is not applicable to the concerns of, for
example, a feminist or anti-racist researcher. But it is important to distinguish
between the object of study and the methodology employed. Whilst Marx may have
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focused on specific research questions, this does not negate the relevance of his
methodology for studying other phenomena, or for studying the same phenomena from
a different standpoint. It is one of the strengths, and one of the weaknesses, of critical
social research that two different researchers can study the same phenomena, using
ostensibly the same methodology, and arrive at different findings, both of which are
valid and reliable. The reasons for this apparent paradox are examined in the
appendix on method. Finally, there are critical social researchers who consciously
reject not only Marx's research agenda, but also part or all of historical materialism;
unfortunately, the emancipatory potential of such alternatives cannot be assessed in
abstraction, and it remains for their proponents to demonstrate their critical potential.
In the analysis of the WHAP case study it was suggested that although the
professionals involved in the project set out with radical objectives, they failed to
adopt a critical social research methodology. There are many reasons for this failure,
not least that critical social research is an extremely complex and time consuming
process, requiring knowledge and skills that are not widely available even amongst
professionals. More importantly, even if the professionals involved in WHAP had
possessed the technical expertise needed for critical social research their location
within the state would have stopped them from bringing it to bear for two reasons.
Most obviously, the professionals would not have been able to adopt a critical research
methodology because the findings of such an inquiry would not have been acceptable
to the state. Critical social research is orientated towards the development of critical
consciousness amongst oppressed groups, in order that they might bring about radical
transformation of existing social arrangements. This type of praxiological knowledge
is totally inconsistent with the objectives of the state. Rather than enabling oppressed
groups to emancipate themselves by engaging in transformatory activity the state is
interested in knowledge about the local population that will enable the bureaucracy to
bring about small incremental changes in service provision without fundamentally
challenging the existing social and economic order. In the current political climate
any departure from that objective is unlikely to be tolerated by the state.
More importantly, as we noted above, critical social research entails actively taking
the side of the oppressed in objective terms, that is, its operational domain is the
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consciousness of oppressed groups. Access to the consciousness of the oppressed can
only be obtained by developing forms of organisation that support a high degree of
mediation between the intelligentsia and oppressed groups. As the WHAP case study
demonstrated the structural location of the professionals within the state blocked their
ability to actively engage the consciousness of the local population - although the
professionals could subjectively side with the volunteers, they were obliged to develop
an organisational form that was consistent with their location in the state, that is, an
organisational form that reflected their objective alienation from the local population.
Although the other points are important it is the final one that is key in determining the
inability to adopt a critical research methodology from within the confines of the state.
This is confirmed by consideration of the British Community Development Projects of
the 1970s which were discussed in chapter one. The CDP workers enjoyed a high
degree of autonomy from the state and were able to reject the social pathology
perspective prescribed by the programme's instigators, in favour of their own model of
critical social research. However, their structural location within the state obliged them
to adopt an organisational form that reflected their alienation from the population,
consequently they were not able to adequately engage the consciousness of oppressed
groups. This resulted in the production of knowledge that had many of the
characteristics of critical social research, for instance: the adoption of an historical
perspective, critique of existing phenomenal forms, even an oppositional stance
regarding the state, but which fundamentally failed to achieve praxiological status.
For all its radical rhetoric the knowledge produced by the CDPs never amounted to
anything more than text, it was never able to inform the conscious practical activity of
oppressed groups.
From the analysis conducted earlier in this chapter it was concluded that the structural
location of the professionals within the state, effectively alienated them from the local
population, and that this, coupled with the inability to adopt a critical social research
methodology, accounted for the failure to produce genuinely emancipatory knowledge.
In this section I have attempted to examine the generalisability of the analysis by
examining commentaries on other initiatives, and also to deepen the analysis by
relating it to a broader body of social and political theory. In the remainder of this
chapter I want to subject my analysis to critical scrutiny by examining a potential
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alternative reading of the research data. The range of alternative readings is
potentially infinite, and it is neither possible nor desirable to present a cross section
here. With this in mind I have chosen to focus on some of the criticisms and
alternative readings that might be produced by those adopting a post-modernist
perspective. The rationale for focusing on post-modernism is that it fundamentally
challenges the assumption that the production of emancipatory knowledge is a viable
project, as such it promises to undermine not only the epistemological basis of WHAP
and projects like it, but also that of my analysis. A collateral reason for examining
post-modernism is that it begins to encroach on the field as the views of post-
modernist academics filter down to the practitioners of community development and
the new mode of empowerment discussed in chapter five.
An alternative reading
It was suggested above that WHAP and similar community development initiatives
were characterised by the desire to achieve partnership or solidarity amongst a
population in order that they might produce a body of knowledge about their needs
and aspirations as a basis for collective action to meet those needs. Furthermore, it
was concluded that dependence on the formal input of professionals employed by the
state, and failure to adopt a critical social research methodology, severely limited the
emancipatory potential of such initiatives. Although such an analysis is critical of
community development in terms of its specific organisational form and
methodological assumptions it leaves unscathed the claim that if such obstacles can be
overcome then people really will be able to come together in solidarity to produce
critical knowledge capable of informing collective emancipatory action.
Post-modernism brings into question the viability and validity of this putative series of
relations between social solidarity, knowledge production, and emancipatory action.
A key distinction between the way post-modernists conceptualise the social world and
the way that they claim it was conceptualised by their modernist predecessors is that
the former emphasise fragmentation and particularism where the latter were concerned
with totalisation and universality. Thus the belief that people can join together to
identify a common set of problems which they can collectively work to overcome, is
157
rejected in favour of a perspective which sees a multitude of small interest groups or
'micro-powers' struggling to impose their own version of 'truth' onto others in order
to exercise power over them. The broad sweep of post-modernist ideas cannot be
encapsulated in their attitudes towards solidarity, knowledge and action, however, our
purpose here is not to précis post-modernist thought, but to examine the extent to
which it provides an alternative reading of community development, and for this
purpose the three 'headings' provide an adequate structure for organising the material.
Post-modernists adopt a sceptical position vis-à-vis social solidarity, on the grounds
that it masks fundamental differences both in personal identity and in perceived
interests. This position is not unique to the post-modernists; many commentators have
noted the extent to which notions of community or the 'common good' mask
fundamental divisions along lines of class, gender and ethnicity. But the post-
modernists go beyond this to reject any totalising category that implies fixed
membership of an objective interest group. Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau claims that:
A post-modern individual is constantly torn by conflicting community loyalties
so that unmitigated allegiance to any specific community is almost an
impossibility. In the end, community affiliation is located in increasingly
specific, local forms of subgroup identity. (Vaillancourt Rosenau, 1994, p.31 1)
Similarly, Caroline Ramazanoglu (1989) has illustrated the extent to which the
emancipation of women has been undermined by divisions of class, ethnicity and
sexuality, which mean that women often confront each other as oppressor and
oppressed rather than uniting around a common emancipatory agenda.
This fragmentary approach to the problem of solidarity emanates from the post-
modernist conceptualisation of power. It would be misleading to suggest that all post-
modernists share a common understanding of power, however, one of the most overtly
expressed, (and most relevant to our argument), is that found in the writings of Michel
Foucault. Foucault's analysis of power is fundamentally empirical, he is concerned in
the first instance with the exercise of power at an inter personal level. From this
perspective power is not an entity in its own right, or even an independent relation,
rather it is an inherent and inseparable quality of other social relations, for example,
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economic, knowledge or sexual relations. Thus power is not something that can be
possessed or won, nor is it a phenomenon that can be monopolised by an institution or
group, rather it is exercised in everyday situations of inequality which are constantly
changing and being re-structured.
This empirical focus on the micro-relations in which power inheres does not blind
Foucault to the broader operations or strategies of power, but it does lead him to
conclude that power emanates from below, that is, from microscopic encounters or
relations that are constitutive of the broader social cleavages and operations of power:
Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing
opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving
as a matrix - no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on
more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. One must
suppose rather that the manifold relationships of force that take shape and
come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and
institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through
the social body as a whole. These then form a general line of force that
traverses the local oppositions and links them together; to be sure they also
bring about redistributions, reallignments, homogenizations, serial
arrangements, and con vergences of the force relations. Major dominations
are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations.
(Foucault, 1976, p.94.)
Foucault draws a number of conclusions from his conceptualisation of power. First,
he makes the apparently paradoxical claim that: "power relations are both intentional
and non-subjective" (1976, p.94), by this he means that power is exercised
consciously at a microscopic or inter-personal level according to specific aims and
objectives, but that the processes in which power inheres and which make the
operation of power patterned and observable at a macroscopic level owe their
existence to the largely unconscious combination or aggregation of the micro-
operations of power. Consequently the mechanisms by which power operates are not
consciously designed or controlled by any powerful elite or ruling class.
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Secondly, in the same way that the operation of power is dispersed as an innumerable
series of points scattered across a network of social relations, so too is the operation of
resistance to power, which again emanates from individual instances of opposition:
Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that
passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localised in
them, so too the swarm of points of resistance traverses social stratifications
and individual unities. And it is doubtless the strategic codification of
resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in
which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships.
(Foucault, 1976, p.96)
Foucault's analysis of power undermines modernist assumptions about solidarity. If
power is immanent to a complex network of social relations in which the individual
actively participates, then there can be no clear cut or universal distinction between the
oppressed and the oppressor, for example, an individual may be oppressed as a
member of the working class but an oppressor in terms of his membership of the male
gender. In the objective sense this means that there can never be solidarity around a
universal emancipatory agenda, hence the tendency towards political fragmentation
noted above.
It is in the second element of the solidarity-knowledge-action trinity that the post-
modernist perspective diverges most sharply from what its advocates describe as
modernist assumptions. Post-modernist approaches to knowledge are diverse and
multi-faceted, however there are two broadly held assumptions about the nature of
knowledge that are relevant to an alternative reading of WHAP and similar initiatives.
First, the post-modernists adopt a relativist epistemology in which the products of
rational inquiry are considered to have no greater validity than other forms of
knowledge. Secondly, the enlightenment claim that the production of knowledge is
potentially emancipatory, is rejected in favour of the pessimistic conclusion that the
production of knowledge is inextricably embroiled in the t will to power', and must
inevitably lead to domination and coercion. Both points are summarised by Foucault
when he states that:
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truth is no doubt a form of power. And in saying that, I am only taking up
one of the fundamental problems of Western philosophy when it poses these
questions: Why, in fact are we attached to the truth? Why the truth rather than
lies? Why the truth rather than myth? Why the truth rather than illusion? And
I think that, instead of trying to find out what truth, as opposed to error, is, it
might be more interesting to take up the problem posed by Nietzsche: how is it
that, in our societies, "the truth" has been given this value, thus placing us
absolutely under its thrall? (Foucault, 1988, p.107)
Tracing the historical development of different forms of knowledge/power is a
constant theme throughout Foucault's work, which charts the implication of
knowledge in different regimes or technologies of power, including: psychiatry, the
penal system and sexuality. Superficially it might appear that Foucault is simply
describing the way in which powerful groups produce knowledge which legitimates
the pursuit of their interests by its appearance of scientificity and universality. But,
this would entail drawing a distinction between 'ideological' knowledge and
knowledge which is not implicated in the operation of power; a distinction for which
Foucault can find no empirical evidence. Thus, although Foucault's methodology
resembles the account of critical social research given above, in terms of its focus on
the historical specificity of knowledge and the critique of existing phenomenal forms
and analytical categories, he is not suggesting that they can be replaced by an
alternative body of knowledge that has greater epistemological validity or
emancipatory potential. For Foucault knowledge can never be separated from the
operation of power, hence the epistemologically neutral term 'discourse' is adopted in
preference to 'ideology':
like it or not, it [ideology] always stands in opposition to something else
which is supposed to count as truth. Now I believe that the problem does not
consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the
category of scientificily or truth, and that which comes under some other
category, but in seeing Izistorically how effects of truth are produced within
discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false. (Foucault, 1980,
p.118)
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Moving on to the third element of the solidarity-knowledge-action trinity, it is
apparent from their perspective on the first two elements that post-modernists must
take a pessimistic view concerning the viability of collective, emancipatory social
action. If the potential for solidarity is inevitably undermined by the infinite
fragmentation and diversity of personal identity, and if the rational production of
knowledge amounts to nothing more than the means by which individuals exercise
power over others, then the likelihood of taking collective action to achieve
emancipation and the satisfaction of human needs must be very slim indeed. Thus
rather than broad social groups struggling to construct their own forms of knowledge
capable of informing collective action to bring about social transformation post-
modernists expect to find small scale and short lived associations between individuals,
often centring on a single issue, and seeking to destabilise the 'truth claims' of others
rather than construct a discourse of their own. Thus Vaillancourt Rosenau concludes:
Post-modernists choose "life politics" over "emancipation." Emancipatory
politics is rejected because so much of what the old social movements
designated as emancipatory, (seeking justice and freedom from inequality and
oppression) turned out to be misguided and misdirected, giving rise to
unanticipated forms of oppression. Besides, any plan for emancipation implies
a "general prescription, a coherent plan, a program." These post-modernists
look rather to "life politics," defined in such admittedly vague terms as
intimacy, globalisation, self-actualisation, and post-modern identity.
(Vaillancourt Rosenau, 1994, p.31 7)
Vaillancourt Rosenau's description of post-modernist praxis fits well with the decline
of traditional class based political activity and the rise of New Social Movements - she
notes that the post-modernists' emphasis on the inter-personal nature of power and
consequent rejection of belief in the accumulation of power within structural relations
or institutions leads them to disregard the state as a political domain in favour of more
localised concerns:
These post-modernists enphasise innovative conceptions of knowing and being
which make for a politics where more conscious attention is given to language
and discourse. This mneans less concern with the state, because they have no
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desire to "seize power," and more concern with the individual and the
neighbourhood, with the local, regional, and community levels. (Vaillancourt
Rosenau, 1994, p.318)
Post-modernism then, offers a fundamental critique of the claim that a population can
work together to identify its needs and take collective action to meet them. The
critique focuses on the three elements of the community development process,
substituting fragmentation and personal identity for social solidarity, a relativist
approach to knowledge for epistemological realism, and an emphasis on life politics
and localism in place of collective emancipatory activity.
If a post-modernist perspective is applied to the WHAP case study it is possible to
arrive at an alternative reading that is completely different to my analysis. Whilst both
readings might conclude that WHAP had failed to meet its original objectives, they
would offer different explanations of why this was so. In my analysis the
communicative model of knowledge and action adopted by the WHAP professionals
at the beginning of the project was criticised on a number of grounds, first, because it
failed to address the alienation inherent in the state-form, (and consequently the
problems arising from the professionals structural location within the state), and
secondly, because it failed to specify the necessity of adopting a critical social research
methodology. This double failure, it was argued, led to the production of a body of
alienated knowledge which failed to inform, (or be informed by), the consciousness of
local people, and therefore failed to provide a basis for collective emancipatory action.
In the absence of a strategy for transformatory social action the project degenerated
into a self-help initiative, and the professionals reverted to a role that reflected their
position in the state.
From a post modernist perspective it is not simply the failure to address the structural
and methodological constraints on the production of emancipatory knowledge that
rendered the communicative model of knowledge and action invalid and unworkable,
but the fundamental inadequacy of the modernist assumptions on which the model was
based. For instance, the assumption that solidarity could be achieved between a local
population that comprised a multitude of personal and political identities influenced
not least by differences in ethnicity, class, and gender, as well as a multitude of other
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social and cultural factors. More fundamentally, a post-modernist would question the
assumption that this infinitely diverse group of people could weave their individual
subjectivity into a single discourse capable of guiding their future activity. Instead of
seeing the production of such knowledge as potentially emancipatory, the post-
modernist would view it as an act of surveillance and control, in which the techniques
of rationalism were used to exercise power over the population. Thus the key
relationship would not be viewed as that between the project and the state, but the
inter-personal relationship between the professionals and the other participants in the
project.
For the post-modernist, it is not simply the case that project's like WHAP are likely to
be derailed by historically specific structural constraints and methodological
ignorance, but rather that the modernist belief in the production of knowledge as a
means of creating solidarity and informing collective emancipatory activity is
fundamentally flawed. To the extent to which emancipation is a valid project in the
post-modernist imaginary, it inheres in the efforts of individuals or small groups to
evade the effects of discursive technologies of power at the level of inter-personal
relations, rather than in pursuing the modernist illusion of universal emancipation
through the production of an alternative discourse.
Before examining the weaknesses of the post-modernist perspective, it is worth
commenting on its broad explanatory range in the current conjuncture. The analysis of
WHAP presented above focuses on a specific type of community development
initiative that is concerned with enabling a local population to produce its own
knowledge concerning its needs and preferences as a basis for collective emancipatory
action. It was also noted that not all community development projects could be
accommodated within this narrow definition, and that in its broadest sense the term
community development covered a diverse variety of initiatives and activities which
often had quite different objectives, organisational structures, and theoretical
assumptions. Many such initiatives have turned away from the project of
transforming, (or even influencing), the state and broader economic relations, in
favour of small-scale activities located in 'civil society':
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As the economic power of the state wanes and contractual obligations between
the state and individuals weaken, the potential for growth of all elements of
civil society increases. It is in this milieu that the next generation of
community development practice will root and flower especially around
environmental and social justice issues requiring community action. The
author thinks that the new paradigm of community development will focus on
participatory methodologies of research, on practical and generalist skills, on
locally derived revenues in small businesses... (Robinson, 1995, p.29)
Many such initiatives entail the utilisation of strategies which might previously have
been considered divisive or oppressive, for instance, the development of
'entrepreneurial spirit' either to create a black middle-class capable of investing in
inner city ghettos (1-landy, 1993), or as a means by which rural communities can
compensate for the contraction of Federal funding (Butler Flora & Flora, 1993).
Other initiatives have focused on the voluntarist aspect of self-help and mutual aid or
on public advocacy (Checkoway, 1995).
As the discussion presented in chapter one and in this chapter demonstrated,
community development has always been a broad church encompassing a wide range
of approaches and forms of activity. However, many commentators claim that the
movement as a whole has become more fragmented and less political since the 1970s,
noting the extent to which community development has been co-opted by the state
under the banner of 'welfare pluralism' as a means of encouraging local populations to
provide voluntary self-help initiatives to compensate for reductions in statutory
services. Although a historical/structural account of the tendency towards de-
politicisation and fragmentation is given, the conclusion often drawn is that the
process is irreversible and that lower expectations must be settled for:
a more dynamic and just pluralism is perhaps the best outcome community
workers can aspire to. This may lead to the strengthening rather than the
weakening of social democracy. There is little evidence, however, that the




construction of meta-narratives, universalism, epistemology and progressivism.
However, as we shall see, post-modernism can only constitute itself as a paradigm by
adopting the assumptions and characteristics to which it claims to be opposed. It is,
therefore, difficult to read accounts of post-modernism without a sense of their self-
refuting irony.
First, it is remarkable that a perspective defined by one of its leading exponents as:
'incredulity towards metanarratives,' (Lyotard, 1985), should treat the rich diversity
of western knowledge from the enlightenment onwards as a unified perspective
capable of being dispatched by a common critique. James Heartfield has noted that
for the post-modernist:
The quest for reason of the encyclopaedists in 1700s France in the face of the
mystifications of church and crown becomes synonymous with the work of
structuralist professors today. The Bolsheviks' attempt to plan society is
equated with the Attlee government's attempt to plan Milton Keynes. The
subli,ne and the ridiculous are joined without regard to context or goals: it is
enough that they should presume to have goals. ... Further, all grand
narratives, being interchangeable, must bear responsibility for any outcome of
the folly of human agency. Every encyclopaedist has taken the first step to the
gas chambers. Any challenge to capitalism will end in the gulag. (Heartfield,
1990, p.46)
Noting the post-modernists construction of 'Modernism' amounts to much more than
the accusation of inconsistency; it is not just that they have been caught using a
metanarrative when they claim to have disavowed such techniques, but rather, as
Heartfield suggests, that this false aggregation of differing perspectives allows every
rationalising project to be undermined by criticisms that are only appropriate to a
particular paradigm. This is particularI' true of the post-modernist critique of
epistemology, where the assumptions of positivism are generalised to any attempt to
rationally produce knowledge. For example, Foucault presents a caricature of
positivist epistemology in which scientists gradually compile more and more 'facts'
which inevitably lead to the unfolding of absolute 'truths', independent of historical or
structural context. Not surprisingly Foucault has little difficulty in demolishing such
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claims, by pointing to the historical specificity of truth claims, and their origins in the
will to exercise power. However, having identified the epistemological naiveté of
positivism, Foucault generalises his conclusions to all rationalising projects, implying
that the only epistemological choice is between a naïve scientism and his own
pessimistic brand of relativism. In fact, as the account of critical social research given
above demonstrates, the adoption of a dialectical conception of knowledge reveals its
historical specificity and ideological function without abandoning the claim that some
knowledge claims grasp reality more adequately, and offer greater emancipatory
potential, than others.
A second irony emerges from the post-modernist conception of the historicity of
discourse. Foucault suggests that his key concern is not with the truth or falsity of a
discourse, but with the historical factors that enable it to be accepted as true. He also
suggests that knowledge cannot be separated from the operation of power. Thus
Foucault provides us with detailed historical accounts of the emergence of different
discursive formations such as the modern penal system, psychiatry and sexuality,
charting their historical conditions of existence, and their implication in the exercise of
power. But what Foucault fails to provide is a reflexive account of his own discourse
or the broader perspective of post-modernism. What were the historical conditions
that gave rise to post-modernism? How is post-modernism itself implicated in the
exercise of power? Foucault offers no answer to these questions. It is not difficult to
trace the origins of post-modernism to the experiences of the Parisian intellectuals
who first articulated it; Alex Callinicos for instance, describes post-modernism as a
'symptom ' of:
the disillusioned aftermath of 1968 throughout the Western world and the
opportunities for an 'over consumptionist' lfesiyle offered upper white-collar
strata by capitalism in the Reagan-Thatcher era. (Callinicos, 1989, p.'7)
To this we might add the imperative of producing an alternative to the Stalinist
politics of the French Communist Party, and the intellectual culs de sac of Western
Marxism. The irony here lies not so much in the absence of any self-reflexive
awareness of the origins of postmodernism on the part of its advocates, but in the
extent to which the epistemological scepticism of the perspective renders it incapable
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of defending itself against the accusation that it is merely a 'symptom' of political
defeat and theoretical confusion, if knowledge is inseparable from the operation of
power and if there is no epistemological basis for choosing between competing truth
claims, then why should we accept the truth claims made by Foucault or the other
post-modernists? The absolute abandonment of epistemology renders the products of
postmodernist intellectual labour as ironic as a newspaper editorial advising us not to
believe what we read in the papers.
Critical social research avoids the epistemological catch-22 of post-modernism
because although knowledge is viewed as historically specific and implicated in the
exercise of power, its orientation towards practical activity provides a means by
which competing truth claims can be tested out in the material world, not in order to
establish them as absolute or eternal truths, but to reveal which offers the more
effective means of adapting the world to our needs at a specific point in time. Thus
in answer to Foucault's question as to why reason should be privileged over myth or
illusion the answer must be that rationally derived knowledge delivers more reliable
solutions to practical problems than do fairy-tales and conjuring tricks.
In the same way that its praxiological orientation enables critical social research to
identify the relative value of competing truth claims, the process of social critique
enables it to identify their conditions of existence, and reveal who benefits and who
loses out from existing knowledge and phenomenal forms. Thus although knowledge
and power are inextricably intertwined, it is possible to judge which knowledge claims
offer the greater emancipatory potential, again at a specific point in time and space.
This ability to evaluate the relative utility and emancipatory potential of competing
truth claims enables critical social research to defend the validity of its analyses in a
way which post-modernism is not able to do.
A final irony of the post-modernist perspective lies in its hostility towards theoretical
abstraction and universality. Foucault's views on the relationship between knowledge
and power make him reluctant to engage in the practice of theory construction. As
Mark Poster has noted:
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Foucault refused to totalise his position, refuses to present a neat and closed
theory of history, a formula that would explain the past. he doggedly takes
each question separately, exploring its details and specificities, acknowledging
that there are gaps in history, unmapped continents of experience. (Poster,
1984, p.146)
Foucault's theoretical reticence is used as another example of the break between post-
modernism and the errors of 'modernist' social inquiry:
Foucault's theoretical diffidence is the consequence of his standpoint on the
human sciences. He adamantly rejects the traditional strategy of theoretical
development and empirical verification that is practised by liberal positivists
and Marxists alike. (Poster, 1984, p.149)
Closely related to Foucault's anti-theoretical stance is the claim that he avoids the
mistaken universalism of, for example, psychoanalysis, or Marxism. Again Foucault's
position is defined in contrast to a hostile and inaccurate caricature of Marxism:
Marxism, which has represented itself as a universal discourse of
emancipation, has been shown to speak with a very particular historical voice.
Classical Marxism may have enabled bourgeois men to analyse society from
the point of view of the industrial proletariat but it has subsequently been
shown to have occupied a position that was both masculinist in content and
Eurocentric in context. (Barrett, 1991, p.161)
The presentation of Marxism as an abstract social theory recklessly applied to all
social phenomena irrespective of context, is a familiar one which is easily refuted.
Marx himself emphasised the extent to which phenomena could only be understood
through specific empirical study, and made clear his opposition to those who saw
historical materialism as a: 'niaster key, a general historico-philosophical theory, the
supreme virtue of which consists in being supra-historical', (Marx, 1877, p.571).
However, our purpose here is not to defend Marx, but to assess the claim that Foucault
avoids theoretical abstraction or false universality. Certainly, Foucault's studies of
Psychiatry, the penal system, and sexuality, are historically and geographically situated
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and no attempt is made to suggest that, for example, the regulation of sexuality in
contemporary Europe can be taken as a general theory applicable to all contexts.
However, although Foucault avoids the construction of grand theories and universalist
claims in reporting the findings of his empirical enquiry, they are very much present
in the assumptions that underpin his approach. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
Foucault's claims about the nature of knowledge and power, discussed above. When
Foucault claims that: 'power is not something that is acquired, seized or shared,
something that someone holds onto or allows to slip away', or, 'relations of power
are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships
(economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations)', or, power relations
are both intentional and nonsubjective, (Foucault, 1976, p.94), he is not simply
reporting the findings of empirical enquiry without recourse to theoretical abstraction,
nor is he limiting his observations to a specific context. Rather, Foucault is
articulating what amounts to a general theory of knowledge and power, applicable to
any discursive formation. Thus in spite of Foucault's alleged aversion to theory, his
method of enquiry is still essentially based on the logic of deduction, and the concepts
which inform that deductive process are essentially theoretical and universalist.
The purpose of revealing the layers of irony in the post-modernist, or more
specifically, Foucauldian, perspective, is not simply to undermine it by showing the
extent to which it relies on the very assumptions and techniques it sets out to criticise.
But rather to demonstrate the inadequacy of a post-modernist reading of the WHAP
case study and similar initiatives. To reiterate, four specific elements of a post-
modernist critique of this form of community development were identified above:
i) social solidarity is not viable because the politics of personal identity must
inevitably undermine group cohesion,
ii) there is no legitimate epistemological basis on which the diversity of subjective
beliefs can be woven into a common 'objective' discourse,
iii) knowledge is inevitably implicated in the exercise of power, therefore, its
production is likely to facilitate surveillance and control rather than emancipation,
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iv) the location of power within micro-relations rather than in broader social totalities,
coupled with the limited potential for solidarity and the absence of an epistemological
basis for inter-subjectivity means that the project of collective emancipatory activity
aimed at transforming society is not viable.
All four of the above criticisms are derived from the way in which post-modernists
like Foucault conceptualise knowledge and power, and the relationship between the
two. The adoption of a relativist conception of knowledge removes the rational basis
for inter-subjectivity - if one truth claim cannot be demonstrated to be 'truer' or at
least less erroneous than another, then what is the basis for agreement? And if there
can be no agreement on what Constitutes 'truth' at a specific point in time, then what
basis is there for group solidarity or collective action? The post modernist conception
of power is equally disempowering. If, as Foucault suggests, power inheres in micro-
relations, rather than in totalities, such as social and economic institutions and
oppressive structures, then the project of collective action to achieve emancipation
through social transformation becomes a none starter - leaving the isolated individual
to struggle against an infinite series of oppressive micro-relations of power, seemingly
with little hope of overcoming his/her alienation. However, both the relativist
conception of knowledge and the micro-relational approach to power were found to be
contradictory and unsatisfactory in the above analysis.
Although the relativist approach to knowledge correctly identifies the historical
specificity of knowledge (and of knowledge congealed into material phenomenal
forms), and also reveals the extent to which knowledge is embroiled in the exercise of
power, it fails to appreciate the extent to which the adequacy of truth claims can be
'tested out' to reveal their relative adequacy and emancipatory potential. Critical
social research, on the other hand, adopts a praxiological approach to truth claims in
order to test out their validity as problem solving techniques, and applies the methods
of social critique or deconstruction to reveal their emancipatory potential, without
losing sight of historical specificity and dialectical change.
The micro-relational conception of power is equally problematic. Although Foucault
is justified in noting the extent to which inter-personal relationships are permeated by
power, his assumption that the broader aggregations of power simply constitute
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unconscious patterns generated by the micro-operations of power is theoretically and
empirically insupportable. Superficially, Foucault's account of power appears to fit
well with the current conjuncture in which broad emancipatory movements based on
class or gender appear to be fragmenting into single issue and personal identity
campaigns. But even here Foucault's approach is inadequate, not least because it
excludes so many instances where power really is exercised consciously at a structural
or institutional level, for instance when Western governments order air strikes against
the third world, or a multi-national conglomerate closes a factory. Such examples
amount to much more than the inter-personal exercise of power, they depend on the
accumulation of power in specific institutions and structural forms; contrary to
Foucault's pessimistic conclusions, they do represent power that can be seized,
dismantled or transformed.
If the criticisms of Foucault's approach to knowledge and power are accepted then the
post-modernist reading of community development is substantially undermined. But
one point remains to be answered, namely the proposition that solidarity and collective
action must inevitably be undermined by the infinite diversity of personal identity.
Again, the tendency for political movements organised around class, gender or race to
fragment into single issue campaigns, and the emergence of 'lifestyle politics' can be
claimed as empirical support for this proposition, even though as Anthony Giddens
(1991) has suggested, the narcissistic obsession with self-identity is specific to late
capitalism. However, the claim that self-identity subverts solidarity and collective
agency is posited as much more than a descriptive account of the current conjuncture,
rather it implies that solidarity and collective action are themselves a form of
oppression, because they entail the subordination of individual needs and aspirations
to a common agenda. Hence the current tendency towards fragmentation is viewed as
a positive abandonment of false meta-narratives of universal emancipation, such as
Marxism.
Essentially then, this is a criticism of the way in which community development
projects like WHAP, and emancipatory social movements in general, conceptualise
the relationship between personal aspirations and collective political action. It implies
that a specific political programme, for instance, the emancipation of the working
class, is presented as a universal discourse of emancipation, when in fact it ignores the
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legitimate demands of individuals constituted by the infinite diversity of personal
characteristics, such as, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality. However, this implication is
false, and it implies a false dichotomy, it suggests that collective emancipatory politics
must produce a universal emancipatory programme capable of liberating everyone
from every form of oppression, or else we must fragment into tiny single-issue
campaigns to pursue our personal aspirations. That the former option is clearly absurd
is used as evidence that the latter represents the only viable political option.
The above dichotomy is a false one because it confuses the goal of universal
emancipation with the political practice of collective emancipatory activity. The
content of an emancipatory political programme is itself historically specific and
socially constructed, reflecting objective factors such as the level of development of
productive forces, the strength of support for the movement, and the strength of its
opponents, and also subjective factors relating to the ability of different groups to
identify their objectives and articulate them in a way which leads to their incorporation
in the political programme. It follows of course that no political programme can ever
completely express all of the needs and aspirations of all of the people who support it.
What it does represent is a set of specific solutions to specific problems, which
supporters of the programme believe it is in their interests to support. Thus when
Marx writes about class consciousness, he is not suggesting that the personal identity
of everyone in a particular class is identical, or that the abolition of class will in itself
bring to an end all forms of oppression, rather class consciousness refers to the point
where those who are objectively located on one side of the relationship between labour
and capital become conscious of a shared interest and take collective action to pursue
that interest.
Whilst the goal is universal emancipation, the struggle to achieve it is always located
in a specific conjuncture, in which some problems are prioritised and others are set
aside. As such although universal emancipation exists as a goal, the process of
achieving it is never complete, there are always new problems to be addressed, and
new opportunities for the expression of human potential. The form that an
emancipatory programme takes at a specific point in time can never be total or
complete in terms of its potential to deliver universal emancipation - it is always
something to be debated, argued and fought over. This process of consciously
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identifying and subscribing to a collective political agenda, is based on self-interest,
mutual dependence and empathy, but crucially it can also be informed by dialectical
logic, social critique, and active engagement with the struggle to transform the
material and social world.
In conclusion, the WHAP case study does not demonstrate that the process of joining
together to identify common problems and a strategy for collectively overcoming them
is a theoretical or practical none starter, as a post-modernist analysis would imply. But
what it does show is that the viability of such a process is impeded by organisational,
structural and methodological factors. Two such factors were identified in this
chapter, the projects dependence upon the support and active involvement of
professionals who were structurally located in the state, and the failure to adopt a
critical social research methodology rather than a positivist approach. The following
chapter looks more closely at the relationship between the professionals and the
volunteers involved in WHAP, and what happened when the original emancipatory
agenda had failed.
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4. The Challenge to Professional Power
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly encountered, given, and transm itted from the past.
Marx
In the previous two chapters it was noted that initial impetus for the Waterfront Health
Action Project came from local health and welfare workers who were discontented
with the constraints of their professional role. This discontent comprised two
elements, frustration at their apparent inability to address the social, economic and
environmental influences on the health of their clients and the local population, and
secondly, a desire to develop a genuine 'partnership' with local people, which would
enable them to overcome the paternalism traditionally associated with professional
practice.
The project set about tackling these problems of alienation by developing what it was
hoped would be an alternative body of local health knowledge, capable of informing
community action to address the broader influences on health, and by developing
organisational forms and types of practical activity that would allow members of the
local community to access the expertise and resources of professionals without
entering into the type of relationship that would entail subordination to professional
power or regulation. In practice, the two elements were intertwined; the production of
emancipatory knowledge depended upon the development of a partnership between
professionals and representatives of the local population, and the development of a
new relationship between professionals and the population depended upon a critical
understanding, (or knowledge), of the ways in which that might be achieved.
The previous chapter examined the ways in which the professionals' inability to
overcome their structural alienation from the local population contributed to the
project's failure to produce genuinely emancipatory knowledge. This chapter is
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concerned with the other side of the equation - the problem of professional power, and
the ways in which the professionals attempted to find a less paternalistic way of
relating to the local population. Unfortunately, this second objective was no more
effectively resolved than the first. Despite the professionals' subjective commitment
to dismantling the basis of their power, their structural location within the state
coupled with the form of consciousness that it gave rise to, meant that the process of
operationalising their skills and resources only led to greater subordination of the lay
volunteers to professional regulation and supervision.
The analysis begins with an account of the contradictory nature of professional
involvement in the project, that is, the benefits and disadvantages of their
involvement. This is followed by a description of professional role conflict caused by
the contradiction between the projects emancipatory objectives and the professionals'
accountability to the state and subscription to professional norms and values. An
account is then given of the ways in which the professionals attempted to overcome
their alienation from the volunteers involved in the project by reducing cultural
dissonance, providing informal access to professional skills and expertise, and by
developing trust amongst the volunteers and Drop-in users. The analysis then
addresses a series of issues or problems, the resolution of which entailed the re-
emergence of professional power and regulation, namely: the need to develop effective
forms of organisation and authority, regulation of smoking at the drop-in and during
meetings, alleged racism amongst the volunteers, and the development of disciplinary
procedures to control disruptive behaviour.
As well as trying to dilute the power of professionals WHAP also attempted to
empower its volunteers by equipping them with some of the skills and expertise more
usually associated with professional practitioners. Although closely related to the
question of professional power the training and development of the volunteers has
more to do with the process of empowerment, therefore, analysis of this important
issue is presented in the final chapter.
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The contradictions of professional involvement in WHAP:
During the interviews both professionals and volunteers were asked what they thought
were the advantages and disadvantages of having professionals involved in the group.
Both groups tended to give similar accounts of the benefits of professional
involvement, but the volunteers seemed more reluctant to discuss the disadvantages.
It may of course be that the volunteers were genuinely less aware of the disadvantages,
but it should also be borne in mind that the interviewer was identified as one of the
professionals, and that this might account for the volunteers' reluctance to criticise.
The perceived advantages of professional involvement are summarised in the
following quotation from one of the professionals:
they have certain skills, by virtue of the roles and professions that they are
in, they do have certain resources that the group actually needs, to develop
and survive. And I think unless you have professionals who are committed,
who have an appropriate attitude and philosophy, who can bring their own
skills, and their own networks of contacts to bear, I don't think WHAP could
survive.
(Professional, November 1993)
As the quotation suggests, the input of professional skills, access to resources, and the
availability of a network of professional contacts, was not only seen as beneficial to
the project, but essential to it's survival. The technical expertise possessed by
professionals was referred to in connection with: research methodology, organisational
skills, knowledge of how statutory agencies work, and fund raising. In addition to
this, the professionals were also called upon to give 'expert advice' about welfare
benefits or health issues, particularly during the Drop-in sessions. The following
quotation from one of the volunteers describes an incident at the Drop-in where
professional advice was sort to support the work of the volunteers:
this morning with the old boy, he sat there and said how he wanted a phone,
and! looked at him amid straight away I thought I can't tell this man how to go
about it cos I really don't know, so, Elaine, she's a professional, I mean as
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Elaine said, there's not a lot that she could do, but at least she was there for
me to ask. So if it had have been just all us girls [...] the most we could do
maybe is make a few phone calls for him, but it's nice to know that there's
somebody there that we can run to...
(Volunteer, December 1993)
The above quotation reveals an interesting point, that even where referral to
professional expertise only served to confirm the volunteers belief that little could be
done, that input was still considered valuable. Thus, the technical expertise of the
professionals was perceived to give the activities at the Drop-in a legitimacy that they
would otherwise have lacked - even in cases where nothing could be done for a client,
the volunteers could seek professional confirmation that 'officially' nothing could be
done! This badge of official status that professional involvement brought to the
project was explicitly referred to by one of the volunteers:
professionals don't do nothing unless it's for real [...] it's like when you see
that little stamp on a bracelet, you know it's gold, and if you don't see it you
think mmmmm a bit iffy, [...] if you've got people who [are] interested because
of their job, then you know it's real.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
Thus, professional involvement was perceived to confer a hallmark of authenticity on
the project and it's activities. As well as giving 'official' status to the advice handed
out at the Drop-in, professional involvement was perceived almost as a magic key,
capable of unlocking information and resources held by the state:
The advantage is that you can get things that we can't get. Information, [...]
being up in public offices, being on their pay role, [...] you can get into things
like, into files and that, we wouldn't get into. If we walked in they'd want to
know who we were. [...] And you could write letters to all the [...] top people,
like the Baroness [the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Health] and
that. We couldn't do, [...] because we haven't got a name behind us.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
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Professional involvement was, therefore, considered to be essential to the external
legitimacy of the project, both in terms of accessing information and resources, and
also, as the volunteer quoted above suggests, as a means of engaging 'top people like
the Baroness'. As well as boosting the external legitimacy of the project professional
involvement was also turned to as a source of authority to provide leadership and
governance to the internal functioning of the group, again this point was emphasised
by one of the volunteers:
we might know about the everyday life, but the academic side of it, I think
it's got to be a professional. [...] I mean you take Kate [one of the
professionals], Kate's got that authority about her, and I think it's good and
we've got to have someone like Kate. [...] I'm not saying we're stupid, but
f/zen none of us could take Kate's place [...] we've got to have a Chief No
matter what, you've got to have that one person, who can.. I'm not saying that
she should have all the responsibility, but the figure head, the one that we
know..
(Volunteer, December 1993)
To summarise, both the professionals and the volunteers were aware of the benefits
that professional involvement brought to the project, not simply in terms of technical
expertise and access to resources, but also as a source of external legitimacy and
internal authority. It was noted above that the volunteers were more reluctant to
comment on the disadvantages of professional involvement, either because they
ascribed professional status to the interviewer, or perhaps because they were less
aware of the contradictions than were the professionals themselves. Whatever the
reason, most of the negative aspects of professional involvement were identified by
the professionals. A key concern was that their involvement might lead to
reproduction of the paternalistic relationship between professional and client. One of
the professionals located the impetus for such reproduction in the expectations of the
volunteers:
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• . . Disadvantages are that the professionals tend to be looked at as experts, and
in a sense deferred to. And also looked to for leadership. And that needs to
be constantly watched really.
(Professional, January 1994)
Another professional felt that the development of a paternalistic relationship was more
likely to come from the professionals themselves; partly because they were used to
relating to 'clients' in that way, but also because their location in the state would limit
their ability to challenge traditional modes of working:
Well f you're a professional in the Health Service, or any of the caring
services, you see ordinary people as clients. You see people who are not a
professional with you, as people that you do things to. I mean that is the nature
of the professional role. Now unless you've really started to challenge that, as
a professional, and even f you have started to challenge it as a professional, in
order to survive the system you have., you know, that's how it works.
(Professional , November 1993)
Whether due to the expectations of volunteers or the difficulty of abandoning an
established role, the professionals were clearly aware that their involvement in the
project might further reinforce lay dependence on their input, rather than the desired
objective of challenging paternalism. Closely related to this was the belief that
professional involvement might act as a constraint on action:
• . .certainly some of the volunteers I'm sure would say that they had wanted
things to move faster than we've allowed then to move, and that they've been
slowed down by the professionals not getting things moving quickly enough.
[...] the volunteers are partly dependent on some of the professional's
resources, and we have not supplied the resources to them in enough degree
for them to move as fast as they would like.
(Professional, November 1993)
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The above quotation attributes the tendency for the professionals to constrain the
practical activity of the project to their inability to supply sufficient resources. A
different professional saw this as a more fundamental contradiction stemming from
the professionals' location within the state:
I'm also aware of the limitations that we have of working in a system that pays
our wages, and it's a question of us doing the best we can within a lot of
constraints. [...] It's almost a contradiction, by working in the community,
you're trying to raise expectations, and then say hang on, you're going too far
cock, because we can't deliver that, you're making impossible demands on
me...
(Professional, February 1994)
The above quotation suggests that the involvement of the professionals served to limit
the scope of the project to activities which could legitimately be supported by the
state. However, as well as acting as a constraint on action, the professionals' location
within the state meant that their role was also potentially one of surveillance and
control. This point was picked up by one of the volunteers:
Kate and Elaine, if you think about it, they're the professional people, they talk
about us, Elaine's actually talked about my personal problems with other
people, and in fact, she actually spoke about somebody else's personal
problem, with somebody else and it got out, and I felt that was wrong, you
know what I mean. And like Tony and all them that are FSU [Family Services
Unit] as well, and we've got personal problems, we've had social workers
'round. They're social workers, Margaret was an ex-social worker, I mean she
was on my ex's case. So there were a lot of times when I was actually going to
leave. [...] Professionals have got their own way of seeing it and their own
way of doing it. So I thought they were two faced. They weren't being honest,
just smiling but they weren't really being honest.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
What the volunteer quoted above refers to as two-facedness might more accurately be
described as the contradictory nature of professional involvement in the project. On
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one hand, the professionals were subjectively committed to challenging the traditional
balance of power between the professional and his/her client, but on the other hand
their location within the state and their formal acceptance of professional
responsibilities meant that they could not objectively relinquish their role as agents of
social control. This contradiction did not only apply to the relationship between the
professionals and the volunteers, but also to that with the user's of the Drop-in. The
volunteer quoted above went on to discuss the way in which the distrust and suspicion
with which some of the Drop-in clients viewed the professionals, did not extend to the
volunteers working at the Drop-in:
Sone of them don't even want to talk to professionals cos they think it's going
to get back to their families. They think social workers are going to take their
kids away, [...] if one woman turned around and said I hate my kids Ifeel like
killing them, some social worker's going to take her kids off her, because she
said that, d'you know what I mean? One might say I'm going to jump off a
building, they'll say oh you're suicidal, let's put you away. It's not right, they
don't want to talk to them, if they see you [meaning the volunteersj outside
doing facials and they come and talk to you one to one, they think you're on
their side. I've experienced that situation, so I know.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
The above quotation is important not only because it reiterates the perception of the
professionals as potential agents of social control, but also because it implies that the
involvement of the volunteers might function as a 'front' for the project, drawing
members of the local population within the purview of professional power by
presenting an accessible non-professional face to the users of the Drop-in. This theme
is revisited in the final chapter.
To summarise the analysis so far, professional involvement in the project was
contradictory; on one hand their expertise, status, and resources were essential to the
establishment and development of WHAP, but on the other hand, their formal location
within the state coupled with other elements of the professional role meant that they
must also act as a constraint on the practical activity of the project, reproducing the
traditional relationship of dependence between professional and client, and ultimately
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acting as potential agents of social control. This contradiction cuts right to the heart of
the project's aims and objectives - subjectively the professionals were committed to
using their skills and resources to enable the local population to exercise greater
control over the factors that influenced their health, but their location within the state
served to reinforce the constraints, dependence and powerlessness that they sought to
challenge. Not surprisingly this fundamental contradiction generated a high degree of
role conflict for the professionals involved in the project.
• Professional Role Conflict
The role conflict experienced by the professionals as a consequence of their
contradictory position congealed around three core themes: recognition of the need to
challenge traditional professional roles and divisions, the problem of establishing
relative autonomy from the state, and the persistence of what might be termed
professional values. It was noted above that the desire to challenge traditional
professional roles and develop a less alienated form of relationship with the local
population was one of the key incentives for the professionals who established
WHAP. Thus, many of the professionals expressed dissatisfaction with traditional
professional roles, particularly regarding professions other than their own, as the
following quotation from one of the social workers involved in the project illustrates:
I don't like tile autonomy that the medical profession have, I think the medical
profession is horribly hierarchical, horribly conceited, horribly arrogant, in a
way that I think clearly stinks, quite frankly.
(Professional, November 1994)
The above quotation identifies the problem of professional arrogance, but what does
professional arrogance mean? Another professional gave a more precise account of
professional power, locating its origins in the tendency for the members of each
profession to see their own discipline as omniscient:
What angers me is that each profession, you know I see it with Social Workers,
I see it within teachers, I see it within health professionals, I see it within tile
whole range, that they kind of imagine, fondly, that they have the total field of
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knowledge. Much as my own profession did for a thousand years, or however
many years, and that from that experience of my own cultural background, I
know it to be false. And teachers think that they have the weltanschauung, the
world view. Social Workers think that they have the same kind of God given
revelation. Health Authorities come into a category of their own, they think
that they're God, they play God, if God sent them a telegram, they'd say get
back on the waiting list...
(Professional, November 1993)
Partly this reprises the perceived relationship between knowledge and professional
power examined in the previous chapter, and again the incentive to produce an
alternative body of emancipatory knowledge is apparent. However, the problem was
perceived to lie not just in the dominance of particular forms of professional
knowledge, but in the type of social relationships that accompanied them, namely,
strictly enforced boundaries between different professions and a paternalistic
relationship to the local population. Therefore, as well as producing an alternative
body of local health knowledge, WHAP was also committed to the development of an
organisational form that would challenge the traditional divisions between the
professions and establish an unalienated relationship with the local population. This
objective was noted in a further comment from the professional quoted above:
we break down the walls that the professionals have erected around their
own disciplines, and we make health professionals more aware of teachers
values, social workers values, of you know right across the board, broaden
them out. I think it has the advantage of giving all of us direct access to these
Gods from on high - the health professionals - and the ability to tell you what
we actually want for our well being.
(Professional, November 1993)
In this account WHAP is viewed as a 'melting pot' in which the divisions between the
professions can be dissolved and accountability to the population forged. This
amounts to a subjective commitment to fundamentally challenge traditional
professional roles. As such it places the professionals involved in WHAP in a position
of role conflict as they attempt to transform traditional forms of practice.
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The second theme of professional role conflict, the problem of establishing relative
autonomy from the state, presented itself in several forms; most directly, it raised the
question of whether or not it was possible to play an active role in the project whilst
remaining within the state. It should be remembered that many of the professionals
had become involved in WHAP because of frustration at the constraints of working
for the state. As the project developed these constraints continued, leading some of
the professionals to further question their loyalties:
DW - HAVE YOU FELT ANY CONFLICT WITH YOUR PROFESSIONAL
ROLE, OR HAS IT MADE YOU RE-EVALUATE YOUR PROFESSIONAL
ROLE AT ALL?
[...] it has made me very, very, considerably evaluate my role and it has made
me realign my personal direction at a time of a lot of change in one 's
professional practice anyway. So, if anything it has made me realign myself
much more to community orientated thinking. I've become much more
aware that there is a community perspective, which I've said before is omitted
in a lot of the decision making.
(Professional, November 1993)
For the professional quoted above, the problem of autonomy posed by WHAP,
coupled with other considerations, eventually led to resignation from a senior post in
the statutory sector and the pursuit of 'independent' employment. However, this
response was the exception, and although other professionals faced the problem of
autonomy, not least in terms of pressure from their employers to reduce their
involvement in WHAP, they responded by reducing their commitment to the project
rather than by compromising their formal employment. This tendency was noted by
the professional quoted above:
I think we are beginning to see changes where there will be some individuals
who need to recede, or who will drop out, others who remain pillars of
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strength, others who will recede because of external pressures, mainly from
their own organizations..
(Professional, November 1993)
Of course the dilemma about autonomy from the state operated at an organisational
level for WHAP, as well as a personal level, but again this presented itself primarily as
a dilemma for the professionals. The following quotation articulates the main factors
of the dilemma; is it better to stay within the state, gaining access to resources, but
losing the autonomy needed to bring about change, or is it better to opt out of the state,
gaining independence, but being marginalised through lack of resources?:
• . . we need money out of the system, to help us do what we want to do. If we
were doing things that we want to do, which actually challenge the very basis
of that system then they're not going to give you any money, and we shouldn't
expect them to. And I think this is one of the difficulties about having this
approach. The alternative is to go all alternative, you know, basically living in
wig-warn, co-operative type approaches, which are pretty nice and you know
Proudhonist, but I think very limited in changing the system as well. So
there's a variety of measures that you need to use, and I think you have to
make compromises all over the place. So, if you get half of what you expect to
achieve then you've gone forward, until the big one's been resolved.
(Professional, February 1994)
The main point here is that statutory funding does not come without strings attached, it
entails a loss of autonomy and the acceptance of constraints that might compromise
the initial objectives of the project, and crucially, undermine the very reason that many
of the professionals became involved in WHAP in the first place. A practical example
of the way in which financial dependence negates autonomy of action and leads to the
adoption of the funding agency's agenda, is given in the following quotation:
I do think that there's a very real danger that [...] we will begin to respond to a
managerial and political agenda, like getting into bed with the GPs, because I
think one of the conditions of continued funding will be that we work with the
local General Practitioners. Now whilst I would see that as a healthy
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development, it would only be a healthy development if it were really truly in a
community basis, on what the community wants. But, of course already what
has been mentioned to me is well the local GPs are hoping it will cut down
their consultation rates.
(Professional, November 1993)
Financial dependence on the state was, therefore, a constant factor undermining the
autonomy of the professionals, but the problem of autonomy was not purely an
economic one, as the following quotation suggests, formal accountability to the state
had a much more insidious influence on professional autonomy, amounting almost to
a form of self-censorship:
• . representing a statutory agency there are behaviour and expectations of you
that you have to perform. so if for example, we did an away-day and then
afterwards we retired for a cup of tea or a pint, you know two people, I might
speak very, very differently, than I would in a kind of meeting scenario. Maybe
because you've got that sort of one to oneness that you can get away with
things. And I find it difficult especially when we're talking about the sort of
social policy aspects, where someone's going on in a particular vein about
equalities issues, to the extent where you think that's a load of bollocks. You
can't actually challenge it there and then without getting into a huge argument
about a theoretical thing; you know exactly where it's going to take you and
so therefore you keep quiet. [...] I mix with people socially who are very
different from the sort of people I mix with at work, and they behave, and the
dialogue is just as interesting, and you can actually get the points over, but it
means there are certain rules that you disregard, and language is one of them,
you know you tailor your language to meet that crowd.
(Professional, February 1994)
The above quotation refers to a set of professional role expectations, about what
constitutes appropriate behaviour, language and styles of inter-action. As the
quotation implies, this amounts to much more than the adoption of alternative
linguistic codes, rather it entails the subordination of personal views, attitudes, modes
of expression, to a much blander, more uniform identity, that is structured by, and
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constituted in terms of, a bureaucratic role model. It goes almost without saying that
this process is profoundly de-politicising, and yet it should be remembered that the
adoption of this self-limiting bureaucratised identity was not externally imposed on the
interactions that took place in WHAP. Although the professionals, and the
organisation as a whole, may have lacked formal independence from the state, the
social space in which the professionals and volunteers interacted lay outside the reach
of formal bureaucratic regulation. There were no spies or informants present to
'report' the professionals for inappropriate behaviour or discourse, but even so, the
professionals felt the need to behave and act in accordance with a traditional
bureaucratic role model.
This leads on to the third theme of professional role conflict - the persistence of
professional values. As with the problem of autonomy from the state, the question of
professional values was not something which could be easily resolved, rather it existed
as a constant contradiction, a continual tension between recognition of the ideological
nature of many professional values, and the simultaneous imperative to maintain a
professional role. This dilemma is illustrated in the two following quotations, the first
identifies the ideological nature of the Health Promotion perspective:
• with Health Promotion, the lfestyles approach on health, you know - give up
smoking, health is fun - personally I think health is naff I think it's boring,
people like doing dangerous things because it's a bit of a laugh. That might
sound irresponsible, but that's how a lot of people approach it. And I have a
Health For All concept in which the pub looms large. [...] I get irritated often
by middle class values, whether they're dressed up as professional values or
not [...] they want to correct working class behaviour, instead of letting it ride
and trying to influence it...
(Professional, February 1994)
However, although the above quotation reveals an awareness of the extent to which
professional values are embroiled in the exercise of power, the same professional was
very much aware of the dangers of stepping outside of that value system:
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I have to remember that I'm paid a reasonable salary by an organisation that
has values, which I may or may not agree with, on the whole I tend to agree
with the thrust of those values, and therefore I've got to ensure that I represent
those values.
(Professional, February 1994)
Again the problem of autonomy from the state is invoked, this time to explain the
difficulty of departing from professional values. However, the problem of autonomy
does not entirely explain the persistence of professional values. As the following
quotation shows, subscription to professional values reflects much more than a
response to the formal demands made by an employer, it is also determined by the
more deeply ingrained notion of professional responsibility:
DW - HAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT WITH WHAP CAUSED YOU ANY
PROBLEMS OR DIFFICULTIES?
no I don't see it causing any problems. Maybe a few minor concerns;
having to stand back and let it happen and not interfere professionally, that's
potentially a little bit iffy.
DW - WHAT SORT OF THINGS ARE YOU THINKING ABOUT?
I think being involved in the drop-in, when people are dealing directly with
people who have quite obviously got mental health problems, that worries me,
you know people without a professional grounding are diving in where angels
should fear to tread. [that is] potentially dangerous; making themselves a bit
vulnerable. But I suppose that's why it's the idea to have professionals
around, because at least you can have someone available. But I think that's
the only real reservation, and only then on one or two occasions.
(Professional, December 1993)
What the above quotation provides an example of is the extent to which the possession
of professional skills creates an imperative, or responsibility, to intervene in a given
situation, to provide expert knowledge, to manage a crisis. However, the observance
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of professional responsibilities also entails reproduction of professional dominance
and the perpetuation of professional values, both of which were considered
problematic in terms of the development of emancipatory practice. The professionals
were committed to transforming their traditional role into something much less
paternalistic; into something which would enable them to use their expertise and
access to resources as a means of empowering the local population, but the very
possession of that expertise and the values inherent in it obliged them to intervene in
ways that reinforced traditional ways of working.
To summarise the analysis up to here, professional involvement in WHAP was
essentially contradictory, on one hand the professionals brought resources, status,
credibility and expertise, but on the other hand their involvement threatened to
reproduce lay dependence on their input, to constrain the scope of practical activity
within the narrow parameters acceptable to the state, and also potentially to act as a
means of surveillance and social control. This contradiction generated a sense of role
conflict amongst the professionals, between their desire to transform their traditional
role, and the constraints placed upon that transformation by their lack of autonomy
from the state and their subscription to professional values which included notions of
professional responsibility.
Elements of role conflict existed throughout the early stages of the project when the
survey was being designed and conducted, but they deepened considerably with the
establishment of the Drop-in. The reason for this intensification of role conflict is
perhaps attributable to the shift from the relatively abstract process of gathering
information, which was quite remote from the everyday practice of the professionals,
to the provision of services at the Drop-in, which was much closer to the type of case-
work that many of the professionals were familiar with. The professionals attempted
to overcome their role conflict by adapting their traditional forms of practice in ways
that they hoped would provide a more equitable balance of power between 'service
provider' and 'client'.
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• Adapting the professional role
The means by which the professionals went about resolving their role conflict
involved a significant transposition. Objectively, the contradictory nature of
professional involvement in the project stemmed from a conflict between their formal
location within the state, with all the constraints and imperatives that that entails, and
the objectives of the project, which were essentially emancipatory, and entailed
enabling local people to obtain control over the social and economic influences on
health. In short, the professionals were struggling to overcome the alienation
engendered by their formal location within the state. However, although the material
basis of that alienation was grounded in the relationship between the professionals and
the state, it was subjectively experienced as a problem associated with the relationship
between the professionals and the volunteers/local population. Even though, as the
quotations analysed above indicate, many of the professionals were acutely aware of
the extent to which their employment by the state served to structure their professional
role and determine their activities, their efforts to overcome the consequent role
conflict focused on overcoming cultural dissonance in their relationship with the
volunteers and local population, rather than on challenging the nature of their
relationship to the state.
I Cultural dissonance
Cultural dissonance refers to significant variations in the knowledge-base, norms,
values, linguistic codes and modes of self presentation available to different social
groups. The attempt to overcome this division between the professionals involved in
WHAP and the members of the local population, by engaging in a process of 'cultural
synthesis', was discussed in the previous chapter, where the focus was on the
production of knowledge which adequately reflected the views and experiences of the
population. However, the need to overcome cultural dissonance extended beyond the
production of knowledge, to include every encounter between professionals and lay
people, and therefore, constituted a major element of the attempt to adapt the
professional role. The reason why cultural dissonance was viewed as such a
significant obstacle to practical activity is multi-faceted. First, as the following
quotation suggests, it was felt that if the professionals failed to adequately grasp the
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experiences of working class people, they would be unable to understand the structural
nature of the problems confronting them and might, therefore, engage in inappropriate
forms of activity:
There's a gulf [between professionals and volunteersi based around different
experiences of education, different experiences of work. Even those that went
to college and spent a year working in industry, you know, still haven't known
what its like to have to get up at five in the morning and do really mind
numbing work, for a pittance, and why it is that the compensations in those
conditions might often be substance misuse as a recreational activity to blot
out the experience. And the fact that that's often regarded as an inappropriate
way to deal with leisure, fails to take into consideration the brutalising effect
of existence, both at work and at home. I'm not suggesting that people should
go native and live like it, although it would probably do some of them some
good, but for heavens sake just try and understand where it is these people are
coming from, and don't have at the back of your mind values that you want to
give them, f they come up with things that are important for them.
(Professional, February 1994)
The above quotation makes an important point - that in order to establish an effective
partnership with members of the local population, the professionals needed to obtain
an understanding of their everyday life. However, the topic of cultural dissonance is
by no means exhausted by this insight. Another example of cultural dissonance
concerns variations in techniques of self-presentation and inter-personal styles; again
this is multi-faceted, and includes a whole range of linguistic codes, and conventions,
as well as shared knowledge and assumptions. This point is illustrated in the
following quotation from one of the professionals, in which he describes the
comparative ease of talking to 'one of us':
DW - HOW DO YOU GET ON WITH THE VOLUNTEERS Th1 THE
GROUP?
In a different way to the way in which I relate to professionals, because there's
that nice sort of smoothy thing, you know we're comfortable, you're one of us.
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In a different way to relating to professionals, I'd like to think that I get on well
with the volunteers too. I've spent less time with them, I'm more used to
clicking into professional dialogues... errm now is that true, because I have a
sort of curious job, because I'm on one level able to deal with professionals,
but a lot of my time is spent with local people.
(Professional, November 1993)
It is worth noting that cultural dissonance persisted even though the professional
quoted above spent a greater amount of time with members of the local population
than with his fellow professionals, suggesting that it was too deeply ingrained to be
overcome by greater familiarity. An equally intractable aspect of cultural dissonance
is related to fundamental value conflicts, for example, concerning equal opportunities
and discrimination:
I think there are attitudes by some of the people in WHAP that I don't agree
with .... and I don't think can run it on equal opportunities, anti-discriminatory
practices and there is for me a real problem with that, which you would expect
and you have to find ways of working with.
(Professional, February 1994)
That some of the volunteers held views that were considered to be 'politically
incorrect', or at least unacceptable to the professionals involved in the project, is a
theme which is returned to later in the chapter, for now it is sufficient to note that this
constituted another form of cultural dissonance between the two groups. The above
examples concern cultural dissonance as it was experienced by the professionals. The
following quotation from one of the volunteers, reveals an awareness of cultural
dissonance, but also reveals the way in which it is embroiled in the operation of
power, or more specifically, in the adoption of a deferential attitude on the part of the
volunteers towards the professionals:
Half of us don't understand what you're talking about anyway. I mean some of
the fs and bvs and wherefores and whatever, some of it goes a little bit
beyond. [...] but that's the way you're brought up. It's hard for you to come
down to our level, because that's where you 're taught, but it's even harder for
194
us to come up to your level, because we weren't taught that way. We were
always taught, and it goes back to early childhood, taught to look up, not to
look down.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
To summarise, many of the professionals participating in WHAP experienced role
conflict and sought to overcome this contradiction by adapting their professional role,
however, rather than addressing the alienation caused by their location within the state,
the professionals focused on their relationship with the volunteers and local
population, or more specifically, on the perceived problem of cultural dissonance.
Four elements of the problem are identified in the above quotations: professional
ignorance of working class experiences, difficulties with inter-personal
communication, value conflict, and culturally patterned attitudes of deference.
WHAP attempted to overcome the problem of cultural dissonance by adapting the
professional role in a number of ways. First, the amount of contact time between the
professionals and volunteers involved in the project, was much greater than that
associated with traditional forms of professional practice, at least for the core
members, allowing the development of much closer relationships between members of
the two groups. The context in which the two groups were brought together was also
much more informal than the traditional way in which members of the local
population gain access to professionals. Thus, the encounter took place on neutral
ground, rather than in a GP surgery or community clinic. Rather than patients or
clients seeking professional advice on a personal problem, the volunteers were treated
as partners in the project of improving local health, this extended to the constitution
and committee structure which at least formally gave the volunteers equal say in the
decision making process. The combination of these factors allowed the two groups to
develop a much greater degree of familiarity with each other than would be likely to
occur in a traditional professional/client relationship, and this had some effect in
reducing the deferential attitudes of the volunteers, as the following quotation
suggests:
At first I looked up to 'em [the professionals], you know like everyone else. But
I have been used to working with professionals, before, on different things. So
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I more or less acted as if they were part of the family (laughter) and Ifind that
a better way to get on with people, [...] They were kind of toffee nosed, but
they've come off their high horses now.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
This relaxed and informal relationship also provided a model for the relationship
between the professionals attending the Drop-in and the local people who used it. The
professionals attempted to blend in with the volunteers, often engaging in the group
discussions or craft activities, but being available to give advice when requested to do
so:
Kate [one of the professionals], for instance, you know, if people come in
and they've got a problem, she'll sit for hours on end explaining it so they'll
understand it. I mean not being over-bearing, being on the same level, and
talking straight to them, never wandering her eyes or showing boredom, or
clicking her feet or anything like that, giving her whole attention. And this is
somebody who 's a professional, and who's not [just] giving them five
minutes...
(Volunteer, September 1994)
Although the Drop-in provided an informal context in which members could seek the
advice of professionals, the brevity of the encounter meant that it was difficult to
develop the type of relationship that had been built up between the professionals and
the volunteers over a longer period of time. The difficulty of establishing a trusting
relationship between the professionals and the Drop-in users was countered by the fact
that the Drop-in sessions were significantly dominated by the presence of the
volunteers, and the type of activities they conducted, such as, craft work, facials, and
manicures. This in effect provided an accessible, non-professional, front for the Drop-
in, that substantially disguised the presence of professionals, and challenged the
tendency for professionals to adopt a 'judgmental' approach to their clients:
• the drop-in volunteers have developed, and I think it is they who have
developed this philosophy, that every person who comes in is unconditionally,
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and unjudgmentally accepted, and I think one of the features of a professional
relationship is that it isn't unconditional and it is judgmental, and stereotypes
may be made and enforced. And in fact when one of the professionals in the
drop-in centre did become judgmental the volunteers made a complaint about
it. And the fault was rectified (laughter).
(Professional November 1993)
Thus the Drop-in provided an informal and relaxed context, in which members of the
local population could gain access to the skills and expertise of professionals,
apparently without having to enter into a paternalistic or judgmental relationship. One
of the social workers involved in the project commented on the way in which this
alternative approach to professional practice was significantly less antagonistic and
coercive than other models of service delivery:
after being for twenty years very much professional client based, [...]
working in this more parallel way, I've gained a lot of understanding, from
that point of view, that I'm not the power and they're not a participant.
Because home working with clients has been a very new experience for me.
Being in statutory agencies, particularly in child protection work, was very
much, if there was therapy at all it was fairly coercive, I had to be there. This
idea of working with people on this level, in a much more participatory way,
has been very good for me and I've enjoyed that.
(Professional, December 1993)
As the above quotation suggests, the Drop-in not only provided a more accessible
form of health and welfare advice for members of the local population, but also a
means by which professionals could overcome their subjective sense of role conflict,
at least during the brief periods of their attendance at the Drop-in, enabling them to
adopt a less coercive and more supportive form of practice. Over time, this also led
to the development of a less polarised relationship between the professionals and the
volunteers, many of whom had previously had negative experiences of welfare
provision:
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I think there's been a bit of suspicion with some of the volunteers that the
professionals would take over, if they didn't cling to their role and to their
corner tenaciously. And from that point of view they've maybe blocked some of
their own development by looking at professionals in their corner and
themselves.., it's not true of all of them, in some people. But I think that's
gradually relaxing and this sort of 'we don't need the professionals', (which is
almost sort of an insulting title), that feeling has certainly been around. It's a
bit less, recently. But I think it's been there all along. And I think some of
them have had historic involvement with professionals, social workers etc. and
maybe have not had wondeifully good experiences. So their perception of how
anybody could be working beside them and not them orf_q them has taken a
bit of time.. to give them confidence really, whether that's been a health
professional or a social worker, or whoever. They've had experiences and
histories that have maybe not been very enabling.
(Professional, December 1993)
What the above quotation refers to is the development of trust between the
professionals and the volunteers, some of whom had previously had extremely
antagonistic encounters with welfare professionals. The extent, and perceived value of
this trust, is indicated in the following quotation from one of the volunteers:
• . . they [the volunteers] look up to the professionals, and they appreciate what
they're doing and they know they're not doing anything against them, and they
need somebody they can trust. Their whole life is riddled with things they
can't trust, like the Council, and their doctors and everything else. They trust
you, and that trust, you know, it's worth a fortune.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
Superficially then, it appears that WHAP's attempts to overcome cultural dissonance
between the professionals and the volunteers/users of the Drop-in was successful. An
informal setting was developed in which issues and concerns could be discussed in
depth, the cautious and deferential attitude of some of the volunteers was at least
partially eroded, a form of practice was developed which apparently facilitated the
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utilisation of professional skills without the paternalism associated with traditional
professional/client relationships, and, over time, a bond of trust developed between the
professionals and the volunteers. However, despite this apparent success, the view
that a more fundamental divide persisted could still be found, for instance in the
following quotation from one of the professionals:
I felt there was a gulf between, [...] what the professionals were about and
what the locals were about. I wasn't sure despite away days, although on a
personal and friendship basis, you know bonds were made. But whether that
sort of like., the dialogue and the perceptions of things were still sort of
separate...
(Professional, February 1994)
This belief that WHAP had succeeded in creating a relatively close and more relaxed
inter personal relationship between the professionals and the volunteers, whilst leaving
the more deeply ingrained aspects of cultural dissonance virtually intact, is borne out
by the following quotation from one of the volunteers:
You can't just shove someone's full life of education out the window, just to be
somebody Ofl tile street. So, you just can't be somebody different over night.
You can be nicer, you can be sweet, but you can't be nothing else really. You
can try, but WHAP has tried, I mean, the professionals, I talk to them now, like
/ talk to the girls, so they don't hit on me as nuch as they did.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
The above quotation, and the previous one, express a nagging doubt about the extent
to which WHAP managed to overcome cultural dissonance, which appears to
contradict, or at least qualify, the account given by others. This can be explained in at
least two ways. First, it might be that the cultural synthesis described in the earlier
account, did not extend to all of WHAP's participants; that perhaps the volunteers and
professionals whose involvement was more peripheral had less opportunity to
overcome their cultural dissonance. Given the variable degree of integration within the
project, particularly amongst the volunteer group whose composition constantly
changed over time, this explanation may well be valid. However, there is a second
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theory which carries even greater explanatory weight, it entails reconceptualising
WHAP's challenge to cultural dissonance as an attempt to circumvent the traditional
professional role rather than to fundamentally restructure or adapt it. Rather than
changing what it means to be a professional, WHAP provided a space in which the
professional role could be briefly set aside in order to reveal the personal
characteristics of the people who inhabit such roles.
Jn this sense the experience provided by WHAP was similar, for example, to meeting
an off-duty Police Officer at a dinner party - the setting is informal, views can be
exchanged, 'off the record' legal advice can be sought. In this way the dinner guests
may get to know the person behind the Police Officer role, and may even benefit from
his/her expertise without having to meet in a professional capacity. However,
although the formal trappings of a professional role may be set aside for the duration
of a dinner party, the role itself remains unchanged. In addition, there are limits to the
'off-duty' status - thus the dinner party host may be reluctant to discuss the origins of
the smoked salmon, and fellow guests might refrain from their preferred after dinner
smoke. Whilst a blind eye might be turned, the possibility remains that it will not.
WHAP created a similar kind of 'off-duty' status for its professional participants,
(even for those who were technically there on their employer's time), allowing them to
dispense with many of the formal trappings associated with their professional role, and
relate to the other participants in a much more relaxed and informal fashion than
would ordinarily be the case. However, although this facilitated a closer inter-personal
relationship between some of the professionals and some of the volunteers, it
constituted a circumvention of the professional role rather than genuine adaptation or
re-structuring. Thus, in their ordinary working activity outside of WHAP the
professionals could reactivate their traditional role. Moreover, as with the fictitious
Police Officer, the 'off-duty' status of the WHAP professionals had very real limits, in
terms of what they could turn a blind eye to, and what they felt obliged to regulate.
It is here that the dinner party metaphor becomes exhausted, because although, like a
dinner party, WHAP undoubtedly had a social dimension, its primary purpose was the
practical activity of bringing about change. Crucially, as the testimony of the WHAP
members presented above indicates, the success of the project was perceived to be
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dependent upon the effective utilisation of the skills, expertise and resources brought
by the professional members. Rather than being relatively passive observers at a
social function, the WHAP professionals were obliged to actively intervene in the
project, using their skills and resources to advance its objectives. As the following
analysis reveals, it was through this active intervention that the elements of the
traditional professional role, that the project had sought to circumvent by challenging
cultural dissonance, re-emerged. In using their skills and expertise the professionals
inadvertently recreated the problems of paternalism, lay dependence, regulation and
control that they had initially sought to challenge.
The re-emergence of professional power
Professional power re-emerged through a broad series of practical activities and issues
addressed by the group, however, four major themes have been selected from the
interview transcripts and case study materials to illustrate the characteristics of this re-
emergence - they are: the development of an effective organisational form, the
regulation of smoking at the Drop-in and at meetings, combating alleged racism within
the group, and the development of disciplinary procedures following an incident with
a WHAP member who engaged in disruptive behaviour. Before looking at these
themes in detail, it is important to establish a number of points about the process they
illustrate. Generally, it will be argued that the four themes listed above provided the
media through which traditional forms of professional power re-emerged.
Superficially, this might appear to be a crude conspiracy theory in which the
professionals, as agents of the state, consciously conspired to exercise control over a
resistant group of volunteers. But, as the evidence presented below illustrates, such a
hypothesis cannot be supported. First, at a subjective level, many of the professionals
involved in the project were acutely sensitive to issues of power and were committed
to dismantling its operational form. Nor were the volunteers uniformly opposed to the
exercise of professional power; in fact many were more insistent about the need to
establish rules and regulations than were the professionals.
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Moreover, recognition that the four themes listed above provided opportunities for
professional power to re-emerge does not mean that the issues themselves were
antithetical to the interests of the volunteers; on the contrary the establishment of a
disciplined organisational form may be essential to the effectiveness of any group with
political objectives, and the desire to tackle racism and encourage smoking cessation
are not in themselves automatically oppressive. The last point is important because it
posits a different relationship between knowledge and power than that suggested by
some approaches to discourse or ideology. Rather than seeing power as immanent in
knowledge, the suggestion here is that even politically neutral knowledge can act as
the carrier of professional power - to invert Marshall McCluhans famous maxim, it is
not that the medium is the message, but rather that the message is the medium, that is,
the medium through which professional power is transmitted and re-constituted.
The above qualifications of the original hypothesis create a theoretical gap or lacuna;
if the imperative towards the re-emergence of professional power cannot be located
either in the subjective aspirations of the professionals, or, in the
ideological/discursive content of their activities, then where do its origins reside, and
what evidence do we have that the alleged re-emergence of professional power
actually occurred. These questions can only be answered by analysis of the four
themes identified above.
N Organisation & Authority
From the outset WHAP adopted a loose and informal organisational structure.
Although, as the case study materials presented in chapter two demonstrate, meetings
were chaired and minuted and a Constitution drafted, it was felt to be important that
the formality of traditional bureaucratic administration was kept to a minimum.
However, as the project progressed and a greater number of lay volunteers joined the
group, it became apparent that a greater degree of regulation was required. It is
important to note that the impetus for such regulation did not come exclusively from
the professionals, as the following quotation from one of the volunteers indicates:
From the meetings that we have had, the little ones here, I find them very
confusing. They make me stressed, cos nobody listens, everybody speaks over
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everybody else. No decisions are made [...] Ifeel that even though we're every
day people, we're coming together to make an organisation, right? So we need
to put a bit of a professional side to it. [...] Because it's like we're all chickens
with our heads cut off running round don't know what's happening, the way it's
going. We need to have a little bit of organisation.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
As the quotation suggests, what had begun as orderly discussion between professionals
became much more boisterous as the volunteers gained the opportunity and the
confidence to express themselves. Hence the need for a more formal approach to rules
and regulations was increasingly articulated, and the transcripts of interviews
conducted at this time reflect the growing concern amongst professionals and
volunteers. Although the need for organisational discipline was recognised by the
volunteers, many considered the production and enforcement of such rules and
regulations to be a responsibility of the professionals, as the following quotation
emphasises:
.afew rules and regulations never hurt no one. It puts people, you know ... in
order. Everybody has gone to school, and everybody is used to regulation,
and when there's no regulations you just have mayhem. And that's what's
wrong with WHAP. [...] we need some rules and regulations, and you
professionals have all the upstairs for that. Do you understand me, you know
all the rights and wrongs of what it has to say. I could write out rules and
regulations, but I wouldn't know the two words to go together...
(Volunteer, November 1993)
Thus the professionals involved in the project were perceived to have the knowledge
and experience needed to produce and implement a series of rules and regulations that
would ensure the effectiveness and smooth running of the project. This expertise in
the techniques of bureaucratic regulation was felt to extend far beyond the realm of
organising effective meetings, to include a much broader range of administrative tasks.
These three factors, the need for organisational regulation, the belief that only the
professionals were competent in this area, and the broad field over which
administrative expertise was required, created a fundamental problem for the
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professionals involved in the project, many of whom were eager to avoid the
reproduction of traditional forms of bureaucratic domination. The following quotation
from one of the professionals lists the range of administrative activities perceived to
be necessary, and the means by which it was hoped that the danger of professional
dominance could be avoided:
I see a core organisation which does, and I know it sounds dreadfully
bureaucratic, but undertakes things like community networking, recruiting,
accounting, personnel functions, we've got to have all of those to underpin an
effective WHAP, and publicity, media relations, in which professionals and
residents share it half and half so whatever tasks are undertaken by a
professional worker is mirrored by the tasks which are being learned by
residents, who would in that capacity be paid. Though quite what model for
that we've still got to work out. So I see a professional input which is mirrored
by residents who wish to have either work experience or training, and who
then by definition, therefore, are at least able to take on some of the skills and
resources that the professionals bring in, because one of the whole ideas is to
transfer the professional resources over to the residents. But then as I said
before I then see a whole repertoire of activities some of which can have a life
of their own, only returning to the central core to get core services, like being
paid expenses, or whatever, or having their budgets accounted for.
(Professional, November 1993)
As the quotation suggests, it was hoped that the need for organisational regulation
could be met by utilising the knowledge of bureaucratic procedures possessed by the
professionals, and that the consequent danger of professional domination could be
overcome by educating and training some of the volunteers to play an equal part in
the administrative process. However, although it is feasible that volunteers could be
trained in the methods of bureaucratic administration, thereby avoiding the need for a
professional monopoly of the administrative process, it is surely wrong to conclude
that this in any way constitutes a diminution or circumvention of professional power.
The problem lies in the fact that professional power does not inhere in a given group
of individuals but in the role or structural position that they occupy. Training
volunteers to occupy professional 'shoes' may give the impression of
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deprofessionalisation, but the fundamental aspects of professional power remain
unchallenged. When the professional quoted above was interviewed again a year later,
the contradictory nature of bureaucratic regulation had become more apparent:
• . there does seem to be a need to create boundaries in an organisation such
as WHAP, for instance, at the moment we're going through the development
process of drawing up a volunteer's charter and recruitment policy, a
grievance procedure, and how people get in and out of WHAP, and that sort of
thing. And at first glance they do seem to me to be quite formalised and
ritualised, but the volunteers and the people who are coming into the Drop-in
who are expressing the wish to be volunteers are asking for that. I tend to set
out with a very informal stance, but there does seem to be the need for these
ritualistic processes. But if you are not careful they can turn from formal
procedures which are simply meant to give some order and structure, in order
to facilitate people's actions, to something that does become authoritarian and
controlling, and since we're only in the process of developing that! think we're
too early to see, but you can obviously see that f you were too formal and too
structured, those kinds of procedures really would be controlling, they would
be excluding certain., for instance [we are] already getting into the debate:
'well f we have a volunteer working with children, entertaining children we
are duty bound under the law to ask about previous criminal offences, because
that's exempted from the Offender's Act from 1974. Now obviously we have
one or two volunteers who have obviously had criminal backgrounds, so it
means then they've got to be vetted. So you get into a very grey area then of
what's control, and what's necessary to protect a so called vulnerable group. I
think it is quite a fine line that you can only work through by grim experience
actually.
(Professional, November 1994)
Of course, utilisation of bureaucratic techniques need not entail acceptance of
employment legislation as in the above example, but it does entail an acceptance of,
and a legitimation of, the constraints on individual autonomy and innovation that are
characteristic of bureaucratic regulation. As the following quotation suggests, this
legitimation of traditional bureaucratic forms of organisation not only influenced
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WHAPs internal affairs, but also hindered the development of a critical approach to
external bureaucratic agencies:
• . . the continual deference to professionals and the acceptance by the
professionals to organise things in fairly bureaucratic ways, I think the
acceptance by the workers that that's okay, has perpetuated the myth of the
need for bureaucracy and a myth in the sense that they don't necessarily
understand the whys and wherefores, but that's how you professionals work.
And I think that's affected the relationship between, the volunteers and other
professionals in other statutory agencies. So I think that WHAP hasn't
demystified how bureaucracies work really for those people. It hasn't given
then the autonomy or, hasn't empowered them to take on bureaucracies at all.
(Professional, November 1993)
In short then, the need to develop organisational discipline led to the utilisation of
professional expertise in bureaucratic forms of administration. It was hoped that the
danger of professional domination would be avoided by training some of the
volunteers to participate in the administrative process. However, professional power
inheres not in the individuals who occupy bureaucratic positions but in the techniques,
assumptions, expectations and practices that collectively constitute bureaucratic forms
of organisation. In failing to arrive at an adequate critique of bureaucracy WHAP
facilitated the re-emergence of professional power within its internal relations, and
legitimated the practice of external bureaucratic agencies.
U Smoking
It might be anticipated that the issue of whether people should be allowed to smoke
either at the Drop-in or during WHAP meetings might provide an opportunity for the
professionals to impose their views on the volunteers and Drop-in users; smoking is
generally less prevalent amongst middle class professionals than it is amongst working
class groups, and smoking cessation is often a central plank of the health promotion
strategies of statutory agencies in the health sector. However, analysis of the interview
transcripts reveals that although the smoking issue produced heated debate amongst
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the members of WHAP, it cannot simply be read as an instance of the health sector
professionals imposing their will upon, or exercising power over, the other parties.
First, support for the opposing sides of the argument did not divide between the
professionals and the volunteers, or between smokers and non-smokers - there were
volunteers and smokers who supported a ban on smoking, and professionals and non-
smokers who supported its continuance. Nor was the issue resolved in favour of the
anti-smoking lobby; rather than banning smoking altogether, separate smoking and
non-smoking areas were designated. Superficially then, it might be concluded that
the smoking issue is evidence of a failure to exercise professional power or hegemony,
resulting either from lack of consensus amongst the professionals, or from the
effective resistance of the pro-smokers. However, such a conclusion misses the point.
In terms of an analysis of the exercise of professional power, the objective merits of
banning or tolerating smoking, and the details of the compromise reached by WHAP,
are more or less irrelevant. What really matters, is the way in which both sides of the
debate were structured and constituted by professional perspectives, and the
consequences of the debate for the relationship between the professionals and the
volunteers/Drop-in users.
The arguments put forward by the opponents of smoking were straight forward,
reflecting the growing body of epidemiological evidence supporting an association
between the inhalation of tobacco smoke, (both directly and passively), and the
incidence of heart disease, lung cancer and respiratory illness. As well as concern for
the health of WHAP members, it was also felt that, as an organisation whose main aim
was to improve the health of local people, WI-LAP would not be taken seriously by
external agencies, if it were seen to condone smoking. This point was emphasised by
one of the professionals:
.certainly people like me were coming from the view that if WHAP was going
to take a view on good health issues to Cory [a local industrial developer] or to
other people, then it had to be seen to be clear within it's own structures and
organisations. You can't have an organ isation which is seen to not be good on
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health issues, if you're going to tell other people what to do, because it really
does make it very easy for them to disregard what you're saying.
(Professional, September 1994)
This concern with the way external agencies perceived WHAP, reflects the belief,
expressed above, that professional involvement had given the project a hallmark of
credibility, which should not be tarnished by tolerance of unhealthy behaviour
amongst the members. Although the anti-smoking position was not exclusively held
by the professionals, it does mirror the concerns of statutory agencies and is
legitimated by reference to 'official' health knowledge. Surprisingly though, the
counter position was also structured by themes which are redolent of a welfarist
perspective. Thus, as the following quotation indicates, it was felt that a strong anti-
smoking stance might render the services provided at the Drop-in inaccessible to those
in greatest need:
[that] it's better to have an organisation where nobody smokes because it's
better for health, is clear; if you're aiming that service at people who are very
stressed and who do smoke, [...] then you have a conflict between those two
situations. If you take your holier than thou view, then you reject certain
people from that service, and that may be the people you were originally
aiming for.
(Professional, September 1994)
Mention of the word 'stress' in the above quotation is essential to an understanding of
the pro-smoking position. It was not simply the case that the pro-smokers feared a
loss of custom at the Drop-in if smoking were banned, (in the same sense that a night-
club might lose trade through the adoption of a strict dress code), but that smoking
was considered to be a consequence of the stress encountered in everyday life, and
that it was, therefore, something to be understood, sympathised with, and treated,
rather than simply proscribed. This point appears more clearly in the following
quotation from a different professional:
Well I think it was a conflict between the medical model which quite clearly
says 'people shouldn't smoke because it's damaging to their health', and the
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U
inure social caring approach that the women have adopted, which is, 'these
people are stressed, we're here to deal with the root cause and help them and
talk to i/win, and if smoking is the only thing they can do to keep themselves
sane i/zen so be it'. So I think there's sort of a clash of outlooks really.
(Professional, October 1 994)
Although both the anti-smoking and pro-smoking positions reflect different elements
of the same professional/welfarist perspective, it is important to recognise the
transformation that occurs in the passage from the former to the latter. From the anti-
smoking perspective smoking is viewed as a form of anti-social behaviour, likely to
damage the health of the smoker and others, from the pro-smoking perspective,
however, the smoker is viewed as a victim, someone who cannot cope with the
stresses and strains of life, someone requiring psychological support rather than
censure. In short, the relationship between smokers and non-smokers that was posited
or brought into being by the 'smoking' debate, bore many of the characteristics of the
traditional relationship between welfare professional and client, although as the
following quotation from one of the volunteers indicates, the impetus for establishing
this relationship did not come exclusively from the professionals:
some of tile people who come in here are totally stressed out, I mean the
man with AIDS and the boyfriend problem, I mean he smoked continually
when he was here, for four solid hours, he didn 't give up. I mean how can you
stop a nan who 's actually really stressed out? I mean lie 's smoked less, I must
ad,nit, as he 's gone on, but in the beginning he was actually lighting one after
another, so how can you stop that? You know, there's no cure is there? I
couldn't give him a pill, and say it'll go away in a half-hour jf you're a good
boy, slap on the wrist or whatever, lie 's not here for that.
(Volunteer, September 1994)
As well as indicating the extent to which one of the volunteers had embraced the
stress/smoking perspective, the above quotation sheds further light on the image or
identity of 'the smoker' that such a perspective gives rise to - in this example it is the
HW victim, too 'stressed out' to regulate his tobacco consumption, but the image of
the smoker as a passive, helpless victim of stress is generalised to all those who have
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endured adverse experiences. Thus, the activity of smoking is inscribed with a new
symbolic value, one of helplessness and passivity. Contrast this, for example, with
Paul Willis' (1977) account of schoolboy smoking which he describes as an act of
rebellion against the middle class values of the school. In the welfare professionalised
context of WHAP the symbolisation of smoking as bravado or rebellion becomes
unthinkable, rather than a refusal to be disciplined by middle class values, smoking is
transformed into the inability either to exercise self-discipline, or to bear the weight of
even relatively mild negative sanctions.
The belief that a total ban on smoking could not be imposed because of the
psychological fragility of those it would affect, did not go unchallenged, as the
following quotation indicates:
They [the pro-smoking lobby] would argue that some people are so stressed
that they've got to do this that and the other. As I said at the time, the people
who come to the WHAP Drop-in are nowhere near as stressed as some of the
people who come in to use our neutral ground facility, you know marriage
break-ups, kids perhaps not been seen for however long, large amounts of
stress; they don't smoke though, or jf they do they pop outside and have a puff
(Professional, November 1994)
However, despite the assertion that a total smoking ban would be far from unbearable,
even for those experiencing considerable stress, the perception persisted that such a
policy would further victimise an already oppressed group who were incapable of
modifying their behaviour. As well as the compromise of creating separate smoking
and non-smoking areas, the perception of the smoker as helpless victim also
influenced the activities of Health Promotion professionals involved in the project; the
following quotation, illustrates the limited extent of their work:
I have gone and done smokelisers and various things, and chatted to people,
but I'm not doing that to sort of lecture them, or to harangue them about
smoking. I mean basically that really is to raise awareness and f they are
interested in giving up smoking to suggest ways to help them, but on the two or
three occasions that I've done it, it was in association with the visits from
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important people, and it was something to be seen to be doing. I mean we've
not spent time and effort in working on the smoking issue with them because
we don't think it would really benefit them or us. I mean we tend to work with
people who 'ye made a decision to give up smoking and we run stop smoking
groups. You know we don't waste their time, or alienate people, or make them
feel guilly by haranguing them all the time saying you shouldn't be smoking,
you know what's the point. It's like any addiction, if they've not decided to
change their behaviour, we're wasting our time and wasting theirs.
(Professional, October 1994)
The above quotation conveys the sense in which the smokers were perceived to be
largely beyond help in terms of smoking cessation, leading to a relatively low level of
health promotion input around this issue. Interestingly, the issue of WHAP's public
image re-surfaces in the claim that much of the professional anti-smoking health
promotion activity was done to impress important visitors to the project. This
pessimism about the likely effectiveness of health promotion initiatives may be
justified; it may well be that smoking is too deeply ingrained in the culture of deprived
groups to be easily eradicated either by health promotion initiatives or by attempts to
proscribe it. However, as was suggested above, the point is not whether the solution
arrived at by WHAP was justifiable, but the way in which the professionalised context
structured the terms of the debate. In this sense the outcome of the debate is
immaterial, if the professionals had insisted on a complete smoking ban, or had
alternatively imposed no regulation on smoking behaviour, the conclusion would
remain the same.
Superficially, this may appear to be theoretically convenient, allowing a direct ban on
smoking to be identified as an example of coercive professional power, and an
apparent compromise to be deconstructed as the assertion of professional power by
other means! However, this apparent theoretical convenience reflects the Catch-22
created by professional involvement, rather than an analytical sleight of hand. Thus,
professional dominance really does create a 'no-win' situation, in which even an
apparently tolerant, non-coercive resolution to a dispute must re-constitute a
relationship of power.
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The key to understanding this Catch-22 lies in the way in which professional
involvement structures the terms of debate - instead of opposing the proposed smoking
ban on the grounds that, for example, it restricted individual choice, the pro-smoking
lobby constructed its argument in terms which reflected a professional discourse about
the debilitating effects of stress. Rather than challenging the intellectual dominance of
professional frames of reference, the pro-smokers actively re-reinforced it, allowing
the traditional relationship between welfare professional and 'dependent casualty of
social circumstances' to be reaffirmed.
What the example of the smoking debate shows us is not the ability of the
professionals to use their position to impose their will on a resistant laity, but rather
the extent to which professional power asserts itself independently of the
consciousness of the individual professional, indeed, that one need not even be a
professional in order to exercise professional power. As many of the quotations cited
earlier in this chapter indicate, many of the professionals involved in WHAP were
uneasy about the professional power they possessed, were largely reluctant to impose
their will, and were keen to enable the volunteers to articulate their own views and
make their own decisions. However, despite this subjective commitment to unravel
the exercise of professional power, the professionals also brought with them a set of
conventions about what constitutes a 'proper' or 'acceptable' frame of reference from
which a line of argument can be constructed. These frames of reference historically
developed, and continue to exist, within the institutions and intellectual tradition of
welfarism, and are heavily patterned with themes of, for example, the dependent poor,
or the helpless victim of social circumstances, whose ills can only be ameliorated by
professional support, within the confines of the welfare state.
Acceptance of this frame of reference is imperative to continued professional
involvement in projects like WHAP, because its absence would rapidly give rise to
conclusions and activities that would bring the professionals into conflict with their
employers. But, acquiescence in those frames of reference necessarily entails tacit
acceptance of the paternalistic relations that underpin them, with the consequence that
no matter how a debate is resolved within their confines, the outcome must inevitably




Whereas the issue of smoking provides an example of the way in which professional
power asserts itself even where the professionals themselves are opposed to its re-
emergence, the problem of racism, and the way it was addressed in WHAP,
demonstrates the extent to which an element of emancipatory politics can be adapted
to serve the conscious exercise of professional power. The issue of racism was a
central concern of WHAP from the beginning of the project, and the professionals
were eager to ensure that the project avoided racism in its own practice, and actively
campaigned to give a voice to people from black and minority ethnic groups, for
example, a concerted effort was made to make contact with minority ethnic groups and
recruit them into the project, and the specific needs and concerns of such groups were
reflected in the survey design and analysis.
As noted in the case study presented in chapter two, concern about racism was
intensified by the occurrence of two racially motivated murders in the Thamesmead
area, and the public campaign against the British National Party's 'bookshop' in
nearby Welling, all of which were constantly referred to in local and national media
throughout 1992 and 1993. However, the issue only became a point of controversy
amongst the members of WHAP when the recruitment of volunteers from the local
population began. The volunteers were an ethnically diverse group and issues to do
with racism often arose both in group discussions and in general interaction at the
Drop-in and during meetings. During this interaction attitudes were expressed, and
forms of language used, which could be interpreted as racist; this triggered concern
amongst some of the professionals, which as the following quotation illustrates, was
often linked to a belief in the endemic nature of racism:
people do have attitudes and they don't like uncovering the attitudes. I have
found, for example, wizen I'm trying to talk to the volunteers about racism,
which is quite up front in the drop-in, people come in and they've got racist
attitudes...
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DW - IS THIS THE VOLUNTEERS, OR THE PEOPLE WHO COME IN TO
USE IT?
Both, both. You see, and I can't say that in that group. I can't say it in the
main group, because that would be incredibly destructive. But I don't expect
them not to have racist attitudes, we all have. We're all a product of what's
out there. We're a product of what we take in. We're a product of the media.
And you know, it has to be talked about, and it is talked about in the volunteer
group, but what I find is it can't go very far because people defences come
up, as they will do, you know: "I don 't, I'm not guilty of racism ", you can't go
beyond that. The only thing you can do is still keep talking about it, and hope
the penny drops.
(Professional, November 1993)
As the above quotation suggests, many of the volunteers were reluctant to accept the
accusation of racism, particularly from white middle-class professionals. Matters
came to a head when two of the professionals wrote a letter to all of the WHAP
members stressing the need to address racism in the group, referred to in the following
quotation from one of the volunteers:
.Ir said something about we have to be less racist, you know?
DW - WHERE DID THAT LE1TER COME FROM?
I think it was Elaine who wrote it, and [she should be] the last person to write
a letter like that to me - my family's made up of different races. [...] My sister
Margaret's married to an African and has three half-caste children. My niece
is married to an Indian and has six Indian children. So we are such a mixed..
I don't even look at somebody [as] of a different colour or a different creed.
When I go to my son's, they speak Portuguese and English together, my
grandkids speak Portuguese. So the racist value is not there. That doesn't
apply, I don't even think about it. And when that came up.. I.. I couldn't cope.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
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As with the smoking issue, it is important not to be side-tracked by the rights or
wrongs of the matter in question; whether or not the members of WHAP were racist,
or, if the measures taken in response to the perception of racism were justified, are not
our concern here, rather we are interested in the extent to which the issue of racism
provided a medium through which the exercise of professional power could re-
emerge, and if so, the process by which that re-emergence occurred. Not all of the
professionals interviewed, were uncritical of the way in which the racism issue was
handled, and the following quotation is insightful:
There was one particular instance where I felt there was an over reaction to
what was being said by the voluntary workers, professional values [were]
being imposed upon what are mainly working class [...] voluntary workers,
and I thought those values, to do with racism particularly, were being imposed
in far too dogmatic a way, that could ultimately be negative and destructive. In
the event the issues were raised with sensitivity and there were no untoward
outcomes.
(Professional, November 1993)
The above quotation suggests that the problem of racism might have represented the
imposition of professional values, rather than a rational response to a genuine
problem. Certainly, the belief that the response to the racism issue was an over-
reaction on the part of 'politically correct' professionals, appears more than once in the
interview transcripts, particularly amongst the volunteers. However, although this
reading of the incident is instructive, it fails to grasp the extent to which the issue of
racism was manipulated to facilitate the conscious exercise of power - this only
becomes apparent when the issue which gave rise to the letter, mentioned above, is
considered.
Ostensibly the letter was written because one of the volunteers had produced a leaflet
to advertise the Drop-in, which at least two of the professionals felt failed to represent
WHAP as a multi-cultural organisation, because it did not contain information in
minority ethnic languages. The two professionals intervened to stop the leaflet being
produced. However, the following quotation from an interview with one of the
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professionals concerned, reveals that there was an ulterior motive for stopping the
leaflet being issued:
• . . this is how I saw it: one of the volunteers, desperately keen to publicise
WHAP and bring loads of people in; which at that time without any structure
would have been very counter productive. What were we going to do with that
number of people? I could not get this point of view across. Some of the
professionals, were saying 'okay give them their head, let them get on with it
and make a leaflet'. And the leaflet was going to be prepared, but it was going
to be prepared presenting WHAP as a totally white organisation. No thought
to any other language, no thought to what are we actually going to do with
people when they come in. If you 're going to stand in public and advertise
your organ isation you have to know what your organisation is going to do.
And that was why I had to stop that leaflet being made. But I had to do it the
way I did it, cos nobody else was seeing my point of view, apart from one other
person in the group.
(Professional, November 1993)
Although the need to promote multi-culturalism is again referred to as a reason for
stopping the leaflets being issued, a second reason is also explicitly referred to, namely
the objective of blocking further recruitment to the group on the grounds that the
professionals involved would not be able to cope with a rapid influx of volunteers or
Drop-in users. One need not question the sincerity of the commitment to multi-
culturalism, or even the need to limit the rate of recruitment and activity at the Drop-
in, to recognise that the issue of racism was manipulated in order to exercise control
over the organisation, and win support for a decision that otherwise had little support
amongst the members. As the following quotation suggests, the volunteer who
originally produced the leaflet was left in little doubt that the issue was used to
subordinate the volunteers to professional authority:
It just makes me wonder how far the professionals want the volunteers to go,
because one minute we were told we could use our own initiative and do
things, then as soon as we do that we're jumped on. It happened to me with
that leaflet [I had] Paul's say so, Kate's say so, [but] next minute Elaine and
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Deepak were jumping on [...] the leaflet. I was only going to go and give afew
leaflets out, which is nothing, but they all made such a big deal out of it, 'cos
we were told we could do something. So I just knocked it on the head.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
Following the leaflet incident it was agreed that all publicity materials should be
vetted by the community development worker, or the steering group, prior to
publication. What this decision represents, is the belief that multi-culturalism or anti-
racism is dependent upon a set of skills, or expertise, which the professionals were
perceived to posses in abundance, but which the volunteers were felt to lack. This
point is made clear in the following quotation, again from the professional who
intervened to block publication of the leaflet:
lfyou are going to be a multi-racial group, you have to present yourself as a
multi-racial group, because f anybody from any other culture had picked up
that leaflet, no other language in it, no reference to any other language, "oh
it's a white group". But working in a multi-racial way takes a lot of
knowledge, skills, experiences, and making mistakes, you know. Maybe I
should have done, but I couldn't let them do it, because I couldn't be involved
in a group that called itself multi-racial, that did something that was not multi -
racial.
(Professional, November 1993)
It is important to note the way in which the conceptualisation of anti-racism or multi-
culturalism as a set of skills required to produce a politically correct discourse serves
to rob the issue of its political content. Instead of being a social and economic
relationship in which powerful groups actively exploit and oppress people by reference
to the false legitimating ideology of racial difference, racism is transformed into
working class ignorance and intolerance, to be remedied by applying the 'knowledge'
and 'skills' of middle-class welfare professionals. According to this interpretation,
rather than working together to challenge the social and economic basis of racial
oppression, the WHAP volunteers should subordinate themselves to professional
expertise until they can learn the complex codes and conventions of politically correct
behaviour and discourse. In the meantime, the professional quoted above was
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prepared to lay down a few ground rules to regulate any future tendencies towards
'racism':
• . . one of the things that I can give to the group before I go, is working out
some things which are going to put some lines, some limits out, some
containment's out; and in a way take the load off the volunteers, or the
professionals, of deciding what is and what isn't racist...
(Professional, November 1993)
Thus, the transformation is complete - instead of comprising an emancipatory struggle
against oppression, opposition to racism becomes a means by which professionals can
impose rules and regulations to police the behaviour of volunteers. This is a further
example of the way in which professional power re-emerged through the practical and
discursive activity of the project. As with the examples cited earlier of 'organisational
structure' and 'smoking', the racism issue served to reinforce the passivity of the
volunteers and reinforce their subordination to, and dependence upon, the
professionals. However, unlike the two earlier issues, the 'racism' incident had a
more consciously manipulative element, in that although professional power re-
emerged as a consequence of the adoption of a traditional welfarist frame of reference
(multi-culturalism), this reference was made at least partially with the conscious
intention of misleading the group and winning support for an action that would
otherwise have been questioned. But this conscious intention to exercise professional
power as a means of control, is not essential to the process under scrutiny; even if the
incident really had only been motivated by the desire to combat racism, rather than
also being a means of regulating recruitment to the group, the conclusion would
remain the same, that professional involvement in WHAP had led to the issue of
racism being addressed within a welfarist frame of reference, which ultimately
facilitated the re-emergence of professional power.
• Disruptive Behaviour
The three examples, presented above, are concerned with practical problems and
dilemmas faced by WHAP as it progressed - the difficulty of developing an effective
organisational form, the question of whether smoking should be tolerated in a project
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concerned with health, and how the group should tackle allegations of racism amongst
its membership. It was suggested that professional involvement in the project led to
these problems being resolved in a way which facilitated the re-emergence of
professional power, even though the professionals themselves were subjectively
committed to dismantling that form of relationship. However, although the three
examples illustrate the legitimation of bureaucratic forms of power, the reinforcement
of lay dependence and passivity, and subordination to professional expertise, they are
all characterised by the virtual absence of direct coercive power. Instead, the process
of regulation and control emerges through agenda setting, fixing the range of
legitimate frames of reference, and winning consent for what appear to be 'reasonable'
conclusions.
The final example departs briefly from this focus on the subtle technologies of power
to consider an incident in which one of the volunteers experienced the sharp end of
professional intervention. However, even here, it is not primarily the coercive
treatment of the individual concerned that is of interest, but the way in which the
incident triggered the demand for a Set of disciplinary procedures applicable to the
organisation as a whole.
The incident centred on an outburst of disruptive behaviour from one of the
volunteers, 'Denise', which occurred over the August bank holiday weekend in 1994.
Denise had taken it upon herself to organise a party for children living in the
Thamesmead area, under the auspices of WHAP, and taking place in the building used
for the Drop-in. Preparation for the party coincided with a turbulent episode in
Denise's personal life, involving the unwanted return of a previously estranged
husband. This, coupled with the stress of organising the event, caused Denise to
engage in increasingly irrational behaviour. As the bank holiday drew nearer, plans for
the party grew ever more grandiose, (including, for instance, a guest appearance by
Michael Jackson!), despite attempts by the other WHAP members to encourage
restraint, and calm Denise's increasingly disruptive behaviour.
As matters progressed, Denise visited local statutory agencies, using WHAP's name to
procure resources for the party. Other WHAP volunteers were visited by Denise in the
middle of the night and subjected to verbal abuse. Eventually, Denise's behaviour, (by
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this time also under the influence of amphetamines), became manic. Busses were
flagged down in the street in an attempt to commandeer them for the party. Phone
calls were made, in the middle of the night, to the Chief Inspector of Police, requesting
the closure of roads.
Some of the WHAP volunteers took Denise and her children into their home and tried
to calm her, without success. Unfortunately, Denise's behaviour had become
unmanageable, and it was felt, posed a threat to her own safety and that of her
children. Unable to reason with her, and exhausted from their efforts, the volunteers
called one of the professionals involved in WHAP, to request help. The professional
also tried to defuse the situation but was eventually obliged to use statutory powers to
have Denise 'sectioned', that is, forcibly admitted to a mental hospital under Section
136 of the Mental Health Act.
When eventually released from the mental hospital, Denise returned to WHAP to face
disciplinary proceedings. A mixed panel of volunteers and professionals heard
'evidence' from those involved in the incident. A number of options were discussed,
but it was eventually agreed that Denise should be excluded from the project for one
month, after which she could return to the project, but would not be given access to
financial resources. After the months exclusion Denise returned to the project, but
there were further disciplinary incidents and she was eventually excluded on a
permanent basis.
In terms of the re-emergence of professional power there are two important aspects to
the incident, first, is the way in which the exhaustion of alternative approaches obliged
one of the professionals to return to a traditional professional role and exercise
statutory powers to have Denise admitted to a mental hospital against her will, the
second aspect concerns the way in which the incident gave rise to formal disciplinary
proceedings orchestrated by the professionals. Again, it is important to stress that in
terms of an analysis of the re-emergence of professional power, the question of
whether the decision to have Denise sectioned was justified or not is largely irrelevant,
as is the question of whether organisations need to have formal disciplinary
arrangements for dealing with disruptive behaviour. The important point is that
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professional involvement in the project meant that the incident itself, and more
particularly its aftermath, took a form in which professional power re-emerged.
When asked to describe the incident, the professional who had been involved in the
sectioning, replied in a way that underlined the extent to which a traditional role and
frame of reference had been re-activated:
The person concerned, I suppose from my clinical point of view, had an
amphetamine induced psychosis, in which she took a unilateral decision to
organise a vast children's party, which involved all the children from
Greenwich and Bexley, at WHAP's expense. And over a period of five or six
days we tried to reason with her, we hoped that she would burn herself out. A
number of the volunteers looked after her children at periods of time when she
clearly was not looking after them herself and eventually the point came
where she didn't burn herself out. The two volunteers who had taken the brunt
of the care, namely direct contact with her and her children, reached the point
of exhaustion, and they told me that they were giving up, they could no longer
cope, and by that time, she and the children were staying in one of the
volunteer's houses. And it wasn't just disruption, there was physical damage
to the house, and the volunteers said that they were at the point of exhaustion
[and] asked me to have her removed and that's what happened.
DW - AND WHAT DID THAT ENTAIL?
She was 'sectioned' under 136.
(Professional, November 1994)
As well as indicating the extent to which a 'clinical perspective' was adopted by the
professional concerned, the above quotation also reveals the pressures that led to its
adoption, and ultimately to the decision to 'section' Denise. The principle of
professional duty, discussed earlier in the chapter, is applicable here, as is the account
of the very limited sense in which some welfare professionals can be 'off duty'.
Clearly, faced by an individual who was extremely distressed, and in the absence or
exhaustion of other alternatives, the professional felt obliged to utilise the available
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statutory powers, for the good of the individual and the others involved in the incident,
not least Denise's children. However, by re-invoking the traditional professional role
and the sanctions which accompany it, traditional power relations are also
reconstituted. Instead of working in a partnership with local people to address the
social influences on mental and physical health, the incident forced the adoption of a
different type of relationship in which the behaviour of a 'client' is coercively
regulated and repressed without reference to the underlying causes of that behaviour.
Ironically, this is precisely the type of relationship that WHAP set out to dismantle or
transcend, but no matter how deeply these emancipatory objectives are subjectively
held, the stronger imperative of professional duty necessitates a return to the
traditional role, at least when other alternatives appear to be unavailable.
Given the nature of the dilemma faced by the professional concerned, one might have
expected the other professionals to be generally supportive, but instead the incident
drove a wedge between those who supported the outcome, and those who saw it as a
betrayal of WHAP's original objectives; the following quotation reflects the latter
view:
the professionals response originally was trying to calm her and deal with it
on a human level and help her and do a little bit of what she wanted, but at the
same time try and make her realise that she was going over the top. But
subsequently when that didn't work.. to have her sectioned, was a little bit of
an over reaction, and I think was a bit unfortunate. So when the humanitarian
response didn't work there was a definite authoritarian response. And that
carried through then to the way that WHAP dealt with it. [...] it was a
convergence of the volunteers, (having been upset by what went on), wanting
to see fair play and justice done, and the professionals wanting to punish her
for being disruptive. I think it was the professionals that suggested a sort of
adjudication panel which smacked of a Court, a kangaroo Court. And the
volunteers originally didn't want that and wanted to deal with it in a full
meeting, in a fairly unstructured way, which would inevitably have resulted in
them shouting at each other and losing their temper, but might have dealt with
it much better, because it would have enabled people's feelings to come out.
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The professionals persuaded the volunteers to go through this rather stylised,
formalised, structured process of collecting evidence, the facts not the feelings,
and making recommendations on those facts - punitive recommendations.
(Professional, October 1994)
The above quotation reveals the way in which Denise's identity within the group was
transformed by the incident, and the way in which that transition was contested.
Initially, Denise was involved in the group in the capacity of a volunteer; sharing all of
the rights, privileges and expectations that are part of that role. Her disruptive
behaviour led to the suspension of her volunteer status, and the enforcement of an
alternative identity, that of 'client' or 'patient' - someone suffering a psychosis, who
needed to be cared for and supported. But the transition did not end there, because
Denise's behaviour was so disruptive that it could not be contained within a
therapeutic domain. This forced a further re-definition of Denise's identity, as a wilful
deviant who's behaviour must be regulated and punished. It was this transition from
'client' to 'offender' that provoked the disagreement amongst the professionals. But it
should be borne in mind that in terms of the re-emergence of professional power the
consequences would have remained virtually the same no matter how that
disagreement had been resolved - whether a 'client' or an 'offender' Denise would still
have been a passive object of professional regulation; the only difference residing in
the enforcement of a therapeutic or punitive regime.
The forced admission to a mental hospital occupies a space between the two domains,
entailing the suspension of some of the individuals civil rights, but with at least the
veneer of 'therapeutic' justification. As such, the 'sectioning' operated as a switching
point in the transition between the identities of 'client' and 'offender', raising, as it
does, questions about the social control of disruptive behaviour, as well as questions
about caring for an impaired individual. The disciplinary proceedings instigated by
WHAP should be interpreted in this context, as they represent the final stage of the
transition, focusing on the need for discipline within the organisation, and the virtual
abandonment of a therapeutic imperative.
Although the transition from 'client' to 'offender' was implied by the sectioning,
dissent amongst the other professionals meant that the shift from a therapeutic to a
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disciplinary domain had to be justified or legitimated. The following quotation from
the professional involved in sectioning Denise, illustrates some of the themes
employed in the legitimation process:
I feel that the volunteers concerned who supported her, and myself have been
very damaged by it and are continuing to be damaged by her behaviour which
has continued to be disruptive. [...} The other volunteers are beginning to feel
very exploited and used by this particular person, and I certainly sympathise
with them because I feel the same way. And I don't actually feel that the
professional members of WHAP, who were not directly involved actually have
dealt with it adequately. I am very, very angry about the whole episode.
DW - WHAT SPECIFICALLY IS IT THAT YOU'RE ANGRY ABOUT?
I'm angry that we've been hurt and damaged and no one has actually
recognised it. And I feel that the volunteer concerned has had far too much
rope, and far too much understanding, that we bent over backwards to help
her, and all we've been is actually abused and used.
(Professional, November 1994)
There are two noteworthy elements here, first, identification of the 'damage' caused by
Denise to the other WHAP members involved in the incident, and secondly, the
implication of Denise's culpability; that she has had 'too much rope', that she has
wilfully abused and exploited her former colleagues. Put together, these two elements
constitute a juridical argument, they imply notions of guilt, punishment and redress for
the injured parties. Hence the perceived need for disciplinary proceedings, or a
'Kangaroo Court', as it was described by one of the professionals quoted earlier. This
belief in the need for 'Justice to be done' extended beyond the professionals involved,
as indicated by the following quotation from one of the volunteers, complaining that
the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings was not sufficiently punitive:
I'm not happy about the outcome of it, 'cos Ifeel what she did was bad, and
what should have been done, is have six months, and then come back, and go
through the [formal] procedure of [becoming] a volunteer. Because we have
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not done that, we've never gone through those things as volunteers, and I've
said to Kate, perhaps we should, you know what I mean. Not a big one, I
mean cos we 'ye done nothing wrong. But I think for six months she should be
kept away, cos all that time she came to the Drop-in and upset the volunteers
who were here and had done no wrong. Because what it looks like, David you
see, what she 's done is nothing, and that is bad, because it means she hasn't
really been punished or whatever word you want to use. And if you did that in
your job what would've happened?
DW - YEAH, BUT IT ISN'T A JOB IS IT? IT'S A VOLUNTEER THING.
Aaaah, In a sense you 're wrong, because we get paid in a sense, I mean we get
ten pounds for like four hours, and we get our expenses paid. And perhaps it
isn't ajob, but we have ajob to do. And if she's not able to do the job with the
public she shouldn 't be around here. This is not drugs and alcohol, and she
misused WHAP 's name. But what does it make us look like. But we're on the
same level as her, and we ' ye done nothing wrong, and it just looks like it
didn 't really matter. So it's all right to go on an alcoholic binge in the Drop-
in, cos all I'm going to get is four weeks away. And she did harm, do you
understand that? But don 't get me wrong, there 's a change between a
volunteer and a friend. For a friend I would have done that, but because she
misused WHAP there is a slight difference.
(Volunteer, September 1994)
The second half of the quotation is significant, because it introduces an element that
goes beyond the call for 'justice' - namely, the suggestion that Denise's behaviour
amounted to a failure to do the 'job' of being a volunteer. The comparison with paid
employment is made explicitly and it is a significant one; it implies that the
relationship between volunteer and voluntary agency should be governed by the same
responsibilities and behavioural expectations as the relationship between employer and
employee, and, crucially, that infringement of the terms of that relationship should
invoke disciplinary proceedings similar to those found in formal employment. The
view that the behaviour expected of a volunteer should mirror that expected of a paid
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employee was not unique to the volunteer quoted above, as the following quotation
from one of the professionals indicates:
I think you expect high standards of anybody providing a kind of public service
and working within an organisation. I don't think that's just professionals, I
think you expect high standards also of volunteers, certainly volunteers
working with people, [...jJ because I think the effects of the behaviour of the
individual in this instance had a lot of damaging effects on other people
socially within that group, so there's a responsibility in that way, and I don't
think we can not take that seriously, and! think that's what we've done.
(Professional, October 1994)
Thus, the domain in which WHAP's disciplining of Denise is located, can be
characterised as juridical, in that it is concerned with issues of justice, such as, the
punishment of a culpable offender, and rights of redress for injured parties, but more
importantly it is grounded in the contractual obligations associated with wage labour.
The disciplinary proceedings instigated against Denise by WIIAP bear greater
resemblance to the process by which a private company, or public organisation,
exercises control over a recalcitrant employee, than to a court of law. This conclusion
is supported by the flurry of administrative procedures and protocols developed in the
wake of the incident to formalise the rules, regulations and entitlements of WHAP
membership, including documents entitled: 'Equal Opportunities', 'Different Roles of
Members, Volunteers & Workers', 'Volunteer Recruitment', 'Volunteer Recruiter's
Charter', and 'Volunteer's Charter' - none of which, in terms of style or suzerainty,
would disgrace the most assiduous of personnel departments.
There is a clear irony here. Many of the professionals became involved in WHAP as a
means of overcoming the constraints imposed upon them by employment within a
statutory agency, yet as a consequence of the incident discussed above, WHAP
earnestly began reproducing the forms of bureaucratic domination by which public and
private sector employers regulate the behaviour of their workforce. But was the
adoption of bureaucratic/managerial forms of organisational authority the product of
professional involvement, or would similar methods have been adopted by an
exclusively lay organisation? One of the professionals subscribed to the former view:
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• . .1 think it was typical of the professional approach, you know, 'lets get the
facts, lets get this cut and dried', and not enough time in the proceedings was
given to allowing people to express their feelings. It was professional
dominance I think. They wanted it dealt with in a fairly authoritarian way and
structured way, that would be punitive. I think f they'd agreed to an open
meeting to discuss it, arms would have been waved, voices would have been
raised, punches may have been thrown, but at the end of the day people would
have kissed and made up and that would have been the end of it.
(Professional, October 1994)
Whatever, the validity of this view, it is important to recognise that even if an
exclusively lay organisation did posses the inclination and the knowledge to develop
bureaucratic/managerial forms of organisational authority, the conclusion that
professional power had re-emerged would still be valid, because the adoption of such
forms necessarily posits a subordinate relationship to welfare professionals, even if
there are none within the organisation - to prescribe the role of volunteer service
provider, and to police it with a disciplinary mechanism, is to locate the organisation
within the domain of the welfare state, albeit its informal arm, and thus to accept
professional dominance. In the same way that the establishment of a neighbourhood
watch scheme constitutes subordination to the rule of law and the power of the Police,
(even if no direct contact with the Police is made), so too does the establishment of
bureaucratic/managerial forms of organisational authority constitute subordination to,
in this case, the welfare agencies, and the power of the professionals who run them.
However, in this instance professionals were involved in the organisation and appear
to have played a leading role in the implementation of bureaucratic forms of
organisational authority.
It is important to clarify the point that is being made. It is not suggested that
emancipatory organisations must adopt an anarchic approach to organisational
authority, on the contrary, to be effective they must be rigorously disciplined. Nor is it
suggested that the professionals conspired to exercise bureaucratic regulation over
resistant volunteers, because the analysis presented above clearly indicates that some
of the professionals felt uneasy about the disciplinary proceedings, and some of the
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volunteers would have preferred more Draconian measures. What is suggested, is that
professional involvement in WHAP meant that when a problem of organisational
authority did arise, it was resolved by recourse to bureaucratic or managerial forms of
domination, which grew up under, and are indelibly stamped with, the wage labour
nexus. In the same way that a wage labourer enters into a contract with an employer
that entails relinquishing control over productive activity in exchange for a wage, the
WHAP volunteer is obliged to become a virtual, (though formally unpaid), employee
of WHAP. Rather than a free association of individuals subjectively pursuing a
common set of goals, WHAP becomes an institution with prescribed roles, the
contents of which are policed by the threat of disciplinary proceedings.
As we shall see in the final chapter, by this time WHAP had become little more than a
provider of voluntary services, and in that sense it might be argued that the formal
articulation of managerial forms of organisational authority only put in writing what
already existed in practice, however, it might also be argued that once such
organisational forms congeal, or become institutionalised, they actively shape future
expectations and behaviour, and thus become increasingly resistant to reform. In
short, the incident involving Denise caused WHAP to examine the ways in which it
regulated disruptive behaviour amongst its members. The involvement of
professionals in the project meant that this 'problem' was resolved by reference to, and
adoption of, manageriallbureaucratic forms of organisational authority, which entailed
formal prescription of the role of a volunteer, and the adoption of a disciplinary
mechanism to ensure that it was adhered to. At this point, the already slim possibility
of WHAP evolving into an emancipatory organisation was extinguished. This is
another example of the re-emergence of professional power.
Provisional Conclusions
This chapter is concerned with the contradictory position of the professionals involved
in WHAP. Objectively, the professionals brought intellectual and material resources
to the project, and their involvement conferred a hallmark of authenticity that made
WHAP appear legitimate to its lay participants and external agencies. However, they
also brought with them the constraints, conventions and imperatives associated with
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formal employment by the state; indeed many of the professionals explained their
involvement in WHAP as an attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by their
traditional role.
At the subjective level this contradiction manifested itself as role conflict. The
professionals were subjectively committed to an emancipatory agenda which sought to
challenge the paternalistic and individualising tendencies of the traditional
professional role, but at the same time were aware of: their lack of autonomy from the
state, the requirement to act as responsible representatives of the agencies that
employed them, and the necessity of subscribing to professional values.
In order to overcome this sense of role conflict, the professionals set about adapting
their traditional role; focusing in particular on the attempt to close the cultural
dissonance between themselves and the members of the local population whom they
came into contact with via WHAP. According to the testimony of those involved, the
attempt to overcome cultural dissonance was at least partially successful - WHAP
provided a forum in which professionals could mix with members of the local
population over a longer period of time and in a more informal context than would
have been likely in a traditional professional encounter. This enabled the
professionals to gain more of an insight into the lives and experiences of local people,
and to establish a degree of trust, primarily amongst the volunteers, but also to a lesser
degree amongst some of the Drop-in users. However, despite the professionals'
subjective commitment to changing the nature of the relationship between themselves
and the local community, and their limited success in overcoming cultural dissonance,
they were unable to prevent the re-emergence of professional power, consequently, as
the project progressed the lay participants became increasingly subordinated to
professional regulation and control.
Crucially, the re-emergence of professional power did not stem from the conscious
volition of the professionals, nor was it, (as a Foucauldian analysis might imply), an
inescapable consequence of the production of discourse - there is nothing intrinsic to
the discursive topics of: organisation, smoking, racism, or discipline, that
automatically entails the re-emergence of professional power. Again, this creates a
theoretical lacuna - what provoked the re-emergence of professional power if it was
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not the volition of the professionals themselves, and if professional regulation and
control was not immanent in the topics they engaged?
The answer to this conundrum lies in the professionals' objective location within the
state. It was noted at the beginning of the chapter that professional involvement in
WHAP was contradictory, bringing skills and resources, but also the threat of
professional dominance and control. The professionals attempted to resolve this
contradiction by changing the nature of their relationship with the volunteers and the
local community; more specifically they attempted to overcome their alienation from
local people. However, this alienation originated, not in the relationship between the
professionals and local people, but in the relationship between the professionals and
the state; and the nature of this relationship went unchallenged by WHAP. Thus,
although the professionals brought skills and resources to the project, those skills and
resources were constituted by, and dependent upon, their position as agents of the
state, and their utilisation, even for what were perceived to be emancipatory ends,
necessarily legitimated and reconstituted the type of paternalistic relationship that
exists between welfare professionals and their 'clients'. For example, professional
expertise regarding the development of effective forms of organisation, only exceeded
that of the volunteers, because of their familiarity with bureaucratic forms of
management and administration, therefore, in activating that expertise they were
obliged to resort to bureaucratic frames of reference, with the consequence that the
oppressive structures they subjectively sought to overcome were both legitimated and
re-constituted in a community setting.
This pattern duplicated itself whenever the professionals attempted to use their
expertise or intellectual resources to resolve a problem or dilemma facing the project -
the problem of smoking at the Drop-in was transformed into a debate between two
elements of a welfarist frame of reference, smoking as a health hazard, and the smoker
as victim of stress; no matter how this debate had been resolved, the traditional,
paternalistic relationship between welfare professional and powerless 'client' would
inevitably have been reinstated. The incident with the leaflets and the accusation of
racism, illustrates the way in which a welfarist frame of reference can be activated
with the conscious intention of manipulation and control, but, as far as WHAP is
concerned, this appears to have been the exception rather than the rule. More often the
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professionals involved in WHAP hoped to use their skills and resources to pursue
what they believed was a genuinely emancipatory agenda, but in utilising those skills
and resources they were obliged to utilise bureaucratic/welfarist frames of reference
which necessarily led to the re-emergence of professional power.
As well as the external constraints imposed upon the activity of professionals by their
objective location in the state, their potential for engaging in emancipatory activity is
also limited by their subjective internalisation of bureaucratic/welfarist frames of
reference. Whilst 'radical' professionals might consider themselves to be 'in and
against the state', it is equally the case that the state is in and against the radical
professional. As well as equipping the professional with bureaucratic/welfarist frames
of reference, this 'colonisation' of professional consciousness also creates a strong
imperative to activate those frames of reference, and to utilise external structures of
professional power - that imperative inheres in subscription to professional values and
notions of professional responsibility. Thus, the incident with Denise illustrates the
way in which when other alternatives are exhausted, commitment to professional
values and the concomitant sense of responsibility, obliges even a progressively
minded professional to activate a welfarist frame of reference and invoke the
repressive apparatus of the state.
Finally, a question remains as to the extent to which the professionals were conscious
of the re-emergence of professional power. Towards the end of the final round of
interviews this issue was partially addressed by asking some of the professionals if
they felt that WHAP provided a means by which health and welfare professionals
could exercise surveillance and social control over marginalised groups. Despite the
incidents analysed above, many of the professionals felt that this was not the case, the
following quotation being characteristic of the view generally held:
I don't think anybody's ever kind of exercising control on people through
WHAP. I think other people would have to come up with an example of how
that happens. I don't think it does that. If it did I wouldn't want to be part of
it. I accept some of the other dilemmas, I mean you can say that all kinds of
social services are a kind of sop for people's experiences, and that's been the
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case for a long time, and will go on being the case for a time. If you accept
that argument I think it ends up with you saying 'I'm not going to do anything'.
(Professional, October 1994)
The above quotation clearly denies the re-emergence of professional power in WHAP,
although, even here, there is a slight unease, or a suspicion that 'all kinds of social
services' might unwittingly constrain emancipatory activity. The implication is, that
by this point in the project WHAP had become a 'social service', much like any other,
and that its objective was now to provide a useful service, rather than to address an
emancipatory agenda.
Another professional answered the same question in a way which was more critical of
the professionals involved in WHAP:
I think the people involved in WHAP are controlled. I don't think it's
consciously used as a tool for that by the statutory agencies, because I don't
think it's a sufficiently high priority to get that sort of attention to it, but
certainly for those professionals involved, it is both a way of picking up issues
and keeping an eye on the situation, and also controlling the behaviour of
individuals, which they have done. You know, you can't be much more
controlling than Sectioning somebody. (laughter).
(Professional, October 1994)
Superficially, this appears to be a complete contradiction of the view expressed in the
previous quotation. Where the first professional began by denying the re-emergence
of professional power, but conceded that WHAP was constrained by the limitations
facing all social services, the second professional appears to suggest that WHAP
really is a means of controlling people, and goes on to imply that the origins of the
tendency to control lie in the consciousness of the professionals involved, rather than
being structurally determined. However, although the two accounts appear to
contradict each other on every point, they both grasp different elements of the actual
process. As the analysis presented above suggests, professional power did re-emerge
as WHAP developed, despite the conscious commitment of the professionals to
stopping that re-emergence. It is also the case that the re-emergence of professional
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the 'sociology of the professions' to deduce insights into the current study, there is a
danger of mistaking a common word for a common meaning, and wrongfully
generalising from the sociological category of 'professional' to a group which shares
the label, but not the characteristics. To avoid this danger it is, therefore, important to
compare the WHAP 'professional' with the 'professional' in sociological discourse.
The range of 'professionals' involved in WHAP, (though more stable than the
'volunteer' group), changed over time, and there were variations in their degree of
involvement. However, during the course of the study I interviewed most of the
professionals involved at that time, and certainly all of those with a high degree of
involvement. This group comprised ten people:
Public Health Physician - originally Director of Public Health for Bexley Health
Authority, but resigned in order to become an independent consultant,
Health Promotion Officer - Director of Health Promotion at Bexley Health
Authority,
Health Advisor - to Greenwich Local Authority,
Social Worker (with responsibility for ethnic minority issues) - at Bexley local
Authority,
Ethnic Minorities Worker - employed by Bexley Council for Racial Equality,
Social Worker - Director of Thamesmead Family Services Unit, a charitable
organisation, largely funded by the Local Authority,
Social Worker - employed by the Family Services Unit on a research project,
Community Development Worker - employed by WHAP,
Social Worker (retired) - who formerly worked in Thamesmead,
Vicar - from the local Anglican church.
Collectively, the group might be characterised as 'welfare professionals'; with the
majority employed in community or social work. Three of the professionals had a
background in health, but none were practising clinicians. Four members of the group
were directly employed by the statutory agencies, and the majority of the remainder
were employed by organisations that relied on state funding. At the beginning of the
project three of the professionals had relatively senior managerial roles within their
organisations, (one later resigned in order to do more community based work), the
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remainder were not involved in the management of junior staff, but worked directly
with their own 'clients'. Most seem to have had some freedom in managing their
work activity, compared to say an office or factory worker, although at least two
professionals were instructed to reduce their involvement in WHAP by their employer.
Details of income and educational attainment were not recorded, but it seems likely
that the majority of the professionals were educated to graduate level, and had a
broadly similar income.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the WHAP 'professionals' were a relatively
homogeneous group, engaged in similar work, with a similar degree of autonomy, and
a similar relationship to the state. But, how does this group compare with the
sociological definition of a profession? The first thing to note is that although
defining the category is perhaps the central question addressed by the sociology of the
professions, the literature reveals no consensus on how it might be answered. A
common approach has been to identify the 'traits' by which a profession can be
differentiated from other occupational groups. Millerson (1964), having surveyed the
literature, identified 23 traits claimed to be characteristic of the professions. The range
of traits and their relative values varied from one account to another; Millerson lists
the six most common as: i) skill based on theoretical knowledge, ii) provision of
training, iii) testing the competence of members, iv) organisation, v) adherence to a
code of conduct, and vi) altruistic service.
Leaving aside the difficulty of distinguishing altruistic service from that which is
motivated by personal gain, and the unlikely existence of skills which are not based on
some form of theoretical knowledge, Millerson's list, and trait theory generally, are
still far from satisfactory. Essentially the problem lies in reducing a diverse and
constantly changing range of professions to a small number of traits; either the model
must be so widely applicable that occupations not normally thought of as professions,
for example plumbing or car maintenance, are included, or else so specific that it only
includes the well established professions, such as medicine, the law, or, the clergy,
relegating other occupations such as, social work, or, teaching, to the status of quasi,
or, aspiring professions.
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The trait approach has spawned a broad debate about whether progressive
'professionalisation' has increased the membership of this elite 'club', or whether
'proletarianization' has reduced their number. Such concerns have prompted
historical inquiry into the origins of the 'established' professions, revealing the extent
to which their content has changed over time (Prest (ed.) 1987, Burrage & Torstendahi
(eds.) 1990, Larson 1977). The adoption of an historical perspective may also lead to a
consideration of the professions in terms of external social relations, rather than
inherent traits. Bryan Turner (1987), for example, has analysed the way in which the
development of the medical profession during the nineteenth century was shaped by:
the rise of an affluent middle-class clientele, the emergence of germ theory, state
support through legislation, and technical advances making medical intervention less
dangerous. Turner's model suggests that the possession of an increasingly extensive
and reliable body of knowledge and clinical expertise enabled doctors to demand that
the state grant them a virtual monopoly over health care or at least the right to regulate
other workers in the field.
This relationship between the medical profession and the state can be generalised to
other welfare professions, offering insights that are very pertinent to an understanding
of WHAP. But what is the nature of this relationship, and how does it differ from that
which other occupational groups have with the state? Again there is no shortage of
answers to these questions. Many have focused on the knowledge and expertise
possessed by professionals, suggesting that the state intervenes to ensure that these
resources are used for the common good rather than being distorted by the market.
Durkheim (1957), for instance, claims that the professions are 'moral millieux'
working to restore social cohesion in the face of a traditional moral order that is
collapsing. RH Tawney (1921) takes up this theme, suggesting that the professions
manage to place the needs of the community before the 'rampant individualism' that
characterises modern society.
Certainly, the professions' relationship with the state does grant them a degree of what
Eliot Freidson (1986) describes as 'shelter from the market'. Rather than open
competition in the labour market, many professional organisations have obtained a
state sanctioned monopoly, as well as a high degree of autonomy and self-regulation,
in terms of training, conferring credentials, disciplining members, and setting rates of
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remuneration. Again there is a danger of making broad, ahistorical generalisations
which may not be applicable to those involved in WHAP. Many of the WHAP
professionals owed their 'shelter from the market' to the fact that they were directly, or
indirectly, employed by the state, rather than to their membership of a professional
organisation. It was not that the WHAP professionals were able to use privileges
conferred by the state to improve their position in the market, but that the market
mechanism had been removed from their relationship with their 'clients'.
Clearly then, welfare professionals like those involved in WHAP have a different
relationship to the state than professions like architecture or engineering where the
market mechanism still prevails, albeit in a modified form. Even so, welfare
professionals still retain enough in common with their more independent colleagues to
distinguish them from other state employees, for instance, the degree of autonomy in
their day to day working, which enables them to become involved in projects like
WHAP. But what is it that accounts for the distinct position occupied by welfare
professionals of being brought under the auspices of the state, but being granted a
relatively high degree of autonomy in their practical activity?
From a functionalist perspective it might be argued that the welfare professions are
located within the state to ensure that they are not diverted from their 'altruism' and
'selfless service to the community' by the need to drum up trade; whilst their relative
autonomy might be accounted for in terms of the freedom to respond to the specific
needs of their clients, and the inability of non-professional managers to regulate those
in possession of specialist knowledge. More specifically, as Turner has noted, it is not
the possession of specialist knowledge that guarantees the relative autonomy of the
welfare professional, but the fact that it cannot be systematised or routinised in a way
that facilitates more direct managerial control:
professions need a barrier to protect themselves from such routinization and
this barrier is constituted by the indetermination of knowledge; the knowledge
of the profession has to have a distinctive mystique which suggests that there is
a certain professional attitude and competence which cannot be reduced
merely to systematic and routinized knowledge. (Turner, 1987, p.1 36)
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Whilst we might question the validity of the specialist knowledge possessed by social
workers and other community workers, Turner is surely correct in observing its role in
legitimating professional autonomy, although in practical terms it may be the intimacy
of the professional/client relationship that limits the extent to which that claim can be
contested by managers. But even if we accept Turner's account of the basis of
professional autonomy, there remains the question of why certain professions are
'tocated within the state. The functionalist argument made by Parsons (1954) and
others, that it is to ensure that their skills are used 'in the service of man', rather than
personal gain, hardly seems convincing. Why should some occupational groups
whose practice is based on esoteric knowledge be taken out of the market-place, when
plumbers, car mechanics, estate agents, financial advisors et cetera, are left to exploit
us?
One answer is that welfare professionals are brought under the auspices of the state,
not to ensure that they serve the interests of their clients, but to ensure that they serve
the interests of the state. There are two closely related lines of argument here,
differing mainly in how they conceptualise the relationship between the state and the
economy.
For liberals like Hayek (1944), the modern state represents a conspiracy between
politicians, bureaucrats and professionals, to deny the freedom conferred by an
unrestricted market in favour of top down social planning and regulation. In the same
vein DS Lees (1966) suggests that the monopolistic rights and restrictive practices
enjoyed by the professions represent a barrier to competition which is against the
interests of the client. This is particularly so where the professional is a full time
employee of the welfare state. Harris and Seldon (1979) point out that the suspension
of the market mechanism removes the essential means by which clients can exercise
control over professionals, resulting in escalating and inefficient expenditure, and the
subordination of the client's wishes to professional diktat. To counter this the New
Right proposes separating the professions from the state, and re-introducing the
market mechanism to regulate the relationship between professional and client (Green
1988).
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Although the libertarian rhetoric of Hayek and his disciples at the Institute of
Economic Affairs is seductive, the analysis on which it is based is ahistorical and
theoretically flawed. Thus the increasingly interventionist state is presented as the
product of universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy, when in fact it predates
both. This act of historical revisionism allows liberal commentators to paint a picture
of an economically autonomous political class, responding to the electorate's demands
for the resolution of social problems, by ever greater state intervention and welfare
provision, at the expense of the market and personal freedom (Dunleavy & O'Leary,
1987).
Historical analysis reveals that the origins of the state-form lie not in parliamentary
democracy, but in the subordination of one class by another. As Engels noted, and
Lenin (1917) re-iterated, rather than being a response to the demands of the masses,
the state was brought into being as a means of their oppression by a 'public force':
This public force exists in every state; it consists not merely of anned men, but
also of material appendages, prisons and coercive institutions of all kinds..
(Engels, 1894, p. 163)
This body of 'armed men' and 'coercive institutions' was constituted by the ruling
class as a means of establishing social order and reproducing the conditions for
economic exploitation. Before looking more closely at Marxist theories of the state it
is important to explain what is meant by the term 'ruling class'.
Marxism is often described, (by both admirers and detractors), as 'class analysis'. The
image evoked is that of an early to mid nineteenth-century mill owner or coal baron
mercilessly exploiting and oppressing a penniless workforce, and using his economic
resources to dominate the political sphere. Not surprisingly this caricature appears
inadequate as a means of describing modern society. Whilst early capitalism may
have been characterised by individual entrepreneurs who directly owned and
controlled their businesses, this elite group of families "by and large failed to
consolidate their positions as the dominant class in the society." (Parsons & Smelser,
1957, p.254). Instead the emergence of the joint stock company during the second half
of the nineteenth-century has led to the separation of ownership and control (Drucker,
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1971) with ownership effectively dispersed amongst shareholders (including trade
unions and pension-funds), and corporate control in the hands of meritocratically
appointed professional managers, rather than the sons and daughters of entrepreneurial
capitalists. If ordinary workers are able to 'own' the company that employs them
(either through direct share ownership, or by participating in a pension fund), and if
the sons and daughters of those workers are able to work their way up the corporate
ladder by gaining appropriate managerial qualifications, then surely Marx's account of
a capitalist ruling class is an anachronism.
However, when we turn to Marx's actual writings we find no universal account of a
ruling class under capitalism. Whilst Marx constantly uses the term he makes very
little attempt to say who its membership might comprise. This apparent omission
stems not from negligence or theoretical incompleteness, but from a fundamental
difference between the way in which class was conceptualised by Marx and the way
the category is employed by many modern social scientists. For example, the
Registrar General uses an occupational classification system to provide a demographic
description of the British population, but Marx had no such intention. Rather than
seeking to describe demographic groups, Marx was concerned with conceptualising
social relations, or more precisely, production relations, (i.e. production in the broad
sense of human consciousness transforming, and being transformed by, the material
world). Under the capitalist mode of production the key relationship is that between
labour and capital, but this relationship is not just expressed in the consciousness of
individuals but in historically specific and socially constructed institutions and the
apparatus of production - it is the ways in which things are done, as well as the people
who do them.
This historically specific socio-economic totality places people in specific class
locations, and ascribes them different roles in the production process, for example,
machine worker, senior manager, financier, entrepreneur et cetera. At the level of
abstraction it is possible to describe the capitalist mode of production as one in which
capital exploits labour by appropriating surplus value. More concretely, it is possible
to identify groups in the production process who are exploited, i.e. who do not receive
the full fruits of their labour, and those who benefit from this exploitation, but this can
only serve as a rough guide to the formation of classes. First, because class is dynamic
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and constantly changing according to specific circumstances. And secondly, because
it is class-consciousness rather than class location that is the key determinant of social
and political change. In political terms it matters less whether someone is a manager
or a shop-floor worker, than whether they consciously side with or against capitalism.
The project of establishing class-consciousness is important for both labour and
capital, but more so for the former, because the transformation of capitalism into
socialism requires a greater degree of conscious collective activity than does the
relatively individualistic pursuit of profit. Those who benefit from the capitalist mode
of production and have an interest in its reproduction are a diverse and fragmented
class, and in civil society they may confront each other as hostile rivals pursuing
apparently opposing interests, for example, industrial versus finance capital, or
political versus military leadership. As we shall see below, the capitalist state
emerged as a means of resolving these conflicts in the interests of capitalism as a
whole, but this is not a project that can be completed; what constitutes 'ruling class
interests' will always be contested and negotiated. More specifically, the homogeneity
of the ruling class waxes and wanes according to the perceived threat posed by
organised labour. Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the labour movement
has left the British state facing tremendous difficulty in orchestrating a homogeneous
line in ruling class politics, for example, over European Monetary Union. In short, the
ruling class is an amorphous constantly changing category that cannot be precisely
defined in demographic terms, but it is a constant reality which inheres in the
relationship between labour and capital, and more precisely in the state-form.
To possess legitimacy and operate effectively, the state must appear to be above
society rather than a product of class conflict; it must be presented as an impartial
arbiter between different factions. Thus, it would be wrong to characterise the state as
a direct form of class rule. Rather, the state is the 'executive arm' of the ruling class,
existing as a formally independent set of institutions. This apparent independence is
necessitated by the fragmentary nature of the ruling class. Rather than being a tightly
homogeneous group with an identical set of objectives, the ruling class exists as a
series of divided, and often competing, factions, united by their common interest in
oppressing the subordinate classes. For example, under capitalism, the power of the
ruling class is derived from its exploitation of labour power in the production process.
241
Individual capitalists, therefore, have a common interest in subordinating the working
class to wage-labour. But, because capitalist production comprises a multitude of
competing enterprises, class rule must take the form of a relatively autonomous set of
institutions, i.e. the state-apparatus, capable of advancing the interests of capital as a
whole (Altvater 1978, Hirsch, 1978).
The state can, therefore, be conceptualised in two ways: first, as a set of social
relations, unifying the interests of the ruling class in the process of oppressing the
subordinate classes - the 'state-form'; and secondly, as a set of institutions through
which this class power is exercised - the 'state-apparatus'. Both the state-form and the
essential elements of the state-apparatus, (those 'special bodies of armed men'), were
established prior to the emergence of parliamentary democracy and universal suffrage.
Thus , where liberals like Hayek and his disciples at the Institute of Economic Affairs
would have us believe that the oppressive nature of the state is indirectly the result of
universal suffrage, which has led to greater state intervention in the economy and
consequently reduced the freedom of the individual, historical analysis reveals that the
state-form and key elements of the state-apparatus were in place well before the advent
of universal suffrage, and that their primary function is to maintain the market rather
than negate it.
Historical analysis of the origins of the state may reveal that its form and character
pre-date universal suffrage, but this tells us little of the extent to which the
parliamentary system might transform the state and subordinate it to the needs of the
masses. Lenin was dismissive of such a notion: 'To decide once every few years
which member of tile ruling class is to repress and crush the people through
parliament - this is the real essence of bourgeois parliamentarism..' (1917, p.46). For
Lenin, even under universal suffrage, parliaments were 'mere talking shops',
incapable of influencing the 'real business of 'state' [which] is performed behind the
scenes and is carried on by tile departments, chancelleries and general staffs' (1917,
p.47).
But why is it that democratically elected representatives are unable to wrench the
state-apparatus from the hands of the ruling class. Ernest Mandel (1969) points to two
important factors. First, the state is tied to the ruling class by the 'golden chains' of
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national debt, which oblige government to go cap in hand to the banks. The
International Monetary Fund's intervention in the policies of the last Labour
government is just one example of the way in which economic dependence
subordinates the state to the interests of capital. Secondly, Mandel notes the extent to
which the hierarchy in capitalist society is mirrored in the state:
The state apparatus is not a homogeneous instrument. It involves a structure
that rather closely corresponds to the structure of bourgeois society, with a
hierarchy of classes and identical differences between them. (Mandel, 1969,
p.1 8)
Thus, for Mandel, the higher echelons of the civil service, the military and the other
institutions of the state are largely recruited from, and have common cause with, the
bourgeoisie. Whilst those further down the hierarchy, who receive relatively minor
financial rewards are closer to the petty bourgeoisie or the proletariat.
To return to our original problem of understanding the category of 'professional', we
can see that the term is only really meaningful when considered in relationship to the
state, particularly for welfare professionals like those participating in WHAP.
Moreover, historical and structural analysis of the state leads us to conclude that
professionals are to some degree embroiled in the exercise of class domination. The
value of this analysis lies in the fact that it enables us to adopt a critical perspective
towards the altruistic and ethical basis of professionalism claimed by the professions
themselves, (and by a generation of functionalist sociologists). It also exposes the
inadequacy of the argument that the discipline of the market would resolve the
'problem' of the professions. If, in the last instance, the state is no more than 'a
special body of armed men' defending the interests of capital, then the market can
offer no escape from professional coercion, because the very survival of the market is
dependent upon that coercion.
There remains a problem with the analysis, or more precisely, questions about the
nature of professionalism that are left unanswered. We have defined the welfare
professional as an agent of the state, serving the interests of capital, and using the
indeterminacy of professional expertise and direct contact with clients to obtain a
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degree of autonomy and other benefits. But this cosy relationship between
professional and state does not fit well with the testimony of the WHAP professionals,
many of whom expressed ambivalence about their relationship to the state, and a
subjective commitment to an emancipatory agenda. Perhaps the answer lies in
Mandel's argument about the hierarchy of capitalism being reproduced in the
hierarchy of the state? There is certainly evidence to suggest that membership of a
profession may be drawn from different classes, for instance, Navarro quotes (with
obvious relish) the Chairman of the Royal College of Surgeons in 1958:
there has always been a nucleus in medical schools of students from
cultured homes... This nucleus has been responsible for the continued high
social prestige of the profession as a whole and for the maintenance of
medicine as a learned profession. Medicine would lose immeasurably if the
proportion of such students in the future were to be reduced in favour of the
precocious children who qualify for subsidies from the Local Authorities and
state purely on examination results. (Navarro, 1978, p.76)
It may be that the senior positions in a profession are occupied by people from
'cultured homes' and that they exercise control over members of the lower ranks who
are closer to the proletariat. If this were the case, then the category of 'professional'
would be of little theoretical value in terms of the consciousness and practical activity
of those to whom it is ascribed. And indeed many theorists have attempted to re-
formulate the category in terms of social class. But there are problems with any
simplistic model which posits the existence of bourgeois-professionals who share the
interests of the ruling class and exercise control over proletarian-professionals. First,
rather than being subordinated to the interests of capital, a profession may, as Klein
notes, act independently, even in opposition to the state, for example:
The history of the British health service is the history of political power,
Ministers, Civil Servants, Parliament, accommodating itself to professional
power. (Klein, 1973, p.7)
Moreover, there is a problem with defining the lower ranks of the professions as
proletarian, not least because although they are wage-labourers they do not produce
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surplus value. Thus, Poulantzas defines civil servants employed by the state
apparatuses as part of the 'new petty bourgeoisie', because:
These workers do not produce surplus value. Like others, they sell their
labour-power, and their wage is determined by the price of reproducing their
labour-power, but they are exploited by the direct extortion of surplus labour,
not by the production of surplus value. (Poulantzas, 1973, p.lO'7)
However, 'class place' is not determined exclusively by economic factors, but also by
political and ideological elements. Moreover, 'class position', that is, how a class will
act and the affiliations it will make, varies according to specific historical
circumstances. Superficially, Poulantzas's approach appears to be an advance on the
more crass interpretations of Marxism in which consciousness and practical activity
are seen as a direct function of production relations. However, as RW Connell (1979,
p.107) has pointed out, the result is far from satisfactory. Whilst Poulantzas includes
political and ideological factors in his account of class, as well as purely economic
relations, the consciousness of the subject is still seen as the product of his/her
location within a structure, that is, as an automatic function of a set of structural
factors. There is no conceptual room in Poulantzas's model for people to gain a
critical consciousness of these structural factors and struggle against them. And yet,
this is precisely the process that was observed in WHAP - rather than simply accepting
the role of professional as it is defined by structural factors the WHAP professionals
were at least partially aware of its contradictions and inadequacies, and attempted to
transform it. Whilst their attempts failed, the conscious impulse was observably there.
In his adaptation of Poulantzas's model, Erik Olin Wright (1978) recognises that due
to developments such as the separation of ownership arid control, loss of control over
the labour process by workers, and the development of bureaucratic/managerial
hierarchies in industrial organisations, some workers may find themselves in a doubly
contradictory class location, which after Braverman (1974), Wright describes as
having 'one foot in the bourgeoisie and one in the proletariat'. It is easy to speculate
how a contradictory class location might lead to the development of contradictory
consciousness, or even consciousness of the contradiction, but Wright offers no
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account of this process, preferring to leave us with a set of 'pigeon-holes' which
those who do not fit must straddle.
What both Poulantzas and Wright fail to provide is a convincing account of the way in
which a persons structural location impacts upon their consciousness and behaviour.
More specifically, for our purposes, why is it that welfare professionals employed by
the state end up serving the interests of the ruling class even though they themselves
are not part of that class? Is it simply fear of being sacked, or is there more to it? This
is largely an empirical question, but there are two strands of thought in the sociology
of the professions that shed some light on the process. The first is concerned with the
extent to which welfare professionals employed by the state are increasingly
subordinated to managerial control; the second addresses the way in which members
of professional groups willingly adopt an identity and an ideology that serves the
interests of the state.
The first theme, with its emphasis on the increasing subordination of individual
discretion and autonomy to the logic of instrumental rationality and bureaucratic forms
of regulation is essentially a Weberian perspective, which surfaces in various forms
throughout the sociology of the professions. In his account of the way in which the
techniques of scientific management are employed to subordinate healthcare
professionals to managerial 'structures of control', Rob Flynn offers an empirically
grounded account of Weber's theory, based on changes in NHS management
introduced since the early 1980's. He concludes that:
An unprecedented battery of measures and techniques for audit, evaluation,
monitoring and surveillance now exists. These constitute the principal devices
through which the structure of control in health is accomplished. They also
represent a radical departure from previous arrangements concerning
professional autonomy, because they entail managerial encroachment on the
determination of work content, productivity, resource use and quality
standards. (Flynn, 1992, p.183)
Flynn's account of healthcare professionals tied up in a web of managerial
surveillance and regulation is persuasive, first because it can be demonstrated by
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reference to actual changes in NHS administration, such as: the implementation of
general management, clinical budgeting, cost controls, performance evaluation, and
quality assurance, and also because it offers an account of professional resistance to
managerial control:
the dynamics and means of control are multiple and contradictory, they are
variable, and subject to social conflict. Collectively, all those practices and
policies which attempt to specify rules and norms for tasks and productivity,
the division of labour, the assessment of pe,formance and accountability, are
regarded here as comprising a complex structure of control. This structure of
control will inevitably be contested because it embodies relations of authority
and power which are themselves negotiated and contractual. (Flynn, 1992,
p.184)
There is some evidence to suggest that Flynn's analysis might be relevant to the
WHAP case study; for example, some of the professional members of WHAP were
instructed to reduce their involvement in the project by their managers, and more
generally, the activities of WHAP were constrained by self-limiting beliefs about what
would be acceptable to the statutory agencies. There was also evidence that the
WHAP professionals were conscious of an on-going struggle with the organisations by
which they were employed. But Flynn's analysis only offers a partial explanation of
why welfare professionals who are not members of the ruling class should conduct
their practice in a way which serves the interests of the state. There are both
theoretical and empirical problems.
Theoretically Flynn's argument of an historically evolving structure of control, implies
the existence of relatively autonomous professions, prior to the recent imposition of
managerialism. Whilst we recognise that professional autonomy is historically
variable, this autonomy can never have been absolute, because as we noted above the
historical development of the state-form and the social relations that it embodies,
determine that those employed in the state-apparatuses must in the last instance serve
the interests of the ruling class. Therefore, there must be some factor other than the
relatively recent development of managerial structures of control that accounts for
professionals' willingness to serve the interests of the state.
247
Empirical evidence from the WHAP case study also suggests that something other
than managerial regulation accounts for the tendency for WHAP professionals to
conduct their practical activity in ways which served the interests of the state. Rather
than close managerial scrutiny and regulation the WHAP initiative was characterised
by the high degree of formal autonomy enjoyed by its professional members. As the
analysis presented in the first half of this chapter indicates, it was not direct
managerial control that led to the re-emergence of professional power in WHAP, but
the persistence of professional values and the utilisation of welfarist frames of
reference.
This leads into the second theme in the sociology of the professions that accounts for
the professionals' subordination to the interests of the state, namely the extent to
which they willingly subscribe to a professional ideology that shapes their identity and
guides their practical activity. Here all the ideological baggage espoused by the
professions themselves and by functionalist sociologists attempting to list the traits of
professionalism can be re-appropriated. Whilst claims to public service, ethical
standards, and the use of specialist knowledge for altruistic purposes, tell us little
about the real nature of professionalism, they tell us a great deal about how that reality
is mystified, not just for lay consumption, but also for the professionals themselves.
Not only does this ideology legitimate professional practice to the outside world, it
also exercises control over the identity and practical activity of professionals
themselves. For example, until recently members of the Royal College of Nurses
refused to go on strike, despite low income and poor working conditions, because they
felt that such action would be unprofessional. Further examples of what professionals
'do and don't do' can be drawn from the WHAP case study, for instance the notion of
a professional responsibility to intervene in the management of crises, the necessity of
using one's professional expertise to resolve problems, and the obligation to activate
more coercive methods of social control when one's personal professional resources
are exhausted, are all described in the first half of this chapter.
W.E. Moore (1970) has studied the processes by which an individual comes to adopt
the identity of a professional. In the well established professions like medicine or the
law, where future professionals often have parents in the same profession, this process
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of socialisation can begin almost from birth, with the emulation of a particular set of
attitudes and beliefs. However, the main elements of professional socialisation occur
during education and training. Moore outlines the characteristics of professional
education, which include: social isolation in a total institution, the internalisation of
an esoteric body of knowledge heavily laden with jargon, and meaningless and
irrelevant training. According to Moore, those who survive the ordeal of professional
education emerge with a strong commitment to their fellow professionals and a deeply
ingrained occupational identity:
The person who successfully learns the language and skills of a trade, and
survives the ordeals that punished him and his fellows will emerge, we are
arguing, not only with an internalised occupational commitment but also with
an identification with the collectivity, the brotherhood. (Moore, 1970, pp.'78-
79)
Again, there is danger in generalising from the experiences of Moore's American
professionals in the 1960s to the welfare professionals involved in WHAP. It is
unlikely that most of those involved in WHAP would have undergone such arduous
and intensive training. But the main conclusion, that the formation of a professional
entails the adoption of a specific identity as well as the acquisition of expertise, may
still be applicable. Moore suggests that this intensive socialisation leads to
'deformation profession elle', or distortions in character produced by the adoption of a
professional role, these include: inability to detach oneself from work, a narrow
woridview (produced by specialisation), and over commitment to occupational norms
and values.
Moore suggests that the internalisation of professional norms is its own reinforcement,
with any infringement of standards or poor performance leading to a loss of self-
respect. This is reinforced throughout the professional career by peer review. The
perspective of the WHAP professionals is, therefore, an unusual one, because many of
them entered the project with a critical perspective on the traditional professional role,
and a desire to reform it. However, as the analysis presented in the first half of this
chapter indicates, although superficial changes to the professional/client relationship
were achieved, the fundamental commitment to professional values and professional
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responsibility remained largely intact. The reasons for this are examined below, but
for now it is sufficient to note that the internalisation of a professional identity entails
a form of self-policing in which any radical departure from professional norms and
values is experienced as a negation of the self and a betrayal of one's fellow
professionals.
It will be argued below that the professional identity is itself an ideological category,
structured by, and serving the interests of, the state. Subscription to a professional
identity, therefore, serves to bind the professional to serving the interests of the state,
even in situations which lie beyond the reach of managerial structures of control. As
Johnson (1972) suggests, a profession is not an occupation, but a means of controlling
an occupation.
To summarise the discussion so far; 'professional' is an empirically grounded category
appearing frequently in the interview transcripts. After describing the characteristics
of the professionals involved in WHAP, comparison was made with the professional
category as it appears in sociological discourse. The 'key trait' approach to defining
the professions was briefly examined and found wanting, in terms of its theoretical
adequacy and its applicability to the WHAP professionals. Approaches which sought
to place the professions in a specific historical and structural context were found to be
more satisfactory. A fundamental element in understanding the professions was their
relationship to the state. Professionals were found to enjoy a degree of autonomy in
their day to day practice which distinguished them from other occupational groups
employed by the state. The possession of indeterminate knowledge and the intimacy
of the professional/client relationship, were felt to contribute to this autonomy.
Functionalist and liberal/New Right accounts of the relationship between the state and
professionals were examined and found to be unsatisfactory. Historical analysis of the
origins of the modern state-form revealed it to be an instrument of class domination
that was resistant to transformation by universal suffrage and parliamentary
democracy. Welfare professionals employed by the state were likely to be embroiled
in the exercise of class power, even though they were not formally part of the ruling
class. Attempts to define professionals as a new class were found to be problematic
and inadequate as a guide to professional consciousness and practical activity. The
development of a managerial structure of control and the internalisation of an
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ideological professional identity were felt to offer a more likely account of why
professionals should serve the interests of the state.
At the end of this it is not possible to offer a concise and all encompassing definition
of 'profession', nor to claim a close fit between lay usage of the term by WHAP
members and the various accounts offered in the sociology of the professions. In
many respects 'professional' is an imprecise category, varying across time, structural
location, and occupational group, but there are specific observations we can make
about the professionals involved in WHAP, and these observations are illuminated and
deepened by consideration of the sociology of the professions. Thus the WHAP
professionals can be described in terms of their relationship to the state and their
adoption of a professional identity. For the most part they are employees of the state,
often working directly with 'clients', but in any case at some distance from the upper
echelons of bureaucratic office. On a day to day basis the nature of their work and
their possession of indeterminate knowledge ensures a relatively high degree of
control over their practical activity. But this relative autonomy exists within sharply
defined limits which are policed by the managerial structure of control, and by the
internalisation of a professional identity which comprises ideologically structured
norms, values and responsibilities. In combination these factors ensure that the
practical activity of the WHAP professionals is subordinated to the interests of the
state. But this process of subordination is never complete, never total; the
professional's class location and day to day experiences are powerful countervailing
tendencies, which may lead to role conflict and active attempts to bring about change.
Of course this leaves many questions unanswered. When we say that welfare
professionals are embroiled in class domination, that their activities serve the interests
of the state, what does this mean in terms of their daily practice? What do we mean
when we say that the professional role is structured by ideology? If the professionals'
class location and everyday experiences give rise to role conflict and the desire to
bring about progressive change, will this lead to a transformation of the professions?
These issues are addressed below when we consider the nature of professional power,
and what is meant by welfarist frames of reference.
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U What is professional power?
As with the term 'professional', the transition from a lay or common sense
understanding of 'power' to a theoretically consistent and universally applicable
sociological definition of the category, has proven problematic (Lukes (ed.), 1986)
Again, this difficulty will be addressed by focusing on theoretical insights that deepen
our understanding of professional power in WHAP; leaving the 'sociology of power'
to look after itself.
The analysis of professional power in WHAP, presented in the first half of this
chapter, raised the following questions: What is professional power? What are its
effects? Whose interests does it serve? Does it originate in the conscious volition of
the professional, or is it structurally determined? Can professional power operate
independently of professionals? Can it be dismantled? A first step towards answering
these questions is to find a basic definition of power; Steven Lukes offers the
following:
A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to Bs
interests. (Lukes, 1974, p.27)
Superficially, this definition may appear unsatisfactory because it fails to take account
of the paternalistic exercise of power, for example, the WHAP professionals
responsible for 'sectioning' one of the volunteers, had a strong argument in claiming
that it was in her best interests, and yet the lack of consent and the use of physical
coercion clearly mark this incident as an exercise of power. In response, Lukes might
argue that denying someone's freedom can never be in their long-term interests, even
if it removes them from immediate danger. Whilst this argument props up Lukes'
original definition it points to a fundamental problem with its practical application -
how do we decide what is in B's best interests? We can always ask B's opinion, but
this assumes that B is aware of those interests, what if B has been misled or deceived?
For instance, the WHAP volunteers not only acquiesced in the exercise of professional
power they actively demanded the articulation of organisational rules and regulations.
252
Lukes has an answer to this. He suggests that rather than confining our analysis of
power to instances where A imposes his/her will on B in an observable contest (a one
dimensional view), or by excluding B's view from the decision-making agenda (a two
dimensional view), we should adopt a three dimensional view which recognises that A
can exercise power over B by getting B to want things that are not in B's best
interests, thereby obviating the need for observable conflict.
There remains the problem of intentionality on the part of A. In the analysis of WHAP
we noted that the professionals were not only largely unaware of the power they
exercised over the volunteers, but were consciously committed to emancipating, or as
they would have it 'empowering', them. Lukes has something interesting to say on
this as well, but before examining the structural aspect of power it is important to look
at the specific characteristics of professional-power. Paul Wilding (1982) suggests
that there are five aspects of the power exercised by welfare professionals: power in
policy-making & administration, power to define needs & problems, power in
resource allocation, power over people, and, control over the area of work.
The danger of assuming that professionals constitute a homogeneous group, in which
all members are equally able to exercise power, was noted above. Therefore, despite
the evidence presented by Wilding in support of his analysis, it is important to test its
applicability to the WHAP professionals. Thus, although Wilding can demonstrate the
influence that the medical, social work, and teaching professions have had over policy
in their respective fields, it should be remembered that the professions are hierarchical,
and that the ability to influence national policy may be a privilege that does not extend
below the upper echelons of a profession. It will be argued that the experiences of
grass-roots welfare professionals do feed into the formal policy making process, but
this is quite different to consciously participating in the authorship of specific policies.
Similarly, the claim that professionals have power over resource allocation cannot be
applied to WHAP without some clarification. Wilding notes that professionals are
able to influence resource allocation at the macro and micro level, for example
hospital consultants have historically resisted the shift of resources from the acute
sector to priority services, and GPs and social workers act as gate-keepers to a range of
benefits and services. WHAP's professionals had a much more tenuous grasp on the
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allocation of resources. Even so, WHAP's ability to attract statutory funding was
largely dependent upon professional involvement, and the distribution of those
resources to the volunteers, in the form of 'expenses', was controlled by the
professionals. Although the sums distributed were small, many of the volunteers were
very deprived, and the ability to withhold payment did provide the professionals with a
source of power, particularly in disciplinary matters.
Wilding's claim that 'control of the area of work' is a form of professional power, is
also problematic. He sights self-regulation, control of training and entry to the
profession, and control over meetings with clients, in support of his argument. Again
the hierarchical nature of the professions is overlooked. Thus, although their location
within professionalised structures of regulation, training and credentialisation may
have given the WHAP professionals a marginally greater degree of autonomy than
other state employees, relative autonomy for oneself is not synonymous with the
exercise of power over others.
The claim that professionals are able to exercise control over their meetings with
clients is more convincing, and Wilding cites the GP/patient encounter as an example
of professional dominance. But this is precisely the aspect of professional dominance
that WHAP was most effective in challenging. WHAP's 'clients' had a much greater
degree of control over whether they consulted the professionals involved in the
project, and over the time, duration and (to a certain degree) the content of the
consultation.
It is only when he considers 'power over people' and 'power to define needs &
problems' that Wilding's analysis has any real resonance with the exercise of
professional power in WHAP. 'Power over people' is defined mainly in terms of the
formal and in some cases coercive powers granted to welfare professionals by the
state; powers conferred by the Mental Health Act, and the regulation of abortion by the
medical profession, are given as examples of the way in which the expertise of
professionals is used to legitimate the usurpation of the rights of the individual. This
relates to Lukes' one dimensional view of power, where a professional is able to
exercise control over an individual even though opposition has been consciously
articulated. Wilding also notes that 'power over people' can take subtler forms, such
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as the ability to influence someone's self-concept and society's reaction to them by
using professional expertise to enforce a label of deviancy. Whilst the coercive
exercise of professional power over people is observable in WHAP, in the 'sectioning'
of one of the volunteers, it is the ability to influence the individual's self-concept, that
is the key to understanding the exercise of professional power in WHAP.
This is a theme that Wilding expands upon when he discusses the 'power to define
needs & problems':
.professionals show a tendency to define problems in ways which seem to
bring them with surprising frequency within the legitimate bounds of their
professional concerns - alcoholism and addiction as diseases, pregnancy as
illness, delinquency as maladjustment, the needs of the disabled as being for
services rather than cash or work... (Wilding, 1982, p.32)
Wilding's point is that professionals tend to overlook the social and economic causes
of their clients' problems and channel them towards ameliorative welfare provision.
Again this is a conclusion that can only be applied to WHAP with some caution.
Whilst it may well be true that, for example, many welfare professionals see
alcoholism as a disease rather than a social phenomenon, this tendency is not generally
observable in the perspective adopted by WHAP. Indeed, many of the professionals
described the objectives of WHAP in terms of addressing the social, economic and
environmental influences on health, and the need to go beyond the bio-medical model.
However, despite the apparently critical stance adopted by the WHAP professionals
their actual practical activity, and their very involvement in the project, meant that the
problems facing the volunteers both as a group and individually were defined in a way
that did not serve their objective interests. First, the radical rhetoric about addressing
the social and economic influences on health quickly degenerated into a hotchpotch of
individualistic measures to enable the individual to survive those adverse conditions
rather than take collective action to overcome them , for instance: stress management,
counselling, social support, and health education. Secondly, and more damagingly,
WHAP reproduced the relationship between client and professional, and by extension
the relationship between client and state. As the analysis presented in the first half of
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this chapter reveals, that relationship is often characterised by dependency,
powerlessness, surveillance and control. Ivan Illich observes that it is this capacity to
establish a disabling social relationship with clients that is the key characteristic of the
welfare professional:
Neither income, long training, delicate tasks nor social standing is the mark of
the professional. Rather it is his authority to define a person as client, to
determine that person 's need and to hand the person a prescription. (Illich et
a!, 1977, p.17)
Many of WHAP's volunteers and clients had previously had bad experiences of
welfare professionals and were understandably wary of further involvement. By
creating a more informal context, WHAP succeeded in bringing this previously
marginalised group back within the fold of professional power.
Wilding offers a useful account of the different elements of the power exercised by
welfare professionals, which with a little pruning and adaptation is applicable to
WHAP. But what purpose does professional power serve, and are professionals
conscious of the fact that they exercise it? There are several potential answers to the
first part of this question. The most obvious answer is that welfare professionals
exercise power over their clients for personal gain or self-aggrandisement. We have
noted above, the extent to which a profession can act collectively to further the
interests of its members at the expense of others. Perhaps a similar motive affects the
individual relationship between professional and client. For example, community
empowerment projects, like WHAP, are perceived to be 'the latest thing' in welfare
provision, possibly improving the status and career prospects of professionals who
participate in them. But this does not explain why such schemes are characterised by
the exercise of professional power; surely if such initiatives are concerned with
empowerment, then greater prestige would accrue to those initiatives which overcame
professional dominance?
A second answer might be that the exercise of professional power is it's own reward.
Foucault argues not only that exercising power over others is a pleasurable activity,
but that being on the receiving end of power may also be rewarding:
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The pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors,
watches, spies, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the pleasure
that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it.
The power that lets itself be invaded by the pleasure it is pursuing; and
opposite it, power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off scandalising,
or resisting. Capture and seduction, confrontation and mutual reinforcement:
parents and children, adults and adolescents, educator and students, doctors
and patients, the psychiatrist with his hysteric and his perverts, all have played
this game continually since the nineteenth century. These attractions, these
evasions, these circular incitements have traced around bodies and sexes, not
boundaries not to be crossed, but perpetual spirals of power and pleasure.
(Foucault, 1976, p.4.5)
If Foucault's account of the 'perpetual spirals of power and pleasure' can be taken
seriously, its application to WHAP paints an entertaining tableau of professional and
lay participants exploring the 'pleasures' of dominance and submission at the tax
payers expense. But of course it cannot be taken seriously. Whilst pleasure may (or
may not) be implicated in the exercise of power, it does not offer a convincing account
of its origins and effects. Why should the state indulge such pleasures, if their only
purpose is recreational?
This leads us back into a consideration of the professional's location within the state.
We know from the analysis presented above that the state is fundamentally an
instrument of class domination, that its institutional and ideological structures were
brought into being for this purpose. Furthermore, the role of welfare professional is
only understandable in terms of its relationship to these institutional and ideological
structures. Therefore, as well as asking how the exercise of professional power
benefits the professional, we must also ask how it benefits the state.
The conduit linking the exercise of professional power to the objectives of the state, is
the process of social reproduction, or more specifically, the reproduction of labour
power. For the capitalist mode of production to continue, resources used up in the
production process must be continuously reproduced. Obviously this entails replacing
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raw materials, machinery, and buildings, but also the reproduction of a reasonably
healthy and technically competent workforce. This is achieved partly by the payment
of wages, which enable workers to buy many of the goods and services needed for
survival, but also by development of the coercive and ideological apparatus's of the
state. Unlike other resources used in the production process labour power possesses a
unique quality - consciousness. Therefore, capitalist accumulation depends not only
on the physical reproduction of labour power, but also on the reproduction of
compliance and submission amongst the working class. Louis Althusser notes that:
the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its
skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules
of the established order, i.e. a submission to the ruling ideology for the
workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology
correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they too will
provide for the domination of the ruling class 'in words'. (Aithusser, 1 969a,
pp.1 27-8)
Whilst the theory of social reproduction reveals the state's interest in perpetuating the
exercise of professional power, as it stands it tells us little about the professionals'
consciousness of the power they exercise, or the viability of them transforming their
role in social reproduction. For instance, we know that the WHAP professionals were
at least partially conscious of the nature of professional power, that they were
committed to an emancipatory agenda that entailed transforming the traditional
professional role, and that despite their efforts, they were unable to stop the re-
emergence of professional power. This returns us to a question raised in our earlier
discussion of Steven Lukes analysis of power - is the exercise of power determined by
the conscious volition of those who exercise it, or is it determined by their place in the
social and economic structure?
For Althusser power is so deeply ingrained in the social structure that even those
professionals who are consciously committed to an emancipatory agenda are unable to
resist its operation:
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I ask the pardon of those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn
the few weapons they can find in the history and learning they 'teach' against
the ideology, the system and the practices in which they are trapped. They are
a kind of hero. But they are rare and how many (the majority) do not even
begin to suspect the 'work' the system (which is bigger than they are and
crushes them) forces them to do, or worse, put all their heart and ingenuity
into performing it with the most advanced awareness (the famous new
methods!). So little do they suspect it that their own devotion contributes to
the maintenance and nourishment of this ideological representation of the
school, which makes the school today as 'natural', indispensable-useful and
even beneficial for our own contemporaries as the Church was 'natural',
indispensable and generous for our ancestors afew centuries ago. (Aithusser,
1969a, p.148)
This belief, also subscribed to by Poulantzas, that the power of social structure
automatically overrides the consciousness and agency of those embroiled in it,
superficially appears to offer a plausible explanation of what happened in WHAP. But
the approach has been contested by those who lay much greater emphasis on the
conscious exercise of power. For instance, Milliband (1970) suggests that the
emphasis on objective structures and objective relations underestimates the role of the
ruling class in consciously exercising power. Moreover, as Connell has suggested, the
Aithusserian emphasis on structural determinism excludes the role played by '.. living,
sweating, bleeding hwnan beings in their own history' (1979, p.1 46). What remains is
a bland and ahistorical functionalism, portraying the state as a monolithic set of
institutions, impervious to the conscious resistance of those it affects.
Not surprisingly the Aithusserian approach has proven unattractive to those seeking
practical ways of transforming the state from within. The London Edinburgh
Weekend Return Group whilst accepting the role of the state in social reproduction,
has challenged the conceptualisation of the state as a monolithic set of institutions,
arguing instead that the state-apparatus's and the relations that underpin them also
need to be continually reproduced. This reproduction of the means of social
reproduction offers an opportunity for those working within the state to consciously
intervene to transform it:
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There is always a tendency for a break or disjuncture to exist between the state
apparatus and the way it is trying to form our actions. The state apparatus,
the network of rules and controls to which we are subject is a fossil, the
outcome of past struggles to channel activity into the 'proper'form, but it also
has a certain hollowness and, if we are strong enough, brittleness. The rules
are constantly being resisted and broken: the problem for us is how do we
bend and break them in a politically effective way, in a way which would
strengthen the struggle for socialism? (London-Edinburgh Weekend Return
Group, 1980, p.60)
The failure of previous attempts to transform the state is explained by reference to the
way in which the labour movement has historically sought to use the institutions of the
state for short term gains, rather than seeking to transform them, for example:
To win a degree of control over the operations of the local authority, Labour
leftists felt they had to fight elections. Yet once elected they found themselves
involved in a management situation, employer to low-paid workers. Advice
centre workers wanted to obtain legal rights for their 'clients', but to do so
they and the people they were helping had to observe the stifling forms of the
law, submit to legal procedures, take on the role of the plaintiff (London-
Edinburgh Weekend Return Group, 1980, pA.2)
This active participation in the institutions of the state serves to legitimate and
reproduce the status quo rather than challenge it, whilst more confrontational
measures, such as public sector strikes, tend to harm the working class more than the
state. In contrast to this, new forms of 'material opposition' need to be developed,
such as: 'rejecting individualisation in favour of collective organisation and action',
'rejecting misleading categories used by the state, such as community, in favour of
class definitions', 're-defining social problems in structural terms rather than victim
blaming', 'refusing official procedures', and, 'rejecting managerial priorities'.
The analysis offered by the London-Edinburgh Weekend Return Group acknowledges
the structural basis of power, and the way in which involvement in the institutions of
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the state conditions our consciousness and practical activity, but also restores the role
of the conscious political agent actively engaging in the struggle to transform the state.
However, the inadequacy of the proposals for action derived from such an analysis
only serves to reinforce the Althusserian view that political agency is ineffective in the
face of structural power. Partly the problem lies in an overestimation of the state
employees room to manoeuvre. We noted above the extent of managerial structures of
control that serve to police the activity of welfare professionals. In the current
conjuncture any radical departure from the managerial agenda is more likely to lead to
disciplinary proceedings than to a transformation of the state. What remains, as the
WHAP example demonstrates, is merely reformist tinkering which may even extend
the grip of state power.
Are we to conclude then, that Aithusser was right; that power resides in social
structures and that state employees are simply its reluctant bearers, often dissatisfied
with their role, but unable to effectively transform it? Certainly the WHAP case study
would appear to support this view. However, before reaching a hasty conclusion it is
worth bearing in mind Steven Lukes observation that the structural determinism
versus individual agency dichotomy may be false; professional power may reside in
the relationship between structural conditions and the consciousness of professionals:
It is not a question of sociological research 'leading finally' either to the study
of 'objective co-ordinates' or to that of 'motivations of conduct of the
individual actors'. Such research must clearly examine the complex
interrelations between the two, and allow for the obvious fact that individuals
act together and upon one another within groups and organ isations, and that
the exploration of their behaviour and interaction is unlikely to be reducible
merely to their individual motivations. (Lukes, 1974, p.54)
The umbilical cord tying the consciousness of the welfare professional to the structural
imperatives of state power is ideology, or what was referred to in the first half of this
chapter as 'welfarist frames of reference'. The character of these welfarist frames of
reference, and the process by which they impact on the consciousness of the
professional are explored below. But first it is important to summarise the discussion
of professional power so far.
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We began this section with a series of questions, some of which can now be answered.
First, we asked 'what is professional power?' Power was defined as 'when A affects B
in a manner contrary to Bs interests', either by open coercion, agenda-setting, or by
manipulating Bs wants and preferences. Professional-power was defined by reference
to five categories, only two of which were felt to be substantially relevant to WHAP,
these being, 'power to define needs and problems', and, 'power over people'.
A second question asked 'what are the effects of power?' This was answered in terms
of the social reproduction of labour-power, and more specifically, the reproduction of
dependence and powerlessness amongst the welfare professional's clients, and their
subordination to surveillance and control. Thirdly, we asked, 'whose interests are
served by the exercise of professional power?' Whilst it was possible for
professionals to benefit from the exercise of power, the main beneficiary was felt to be
the state and the class that it represents. In this sense the power exercised by
professionals is in the last instance state power. The fourth question asked if
professional power was structurally determined, or whether it resided in the conscious
volition of the professional. It was decided that neither option was adequate, but that
professional power resided in the relationship between professional consciousness and
the objective structures of the state. This meant that the final two questions: 'can
professional power operate independently of professionals?' and, 'can professional
power be dismantled?', could not be answered without considering the processes that
mediate between the consciousness of the professional and the structures of the state.
The key process here is ideology or 'welfarist frames of reference', and it is to this that
we now turn.
U Understanding 'welfarist frames of reference'
Ideology is a term that comes heavily freighted with theoretical assumptions and
consequences, and, as Foucault (1980, p.1 18) has noted, cannot be used without
circumspection. To overcome this difficulty I have focused on 'welfarist frames of
reference'. This is partly a semantic sleight of hand, because it will be argued that
these frames of reference are fundamentally ideological phenomena. But the point of
departure is different. I will look at observable institutions, practices and beliefs, and
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bring in theoretical constructs to explain them. The validity of the theoretical
constructs can then be assessed in relation to the empirical phenomena. Hopefully this
is more circumspect than starting from an exposition and defence of a general theory
of ideology, which in any case is not feasible here.
By welfarist frames of reference I mean the knowledge, beliefs, practices, institutions
and structures that collectively constitute the welfare state. Rather than simply being a
discourse or text, welfarist frames of reference also have a material existence; they are
tangible resources as well as sets of ideas. Welfarist frames of reference therefore
have a dual nature in that they are both material and ideational; the synthesis of these
elements constitutes a cultural pattern of expectations - they are what one expects to
do in response to social problems. If we are ill we expect to see a doctor, and perhaps
receive a prescription or a referral to hospital. if we become unemployed we expect to
receive a (diminishing) range of benefits and/or social services. But the reach of
welfarist frames of reference is not total, for example, when ill we might rather seek
the services of a herbalist, or struggle on without treatment of any kind, but such
alternatives are marginal as a means of resolving social problems, compared with the
resources wielded by the state.
The content of welfarist frames of reference is not historically fixed, but varies over
time. It is, therefore, possible to trace their historical development, as Foucault has for
psychiatry (1961), and Jewson (1974, 1976) has for medicine. But here we are
concerned with the form taken by welfarist frames of reference in the current
conjuncture, and with the general characteristics of the phenomenon rather than the
precise contents of its constituent elements.
Some of these characteristics have already been identified in the empirical material
presented in the first half of this chapter, and in the subsequent discussion - reliance on
bureaucratic forms of organisation, dependence on professional expertise, intervention
at the level of the individual rather than at a social or economic level, and utilisation of
the resources offered by the state, were all characteristic of the welfarist frames of
reference utilised by WHAP. As we noted above, these frames of reference have a
dual nature, at a material level they exist as institutions and procedures (apparatuses)
that are available to welfare professionals and their clients, but they also have an
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ideational existence, and it is at this level, the level of ideas, that their systematic
nature is revealed. The ideational aspect of the welfarist frames of reference that
prevail in the current conjuncture has been described as 'social administration'
(Walker, 1984).
Broadly speaking, the main tenets of social administration are: that social problems
can be understood by social scientific enquiry, that their resolution is largely a
technical issue, requiring the intervention of the state via bureaucratic institutions, and
that a more radical social and economic transformation is not essential to their
amelioration. Social administration is, of course, constantly changing, for instance the
perceived efficacy of incorporating quasi-market mechanisms to improve the
efficiency of bureaucratic institutions is a relatively recent development, as is the
lowered expectation of what social policy might achieve, but the fundamental
assumptions of the approach still prevail.
It is also important to recognise that the ideational aspect of welfarist frames of
reference, that we are describing as social administration, can only be distinguished
from their material manifestation, institutions et cetera, at the level of theoretical
abstraction - in the concrete world the two are inseparable. It is erroneous to assume
that social administration gave rise to the development of the institutions of the
welfare state, or conversely that it developed as a post hoc justification. For example,
the idea of psychiatry is a meaningless abstraction until its material existence as a set
of buildings, implements, pharmaceutical compounds, therapeutic procedures,
practices, roles and relationships is also considered. And by the same token, the
material apparatus of psychiatry is just so much junk without the ideas that give it
meaning. To describe psychiatry at any point in its chequered history is to describe a
frame of reference that is simultaneously and irreducibly both material and ideational.
Grasping the dual nature of welfarist frames of reference, that is, that they are
inseparably both material and ideational, is essential to an understanding of the way in
which they impact upon the consciousness of the professionals and 'clients' that utilise
them. It is not possible to operate within the material structures of welfarist frames of
reference whilst maintaining an objectively critical approach to their ideational
content. This does not mean that critical views cannot be subjectively held whilst
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operating within welfarist frames of reference, for example, one can be subjectively
critical of psychiatry whilst practising as a psychiatrist. But one cannot transform
those subjective criticisms into practical activity without departing from, or stepping
outside of, psychiatric practice. As we shall see, this 'stepping outside' remains a
possibility, but there are substantial disincentives for welfare professionals to do so.
First, we noted the extent to which managerial structures of control are able to police
the boundaries of professional practice. Thus anyone who radically departs from a
'legitimate' professional role is likely to incur disciplinary penalties and the
opprobrium of his/her peers. Secondly, we noted the extent to which notions of
responsibility and professional values permeate the identity of the welfare
professional. It is not simply the case that professionals make use of welfarist frames
of reference, the professional identity is itself a part of those frames of reference - to
adopt the role and identity of a professional is largely to accept the legitimacy of
welfarist frames of reference.
It is worth looking more closely at the way in which the adoption of a professional
identity shapes consciousness. We have already noted the process of professional
socialisation, in which the norms, values and woridview of a profession are
transmitted to new recruits in the educational and training process. But there is a more
fundamental process at work by which everyday experience of professional practice
tends to reinforce the boundaries of the professional identity and legitimate welfarist
frames of reference. The process has been identified by Aithusser, who refers to it as
'interpellation' (Althusser, I 969a).
Interpellation is the process by which ideology, (or in this case welfarist frames of
reference), transform the individual into a subject. Althusser offers two metaphors to
explain the process, first he suggests that ideology holds up a mirror in which the
individual recognises him/herself; it says 'this is you, this what you think, what you
believe and how you act'. But of course the image in the mirror is socially
constructed, it reflects an identity which ultimately serves ruling class interests.
Aithusser's second metaphor is about hailing someone in the Street. if someone calls
out to us and we acknowledge them, then we accept the identity by which they hail us:
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ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects
amongst the individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals
into subjects (it transforms them all) by the very precise operation which I
have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the
lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you
there!' (Aithusser, 1969a, pp. 162-3)
Aithusser goes on to point out the limitations of the hailing metaphor - whereas it
implies a temporal process, with a before and after, in the case of ideology there can
be no before and after; the interpellation process is continual, and we are always 'in'
ideology. As we shall see, the generalisation that we are always 'in' ideology, though
formally correct, is misleading, and serves to mystify the potential for critical
consciousness and emancipatory activity. This problem is addressed below, but first it
is important to go beyond the metaphor and examine the concrete ways in which
welfarist frames of reference interpellate the professional subject.
Rather than actually calling out to the professional, welfarist frames of reference
interpellate the individual by shaping his/her options for practical activity. Thus, to
become a professional is to position oneself in a specific relationship to one's 'clients'
and to the resources of the state. It is to say, for example: 'I am someone who is
responsible for dealing with the psychotic episodes of the mentally ill'. Not only that,
but also to accept the prescribed options for action, for example, the administration of
counselling, psychotropic drugs, or ultimately coercive restraint. To accept the
identity of welfare professional is to legitimate the validity of welfarist frames of
reference; indeed it entails actively internalising and becoming a part of those frames
of reference.
The process by which welfarist frames of reference interpellate the professional
subject is so binding that one need not formally be a paid employee of the state in
order to be interpellated. Amongst the WHAP 'professionals' were individuals who
were not formally paid employees of the state, one was retired, one was a priest, others
were employed by voluntary agencies. But despite their formal autonomy, they still
placed themselves in the same relationship to 'clients' and the state, they still accessed
welfarist frames of reference, and in so doing were interpellated as welfare
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professionals. We shall see in the next chapter that the same process began to happen
with some of the 'volunteers'. This is what was meant when in the first half of this
chapter we claimed that one need not be a professional to exercise professional power.
So welfarist frames of reference are not simply a set of ideas, they are also a set of
material institutions, procedures, skills and resources. By entering a relationship
between the state and 'clients' which entails utilisation of those frames of reference
the professional is obliged to internalise them, that is to use them as a means of
constituting his/her subjective identity. This has consequences for emancipatory
practice, because to radically depart from one's prescribed professional role, is not
only to provoke the managerial structure of control, but also to do violence to one's
subjective identity. This is clearly observable in WHAP. The 'sectioning' of Denise
is the most extreme example of the extent to which an alternative course of action
would not only have left the professionals concerned open to criticism/disciplining by
their employers, but would also have damaged their subjective identity as a caring and
responsible professional.
The other examples, where the WHAP professionals resorted to welfarist frames of
reference to solve the problems of: organisational structure, smoking at the drop-in,
and racism, may be less extreme, but they are even more a product of interpellation.
The social space in which these issues were addressed was largely beyond the reach of
managerial structures of control, but the professionals still resorted to welfarist frames
of reference, because not to do so would not only be to say 'social work is no good, or
health promotion is no good', it would have meant saying: 'I am no good, my
knowledge is worthless, my skills are irrelevant'. Although many of the professionals
involved in WHAP were subjectively critical of the state-power manifest in welfarist
frames of reference they were not able to convert this critique into concrete
emancipatory activity because to do so would have done violence to their subjective
identity - an identity which they had struggled to attain, and on which their status,
prestige and livelihood depended.
Althusser's claim that we are always 'in' ideology, was noted above, and it leaves two
questions unanswered: What are the origins of ideology (or welfarist frames of
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reference)?, and, If we are always the bearers of ideology, how does one account for
human agency?
Searching for the origins of ideology is a false pursuit. Ideology does not represent the
results of a conspiracy in which members of the ruling class consciously 'author' an
ideological theme that serves their interests, and then impose it on professionals and
their clients. Rather, as Althusser notes, ideology is always already in existence, we
are all born into ideology. However, the content of ideology is constantly changing,
constantly being modified. Thus, specific ideological phenomena, for example
welfarist frames of reference, have an observable history, even though no absolute
point of origin can be identified.
What then, are the forces that drive ideological change? With welfarist frames of
reference, we have seen that they ultimately serve the interests of the ruling class as a
means of intellectual domination, and of regulating the behaviour of subordinate
classes - for example by providing a means of managing social and economic
problems within the capitalist mode of production. But the social and economic world
is itself in a constant state of flux, constantly creating new problems to be managed -
thus ideology must be constantly transformed, because the problems it addresses
change over time.
The need to reproduce the economic dominance of the ruling class is a fundamental
determinant of the changing composition of welfarist frames of reference, not least
because it ultimately defines the resources available to the ideological apparatuses of
the state. But again, in the concrete empirical world 'the economic' cannot be
abstracted from the totality of social relations; it can never be differentiated as a
discrete causal variable. Moreover, the domain of ideology comprises much more
than the ruling class struggling to maintain economic domination, many other interests
are pursued and contested in ideology.
Rather than being exclusively authored by the ruling class, welfarist frames of
reference are also the product of other determinants, for example, Manning has
attempted to provide an empirical description of the way in which 'social problems'
are constructed:
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the promotion of social conditions as social problems typically occurs
through perceived grievances being organised into claims which various
groups bring to the state. The legitimacy of these claims is heavily influenced
by mass media interpretations of public opinion, and the priorities and
interests of government departments in terms of existing policies, perceived
voter preferences, and major power blocks such as the Labour movement and
the business community. (Manning (ed.), 1985, p.22)
It is important to recognise that the apparent pluralism of this process, is only
superficial; social problems may be constructed by the interaction of a range of actors,
but they are shaped within the rigid parameters imposed by economic scarcity and the
weight of already existing ideological forms. The value of Manning's analysis is that
it points to the way in which welfare professionals and their clients can unwittingly
collude in their own ideological subordination. We noted above, that the WHAP
professionals resorted to welfarist frames of reference to address the problems faced
by the group, and that in so doing they became the bearers of state-power. But this is
by no means a one way process. WHAP's professionals may ultimately have 'played
by the rules', but many of the problems they confronted were novel, and required a
degree of innovation, or 'policy entrepreneurship'. Again this innovation took place
within fixed parameters, but it can still be concluded that whilst acting within the
rules, the WHAP professionals also began articulating new rules and new solutions.
This observation provides a crucial insight into the process by which welfarist frames
of reference are modified, particularly in the realm of community empowerment. The
'new methods' of counselling, stress management, social support, and community
organising, were not contrived by the ruling class as a means of extending their
ideological domination, they were developed by the community workers, health
promoters, and social workers, as they went about managing the problems that
confronted them, but because they developed within existing welfarist frames of
reference they were inevitably incorporated into the project of ideological domination
and the exercise of state-power.
At the level of theoretical abstraction it is possible to refer to ideology as a totality, as
a structured whole, with common themes, processes and outcomes. But in concrete
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empirical terms there is never an ideology to be studied, only ideologies. The network
of ideological structures, (which includes welfarist frames of reference), has a
systematic character, determined by material constraints and the unequal distribution
of power, but the constituent elements of this network are diverse and fragmentary;
rather than the product of ruling class 'authorship' they are complex social
constructions.
This leads us some way from Althusser's theory of ideology; rather than tightly
sutured mechanisms of social reproduction, welfarist frames of reference represent a
dis-jointed and opportunistic struggle to impose ideological closure on a continually
changing world. Laclau and Mouffe refer to this struggle as hegemonic suturing:
Hegeinonic practices are suturing in so far as their field of operation is
determined by the openness of the social, by the ultimately unfixed character of
every signifier. This original lack is precisely what the hegemonic practices
try to fill in. (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.88)
Whilst Laclau and Mouffe are correct in noting the struggle for ideological closure,
they fail to recognise the dual nature of ideology as both ideational and material, for
them ideology is simply about the struggle to impose a dominant interpretation of
reality; what they fail to perceive is the extent to which ideology is embodied in
institutions, apparatus, procedures et cetera, and the extent to which direct experience
of this material embodiment of ideology necessarily brings about acceptance of its
ideational content. Ideology can be characterised as a messy battleground in which
competing interest groups struggle to impose their interpretation on reality. But this is
an unfair contest, in which the material structures through which the individual
encounters reality are the product of ruling class domination. These material structures
cannot be accessed without activating their ideational content, and this serves to
interpellate the individual as a subject, in two senses of the word, as a self-identity,
and as a subordinate.
Where does this leave political will and human agency? So far we have argued that
welfarist frames of reference have both an ideational and a material aspect, that
accessing the material resources embodied in welfarist frames of reference necessarily
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entails activation of their ideational content, that this process interpellates the
individual as a subject, and that overall, welfarist frames of reference serve the
interests of the ruling class. However, we have also noted that although ideology
exists as a theoretical totality with common determinants, themes, and outcomes, at
the empirical level it is always fragmentary and constantly changing, that it is socially
constructed rather than authored, and that those involved in welfarist frames of
reference can contribute to their content, but that this contribution can only strengthen
their ideological effectiveness.
Superficially it might appear that having made some concessions to those who stress
the role played by human consciousness in the exercise of power, we have still come
down firmly on the side of structural determinism. Whereas the London-Edinburgh
Weekend Return Group claimed that it was possible to be 'in and against the state', to
pursue an emancipatory agenda by transforming the institutions of the state from
within, we have argued that such attempts are likely to fail, that despite the conscious
desire to bring about progressive change, those efforts can only lead to the
marginalisation or disciplining of the individual, or, to the extension of the state's
ideological dominance. This argument that the consciousness of the subject tends to
be subordinated to welfarist frames of reference would appear to put our analysis
firmly in the Aithusserian/structuralist camp, and make it vulnerable to the criticisms
that have been made of that approach. For instance, we have already noted Connel's
criticism that Aithusser overlooks the role played by humans in consciously making
their own history.
The implication is that Aithusser saw the individual as a tableau raza that the
ideological state apparatus's write upon. He describes the individual as the bearer
(trager) of ideology, suggesting a passive acceptance of ideology, rather than an active
process of assimilation, thus he describes ideologies as:
perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects and they act functionally on
men via a process that escapes them. (Althusser, 1969b, p.23 3)
However, it is possible to subscribe to the belief that welfarist frames of reference
interpellate the individual as a subject, and that this process cannot be effectively
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opposed from within those welfarist frames of reference, without accepting
Aithusser's pessimistic theory of the subject and human agency. First, as Barrett
(1991), amongst others, has noted, Aithusser is virulently anti-essentialist. This
hostility towards the notion of essential human attributes stems from the concern to
refute the claims of bourgeois humanism with its tendency to assume that socially
constructed and historically specific aspects of the self were in fact universal and
innate characteristics. In place of the universal humanist subject, Althusser argues for
4he socially constructed subject. But this leads to a theoretical cul-de-sac; if
subjectivity is simply 'written' onto the individual by society, then where does the
political will to transform society come from? The problem of human agency is not
unique to Althusser, as Giddens points out, Foucault's anti-essentialism leads him to a
similarly pessimistic conclusion:
Foucault 's history tends to have no active subjects at all. It is history with the
agency removed. The individuals who appear in Foucault's analyses seem
impotent to determine their own destinies. Moreover, that reflexive
appropriation of history basic to history in modern culture does not appear at
the level of the agents themselves. The historian is a reflective being, aware of
the influence of the writing of history upon the determination of the present.
But this quality of self-understanding is seemingly not extended to historical
agents themselves. (Giddens, 1987, p.98)
Much of the debate on human agency oscillates between essentialist notions of a pre-
social self and the apparently agency robbing notions expounded by Althusser or
Foucault which view consciousness as exclusively the product of socially constructed
discourse or ideology. Neither approach is satisfactory, but as Michèle Barrett has
noted, we are not obliged to accept either:
One does not need, having seen the errors of an overly universalistic and
essentialist view of human nature, to say that there is 'thus' nothing
recognisable or distinct about humans - this should be a matter for further
investigation. (Barrett, 1991, p.89)
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One route out of the impasse is to define what is distinct about humans not in terms of
pre-social attributes, but as the necessity of creating meaning in order to act in the
world. From this perspective there is no pre-social self, indeed consciousness results
from the dialectical interplay of the individual and the objective world; consciousness
is always consciousness of something, and that something is the objective world.
Sartre (1943) explains this process by reference to two aspects of being - the en-soi
and the pour soi. The en-soi is the raw material of consciousness; the pour-soi is
active reflection upon it. It is important to note that these two categories are
inseparable aspects of being; there is no pre-social pour-soi waiting to appropriate the
world, and the concrete world only exists as a set of meanings to the extent that it is
the object of conscious reflection.
Moreover, human consciousness is itself simultaneously being in itself (l'etre en soi)
and being for itself (l'etre pour soi); my self-identity, i.e. who I am, what I believe, is
contained in the en-soi, but I also reflect on my self-identity, and this process of
reflection comprises the pour soi. Crucially the pour-soi can never be an object of
reflection in itself, it is always experienced as 'nothingness', as an awareness that has
no ideational content, our consciousness of it is always as a negation of the en-soi, i.e.
as 'I am not that'. The unbridgeable duality of consciousness, the fact that it is
simultaneously en-soi and pour-soi, creates a tension, I am aware of myself as an en-
soi, i.e. as the sum of my experiences, knowledge and biographical data, but this very
act of reflection suggests to me that I am something more than my self-identity. Thus,
we experience our self-identity as something incomplete, as a project to be worked on.
In attempting to achieve that sense of completeness, that unattainable unity between en
soi and pour soi, we are driven to act in the world, to experience it, produce
knowledge of it, and bring it under our control. Thus without resorting to essentialist
theories of a pre-social self it is possible to deduce a distinctly human mode of being,
which disposes us to act in and on the world; this mode of being is not characterised
by a set of pre-social attributes, but by 'nothingness'.
This conception of the nature of human consciousness can not only be distinguished
from the essentialist and ahistorical Cartesian subject of bourgeois humanism, but also
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from Aithusser's conception of the ideologically constituted or interpellated subject.
Whilst there is no pre-social self, neither is it the case that the individual is simply a
blank page on which subjectivity is written by society. According to Sartrean
existentialism the self continuously reconstitutes itself, but it does so by incorporating
experiences from the objective world. However, we know from Aithusser's account
of ideology, that the objective world can be structured to present itself to experience in
a way that gives rise to particular forms of consciousness. To paraphrase Marx, we
constitute our own self identity, but not under conditions of our own choosing.
So where does this leave us in terms of the human agency versus structural
determinism debate? Is the subject interpellated by ideology negated by the pour soi?
And if so, then what is the material from which a revised en-soi is formulated? First, it
is important to note that whatever the influence of ideology on the en-soi it is always
historically specific, and vulnerable to negation. Ideology cannot interpellate the
subject in a fixed or absolute form, not only because the world it refers to is constantly
changing, but also because its domain is the en-soi the self-identity it gives rise to
must always be perceived as incomplete, for example, the adoption of a professional
role may play a significant part in the formation of self-identity, but because that
identity must also be an object of reflection, it is always open to negation - the process
of reflection (the pour-soi) always gives the awareness that 'that object is not me'.
Superficially then, it might be concluded that the best efforts of the ideological
apparatuses to interpellate the individual as a subject must inevitably end in failure.
But the process is not that simple, because although the pour-soi continuously negates
self-identity, the means by which a revised self-identity is forged, what Foucault
(1988) refers to as 'technologies of the self', reside in ideology, rather than in the
pour-soi which we have already observed can have no content. Thus we might reject a
professional identity, because we experience it as inauthentic, but then seek to revise
our self-identity by utilisation of technologies of the self which are themselves
ideological, for example, welfarist frames of reference. It is possible to envisage a
circular Promethean nightmare in which an ideologically interpellated subjectivity is
negated only to be replaced by an equally subordinate subjectivity produced by
ideological technologies of the self.
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Recognition that the technologies of the self are themselves ideological appears to
imply that despite the continual negation of the en-soi the structure must always strike
back as the ultimate determinant of self-identity. Certainly this seems to have been the
case in WHAP, where the professionals actively struggled to overcome the alienation
inherent in their self identity, only to create an equally oppressive identity through
their reference to welfarist frames of reference. But is this process inevitable, or, is it
a product of the structural and historical location that the WHAP professionals
occupied?
We noted above that the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) were never able to
achieve total closure, because of the continual changes occurring in the social
formation. As well as struggling to keep up with a changing world, the ISAs also have
a contradictory nature and a limited range. They are contradictory because the
reproduction of labour power entails the development of intellectual skills in the
worker, as well as subordination to the process of accumulation. These intellectual
skills include the capacity to create new meanings from our experiences by a process
of assimilation and synthesis; a capacity that can be turned towards a critical appraisal
of prevailing social relations, as well as being an essential requirement of modem
production.
The limited range of the ISAs refers to their inability to eradicate alternative
ideologies, for example, communism, or, religious fundamentalism. Clearly the threat
that such alternative ideologies pose is historically specific, depending upon their
perceived adequacy, and the extent to which they are supported by effective political
organisation. For example, the ideological threat posed by revolutionary communism
is now virtually extinct, because of the degeneration and collapse of the Soviet Union
and the co-option or marginalisation of working class political institutions. Even so,
because of their contradictory nature, limited range, and the constantly changing social
formation, the ISAs are not able to totally determine consciousness and self-identity.
Despite the extent to which the ISAs (including welfarist frames of reference) are able
to structure the experiences of those who encounter them, and in so doing force the
acceptance of their ideational content, the possibility remains for the adoption of an
alternative and oppositional self-identity.
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But what are the conditions under which an oppositional self-identity can be adopted?
The analysis of WHAP reveals that dissatisfaction with an existing role is unlikely to
be sufficient to guarantee the adoption of a genuinely oppositional self-identity. Even
though the WHAP professionals were subjectively committed to an emancipatory
agenda their embroilment in welfarist frames of reference constantly interpellated
them as welfare professionals, and they were consequently unable to shake off their
role as the bearers of state-power. Thus, the adoption of a genuinely oppositional self-
identity appears to depend upon the individual rejecting, or 'stepping outside of', the
ideological state apparatuses. This 'stepping outside' refers to something other than
formal employment; we noted in WHAP that many of the 'professionals' were not
formally employed by the state, but were still interpellated as welfare professionals by
their referral to welfarist frames of reference. The adoption of an oppositional self-
identity entails recognising that welfarist frames of reference are a mechanism for the
exercise of state-power, and defining one's emancipatory activity in opposition to, and
outside the range of, these and other ideological state apparatuses - it means
relinquishing the myth that one can pursue an emancipatory agenda from within a
professional identity.
Just as one need not be formally employed by the state in order to be interpellated by
welfarist frames of reference, the welfare professional need not resign his/her position
in order to adopt an oppositional self-identity. It is not formal employment as a
professional that must be rejected, but the definition of one's emancipatory practice in
terms of the professional role - this means recognising that one's professional role is
always likely to be oppressive, that it cannot be significantly reformed from within. Of
course this is a contradictory position for someone pursuing an emancipatory agenda,
because it means acting as an agent of social control during 'office hours' whilst
struggling to negate that role through autonomous emancipatory activity. This is an
uncomfortable contradiction to maintain for any length of time and is likely to be
resolved either by resignation of the professional post, abandonment of the
emancipatory agenda, or as the following quotation from the London-Edinburgh
Weekend Return Group (LEWRG) indicates, adoption of the ideological belief that
one can pursue an emancipatory agenda from within a professional role:
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We spend our evenings and weekends struggling against capitalism, and our
days working diligently as agents of the capitalist state to reproduce the
capitalist system. Like Penelope, in the Greek myth, we stitch the tapestry of
bourgeois society every day and attempt each night to unravel it before dawn.
Is there any way out of this hopeless dilemma? Can we shape our daily
activity in such a way as to avoid stitching capital's tapestry, can we hinder
rather than promote the reproduction of capitalist social relations? Does the
fact that our work is situated in the state give us special opportunities in this
respect, or is that merely a reformist illusion? (London-Edinburgh Weekend
Return Group, 1980, p.5)
LEWRG hope that they will be able to find a way of pursuing an emancipatory agenda
from within the professional role, but our analysis suggests that they are mistaken -
that their belief in the emancipatory potential of the professional role really is a
'reformist illusion'. But recognition of this does not mean that the welfare
professional must resign his/her post in order to pursue an emancipatory agenda, in
fact their position is no more contradictory than any other worker who chooses to
challenge oppression whilst occupying a post that contributes to its reproduction. For
example, employment in a munitions factory does not debar the worker from
struggling for peace, but one cannot struggle for peace in one's capacity as a munitions
worker.
if the adoption of an oppositional self-identity depends upon stepping outside of
welfarist frames of reference, then what does an emancipatory agenda entail? Put
another way, if the oppressive nature of the state cannot be significantly reformed
from within by attempting to modify welfarist frames of reference, then how can it be
opposed? The answer lies in the dual nature of the state, as both state-form and state
apparatus. We noted above that the state exists as a set of social relations, most
notably the relation between capital and labour, as well as a set of institutions. Our
analysis suggests that attempting to challenge the oppressive character of the state
apparatus whilst leaving the state-form intact is unlikely to be successful. While the.
state-apparatus continues to be the executive arm of capitalism any attempt to make it
less oppressive is likely to be constrained. 	 For this reason an authentically
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emancipatory agenda must also entail an assault on the state-form as a necessary pre-
cursor to transforming the state-apparatus.
To express this metaphorically, the state apparatus can be conceptualised as a machine
that shapes the subjectivity of anyone who comes near it. Any attempt to dismantle
the machine from within is obviously bound to fail, because to draw near it is to have
one's subjectivity shaped by it. Rather than approaching the machine directly, a more
effective strategy is to first disconnect it from it's power supply, thereby rendering it
inoperative as a means of interpellation, and therefore vulnerable to change. The
'power supply' of the state apparatus is its relation to capital, and it is this relationship
that must be broken before it can be transformed.
In the first half of this chapter empirical evidence was presented of the ways in which
members of the Waterfront Health Action Project attempted to challenge the operation
of professional power. The impetus for this challenge came from the contradictory
nature of professional involvement in the project. On one hand the professionals
brought expertise and access to resources, but on the other hand the traditional
professional role was associated with paternalism and the exercise of social control.
In order to overcome this contradiction WHAP set about changing the professional
role, by providing informal access to professional skills, and by reducing cultural
dissonance and building trust between the professionals and the volunteers.
Although these efforts were partly successful, professional power re-emerged when
the professionals attempted to use their expertise to resolve problems facing the group,
such as: organisation, smoking at the Drop-in, racism, and discipline. It was
provisionally concluded that professional power re-emerged in spite of the
professionals subjective commitment to an emancipatory agenda, because their formal
location within the state and their subscription to a professionalised self-identity
obliged them to access welfarist frames of reference as a means of resolving the
problems faced by the project; these welfarist frames of reference were dependent
upon and constitutive of professional power.
In the second half of the chapter we attempted to deepen the analysis by examining
sociological approaches to understanding the categories of 'professional', 'power', and
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'welfarist frames of reference'. The key characteristic of professionals (and welfare
professionals in particular) was found to be their relationship to the state. It was
suggested that the state could best be understood as an instrument of class domination.
Professionals were implicated in the process of domination, not because they were
members of the ruling class, but because of their subordination to a managerial
structure of control, and more importantly because of their interpellation into a
professional self-identity. From this perspective, professional power could be
recognised as a manifestation of state-power. By defining social problems in terms of
the need for services offered by the welfare state, professionals facilitated the social
reproduction of labour power, and posited the individual in a dependent and
subordinate relationship to the state.
Welfarist frames of reference were described in terms of their ideational and material
nature. The professional's reliance on welfarist frames of reference led to his/her
interpellation as a subject, that is, as someone with a professionalised self-identity.
The process of interpellation accounts for the professionals' participation in the
exercise of state-power, even when they are subjectively committed to an
emancipatory agenda. But the tendency for human consciousness to continually
negate a 'fixed' self-identity, coupled with the contradictory and incomplete nature of
ideological structures, means that the interpellation process can never be absolute.
The possibility of adopting an alternative, or even oppositional, identity always
remains, but it seems unlikely that this can be achieved within a professional role.
Effective emancipatory practice appears to depend upon the individual standing
outside of welfarist frames of reference.
WHAP's attempt to produce emancipatory knowledge and to overcome the exercise of
professional power was embarked upon as a means of empowering members of the
local population. In this and the previous chapter we have identified and analysed the
failure to achieve either objective. The final chapter examines the effects that this
failed attempt had on the consciousness of WHAP's lay participants, before drawing
general conclusions about the viability of 'community empowerment' as an effective
emancipatory strategy.
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5. The Myth of Community Empowerment
The Waterfront Health Action Project took as its point of departure the belief that
health and welfare professionals could form a partnership with local people that would
enable them to exercise greater control over the social, economic and environmental
influences on health. Achievement of this aim was felt to rest upon the production of
emancipatory knowledge and on dismantling the exercise of professional power, both
of which are examined above. However, the fundamental strand of WHAP's strategy
remains to be considered, namely, whether WHAP enabled its lay participants and
members of the wider community to become more competent social actors and more
effective agents of change, or, more concisely, whether it 'empowered' them. So
central was this objective to WHAP's overall goal that the extent to which it was
achieved can be taken as a proxy indicator of the success of the project as a whole,
making it an appropriate topic for this the concluding chapter.
In the previous chapter it was noted that the category of 'professional' could be found
amongst the interview transcripts and within sociological discourse, and that this
coincidence was a mixed blessing. 'Empowerment' also has both a lay and an
academic usage, which also cannot be assumed to be consistent with each other. As
before this difficulty will be addressed first by presenting the category as it emerged
from the empirical data, and then examining the extent to which academic accounts of
empowerment are pertinent to the analysis. Three closely intertwined strands of
empowerment can be derived from the accounts given in the interviews with WHAP
members: 'empowerment of the WHAP volunteers', 'empowerment of the Drop-in
users', and 'community empowerment'.
Empowering the Volunteers
WHAP's volunteers received a greater input of professional time and financial
resources than the Drop-in users or the broader population, and it might be anticipated
that they would, therefore, exhibit a greater degree of empowerment. We begin the
analysis by looking at why the volunteers became involved in WHAP.
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• The Voluntarist Impulse
One reason for becoming a WHAP volunteer was the desire to help others, pacticuary
'people less fortunate than myself'; a group which was felt to comprise the elderly,
the house-bound, handicapped people, or more generally, the under-dog. Thus,
participation as a WHAP volunteer was viewed by some as a charitable or altruistic
act, akin to giving money to a beggar:
I don't think that I'm going to be able to do enough in my life time to change
things, that much, do you know what I mean? There's too much going on in
this world that's too wrong, that whatever little bit we can do.. It's like when
you go out... enn, I've been to London, been through the railways,
underground or whatever, [...] I saw a boy down there with his dog, only a
young fellow, [...] I gave him what change I had, which was sixty pence [...]
But I felt good, because I was giving him.. and as I say, maybe he's making a
lot of money, but maybe he's not, maybe he really is homeless, [...] So even f I
only help one person. Like I felt good this morning, with that old man, that's
made me feel good.
(Volunteer, December 1993)
As the above quotation implies, the charitable impulse can reflect both scepticism
about the viability of more ambitious methods of achieving change, and the
satisfaction obtained from small acts of kindness. The Drop-in centre provided access
to some of the more needy people in the Thamesmead area, and the provision of social
support and welfare information was seen as a tangible and achievable way of helping
them.
• A Route into Paid Employment
A second motive was the hope that voluntary participation might eventually lead to.
paid employment. The significance of this aspiration only becomes intelligible when
the class location of the volunteers is considered. These were not members of the
affluent middle-classes seeking seif-aggrandisement through charity work, but were
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for the most part extremely deprived people, marginalised from full employment and
dependent on welfare benefits. The possibility of finding a route into paid
employment, no matter how tenuous, was therefore an important consideration for
many of the volunteers:
There's quite a few volunteer places that they don't get paid, you know they are
volunteers, and we've been involved this far, we stayed involved, to be honest,
because there was promises or half promises of work, of proper jobs, because
at first I thought yeah, both my kids are at school I want to actually go out and
earn some money. Elaine [one of the professionals] was saying, 'If you hang
on you could get a good job out of this,' this is what she was saying. I think
this is what made us stay on, but like Angela she's left, because she felt like
that just wasn't happening, and she was getting very frustrated with it, and
then she got on her social work course.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
That WHAP could be viewed as a potential route into paid employment may appear
overly optimistic given the limited financial resources available to the project, but the
possibility of obtaining further funding remained, and it is not unheard of for
community development projects to recruit paid workers from amongst their voluntary
participants. Moreover, WHAP was seen as a means of acquiring work experience,
skills and personal qualities that might be of value in seeking employment elsewhere.
Before examining the skills and competencies obtained by the volunteers, it is
important to note the significance of the voluntarist impulse and the pursuit of paid
employment as motives for their involvement.
In previous chapters we examined the reasons that the professionals gave for their
involvement in WHAP; many were frustrated with the constraints of their professional
role, particularly that they were only able to support individual clients rather than
addressing the social, economic and environmental influences on health and well-
being. There is a clear paradox here; whereas the volunteers saw WHAP as a means.
of helping needy individuals and possibly entering paid employment, the professionals
initially saw it as a means of transcending the constraints of such a role. For the
volunteers empowerment meant taking on precisely the role that the professionals
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were so eager to transcend. Our purpose here is not to condemn either party for their
different aspirations, but simply to note the extent to which different social and
economic positions give rise to different forms of consciousness.
Given the professionals' dominant position in WHAP it might be assumed that their
emancipatory agenda would take precedence over the aspirations of the volunteers, but
this was not the case. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the professionals
were genuinely committed to listening to the views of the volunteers and following
their wishes, so long as this did not contradict their professional values and
responsibilities. Secondly, we saw in chapter three that WHAP failed to produce
emancipatory knowledge capable of either influencing the statutory agencies or
developing critical consciousness amongst the local population, thus despite the
professionals' subjective commitment to a broader emancipatory agenda, the means of
operationalising such aspirations were not forthcoming. And thirdly, in the absence of
critical consciousness WHAP was unable to transcend traditional professional roles
and welfarist frames of reference, (see chapter four), which in practice meant a
reversion to 'case-work' with individual 'clients'. Thus, when the volunteers
proposed the establishment of a Drop-in centre where they could provide 'services' to
individual 'clients' and develop skills and opportunities for themselves, the
professionals were unable to offer a more emancipatory alternative. For these reasons
the 'empowerment' of the WHAP volunteers took the form of equipping them with
the quasi-professional skills and competencies that would enable them to address the
needs of Drop-in users, and possibly find a route into paid employment.
U Developing self-esteem & confidence
The professionalisation of the WHAP volunteers did not simply entail the acquisition
of knowledge and techniques. We noted above that many of the volunteers were
economically marginalised, to this we might add that many had also encountered
adverse social circumstances, the combined result of which was perceived to be low
self-esteem. So a fundamental part of the empowerment process was raising the self-.
confidence of the volunteers. Simply participating in WHAP was felt to counter the
effects of loneliness and isolation, not only because it brought contact with others, but
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also, as the following quotations suggest, because it provided a project - quite literally
a reason to get out of bed:
I belong .. do you know what I mean? It's a really strange feeling, it's like
people believe [...] that you actually exist. When you're in a house on your
own you're a non-existent. [...] You give people a goal, something to do, you
know apart from I think unemployment as well, but you're employed if you're
doing community work. You've got something to do even if it's not cash, it's
something to do, and I think that's important.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
And again from the same volunteer:
you have to get up and get dressed, and look presentable. And I know that
sounds strange, but when all you've got is to sit in bed and do nothing, then
you think to yourself well where's the point getting dressed. At first it became,
oh do I have to, but now it's like you can't wait to go.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
Merely being involved in WHAP conferred feelings of self-worth, and led to the
acquisition of personal skills that others might take for granted, for instance, getting
out of bed in order to attend, and wearing appropriate dress. As well as these informal
gains WHAP also offered the volunteers formal tuition in personal skills and self-
management:
when I first came here I was depressed, suffering from panic attacks. My
panic attacks are virtually gone now. Having a self-assertion and the stress
management thing, like little courses, helps me to be aware of how I'm feeling,
how other people are, how to conduct myself in a more positive way. [...] with
the little sessions that we've had, self-assertion and that, it makes you identify
the things, how to control what you're trying to put across, without getting.
aggressive. I think it's very good, it's helped me a lot.
(Volunteer, June 1994)
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As well as stress management and assertiveness training, the volunteers also gained
experience of public speaking, participating in meetings, and interacting with welfare
professionals as fellow providers, rather than merely being the recipients of services.
There is little doubt that these experiences improved the self-esteem and inter-personal
competence of many of the volunteers, at least for the duration of their involvement in
the project. Nor would I wish to denigrate the value of such skills. But the point is
that although the acquisition of such skills maybe worthwhile, in the absence of
critical consciousness and an agenda for structural change, they cannot be considered
emancipatory. The reason for this being that alienation and oppression do not reside
in the consciousness of the individual, but in social and economic relationships.
As we shall see, the most that WHAP could offer its newly 'empowered' volunteers
was a marginally improved chance of finding paid employment, and failing that, the
opportunity to live out the fantasy of empowerment by playing at being a professional.
And it is here that the main emphasis of WHAP's attempt to empower the volunteers
lies; although the pursuit of paid employment was acknowledged, the primary concern
was to enable them to become quasi-professionals, offering a range of 'services' to
other local people.
U Overcoming deference to professionals and 'de-bunking' bio-medicine
The acquisition of a quasi-professional identity by the volunteers was accompanied by,
or perhaps even dependent upon, reduced deference to professionals. In some respects
this was a progressive development, for example, the volunteer quoted below felt
more able to question those in authority:
[...] I've always looked on Authorities like they're the ones in control - I have
no power. But then being in WHAP makes me feel that, or tells me that, I have
got power. They're just another person, airight they're a doctor or whatever,
above me, I haven't got that knowledge, but I have got a right to stand up and
say well I don't agree with that. Before I used to think that I wasn't allowed to..
(Volunteer, June 1994)
Similarly, another volunteer felt more able to fend off an overly intrusive doctor:
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[...] it's made me much more confident. I went in to see a doctor, because I
wanted something, and it like she was trying to tell me something completely
different. A Rain, the doctor is getting like the social services. I mean I'll tell
you the truth, I went in for the morning after pill, right. I've never had it
before, and she's talking about which relationship, and this relationship, and
its none of her fuckin' business, right? And I'm trying to cover up and say
'well its the children 's father' or something like that - 'you're not supposed to
be with the children's father', and so and so. So I said to her, 'I did not come
in here to discuss family planning and what family I intend to have, I came in
here to get this tablet, that is all I want, right'. And she gave it to me, [...] I
don't know whether I would have done that before. I don't think I would have
done, I wouldn't have had that sort of confidence [...]
(Volunteer, June 1994)
Telling nosy General Practitioners to mind their own business is an action that can
only be applauded. However, it is important to examine the basis of this newly found
confidence. Rather than stemming from a conscious critique of the professional's
location in the state, as an agent of social control, (as we identified in the previous
chapter), the criticism was based largely on dissatisfaction with the personal attributes
of the practitioner, or the therapeutic encounter. Thus, doctors were criticised for
being aloof, or for not giving sufficient time to their patients. More importantly, this
dissatisfaction was often linked to a belief that bio-medicine only offers a partial
solution to health problems, as the following quotation indicates:
[...J a doctor will just give you a tablet. A tablet, airight it might relieve the
pain, but the pain will still come back. You have to look inside yourself to
deal with [it] instead of keep taking these tablets. So it depends on how you
put yourself across, you might be curing that person, but it might be a longer
term, do you know what I mean? For them to actually look at their selves.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
This belief, that bio-medicine tends to treat symptoms rather than addressing the
underlying causes of ill health, has a radical ring to it. Indeed, many on the left have
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argued for 'social medicine' that would address economic and social influences on
health as well as curing sick individuals. However, in this instance the de-bunking of
bio-medicine did not engender a commitment to challenge the structural influences on
health, but rather the need for WHAP to complement existing health services by
providing various forms of psychological and social support, as the following
quotation indicates:
[...] when you go to see a doctor you feel intimidated a little bit anyway, and
you don't always feel as though you can talk to a doctor, really pour your
heart out. But when you come in here, and you get to know people, some
people will start to talk, just in an ordinary conversation. It's like the girls are
all sitting around the table nattering now, they're doing this little patch-work,
but as they're getting relaxed, they're starting to talk, so that's going to get
them, that's going to get it off their chests.
(Volunteer, December 1993)
It is important to note the consequences that this critique had for the consciousness of
the WHAP volunteers. First, it led the volunteers to question their deference to the
medical profession, which may be no bad thing. But more importantly, the perception
that general practitioners are incapable of fully meeting their patients needs for
psychological and social support, opened up a route for the professionalisation of the
volunteers, by creating an unmet need that they as quasi-professionals could address.
Rather than being the passive objects of professional intervention the volunteers could
become 'fellow professionals' helping to address the health needs of the local
population.
Professionalisation of the volunteers
Despite their increasingly critical stance towards the merits of bio-medicine the
volunteers did not think of themselves as a replacement for the medical profession or
the professions allied to medicine, although they did feel that they had a role to play:
what can one person do, [...] especially people like [us] we're not trained in
health, we're not Health Visitors, we're not doctors, we're not midwives, not
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nothing like that. [...] but there is a thing called stress, and anxiety and
boredom, upset and all that sort of thing. So I think we can do something
about that. Ifeel that I can do something about that.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
Moreover, this role was conceived of in quasi-professional terms:
they've actually said quite overtly, 'the djfference between us and you is that
you get paid and we don't.' You know, and they realise that they're trying to
do something very similar in a caring sort of one to one way. They're not
being paid, but they're playing a role that isn't that dissimilar to a professional
role and I think they realise that.
(Professional, November 1993)
In fact the professional role model for the volunteers was closer to social work,
community development and health promotion, than it was to the medical profession.
This was reflected in the kind of 'work experience' and 'professional training' that
WHAP offered its would be professionals:
one volunteer is now involved with the Family Services Unit in supporting
one of their clients, and I hope that that sort of inteiface between other
services and WHAP might continue. WHAP at the moment is beginning to
offer the volunteers structured training in health issues of their choice. So
three people have just been on a child accident day, and we've got a couple of
days coming up on stress management, and we're going to look at a selection
of health education videos. So we're beginning the long process of being able
to offer something in terms of training, and of course Elaine is continuing her
training on committee processes, counselling, budgeting and basic
administrative skills
(Professional, November 1993)
To summarise the argument so far, volunteer involvement in WHAP was at least
partially motivated by the charitable desire to help others and the hope of finding a
route into paid employment. The project's failure to create critical consciousness
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through the production of emancipatory knowledge, coupled with the resilience of
professional values and welfarist frames of reference meant that no alternative could
be offered to the volunteers desire to become quasi-professional welfare workers.
Before the quasi-professional identity could be adopted the volunteers needed to be
'empowered' in a number of ways. First their self-esteem and inter-personal skills
were raised, this was largely a by product of their participation in a collective project,
although more formal training in assertiveness and stress management were also
provided. Secondly, the volunteers came to adopt an increasingly critical stance
towards bio-medicine, this had the effect of reducing their deference to doctors and
other professionals, and also implied an unmet need for social and psychological
support amongst the local population, that they could address as quasi-professionals.
Thirdly, the volunteers were given work experience and training in professional skills
that would supposedly make them into competent quasi-professionals.
We have already noted that this form of 'empowerment' has very little emancipatory
potential because it fails to address the structural basis of oppression and alienation.
However, even if we evaluate it on its own terms, as a means of improving the self-
esteem and competence of the volunteers, its efficacy is still questionable. First, the so
called training in professional skills amounted to little more than exposure to
occasional health promotion workshops and videos, which could hardly be considered
the equivalent of professional qualifications, thus one of the professionals remarked:
[...] the down side is that it might raise unrealistic expectations on their part;
they're not particularly well educated, they are not used to formal, educated
ways of thinking, and I think that if they think that they can achieve great
things, they're going to come.. I'm not saying that they can't, but they've got to
realise how dfJIcult that's going to be for them. On the other hand, there are
lots and lots of courses, return to learning, Open University, community
education courses, NVQs, that they can build up over years, that actually
would enable them to achieve, and maybe to acquire some skills, some
vocational qualifications, so it is realistic for them, but at the moment it's not
being provided. And when it is provided it will have to be made clear what the
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It is easy to dismiss the claim made in the above quotation that WHAP's quasi-
professionals might provide a cheap alternative to, or even undermine, the role of
social workers, for instance, where were their statutory powers, either to coerce their
'clients', or to distribute benefits? Yet despite this, there is a glimmer of truth in the
quotation, but it relates to the extent to which the volunteers served to append the
services offered by the real professionals in WHAP, rather than their capacity to offer
a viable alternative. Although the volunteers could never have replaced the welfare
professionals, they did provide a means of extending the reach of professional power.
This extension of professional power was possible because the volunteers became co-
opted into, and therefore served to legitimatise, welfarist frames of reference and the
traditional professional role, with two consequences. First, they provided an informal
'front-end' for professional services that was capable of drawing previously reticent
members of the local community within the purview of professional power. Secondly,
their adoption of a quasi-professional identity reinforced the volunteers' passivity by
reducing their resistance to the exercise of professional power, a tendency noted by
one of the professionals:
the volunteers are becoming more professionalised, and therefore, I think
we've already lost something in terms of the abrasive interface between the
professionals and volunteers, because we're all becoming professionalised
more, and therefore, are learning how to pose questions, and make challenges
and everything else, and that's actually taking out the abrasiveness of the
encounter. I think that's a loss as well as a gain.
(Professional, November 1993)
At first glance this may appear to contradict the evidence of reduced deference to
professionals presented above. However, although there is evidence that some of the
volunteers became increasingly critical of the traditional professional-client
relationship, their belief that they had attained quasi-professional status led them to
accept welfarist frames of reference, albeit in a revised form. Thus, although WHAP
set out to empower the volunteers by encouraging them to adopt a quasi-professional.
identity, the claimed empowerment was for the most part a myth; rather than enabling
the volunteers to exercise greater control over the social, economic and environmental
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influences on their health, WHAP only succeeded in co-opting them more thoroughly
into welfarist frames of reference.
Empowering the Drop-in users
As well as seeking to 'empower' the volunteers, WHAP also sought to address the
health needs of the Drop-in users. We have already noted the way in which the de-
bunking of bio-medicine contributed to the identification of an 'unmet' mental health
need amongst the local population that WHAP could address. This perception was
reinforced by the belief that the local population was particularly needy.
• The damaged community
The mental health needs of local people were perceived to originate in a lack of social
solidarity or community spirit. We noted in chapter one that loss of community is a
common theme in other modes of empowerment. It has particular resonance in
Thamesmead where as a 'New Town' the built environment and the composition of
the population were the result of social planning rather than organic development.
One of the volunteers noted that:
Thamesmead itself is a peculiar place, made up of all kinds of people. The
concept of Thamesmead in the beginning was good. You know, like working
people working together in a community, but this community wasn't a
community. It still isn't a community, because you need all the people to get
together. It's like I said to one of the Councillors the other day, it's like in war
time, we had an object, to bring us all together, so we were part of a whole.
Do you understand me. We don't have a project do we? So the community
cannot get together as a whole can they?
(Volunteer, November 1993)
The lack of community spirit was felt to lead to isolation and behavioural
irregularities:
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some of their [Thamesmead residents] behaviour is way out of kink, it's like
they've been closed out of society, and so their little society is in the house, and
that comes like on incest. There is a lot of that on Thamesmead, people don't
really know about. I was surprised when I found out, I nearly fell through the
floor. You know because community's enclose themselves in, and they don't
get involved in the community, they become like a community inside their
house.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
In short, the local population was perceived to have special needs resulting from its
atomised and fragmentary structure. We noted above that local health and welfare
services were perceived to be unresponsive to these special needs. When the two
themes are combined they provide a rationale for the Drop-in centre, as a means of re-
integrating the community and addressing the psychological consequences of
isolation.
• The need for social support
The Drop-in responded to this perceived need by providing a venue for people to
discuss their problems, mix with others with similar difficulties, and receive informal
welfare advice, along with cups of coffee, massage, and facials. Again, we would not
wish to contest the claim that lonely, isolated people might obtain some benefit from
belonging to a group where they can socialise and quite literally have their troubles
'massaged'. However, what is noteworthy is the extent to which the provision of 'tea
and sympathy' took on the appearance of a quasi-professional 'service', for instance
one of the professionals commented that:
the amount of mental stress and distress that came out [of the survey], and
the consequent behaviours of heavy drinking and all the rest of it, was the top
of the list really, it was the main issue - which I thought was quite a significant.
finding, and I think the Drop-in can be seen to have been WHAP's response to
try and do something, you know to deal with [it], to offer a facility for people
that were at their wits end. [...] I think the purpose is to provide that facility, a
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listening ear, a friendly ear, a cup of tea, a fag, you know a bit of pampering,
work on their self-esteem.
(Professional, October 1994)
Not only was the Drop-in centre seen as a form of service provision, it was also felt to
offer a means of 'curing', or at least ameliorating, the health and welfare problems of
local people. Thus, one of the volunteers suggested that:
These people [the Drop-in users] are all people from different walks of life,
and by just listening to them, and showing them some craft or whatever, doing
their nails to help them relax, you know, and things like that, you're actually
curing a lot of the problems that are on Thamesmead, like loneliness,
depression, isolation...
(Volunteer, September 1994)
As a means of resolving or 'curing' the health needs of local people the 'services'
offered by the Drop-in were barely significant, they may have stimulated a temporary
improvement in their clients' sense of well-being, but they were hardly likely to meet
WRAP's original objective of enabling people to obtain greater control over the
social, economic and environmental influences on health. Rather than enabling people
to challenge the structural causes of their problems the Drop-in simply encouraged
people to endure adverse social circumstances - to learn how to survive.
The real significance of the Drop-in is that it provided the final ingredient for the
professionalisation of the WHAP volunteers, namely, a needy clientele for their quasi-
professional 'expertise'. That this 'expertise' amounted to little more than the ability
to engage in empathic chit-chat is less significant than the series of relationships it
established between Drop-in user, quasi-professional, welfare professional, and the
state.
We have already suggested that the Drop-in provided an informal 'front-end' for the
welfare professionals, enabling them to exercise surveillance and regulation over
sections of the population that might otherwise evade them. Although the Drop-in
presented an informal voluntarist face to its users, the quasi-professional perspective
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adopted by the volunteers (which included tacit acceptance of welfarist frames of
reference), coupled with the continued presence of the real welfare professionals,
meant that the Drop-in users were always likely to be 'referred' to one of the real
professionals if the need arose. The 'informal' context of the Drop-in simply
disguised the fact that such a referral had been made. Speaking from her own
experiences, one of the volunteers identified the way in which the informality of the
Drop-in had reduced her reluctance to seek professional advice:
I've never been a doctor person, but I feel like with Kate [one of the
professionals at the Drop-in], I can come to her and talk to her about anything
because she takes her time to explain everything to me. She gives me a one to
one, so Ifeel comfortable in that, and I think that's what's needed. And like the
Drop-in is a link with health, and the fact that a lot of people are stressed out,
depressed, for all sorts of reasons, and here is a place that's giving a service
that makes them feel special. Somebody's there to sit and listen to them if they
want to talk. The massage is a relaxing aspect. So all of them things breaks
down the stress a little bit, that'll probably bring them back on their feet. Cos
stress is a main cause of depression that leads to other illness, I believe.
(Volunteer, June 1994)
In effect the volunteers became a conduit through which marginalised (hard-to-reach)
sections of the population could be brought within the purview of welfarist frames of
reference and the direct exercise of professional power. Rather than a transformation
of the relationship between the local population and the state, the Drop-in represented
a re-assertion and reinforcement of the traditional relationship between welfare
professional and client, albeit in a heavily disguised and superficially less threatening
form. Rather than promoting the development of critical consciousness or
emancipatory activity, adopting the identity of quasi-professional led the volunteers
into even greater passivity and dependence on the real professionals. For example the
following quotation from one of the volunteers reveals the extent to which her
involvement in WHAP not only led her to reassess her own capacity to cope with
stress independently of professional intervention, but also produced lowered
expectations about the psychological resilience of others:
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when we had that stress thing, that was brilliant, and hopefully we're going
to go and do afew more on that. So that's helping me as well, cos don't forget,
I'm your ordinary Joe Bloggs, I've got all the stress and problems, you know
what I mean? I know that can't go away over night, but it's great to have done
that, because for all the stress that I've had, I've never had the bottle to go and
see my doctor and say I'm stressed out and I want some help. So I want to get
all them things, and plus to help me understand things a little bit more and
understand people a little bit more, cos I'm a very impatient person. [...] I
haven't got a lot of time for what I would call a weak person. I may be wrong
in labelling them weak. But when I see somebody who for instance, is
continuously drinking, because I've lived amongst that, I know the problems of
it, I've got no time for 'em. It may be wrong, but I think to myself 'no you don't
need a drink', I don't think it solves the problem. So I'm a bit impatient. I
look a bit hard in that way and I think I'm a buck yourself up.. you know, cos I
think about what I've gone through and I've survived and I've not needed a
Drop-in, do you know what I mean? We're not all the same, so I've got to
learn to understand that, that we're all different, we've all got different
personalities, breaking points.
(Volunteer, December 1993)
Superficially it might be concluded that recognition of her own psychological needs
and the development of a more sympathetic approach to the needs of others, was a
valuable lesson for the volunteer quoted above, perhaps even a form of empowerment.
But, the opposite can also be argued. Rather than thinking of herself as an emotionally
competent individual, capable of managing her own mental life in the face of adverse
personal circumstances without resort to either medical or welfare professionals, the
volunteer quoted above came to think of herself as a victim of stress who had been
'empowered' to seek professional help. Where she previously had high expectations
of the behaviour and mental resilience of others, for example, dismissing drunkards as
'weak', she now 'understands' that such behaviour is only evidence of personality
differences. The net result is a lowered expectation both of her own competence and
the behaviour of others; drunkenness and the inability to cope are no longer viewed as
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individual weakness, but are valorised as a normal response to hardship. Rather than
congratulating herself on her earlier strength of character in coping with hardships that
had led others to drink, she upbraids herself for her insensitivity and lack of
understanding. This represents a bizarre reversal where independence and mental
competence become symbols of weakness, and the inability to cope without
professional care becomes an emblem of self-knowledge.
WHAP did little to empower the Drop-in users, beyond offering short-term relief from
social isolation and depression. Rather than developing critical consciousness and the
self-possession required for emancipatory activity, the Drop-in users were duped into
entering a subordinate relationship to welfarist frames of reference and the exercise of
professional power.
Community empowerment
When the survey had been completed and WHAP had presented the findings to
various statutory agencies, the project increasingly focused on the development of the
Drop-in centre and the professionalisation of the volunteers. However, several of the
professionals felt that WHAP was failing to address the original agenda of enabling
local people to have greater control over the social, economic and environmental
influences on health. The following quotation reflects a widely held view:
the Drop-ins are a natural and obvious way for the women to develop
WHAP, because they're working with people that they can talk to, that they
know, [...] they can make them feel better, they can feel that they're being
valuable on a day to day basis, they can feel that they're providing much
needed social support, and it's not challenging for them to do that. It would be
challenging for them to have to take on a big bureaucracy, but they've avoided
that. I mean in a sense, self-help, I'm not saying its not necessary, because it
is, as I said earlier on, but it's not sufficient in itself to get things changed and
I think it's diverted them into something which they feel comfortable and easy
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with, and it's diverted them away from challenging an authority that they don't
understand, and have not really been empowered to understand
(Professional, November 1993)
The desire to go beyond the constraints of the self-help model may have been widely
held, at least amongst the professionals, but there was little awareness of what an
alternative strategy might entail. Again, this may have reflected the failure to produce
an emancipatory body of knowledge, coupled with the fact that the professionals'
relationship to the state ruled out the development of overtly political forms of
organisation. In chapter four we noted that the professionals involved in WHAP failed
to 'step outside' of welfarist frames of reference, or, relinquish their professional
identity, and that, therefore, the problems facing WHAP tended to be articulated and
addressed within the parameters of these ideological structures. Perhaps for these
reasons the aspiration of empowering the community also tended to be articulated in a
form that could be legitimately incorporated within a professional role. Two themes
stand out: 'giving a voice to local people' and 'community participation in the
decision-making process of local statutory agencies'.
• Giving a voice to local people
In chapter three we examined the communicative model of knowledge and action that
was felt to underpin WHAP's original agenda, particularly prior to and during the
attitudes to health survey. The main assumption of the model was that statutory
agencies were unresponsive to the needs of the local population, and that this problem
could be resolved by enabling the community to identify and articulate its health
needs. Giving local people a voice was, therefore, a key objective of the project from
the beginning:
we were going to find out what people were feeling within the community,
and difficulties they were having related to their health, and the effects they
had, and actually going ahead and doing.. giving them a voice. That's what
298
WHAP to me was about - giving people the power... and doing something
about.. what would they like to see, and making the link for them.
(Professional, January 1994)
Despite the pre-occupation with the Drop-in, the broader objective of giving people a
voice was still subscribed to later in the project, as the following comment from one of
the volunteers indicates:
Well at first I didn't really know what it was all about. I just knew it was a
Drop-in. You could sit and talk, have a cup of tea, a massage and a facial.
But sort of being there week after week, and helping out and coming to the
meetings, I understand it's like voices, it's doing something for the community.
And it gives people a chance to open their mouths, speak their mind, in public,
with the higher people.
(Volunteer, November 1993)
As with the other aspects of empowerment, giving local people a voice was felt to
depend upon equipping the volunteers with the type of skills that many of the
professionals already had:
I would like through the infrastructure of the organisation various skills and
resources being available to residents that can be used to lobby, for example,
video making skills, public speaking skills, debating skills, publicity skills,
media skills, that there could be again a repertoire of those resources that
residents can call on when they wish to make some sort of lobbying debate or
argument about a particular issue, and I think that that's got infinite potential.
(Professional, November 1993)
Equipping local people with better communication skills may be a desirable objective,
but again it does not in itself constitute empowerment, because the ability to express
one's needs does not confer the power to ensure that they are met. Nor did WHAP see
the acquisition of such skills as the basis for organising the population into an
effective force capable of taking such power - the aim was not to create competent
activists, but more articulate supplicants to the statutory agencies. As the following
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but through other means, they're not entirely successful and I think we're quite
a long way [from] where residents can actually make an effective contribution,
and that's not because of the residents, I think it's because of the resistance
from the statutory agencies. You know it's what you would call tokenism
(Professional, November 1993)
The suspicion that statutory agencies would be reluctant to act upon the advice given
by community participants was borne out by the practical experiences of one of the
volunteers who via WHAP had become involved with two local decision making
bodies. As the following quotation indicates the volunteer was pessimistic about the
chances of achieving change by such means:
being in WHAP there's opportunities of being on different boards, and I
think that by being on them boards you are able to voice your opinion, in a
strong positive way, that should be listened to. [...] Thamesmead Race
Equality Forum, and Bexley Council for Race Equality, which I enjoy being
on, because it's issues that is dear to my heart.... and I've got the opportunity
to say what Ifeel, for the community, even though no one's asking me to, but
I'm hoping that they'll see things in a different light, because I've never done
this before, but when I went to the first meeting of TREE, it was like Police,
Council officials, blah, blah, and them sitting 'round a table making decisions
which had no result at the end. And they're not even looking on the people on
Thamesmead or involving them or nothing. Well how can they sit and make a
decision about something, and you're not even inviting the people to say their
part? So I spoke up about that, and they said that they're going to let the
public come in for half an hour before their meetings, to say what they want to
say, but its if they put it into practice. Because they always put everything
down in the minutes, and when it comes back to the next meeting, nothing was
done
(Volunteer, June 1994)
Despite widespread scepticism about the likely outcome of community participation in
statutory sector decision making, WHAP continued to identify and pursue community
issues that were appropriate to this strategy. We have already noted the persistence of
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welfarist frames of reference and the ways in which they structured WHAP's internal
affairs. The same process can also be identified in the community campaigns
organised by WHAP. For instance, in the incident described below WHAP volunteers
were sensitised to an 'appropriate' issue as a result of their participation in a training
day. From this a campaign was developed by the volunteers to influence the Local
Authority; a strategy that was welcomed by the organisers of the training day:
a couple of the volunteer workers went to a training day on accident
prevention and were quite impressed by it. And one of the things they came
out with was the dangerous state of playgrounds in the Thamesmead area. [...]
the voluntary workers in discussion with the people who'd undertaken the
training realised that one of the things they could do would be to campaign
publicly about the dangers on those playgrounds. [..j they were talking in
terms of writing to the newspaper, taking a video of the playgrounds and
showing it at public meetings, and that sort of thing, and [...] applying public
pressure to the Local Authorily to get them to change the playgrounds. And
they were advised by the people who organised the training session that there
was every chance that that would be successful.
(Professional, November 1993)
It is important to note the way in which the volunteers' involvement in a health
promotion training day stimulated an issue, and a means of addressing it, that were
contained within the strategy of community participation. The acceptance by the
volunteers that they should acquire professional skills and professional training served
to limit the agenda for action to issues and strategies that were appropriate for
negotiation with the local state. This emphasis on going through the 'proper' channels
in order to win minor concessions from the statutory agencies is indicated by the
professional quoted above, in reference to the same issue:
I think if they went to the Local Authority and said look we're local
residents, we've got a legitimate grievance, that they wouldn't have to push
that hard, they could influence the Local Authority to change those
playgrounds, without having to mount a sort of populist mass campaign, [...]
they could be effective in lobbying Councillors for example. Going through
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the establishment machinery, I think they would get somewhere. And saving
the threat of a campaign if that didn't work. But they don't have the
knowledge, the sophistication, to think through the ways that they're going to
play it. Their immediate response was 'we'll get a campaign going on this and
we'll show 'em' (laughter).
(Professional, November 1993)
Not only is the importance of using the 'establishment machinery' reiterated, but the
desire to step outside of the community participation perspective and adopt a more
adversarial approach is dismissed as a lack of sophistication on the part of the
volunteers. It is as if the only viable strategy for achieving change at the community
level is to seek the intervention of the local statutory agencies, even though, as we
noted above, many WHAP members were pessimistic about the likely outcome of
such a strategy.
The strategy of seeking to empower the local community by embroiling its
representatives in the decision making processes of statutory agencies is not only
contradictory because the achievement of worthwhile gains is so unlikely, but also
because it may lead to an extension of repressive state intervention in the community.
For example, the attitudes to health survey raised a number of concerns about public
safety and the fear of crime, and it was suggested by the professional quoted below,
that such concerns might form the basis of a community campaign to increase the
level of surveillance and policing by the state:
I think there is a general fear for safety in parts of that area, and a
community based campaign that addressed that would be popularly supported.
[...] I was impressed by a woman I work with who told me, I think it's by the
boiler house in Thamesmead, something like four deaths occurred, and road
accidents occurred, within a year and a half And a community based
campaign to put pressure on the council and say should there be a couple of
crossings or a bridge would be good. So 1 think that sort of thing, safety and
anti-crime, and that would possibly mean links with the Police, actually
forming an alliance with some of those local beat coppers, and the groups
they're involved in - Neighbourhood Watch for example, I think that might
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yield some good things, even though as a professional I have some misgivings
about which other professionals I sit down with. [...] from your survey, there
were fears about crime, drug-taking, and no one, including the police, or
maybe especially the police, seemed to be doing anything about it. And I think
that's got great scope for community action, and WHAP might want to
consider how it can look at that.
(Professional, February 1994)
This is one of the problems of using the 'establishment machinery'- genuine
concessions are unlikely to be forthcoming, unless the use of 'proper channels' is
backed up by some external means of enforcing the community's demands; but in the
absence of such external pressure, the only successful demands are likely to be those
which comply with the state's own agenda of cost containment, the material and
ideological reproduction of labour power, and crucially, the maintenance of social
order by extending surveillance and regulation of working class communities (see
chapter three for a more detailed account of the role of the state under capitalism.. But
why was it that, despite their reservations about the likely outcome, the WHAP
professionals continued to advocate community participation in statutory sector
decision making as a means of achieving community empowerment? One possible
explanation is that the possibility of achieving progressive change by any other means
was felt to be even more remote.
• Low expectations of the capacity for achieving change
WHAP began with high aspirations for change, more specifically, it was hoped that
the project would enable local people to obtain greater control over the social,
economic and environmental factors that influenced their health. However, ideas
about how this change would be brought about were initially vague, perhaps even
naïve. When the findings of the survey failed to provoke action from either the
statutory agencies or the local population, it became apparent that WHAP's original
objectives were unlikely to be met. Rather than seeking alternative forms of action
many of the professionals involved in WHAP resigned themselves to the fact that
structural change was beyond their reach:
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Well there's no way that we've done anything about people's poor housing,
there's no way we've done anything about pollution, there's no way we can do
anything about that. You know, we can't do anything about that. We can't
change the system that's out there..
DW - WHY NOT?
Well you know because a small group of people's actually going to get good
housing?, a small group of people's actually going to change the pollution
levels?
(Professional, November 1993)
As the above quotation suggests, the small scale of the project was perceived to be one
cause of its political impotence; although this begs the question of why a broader,
population based strategy was not pursued. The point is that localism lies at the heart
of community action. From the outset WHAP was determined to find local solutions
to community health problems, indeed, the project's modus operandi was based on a
micro-analysis of local people's needs and concerns, and no attempt to broaden this
out either in terms of social critique, or, political organisation was ever seriously
considered. Although some of the more radical professionals expressed the need for a
broader political campaign to complement the localist perspective:
you actually get into some very wide political questions, you know like, 'we
cannot have good health until we abolish capitalism' type arguments, which
may well be something that we believe, but are we going to, therefore, ignore
the very immediate health needs of people - 'I'm sorry I'm not going to operate
on you because I'm going to my revolutionary meeting'. You know there are
certain issues there that are unattainable, and I.. I don't have an answer for
that I'm afraid. I think one has to do both. I think you need to move, you must
take local action, you must address short term issues, but there should also be
space to consider long term implications and how one influences public policy,
to help that along. And part of that public policy is that you want ownership of
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that process by people, so you want them to have a greater knowledge and
awareness of the things that influence their health...
(Professional, February 1994)
Although the professional quoted above is reluctant to relinquish the possibility of a
broader emancipatory project, it is conceded that this may be 'unattainable', or at least
that it should not take preference over more pressing local issues. It is important to
note that the desire to 'do both' remains an aspiration rather than an actual activity.
The belief that local empowerment initiatives might lead into a broader emancipatory
struggle is a common theme in the literature on empowerment, but as we shall see in
the discussion section below there are several factors that make this an extremely
unlikely prospect in the current conjuncture. WHAP's adoption of such a short-term
localist approach, is perhaps only explicable in the context of broader historical and
political factors. In many senses the project itself can be seen as a response to the
deciine of tradtiona) forms of political activity, like the labour and trade union
movement. That WHA2 chose to pstxe its objectives at a local level, reflects the
a^isence of a viable political force capable of furthering those objectives at a national
or international level. Lobbying the local statutory agencies for a few meagre
concessions was felt to be the only viable form of 'political' activity, and even here the
tpe Io'r change was perceived to be small:
I was thrilled [...] to hear that Galleon's Reach, which is a fundholding
practice, had an arrangement with Thamesmead Pools so that if they had one
of their patients come in suffering from stress, they wouldn't automatically
reach for the prescription pad, they would give them free, for I think it was
three months, swims once a week, then having established the habit they're
likely to continue after the three months. If that is a cheaper way than putting
them on drugs, [ifi it actually has a way of making them healthier, as well as
reducing their stress, I think that's wondeiful. And to say that we ought to not




'clients' in need of social support and quasi-professional care. WHAP's informal
ambience may have reduced the cultural dissonance between the Drop-in users and
welfare professionals, but the failure to step outside of welfarist frames of reference
and the broad parameters of the professional role, meant that the encounter only served
to bring a previously reluctant and largely inaccessible section of the community
within the purview of professional surveillance and regulation.
Finally, as a means of empowering the community, WHAP achieved very little. The
survey of attitudes to health identified a number of issues, but the failure to develop a
critical analysis from the findings, coupled with the inability to adequately engage the
population, meant that the knowledge produced was not a basis for critical
consciousness or emancipatory activity. Instead WHAP directed its activities towards
the statutory agencies, embroiling some of the volunteers in fruitless participatory
exercises and reinforcing the belief that the pursuit of small incremental concessions
from the local state was the only viable form of political activity.
Discussion
Amongst the articles and books that comprise the literature on empowerment, a
common opening lament is that the category is applied promiscuously, without due
regard for theoretical exposition or clarity of definition. A concern that is often
followed by a promise to remedy the deficiency by presenting the definitive theory of
empowerment - as if the diverse range of professionals, academics and volunteers who
claim to practice empowerment would thereafter confine themselves to the usage laid
down in the theoretical framework. Unfortunately, the proponents of empowerment
have spumed the theoreticians' exhortations and the field remains diverse and
fragmented.
Given such intransigence, a more modest goal is pursued here. Rather than
expounding another general theory of empowerment a distinct strand is identified
within the broader field, by reference to a shared series of characteristics, or more
precisely, social relations. Conclusions from the subsequent analysis cannot,
therefore, be automatically generalised to all phenomena to which the empowerment
308
label has been applied, but only to those that share the same series of social relations.
This may be inconvenient, but it is perhaps the most robust way to proceed.
Of course, it might be argued that the critical social research methodology employed
here is nothing more than Marxism, and that as such it is based upon assumptions that
really do comprise a grand theory of empowerment. However, there are two problems
with this line of argument. First, it can only be sustained by conflating the
methodology of critical social research, (or more specifically, historical materialism,
admittedly developed and employed by Marx), with the historically specific political
conclusions drawn by Marx and his followers as a result of applying that
methodology. Secondly, it confuses the object of study, in this case 'empowerment',
with the method of studying it, i.e. critical social research. We have already noted (in
chapter 3) Marx's hostility to those who ignored the necessity of specific empirical
enquiry and converted his approach into a 'master key a general historico-
philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being supra-historical'
(Marx, 1877, p.5'7l). Thus, in order to be valid it is not only desirable but essential
that a critical appraisal of empowerment is based upon the type of methodology
outlined in chapter three rather than on a dogmatic imposition of a 'Marxist' political
programme. It is precisely the need for specific empirical enquiry that necessitates the
rejection of the general theories of empowerment alluded to above. Empowerment is
a very vague and amorphous category, varying over time and place; the intention here
is to empirically derive a specific form of empowerment in order to assess its
emancipatory potential, rather than developing a generally applicable Marxist theory
of empowerment based on the emancipation of the working class.
• Unpacking empowerment
Empowerment has been described as both a process and an outcome, but it can more
profitably be conceptualised as a set of social relations, or more specifically, as a
mythical way of conceptualising a set of social relations. It is the central contention of
this thesis that empowerment is a mythical way of conceptualising the social relations
that prevail between the state, welfare professionals, and members of the community.
Put simply the myth of empowerment is that welfare professionals can use the
resources at their disposal to enable people to gain greater control over their lives. In
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fact, as we have argued above, the emancipatory claims of empowerment only serve
to mask a process that increases the individual's subordination to the state, by
extending surveillance and regulation, and by engendering the development of an
oppressive self-identity.
It is a characteristic of myths that their proponents often believe them to be true, and
that is the case here. Thus, the welfare professionals engaged in empowerment do not
think of themselves primarily as agents of social control, but rather as radical political
activists striving to emancipate the oppressed. The key point is that the ideology of
empowerment enables them to adopt this self-identity in good faith. Rather than a
conscious act of deceit practised by welfare professionals on their gullible clients,
empowerment is a process of mutual delusion, determined by the location of both
parties within a materially and ideologically structured set of social relations.
The character of the state, and the role of the welfare professional within it, were
examined at length in the previous chapter. Here we begin from the other end, looking
at the claims of empowerment and the political theory that underpins them, before
returning to the structural processes that both engender and negate such claims.
A central claim made for empowerment is that it enables people to obtain greater
control over their lives, and emancipate themselves from oppression, thus Wallerstein
defines empowerment as:
a social action process that promotes participation of people,
organ isations, and communities in gaining control over their lives in their
community and larger society. (Wallerstein, 1988, pL38O)
Empowerment is seen as a way of equipping the individual, or group, with the skills
and competence required to bring about emancipatory social change. It is worth
examining the assumptions that underpin this claim. First, it is implied that prior to
the empowerment process, the individual is unable to take social action because of
some personal deficiency. Secondly, that empowerment will lead to emancipatory
social change. And finally, although not referred to directly, there is an implied role
for an 'empowerer' who equips the individual with the skills and competence to bring
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about change. As we shall see below, the role of empowerer often falls to the welfare
professional, who uses the resources at his/her disposal to empower a 'client'.
Although a distinction can be drawn between individual/psychological empowerment,
and the broader process of community action, it is important to note that the two
aspects are seen as essential elements of emancipatory social change:
Community empowerment includes a raised level of psychological
empowerment amongst its members, a political action component in which
members have actively participated, and the achievement of some
redistribution of resources or decision-making favourable to the community or
group in question. (Rissel, 1994, p.41.)
The discourse of empowerment posits a relationship between two subjects: the
impaired individual and the welfare professional. The concept of individual
impairment is applied very loosely in the literature on empowerment and is often
theoretically confused or combined with powerlessness. For example, Bryant-
Soloman defines powerlessness as:
the inability to manage emotion, skills, knowledge and/or material
resources in a way that effective performance of valued social roles will lead
to personal gratification. (Bryant-Soloman, 1976, p.1 6)
The equation of impairment with powerlessness, means that a very broad and diverse
range of people can be included as legitimate targets of empowerment, for example:
the clients of community care, such as, the physically disabled, the mentally ill, people
with learning difficulties, and elderly people, (Stevenson & Parsloe, 1993), as well as
oppressed or marginalised groups, such as, women, blacks, adolescents, and the poor.
The important thing to note is that from the perspective of empowerment, individual
impairment and powerlessness become closely linked. Whilst individual impairment
becomes politicised by this putative association, by the same token powerlessness
becomes a form of impairment warranting the intervention of the welfare professional.
It could be argued, with some validity, that the equation of powerlessness with
impairment depoliticises emancipatory struggle by focusing on the deficiencies of the
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individual rather than the structural basis of powerlessness. However, this is an
unsatisfactory critique; rather than ignoring structural factors, the discourse of
empowerment ascribes them a key explanatory role both in the impairment of the
individual and as obstacles to emancipatory practice. The claim made by
empowerment is that the individual's everyday experience of oppressive social and
economic circumstances robs him/her of the subjective capacity to engage in
emancipatory social action. Thus, the emphasis on changing the consciousness of the
individual is presented as an essential pre-requisite of a broader challenge to the
structural basis of powerlessness. This is a valid and logical argument; if the
consciousness of the powerless individual does not derive from experience of
oppressive social and economic conditions then where does it come from? And, is a
radical challenge to oppressive social relations viable without developing critical
consciousness amongst the agents of social change? In fact, the advocates of
empowerment are correct when they note the relationship between individual
consciousness and broader political struggle, and in the current conjuncture their
decision to focus on the former is more than justifiable, but only if their claim that it
will eventually lead to broader structural change can be supported.
Many theorists and practitioners of empowerment describe it as a linear model of three
or four stages, which include: the development of personal competence, group-work
and consciousness raising, and collective social action (Kieffer 1984, Swift & Levin
1987). It is claimed that the individual will proceed through the different stages of the
model, and in so doing be transformed from an impaired client into an autonomous
political actor. Referring specifically to health related initiatives Rissel (1994), after
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The proponents of an empowerment continuum point out that progress through the
various stages may not be sequential, for instance an initiative may begin as a mutual
support group, but then regress to personal development work before conducting
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community campaigns. Even so, the assumption is that all the points on the
continuum are viable within the empowerment framework, and that the process is
generally emancipatory. One criticism might be that empowerment initiatives are
skewed towards the personal development/mutual support end of the continuum; that
the model has no detailed proposals for effective political organisation and radical
social action, for example, Page hints at this when he suggests that:
The tangible achievements of this technique may turn out to be extremely
modest unless some attempt is made to translate the diverse perspectives of the
groups concerned into realisable demands of a more unified kind. Without
such a strategy it is likely that social work techniques of this kind may prove to
be more beneficial to facilitators and educators who wish to cling on to the
vestiges of a personally rewarding form of 'radical' practice rather than to
those disadvantaged members of the community for whom the promise of a
better tomorrow appears to be as far away as ever. (Page, 1992, p.2)
Page is very much to the point when he suggests that empowerment is a means by
which welfare professionals can delude themselves that their work is radical or
progressive, however, the broader complaint that empowerment lacks a detailed
strategy for change is an unfair criticism. Whilst progressive social change depends
upon moving from the development of critical consciousness in the individual to the
creation of effective forms of political organisation and a radical agenda for action,
this transition cannot be planned in advance and then imposed on the potential agents
of change. The advocates of empowerment are correct in realising that a radical
agenda and effective organisational forms must be developed by the people
themselves in response to a specific set of circumstances - the welfare professionals
see their role as facilitating this development rather than imposing a pre-defined
programme.
The real problem with empowerment is not the tendency to focus on the individual,
nor is it the absence of a prescriptive strategy for social change, but rather the extent to
which the model is based upon mediation by welfare professionals, who as we saw in
the previous chapter, are essentially agents of the state, whether employed by it or not.
We shall see below, that the intervention of the state via the welfare professional
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effectively transforms empowerment from a form of emancipatory activity into a
means of social control: rather than developing critical consciousness through debate
and emancipatory activity, the individual becomes a 'case' or 'client' to be empowered
by the socio-psychological techniques of the welfare professional. Group-work and
'consciousness raising' become 'mutual-aid' or 'self-help', rather than the
development of effective political organisation. And social-action becomes
supplication to the state rather than an effective challenge to oppressive social and
economic relations. Rather than the absence of a political agenda, it is the
professional's location within welfarist frames of reference that blocks the path from
psychological empowerment to emancipatory social action, and gives the lie to claims
of an empowerment continuum. But this is to anticipate the conclusions of our
analysis. First, it is important to ask why the welfare professionals who advocate
empowerment are so convinced of its emancipatory potential. To understand this we
need to look at the political theory from which empowerment is derived.
• The politics of empowerment
The discourse of empowerment did not develop in an intellectual and ideological
vacuum; as well as being a response to the welfare professional's location within the
state, empowerment also reflects a specific set of 'radical' beliefs. Many of these
beliefs have a long history, and their antecedents can be found in the different modes
of empowerment examined in chapter one, (as well as in the discourse of post-
modernity discussed in the alternative reading section of chapter three). Essentially
the politics of empowerment is characterised by idealism and utopianism; rather than
addressing the material basis of domination, empowerment is primarily concerned
with the subjective aspects of inter-personal relations. This is reflected in a pluralistic
and micro-analytical understanding of the operation of power and oppression.
Again, it is important to note that the advocates of empowerment are a diverse group,
and their subjective political beliefs are presumably equally varied, however, here we
are concerned with the political theories and assumptions that logically inform the
practice of empowerment, and which necessarily possess greater unity. Importantly,
the political domain of empowerment is defined as 'civil society' rather than the
economy or the state, Friedmann defines civil society as:
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those associations beyond the reach of the state and corporate economy
which have the capacity for becoming autonomous centres for action.
(Friedmann, 1992, p.vii)
As we shall see, empowerment initiatives do not ignore the state or the economy, nor
are they uncritical of them as a basis for the exercise of power, but the primary unit of
oppositional organisation is perceived to be the local 'community group' if not the
individual household. This focus on civil society is accompanied by a pluralistic
theory of domination in which the exercise of economic and state power is ascribed a
minor role within a broader network of oppressive social relations:
British society is saturated in oppression ... An empowering social work
practice derived from such an understanding addresses itself to the
powerlessness and loss which results from the material and ideological
oppression of black people by white people; working class people by middle
class people; women by men; children and old people by 'adults'; disabled
people by 'able' people; and gay people by 'straight' people. This social work
practice recognises oppression not simply in the behaviours, values and
attitudes of individuals and groups, but in institutions, structures and common-
sense assumptions. (Mitchell, 1989, p.14).
The adoption of a pluralist model of domination not only broadens the number of
'victims', it also renders virtually everyone an oppressor. Ward and Mullender (1992)
point out that such a model rejects any notion of a hierarchy of oppression, instead all
forms of oppression are afforded equal priority. But such an approach targets all
forms of oppression and understands none of them - the subjective experience of
hardship is substituted for an understanding of the structural basis of power. Thus, the
disabled person's inability to get on a bus is elevated to the same explanatory weight
as society's inability to exercise rational control over the production and distribution
of goods and services under capitalism. Subjectively, for the individual concerned, the
former may be of greater importance, but the capacity to explain the nature of
exploitation and oppression is vastly different.
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The theory that power is equally immanent in all social relations has a number of
consequences for practical activity. First, it shifts the focus of emancipatory activity
from the structural basis of power to the superficial level of inter-personal relations;
rather than challenging the state-form or the capitalist mode of production,
emancipatory activity is transformed into the elusive ideal of mutual tolerance and
respect. Secondly, a pluralist conception of oppression tends to mystify the specific
nature of state-power; we shall see below that the advocates of empowerment are not
uncritical of the state, but they criticise it in the same way that they criticise civil
society, that is, as a domain in which inter-personal acts of oppression are committed,
rather than as a structural and ideological expression of the oppressive relationship
between capital and labour. Consequently, the state becomes just another place to
pursue non-oppressive inter-personal relations; it becomes something to be reformed
rather than overthrown.
A third consequence of the pluralist model of domination is that it enables the welfare
professional to pose as a champion of the oppressed, using the techniques of
empowerment to 'emancipate' them, whilst simultaneously discouraging oppressive
behaviour. According to the pluralist model, candidates for empowerment may also
be oppressors, for example Mullender and Ward describe, with thinly veiled contempt,
participants in an empowerment initiative called 'the Ainsley Teenage Action Group':
In terms of gender, the boys frequently dominated the girls through ridicule,
the loudness of their voices, and pushiness. Implicitly the boys believed they
had the right to behave in this way - that their interests prevailed over the
girls'. The boys also behaved in 'Macho' ways towards each other, using
humiliation to establish and maintain a pecking order. They would react to
the male workers not joining in with their views about women with mistrust
and accusations that they were 'homos'. Similar views existed amongst the
white members about race, although it seemed less acceptable to express these
openly. (Mullender and Ward, 1991, p.1 17)
As the above quotation implies, oppression is transformed from a structurally existent
social relation into a form of unacceptable personal conduct, akin to bad manners or
vulgarity, but rather more extreme. The role of the progressive welfare professional is
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to discourage such oppressive behaviour in the name of empowerment - a role
reminiscent of the parish priest, safeguarding the souls of his flock by discouraging
sinful behaviour. When the WHAP professional quoted in the previous chapter
offered to 'take the load off the volunteers, or the professionals, of deciding what is
and what isn't racist', she was performing just such a function. The need for the
empowering welfare professional to police the oppressive behaviour of his/her
'clients', throws up a contradiction that even the enthusiasts of empowerment can
spot. It stems from the second aspect of the politics of empowerment - the theory of
knowledge.
Like good post-modernists the advocates of empowerment recognise that knowledge is
power, and that the process of empowerment entails discarding the oppressive
knowledge of others in favour of one's personal truth (Hill-Collins, 1990). We saw in
chapter two that WHAP placed a great deal of importance on giving the local
community a voice, and enabling it to produce its own body of knowledge via the
attitudes to health survey. The more extreme advocates of empowerment suggest that
this 'self-knowledge' resides within the individual and that the empowerment process
enables it to emerge, for example, in her empirical study of women's attitudes to
empowerment Shields suggests that:
Intuition played a central role in the process of self-knowledge and self-truth
for the women in the study. They spoke of using their intuition more, trusting
it more, and using it differently. (Sheilds, 1995, p.25)
Not all advocates of empowerment adopt such an essentialist approach, but many
emphasise the oppressive nature of existing knowledge and the importance of
producing an alternative as part of the empowerment process. As the following
quotation suggests, this incitement to discourse stems from a subjectivist conception
of knowledge:
Epidemiological studies are useful and important, but direct practice must be
built on local knowledge, on the particular, on attention to difference and,
most vital, on multiple voices. (Hartman, 1992, p.484)
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As with the self-help model discussed in chapter one, the advocates of empowerment
prioritise the subjective experiences of the individual over scientific and 'official'
knowledge. Not only this, but the production of alternative truth claims is viewed as
an emancipatory act. The adoption of a subjectivist theory of knowledge also entails a
critique of the 'expertise' of welfare professionals, which again is reminiscent of the
self-help movement discussed in chapter one, for example Bernstein et al, (after
Rappaport, 1985), suggest that professional knowledge:
unwittingly encourages dependence on professionals, creates the view that
people are clients in need of help, may limit the discovery of indigenous
resources and reduces the likelihood of people helping each other. (Bernstein
et al, 1994, p.284)
This is the contradiction referred to above. The pluralistic model of domination, on
which empowerment practice is based, places the welfare professional in the position
of a referee responsible for ensuring that the infinitely fragmented series of interest
groups do not engage in oppressive behaviour. However, the subjectivist conception
of knowledge that accompanies the pluralist model of domination, brings into question
the knowledge base of professional practice. Put simply, how can the welfare
professional effectively counter oppression, if his/her professional expertise is
politically questionable, and if oppression itself can only be defined by the subjective
claims of the individual?
The advocates of empowerment extract themselves from the above dilemma by a piece
of deft theoretical footwork. First, there is recognition that professional knowledge is
embroiled in the exercise of power and domination, for example, Holmes and
Saleebey suggest that the relationship between welfare professional and client is based
upon the 'medical model' and that this places the client in a passive and subordinate
role:
The unspoken assumption of the medical model is that clienthood and
autonomous seljhood are mutually exclusive concepts, an idea which has far
reaching effects on clients, their families, and society as a whole. The
professional comes to 'own' the client, giving or withholding services
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according to how well the client plays the role of client in terms of dependence
and acquiescence. (Holmes and Saleebey, 1993, p.64)
At first glance Holmes and Saleebey's account appears similar to the discussion of
welfarist frames of reference presented in the last chapter, but closer inspection reveals
it to be less insightful. We noted that welfarist frames of reference are simultaneously
ideational and material, that is, they comprise both a set of ideas and a structural
apparatus - we gave the example of psychiatry, and noted that it exists both as a set of
ideas and as a material set of buildings, implements, pharmaceutical compounds,
therapeutic procedures, practices, roles and relationships. We went on to note that the
adoption of a professional self-identity necessitated a willingness to work within the
ideational and material confines of welfarist frames of reference, and that this was
reinforced by the managerial structure of control. However, Holmes and Saleebey
overlook the material existence of welfarist frames of reference, suggesting that the
ideational content is autonomous of structural constraints.
If welfarist frames of reference can be conceived of in purely ideational terms then the
oppressive aspects of professional knowledge can apparently be reformed without
having to address the state-form, or the professional's location within the state
apparatus; this is where the deft theoretical footwork comes in. Language is
considered to be a major factor here, for example Bernstein et al (1994) recommend
replacing oppressive terms such as 'client' and 'expert' with the more empowering
'participant' and 'collaborator'. Holmes and Saleebey elaborate on this theme,
suggesting that the adoption of a new lexicon will overcome the alienation between
professional and client:
consider how using the labels in the following descending order of
separateness might change the relationship between a helper and a client: (1)
patient, (2) client, (3) consumer, (4) customer, (5) partner, (6) neighbour, and,
(7) friend. Each label carries its own value-laden connotation, so that persons
wanting help can be located on such a scale according to their degree of
beloninR to the professional's world. Autonomy increases with
belongingness. (Holmes & Saleebey, 1993, pp.71-72)
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Unfortunately, as the study of WHAP indicates, the adoption of euphemistic phrases
cannot dilute the coercive powers conferred on the welfare professional by the state,
nor does it enable them to step outside of welfarist frames of reference. Changing the
lexicon of professional knowledge empowers the welfare recipient to the same degree
that consumption of a re-named 'plough-persons lunch' empowers a female diner.
The proposition is patently absurd, but the belief that the oppressive aspects of
professional practice can be conjured away by the adoption of an 'alternative model,'
or a handful of euphemistic nouns, is a convenient fiction for the advocates of
empowerment. In effect it transforms professional power from a structural
relationship into a moral choice on the part of the individual practitioner. Rather than
being an agent of state-power the welfare professional becomes an autonomous actor
able to freely choose whether or not to oppress or empower his/her clients. This
transformation serves a number of purposes. First, it enables the progressive welfare
professional to distance himlherself from colleagues who have not adopted
empowering forms of practice - 'they may have oppressed you, but I am different'.
Secondly, it allows the 'authentic' knowledge produced by the client to be
appropriated by the professional as a basis for future practice - 'my actions cannot be
oppressive because they are determined by the knowledge of the client'. Ward and
Mullender express the latter point when they suggest that:
The challenge to the white majority and particularly to white professionals is
to join the fight against racism without altering its terms. Only the black
experience of oppression can give the lead. (Ward and Mullender, 1992,
p.27.)
That welfare professionals have difficulty meeting this challenge was demonstrated in
the study of WHAP, where despite the best intentions of the professionals involved,
the problems encountered by the project were invariably incorporated within welfarist
frames of reference. Finally, the belief that professional knowledge can be purged of
its oppressive aspects, in favour of the experiential knowledge derived from clients,
implies that what remains of professional knowledge can be rehabilitated as
oppression free. Thus, Hartman concludes:
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Must we discard our knowledge, our accumulated professional wisdom? This
would leave us adrift without anchor or compass. We need not discard our
knowledge, but we must be open to local knowledge, to the narratives and
truths of our clients. (Hartman, 1992, p.484.)
We have seen that the adoption of a pluralistic model of domination enables the
welfare professional to pose as the arbiter of oppressive behaviour. However, the
pluralist model of domination necessarily entails a subjectivist approach to knowledge,
which gives primacy to the subjective experiences of the client and points to the
oppressive character of professional knowledge. This presents a contradiction for the
empowering professional that can only be resolved by conceptualising welfarist
frames of reference purely in terms of their ideational content, and overlooking their
material and structural basis. This allows the oppressive aspects of professional
knowledge to be discarded, and the subjective experiences of the client to be
appropriated into a seemingly emancipatory body of professional expertise. Deft
theoretical footwork indeed, but a problem still remains - how is the welfare
professional to respond if the subjective experiences of clients lead them to adopt
oppressive behaviour? This question cannot be answered without addressing the
fourth aspect of the politics of empowerment; its moral dimension.
That the work of welfare professionals is often legitimated by reference to 'core
values' or a moral code is hardly a novel insight, but the moral dimension of
empowerment takes a specific form that is worth examining more closely. As with
other aspects of the politics of empowerment the moral dimension is a product of
wider social and ideological forces as well as the specific relationships on which
empowerment is based. A key factor is the belief that power resides in immediate
inter-personal relationships, rather than in broader social relations like the state or the
economy. From this perspective emancipatory practice is transformed from a political
assault on oppressive structures, for instance the seizure of state power, or
socialisation of the means of production, into the moral regulation of personal
behaviour. There is a strong utopian flavour to the politics of empowerment, as if
emancipation only depends upon us learning mutual respect and tolerance. Mullender
and Ward illustrate the utopian tendency when they suggest that:
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Just as oppression is experienced through personal and everyday events so,
equally, an empowering practice can offer people the chance to try out and
experience new ways of being involved in those events at the everyday level.
This is the overall aim of our model of action. It looks to share power between
workers and participants and to challenge them both to use it non-
oppressively. Together they can construct tentative models for more human
forms of social relations which provide in microcosm what is ultimately
aspired to at the level of total society. (Mullender & Ward, 1991, p.6)
The strong emphasis on learning not to oppress each other means that the structural
relations of power go unchallenged, (at least in terms of practical activity). Moreover,
the adoption of a subjectivist conception of knowledge distorts the internal relations of
empowerment initiatives and hampers the development of critical consciousness.
Superficially, empowerment is concerned with 'giving a voice' to oppressed people,
but the belief that knowledge is essentially a personal affair means that genuinely
critical discussion is discouraged. Any critical engagement with the personal
testimony of a group member becomes an act of oppression. listead, group members
sit around exchanging personal anecdotes about the hardships they have encountered,
and the various accounts of the causes of that hardship, no matter how trite or banal,
are accorded equal 'respect' in terms of immunity from criticism (Repo, 1977). The
result is to stifle rational debate and limit the group's capacity to theorise the objective
nature of oppression. The injunction not to oppress others places sharp constraints on
personal testimony, for example, prejudiced or discriminatory views are considered
taboo, as Mullender & Ward point out:
The result will be that some potential answers to 'how' [questions] are
favoured over others. Thus we do not accept solutions which empower one
group at the expense of the oppression of another, as is alleged in some
community work practice with working class white people. (Mullender &
Ward, l99l,p.lO4)
When Ward and Mullender write that ' do not accept...' it is important to note that
the personal pronoun refers to welfare professionals, who according to the theory of
empowerment, are posited as the arbiters of oppressive behaviour - in effect: you (the
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oppressed) can say anything you want as long as it is not oppressive, but we (the
welfare professionals) will decide what is and is not oppressive. It is this assumed
sovereignty that comprises the core of empowerment. The welfare professional
engaged in empowerment is assumed to possess the anti-oppressive values, that their
clients (and traditional welfare professionals) cannot be trusted to have, because such
values are deemed to be deeply embedded in the philosophy and techniques of
empowerment, which are perceived to be accessible only to like minded professionals
or quasi-professionals.
Paradoxically, the transformation of anti-oppressive values into a set of technical
skills, re-instates the welfare professional in a position of ascendancy over his/her
clients. Empowerment may be critical of professional knowledge, it may prioritise the
subjective experiences of the client, but the empowering professional always has the
trump-card of anti-oppressive values to bolster his/her authority and ensure that clients
toe-the-line. Although articulated in technical terms, the primacy ascribed to anti-
oppressive values is essentially based on the assumption that inter-personal relations
amongst the masses need to be regulated by middle-class morality. The assumption is
that the various strata and sub-sets of the working classes are incapable of
autonomously regulating their inter-personal relations, instead the welfare professional
must intervene to stamp out oppressive behaviour. There is then, a strong moral
imperative for the client to submit to empowerment, and for the welfare professional
to do the empowering (Baistow, 1994).
In summary, the political theory that underpins empowerment comprises four
interwoven elements: a pluralistic and micro-analytical understanding of oppression, a
subjectivist approach to knowledge, a purely ideational understanding of welfarist
frames of reference, and a moral imperative towards the regulation of working class
life by external agents. In combination these themes mystify the social relations that
prevail between the state, the welfare professional, and the client - they conceal the
exercise of state-power behind a radical mask, enabling the welfare professional to
adopt a progressive self-identity, and to genuinely believe that clients are being
emancipated from oppression, when in reality they are only being more thoroughly
subordinated to state-power. The following section looks more closely at what lies
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beneath the radical appearance of empowerment, in terms of the effects it has on the
consciousness and autonomy of the 'empowered'.
U Empowerment and the new authoritarianism
The previous section demonstrated the way in which the ideology of empowerment
enables agents of the state to adopt a professional self-identity based on emancipatory
practical activity. It was concluded that this self-identity is nothing more than a mask
for the continued exercise of state-power and domination. Here we look more closely
at what lies behind the mask, at the practical activity of empowerment and the effects
it has on the consciousness and autonomy of the 'empowered'. It is concluded that
although empowerment serves to perpetuate an existing relationship of dominance
between the state, welfare professional and client, it achieves this in an innovative and
more effective way, by embracing a new form of authoritarianism. First, it is
important to explain what is meant by the 'new authoritarianism'.
The concept of authoritarianism has a long, if heterogeneous, history in the social
sciences. In the 1930s Wilhelm Reich employed the term to account for the mass
appeal of fascism in Germany. According to Reich (1933), it was the strongly
patriarchal character of the family under German capitalism, which led to sexual
repression, and in turn to the development of an authoritarian personality. This
authoritarianism was expressed not simply as conservatism or passive submission, but
as active support for authoritarian rule. After the 1930s Reich's intellectual project
lapsed into mysticism, and the credibility of his early work declined along with that of
its author. However, the concept of authoritarianism was taken up by Reich's
colleagues at the Frankfurt Institute, particularly by the 'Berkley Group' of émigrés to
the United States, including: Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford.
A key text in this tradition is Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom, (1941). Like
Reich, Fromm attempted to synthesise a broadly Marxist analysis with insights drawn
from Freudian psychoanalysis. Again, the family is viewed as the means by which
society moulds the 'character' of the individual, but Fromm's emphasis lies more on
inter-personal relations than on the project of political transformation.
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This shift of emphasis is even more pronounced in: The Authoritarian Personality,
(Adorno et al, 1950). Here, fostered by the context of growing cold-war anti-
communism, authoritarianism is transformed from a Marxist-Freudian critique of
fascism, into a liberal account of the psychological characteristics of a right-wing
personality type, to be calibrated and measured using the ubiquitous 'F-Scale', which
was employed in countless empirical follow-up studies until the late 1960s. Not only
did this psychologisation of authoritarianism rob the category of its historical and
political specificity, it also stimulated immediate and convincing criticism, (Shils
1954, Eysenck 1954). First, it was argued that the theory conveniently overlooked
the left-wing authoritarianism of the Stalinists, by focusing exclusively on ideological
themes which appealed to right-wingers, and over-looking the equally authoritarian,
but qualitatively different, beliefs of the 'Communists'. Secondly, criticism came
from empiricists who argued that because the F-Scale comprised a series of right-wing
statements which respondents were asked to either agree or disagree with, it therefore
only measured people's willingness to agree.
Samelson has pointed out the extent to which the concept of authoritarianism has been
transformed and in effect robbed of its critical content:
The movement of the nuclear idea proceeded from the far left, in the
revolutionary and 'extreme 'formulation by a Communist- Freudian activist, to
the milder Marxist-Socialist, and incipiently empirical, versions of Fromm and
the institute, on to the liberal American social-scientists at Berkley and their
epigoni, to end up eventually in the neo-conservative camp and in the value-
free empirical data-crunching of the late 1950s. Retreating from broad theory
and increasingly encapsulated, research interests moved from the events of the
outside world toward laboratory-generated problems, a process justified as
the way of true science. Yet although the approach became progressively less
politically 'engaged', as well as more 'empirical', it would be hard to argue
that this improvement in the objectivity of methods succeeded in solving the
problem, instead it defined the problem away. (Samelson, 1986, p.p. 203-4)
To the extent that the concept of authoritarianism has survived the late 1960's it has
done so largely in the hands of right-wing commentators. Interestingly, this has often
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entailed a shift away from the psychological perspective towards consideration of the
ways in which 'totalitarian' regimes exercise domination. Many such accounts are
ahistorical and reductionist, for example, suggesting that fascism and Stalinism are
essentially the same phenomenon. A more comparative version of this approach is
adopted by Perimutter (1981), who examines the differences as well as the similarities
in the mechanisms employed by different authoritarian regimes. However, the
assumption is still that authoritarianism is a phenomenon that resides exclusively
outside Western democracy; rather it is to be found amongst fascist and communist
regimes, and in developing countries, "practically all of which are authoritarian
states"(Perlmutter, 1981, p.xii).
The belief that authoritarianism was not a problem faced by western democracies may
have had some currency in the period between the mid 1960s and the late 1980s when
first the 'hippy' counter-culture, and then the free-market libertarians (at least
rhetorically), argued for the freedom of the individual and curtailment of the state's
power to intervene in everyday life. However, times change, and more recently the
dominant theme of political discourse in British society has not been to limit state
intervention in everyday life, but to call for ever greater surveillance and regulation of
inter-personal relations.
The monetarist economics and individualistic social policies pursued by Government
over the last twenty have undermined collective institutions and social cohesion to
such a degree that solidarity and trust have been replaced by a widespread, and often
grossly exaggerated, fear of others, and to calls for state intervention to regulate bad
behaviour, promote public safety, and reduce personal risk. Child protection, crime
prevention, equal opportunities, CCTV surveillance cameras, paedophile registers,
censorship, anti-harassment policies, and gun control, are all based on the assumption
that we are at extreme risk from each other, and that this risk can only be ameliorated
by the imposition of authoritarian measures either by the state or employers. As Hume
has noted, calls for greater social regulation are no longer confined to the middle-
classes:
What distinguishes this new authoritarianism most clearly from old forms of
overt social control is that it is not seen as a problem. Indeed the new
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cautiously. However, the WHAP case-study took place against the backdrop of this
emerging phenomenon, and the ethnographic data presented above suggest that the
regulation of inter-personal relationships by welfare professionals was a key theme. It
is, therefore, appropriate to consider the extent to which community empowerment
projects like WHAP can become a forum for the new authoritarianism. It was noted
above, that the empowerment process could be conceptualised as a continuum with
three key points on it: psychological empowerment, group wok/consciousness raising,
and social action. We will argue that each of these levels of practice is shot through
with elements of the new authoritarianism, that this denies the possibility of
emancipatory practice, and creates an internalised culture of victimhood and self-
limitation.
Psychological empowerment starts from the assumption that people are
psychologically damaged by their experiences of hardship and oppression, and that
this impedes their capacity to act. Barber (1995) describes this as 'learned
helplessness'; a process by which people who are denied control over their lives lose
faith in their ability to bring about change. Barber's argument is derived from a
psychological experiment in which dogs were chained to a platform and administered
an electric shock each time a light was lit. It was assumed that when the dogs were
unharnessed they would have learned to associate the light with the electric-shock, and
would, therefore, leave the platform whenever the light came on, even if a shock was
not administered. However, when the dogs were unharnessed the experimenters found
that they failed to leave the platform, even if a shock was administered; it was
concluded that the dogs had learned that they were powerless to escape
Barber argues that humans exhibit similar behaviour when confronted by adverse
social experiences, and suggests that social workers can counter this learned
helplessness by enabling clients to exercise control over some aspects of their lives, so
that they re-learn the relationship between their actions and valued outcomes:
the helpless client must be exposed to as many controllable events as is•
possible, thus helping the client to understand that some valued outcomes can
be attained and some negative ones avoided. (Barber, 1995, p.32).
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But there is a flaw in Barber's logic. The dog experiment is remarkable because it
shows the dog's reluctance to move after the restraining harness has been removed;
while the dog remains harnessed it's recognition that it is helpless is astute rather than
pathological. In the real world the external constraints that render the client powerless
cannot be so easily removed, so the empowering welfare professional is obliged to
engineer artificial situations where the client can 'play' at exercising control, in order
to raise the individual's self-esteem and sense of potency.
In WHAP this process entailed setting up the Drop-in centre and enabling the
volunteers to 'play-act' the role of quasi-professional. In other projects even more
mundane activities have been used to raise the clients' self-esteem, for example, a
participant in the Ainsley Teenage Action Group, (referred to above), notes that: 'We
organised ajumble-sale to gain our respect back' (Mullender & Ward, 1991, p.114).
It is easy to scoff at such 'emancipatory' activities, and in fairness they do appear to
confer an improvement in the participants' self-esteem, even if this is perhaps ill-
founded and transitory. But the point is that this type of psychological empowerment
does nothing to loosen the social and economic constraints that render people
genuinely 'helpless'. Moreover, the application of psychological techniques to the
process of empowerment gives the impression of value neutrality, that is, that the
client is simply enabled to identify personal choices for change and act upon them.
However, the welfare professional's location within welfarist frames of reference,
means that there is always a hidden agenda, for instance, the health promotion officer
engaged in an empowerment initiative may claim that s/he is simply enabling clients
to make informed choices, even if those choices are unhealthy, but the objectives of
reduced smoking or alcohol consumption are always presented as the preferred
outcome (Brown & Piper, 1995).
This hidden-agenda is not a product of contingency, but a product of the professionals
location within the state and welfarist frames of reference, as Grace suggests:
Although the discourse attempts to position the community as being 'in
control', being the initiator, there is still an external agent in a background
role that has controlling implications. The use of concepts such as 'enabling'
and 'empowering' serves as a way of disguising this role. It appears as
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though the professional is facilitating what already exists in the community.
On closer inspection, it is possible to see the existence of a priori concepts of
the professional that are directive and strongly implicated in the succeeding
action. (Grace, 1991, p.331)
The politics of empowerment constitute a specific welfarist frame of reference, which
serves to interpellate the individual into a fixed range of self-identities. These
identities lie on the points of intersection between two continua: victim-oppressor and
client-professional. The continua can intersect at any point, giving an infinitely
nuanced range of identities, but consideration of the extreme points of each continua





Each of the cells A-D represents a different potential self-identity for the participants
in an empowerment initiative to inhabit: client/victim, client/oppressor,
professionallvictim, professional/oppressor. As we saw earlier, the 'professional'
identities are nominally available to lay participants, as quasi-professionals. The
identities are not fixed, and a client may switch identities over time or in different
contexts. The important thing to note is that the identities are intersection points on
two continua. Thus, to become less of a client one must become more of a
professional, primarily by internalising professional skills and knowledge, (welfarist
frames of reference), but also by becoming one who acts on others, (for example, by
empowering them or relieving their stress), rather than one who is acted upon.
Similarly, becoming less of a victim entails becoming more of an oppressor, because
the individual moves from being someone whose interests are subordinated to the will
of others, to being someone who subordinates other people's interests to his/her own
will.
The different self-identities can be freely adopted by the individual, or forcibly
imposed on others. The moral desirability of each identity is not fixed, but varies
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depending on the context. With WHAP this can be seen in the points of conflict
described in the previous chapter, for example, the smoking issue was characterised by
an unseemly scramble to appropriate the identity of client/victim, and impose the
identity of professional/oppressor on the others. For the anti-smoking lobby the
smokers were client/oppressors, harming themselves and others by their unhealthy
(and therefore unprofessional) behaviour. However, for the pro-smoking lobby, the
smokers were client/victims, requiring help to enable them to cope with the stress
caused by their oppression, whilst the anti-smokers were professionab'oppressors,
using their professional knowledge (about the association between passive smoking
and ill health) to dominate others. In this instance the day was won by the
professional/victims, whose willingness to go against their professional judgement and
risk their health in order not to 'oppress' the smokers, enabled them to seize the high
moral ground.
Conversely, with the racism issue the professional/oppressors were able to use their
putative anti-racism skills to exercise control over group members allegedly on behalf
of ethnic minority client/victims. It is important to note the way in which every issue
is reduced to one of interpersonal relations rather than structural change. Each issue
can be vehemently contested, but the grounds for that contest are always subjective
knowledge versus professional expertise, victimhood versus the oppression of others.
It is never possible to be neither professional nor client, or to be neither victim nor
oppressor. Moving beyond one's subjective beliefs must always entail the acquisition
of professional knowledge; to reject the label of victim must always be to risk
oppressing others.
As with any belief system the occasional heretic must be burned to shore up the faith
of the true believers. With empowerment it is those who refuse to define their self-
identity in terms of the victim-oppressor client-professional continua, who are likely to
be excommunicated. WHAP's disciplining of Denise is an example of this process.
Initially her psychotic behaviour clearly identified her as a potential client/victim,
however, her reluctance to accept this label and willingly undergo treatment meant•
that her actions had adverse consequences for the other volunteers, for whom she
became a client/oppressor. This transition is vital because it provides a moral
justification for the full coercive powers of the state to be deployed against the
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individual, which in this case entailed forced admission to a psychiatric hospital.
However, on her release Denise refused to comply with the identity that she had been
ascribed; rather than displaying contrition for the sin of oppressing her fellow
volunteers, she protested her innocence, and claimed that the project members had
treated her unfairly. This direct challenge to the legitimacy of the project could not go
unanswered, and WHAP had 'no choice' but to expel her. It is dangerous to speculate,
but had Denise accepted the identity she was ascribed, apologised to her colleagues for
'oppressing' them, and laid claim to the identity of client/victim, by emphasising the
social causes of her psychosis and her willingness to comply with a treatment regimen,
then the outcome might have been different.
That the process of empowerment tends to interpellate people into specific identities
can be observed in other initiatives. For instance, Stevenson & Parsloe report the
following finding from their study of community care staff engaged in empowerment
practice:
Some staff we met appeared to think that involving others required a passive
stance on the workers' part, in which they listened and then did what the user
requested. In fact this is not at all what empowerment entails. It requires an
active worker ready to share ideas and thoughts and to ensure that the other
has the advantage of hearing different points of view. It may also mean being
almost brutally clear, as one carer we met told us. He told us he could not
look at his own needs until one day his social worker said 'you daft bugger,
the penny still hasn 't dropped. You are the patient. We can't do anything for
your wife - it's you we 'ye got to look after.' This carer saw this 'levelling' as
a turning point in a process which led to his growth in confidence which found
expression in his joining the local Alzheimer Society (he is now its president).
(Stevenson & Parsloe, 1993, p.11)
Thus the empowerment process begins when the client 'recognises' himself as a
client/victim, and is completed when he achieves the quasi-professional status of•
president of the Alzheimer Society. A second example comes from Holland et al
(1991) in their study of women's attitudes towards safer sex. It is suggested that
women are often unable to negotiate 'safe' sexual practices because of oppression by
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confining women to the domestic sphere, or by the imposition of repressive moral or
religious sanctions, empowerment encourages women to intemalise the moral
imperative and become self-regulating. This is achieved by facilitating the adoption of
a clientivictim self-identity - sexual freedom becomes a risk, sexual partners become
oppressors, welfare professionals become allies enabling the 'victim' to be more
assertive in her sexual denial. Of course there is no guarantee that women will accept
this self-identity, but the fact that sexual temperance can be presented as a form of
emancipation indicates the way in which psychological empowerment is bound up
with the new authoritarianism.
Increased consciousness of personal risk appears to be a common theme amongst
empowerment initiatives, particularly those concerned with health. In such cases
empowerment tends to be couched in terms of risk-avoidance, risk-management, or
the acquisition of 'survival' skills. This gives rise to a very conservative form of
consciousness that emphasises: the fragility of the individual, the threat posed by
active engagement with society or the environment, the need to exercise self-discipline
to avoid harm, and the need to contain the 'dangerous' behaviour of others, either by
personal persuasion, or by calling for state intervention. Even one's most intimate
social contacts become potential threats, potential oppressors, and one's only ally is
the empowering welfare professional. Rather than providing the basis for collective
struggle against the state-form and other social and economic structures of oppression,
empowerment entails the mis-recognition that social relations are inevitably
oppressive and damaging, and that our best hope for survival is individual self-
defence, facilitated by the empowering welfare professional and backed up by the
repressive apparatus of the state. The process of empowerment entails active
internalisation of this new authoritarianism.
We have already noted that although empowerment is often defined as a continuum
that proceeds from developing the psychological competence of the individual,
through group work and consciousness raising, to social action, there is a tendency to
concentrate on the individual end of the continuum, and overlook the broader project
of collective social action. But, this is not exclusively so, and even WHAP made
tentative steps to bring about change beyond the immediate confines of the group.
However, because empowerment operates within the parameters of welfarist frames of
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reference the scope for genuinely emancipatory activity is extremely limited, creating a
tendency for collective social action to be re-defined as the pursuit of minor
objectives.
WHAP's failure to achieve change through the communicative model of knowledge
and action, contributed to the belief that any attempt to obtain control over the social,
economic and environmental influences on health was likely to fail. Although WHAP
continued to send representatives to participate in local statutory bodies, such efforts
were often felt to be tokenistic and ineffective, leading to the conclusion that the local
state was either unwilling or unable to bring about significant social change. This
culture of low expectations is evident in other empowerment initiatives, and it creates
a tendency to exaggerate the significance of quite minor gains. In this climate
'achievements' like: blocking the construction of a new by-pass or industrial
development, or the acquisition of additional service provision by the state, or the
granting of minor sums of money for community projects, take on the appearance of
major political victories, for example, Mullender & Ward (1991), write of the Ainsley
Teenage Action Group's successful five year struggle to have a 'youth-hut' built on
local waste ground.
The tendency to present minor gains as major achievements can be found elsewhere in
the empowerment literature, and it is often claimed that such gains are the beginning
of something much bigger. For example, Friedman (1992) discusses empowerment in
the context of 'alternative development' in the third world, and writes of the way in
which the most deprived sections of the urban poor manage to survive on the margins
of the formal economy by developing 'popular economic organisations'. For example,
the 'ollas communes' where food is collectively produced and cooked. For Friedman
these informal organisations provide an empowering experience that may eventually
lead to collective political struggle:
In addition to solving a major problem of malnutrition, especially amongst
children, participation in an Q	 also teaches about the values of•
organisation, joint decision-making and leadership. (Friedman, 1992, p.23)
335
Capitalism oppresses people in different ways, and whilst the capacity to scrape a
living on the margins of the formal economy might be considered laudable, it is surely
a mistake to confuse such activity with the seeds of emancipatory practice.
Recognising the value of collective organisation may be an essential ingredient of
social action, but it relates to the project of social transformation in the same way that
learning to tie one's shoe-laces relates to running a marathon - it may be a necessary
first step, but realisation of one's ultimate goal depends upon much more, and the road
to success is littered with obstacles.
This is one of the main failings of empowerment as a model of emancipatory practice;
as we saw above, the process is based upon a completist logic in which individuals
endowed with a basic degree of psychological competence identify their collective
needs through group-work and consciousness raising, and ensure that they are met
through specific forms of social action. Perhaps because of the need to demonstrate
tangible success to statutory or charitable funding agencies, the long haul from the
collective identification of 'needs', to the achievement of genuine social change,
becomes ridiculously compressed, giving the impression that one need only establish a
small community group to be on the verge of genuine political power.
Of course, this theoretical 'compression' is impossible to sustain within its own terms.
In the current historical conjuncture, when the traditional forms of oppositional
political organisation are all but defunct, the development of a powerful emancipatory
social movement must be viewed as a long-term project. But empowerment initiatives
have neither the time, nor the autonomy, to commence the drawn out process of
building such a movement - they need demonstrable results and they need them
quickly, hence the elevation of minor gains to the status of political victories. The
completist logic of empowerment has two consequences. First, it lowers expectations
of the potential for change through autonomous social action by focusing on short-
term pragmatic campaigns. Secondly, the perceived impotence of direct action,
coupled with frustrated attempts at achieving change through community participation
in the statutory agencies, leads to calls for a stronger and more interventionist state.
Thus Friedman, perhaps in anticipation of the limited emancipatory potential of
collective cookery, reluctantly admits the need for a strong state:
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Although an alternative development must begin locally, it cannot end there.
Like it or not, the state continues to be a major player. It may need to be more
accountable to poor people and more responsive to their claims. But without
the state 's collaboration, the lot of the poor cannot be significantly improved.
Local empowering action requires a strong state. (Friedman, 1992, p.7)
Note, empowerment depends not just on the state, but on the action of a strong state;
and here lies one of the main contradictions of the approach. For all their radical
rhetoric about changing the balance of power between the state and civil society, for
all their claims about combating oppression, the advocates of empowerment are
ultimately obliged to call for a strengthening of the state's powers. As we have
already noted, this contradiction is reinforced by the politics of empowerment; more
specifically, the pluralistic conception of oppression gives rise to the belief that inter-
personal relations must be regulated by an external agent. As new striations of
oppression are discovered, (according to the pluralist model the number is infinite),
the policing function of the state must increase commensurately. From this
perspective the chief problem with the state is not its oppressive character, but its
inability to expand rapidly enough to protect the individual from harm and oppression.
Rather than challenging the coercive powers of the state, empowerment initiatives are
more likely to help shore-up its powers of surveillance and control, ensuring that they
are used effectively, and shouldering the burden themselves where possible.
We have already noted that the politics of empowerment tends to give rise to an
increased consciousness of personal risk and anxiety, encouraging the individual to
modify their own 'risky' behaviour and police the behaviour of oppressive others.
This tendency is reinforced by the broader ideology of health promotion, as Lupton
(after Armstrong, 1993) has noted:
To deal with the complexity of disease causation in modern societies and the
need to maintain continuing surveillance of all members of the population,
health promotion has engendered a 'vast network of observation and caution'•
throughout society, involving the participation of all citizens in the generation
and regulation of anxieties around public health. (Lupton, 1995, pp.51-52)
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This self-policing of behaviour and inter-personal relations is complemented by an
equally strong imperative towards greater state intervention. The perception is of a
major threat lurking behind every bush, and whatever the threat, be it: unsafe food,
mini-buses without seat-belts, the abduction of babies from hospital maternity wards,
domestic violence, joy-riding, air-pollution, (the list is endless), the response is always
the same - the state must implement new regulations and tighter controls. Community
empowerment takes place within, and contributes to, this broader climate of fear and
social regulation. As well as providing a conduit through which calls for greater
statutory regulation can be articulated, empowerment also provides the welfare
professional with both reason and opportunity to become yet more involved in the
surveillance and control of everyday life, either to administer survival techniques, like
stress counselling, or to promote anti-oppressive values, as Baistow suggests:
• . far from being left robeless, or less poweiful, by the process of user
empowerment, professionals are increasingly being seen as being central to it
in a number of ways which extend rather than reduce their involvement and
intervention in the everyday life of citizens. Furthermore, whilst professionals
are becoming an essential ingredient of empowerment, empowerment is
increasingly being seen as central to their professional raison d'être and
legitimacy. (Baistow, 1994, p.39)
We began this concluding chapter by posing the question of whether WHAP
succeeded in empowering its lay participants and members of the wider community.
If empowerment is defined as the process by which people become more competent
social actors and more effective agents of social change, then the conclusion must be
that WHAP failed to achieve this aim. The volunteers may have gained in terms of
self-esteem, some may even have marginally improved their chances of gaining paid
employment, but as a means of obtaining greater control over the social and economic
influences on health WHAP could offer very little beyond the mythical fantasy of
quasi-professionalism and a tokenistic participation in the affairs of local statutory
agencies. The broader population appear to have gained even less from WHAP,
although the small number of local residents who attended the Drop-in centre may
have gained some benefit from the 'services' on offer there, at least in terms of
momentary relief from loneliness and isolation.
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Generally, the form of consciousness that WHAP gave rise to was one of low
expectations, first, of the psychological competence of the individual, and secondly, of
the possibility of social change. To the extent that WHAP retained its commitment to
social action, this entailed little more than the provision of services at the Drop-in and
lobbying local statutory agencies to obtain additional funding for the project and for
the implementation of minor reforms to existing local services. It was concluded that
WHAP's model of community empowerment amounted to little more than a myth,
promising to give greater control over the social and economic influences on health,
but delivering only a meagre boost to self-esteem, tokenistic participation in local
statutory agencies, low expectations of the possibility of social change, and greater
surveillance and regulation by welfare professionals.
The conclusions drawn from WHAP can be generalised to other initiatives where the
same social relations prevail between the state, welfare professionals, and
clients/members of the community. The politics of empowerment were found to
comprise: a pluralist model of oppression in which virtually anyone could occupy the
identity of victim or oppressor, a subjectivist approach to knowledge that prioritised
personal experience and problematised professional expertise, a purely ideational
conception of welfarist frames of reference that ignored their material basis and
suggested that the oppressive aspects of professional practice could be dismantled
without challenging the professional's location within the state, and a moral
imperative suggesting that the consciousness and inter-personal relations of 'clients'
require regulation by an external agent.
The politics of empowerment were found to provide a 'mask' for the practice of
welfare professionals, enabling them to adopt and believe in the self-identity of a
progressive political activist, claiming to confer upon their clients the psychological
competence, critical consciousness, and organisational capacity, to engage in
emancipatory social action. Each of these claims was found to be false. Instead
community empowerment was found to be a welfarist frame of reference that•
interpellated individuals into a fixed range of self-identities, the ideal types of which
were: client/victim, client/oppressor, professional/victim, and professional/oppressor.
Rather than empowering the individual, such identities were consistent with an
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increased consciousness of risk, a focus on inter-personal relations rather than the
structural basis of oppression, internalisation of professionally determined behavioural
norms, and calls for professional/statutory intervention to regulate the behaviour of
others. The forms of consciousness that community empowerment gives rise to were
found to be consistent with and contribute to a broader ideology, referred to as the new
authoritarianism.
It was concluded that community empowerment is nothing more than a mask
concealing the exercise of state power. Adoption of this bogus self-identity enables
welfare professionals who might otherwise be reluctant to engage in the social control
of their clients to believe that they are engaged in progressive political activity. Lay
participants are also caught up in the myth, mistaking the exercise of surveillance and
regulation by the state for the beginnings of emancipation. Grace (1991) has noted the
ironic character of such initiatives in the health promotion field:
It is ironic that a discourse articulating a concern to promote health in the
name of freedom and 'wholeness' functions to alienate people from their
capacity to engage in protest, and effectively operates to subordinate them
further to the political and economic order. (Grace, 1991, p.34.1)
The contradictory character of community empowerment comes from the
professional's location within the state, or more specifically his/her interpellation
within welfarist frames of reference. Subjectively the welfare professional might side
with the oppressed and be consciously committed to their emancipation, but while
ever this aim is pursued through professional practice it cannot be realised; the welfare
professional cannot objectively take the side of the oppressed until s/he steps outside
of welfarist frames of reference and the professional self-identity, but such activity is
qualitatively different to community empowerment.
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Summary of Conclusions
Chapter 1: Five Modes of Empowerment
In chapter one we found that in its broadest sense empowerment was a politically
ambiguous and contested category. Generally, empowerment could be described as
the attempt to overcome alienation, to obtain greater control over the extraneous
influences on life, not via traditional forms of political organisation such as the
political party or the trade union, but by a varied and constantly changing series of
activities - empowerment was found to be politics by 'other' means.
It was also concluded that as a form of emancipatory activity empowerment lacked a
clearly discernible history prior to the early 1970s. Forms of empowering practice
were found to exist before this time, but were not labelled as such. Five such 'modes
of empowerment were considered, in order to trace the diverse origins of modern
empowerment and predict its emancipatory potential, they were: consumerism,
citizenship, self-help, community participation, and community development. An
historical-logical analysis was conducted to identify the changing conditions of
existence and internal logic of each model.
The analysis revealed that the emancipatory potential of the first four modes of
empowerment was constrained by their self-limiting internal logic. Consumerism
provided scientific knowledge about the quality and value for money of different
commodities, empowering the shopper to make more informed purchases. But the
models dependence upon the market mechanism and state regulation meant that
consumerism could never confer the right to participate in planning or decision-
making about the production and distribution of goods and services, and was,
therefore, extremely limited as an emancipatory strategy.
Citizenship had more ambitious emancipatory objectives, aiming to achieve universal
civil, political, and welfare rights, recognised and enforced by the state. However, the
granting of equal rights before the law masked the persistence of social and economic
divisions that led to inequalities of power. The state's inability to address the
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structural basis of inequality meant that citizenship also had a self-limiting internal
logic.
Unlike consumerism or citizenship, self-help was found to have a critical perspective
on the state. Rather than calling for state intervention, either to regulate the market or
safeguard rights, self-help focused on the inner resources of the individual and
advocated autonomous self-advancement either through personal improvement or
mutual aid. However, in its modern form self-help had evolved into a deeply
fragmented series of support groups, critical of the paternalism and insensitivity of
existing welfare provision. In place of scientific knowledge and professional service
provision, self-help initiatives gave primacy to the subjective knowledge of the
individual 'victim' and the provision of mutual support by fellow sufferers. Whilst the
anti-professional stance of some self-help initiatives gave the movement a radical
appearance, the adoption of a subjectivist epistemology denied the possibility of
collective social action, and again it was concluded that this mode of empowerment
had a self-limiting internal logic.
'Community Participation' aimed to empower representatives of the community by
enabling them to directly participate in statutory sector planning and decision-making.
Again it was felt that this represented a self-limiting internal logic that was not
consistent with emancipatory activity, first, because it entailed the assumption that the
solution of social problems was the sole preserve of the state, and therefore,
overlooked the structural basis of inequality and powerlessness, and secondly, because
the powers conferred on lay participants were extremely marginal.
As with the other modes of empowerment, community development faced a
contradictory relationship to prevailing economic relations, the state-form, statutory
services and the production of knowledge. However, unlike the other modes of
empowerment community development confronted these potential constraints as
external phenomena, rather than incorporating them into its internal logic. Whilst the
possibility remained that community development initiatives would be co-opted by the•
state, or dominated by welfare professionals, or slide into a politically impotent
subjectivism, there remained the theoretical possibility that such initiatives might also
adopt a critical perspective, collectively identifying needs, and engaging in
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emancipatory political activity to ensure that they were met. Whereas the
emancipatory potential of the other modes of empowerment could be dismissed
because of their self-limiting internal logic, community development required
empirical study in a specific context. It was concluded that the Waterfront Health
Action Project provided an opportunity to compile a case study of community
development, focusing on its relationship with the state, the production of knowledge,
and the consciousness it engenders in lay participants, to ascertain the model's
emancipatory potential in the current conjuncture.
Chapter 2: Case Study - The Wateifront Health Action Project
The purpose of the second chapter was descriptive rather than analytical, however, the
process of describing WHAP's aims and objectives, the people involved, the changing
activities conducted over the course of the project, and the contradictions and conflicts
that occurred along the way, did yield a number of conclusions. First, WHAP's point
of departure was clearly close to the community development model described in
chapter one; the intention was to form a partnership with local people to enable them
to identify their health needs and take collective action to meet them. However, the
case study revealed that as WHAP progressed it moved further away from community
development, towards what we have described as 'community empowerment' where
the focus was much more upon developing the self-esteem and interpersonal
competence of the volunteers, providing 'services' to other local residents, and
influencing the decision making of local statutory agencies.
As well as indicating the above transformation, the case study also revealed the form
in which some of the issues raised in chapter one presented themselves in the context
of WHAP. For instance, the contradictory relationship between empowerment and the
state presented itself as a questioning of professional power and the traditional
professional role. Similarly, the question of epistemology arose as WHAP attempted
to produce a body of knowledge that was acceptable to the statutory agencies, but
which also articulated the authentic 'voice' of the community. It was concluded that•
the production of knowledge, the attempt to dismantle professional power, and the
pursuit of community empowerment, were the key themes of the WHAP case study,
and that they should be examined at length in the remaining chapters.
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Chapter 3: The Production of Knowledge
From the case study materials and interview transcripts it was found that the decision
to produce an emancipatory body of knowledge was taken by WHAP's professionals
before members of the community became involved in the project. The process was
based on a 'communicative model of knowledge and action', the characteristics of
which were found to be: first, that local statutory agencies were likely to be the
primary agents of change, in terms of improving the health of local people, secondly,
that local statutory agencies had previously failed to act on the community's needs and
preferences because they lacked authentic knowledge of those needs, and thirdly, that
WHAP would be able to articulate the authentic 'voice' of the local community in a
form that was acceptable to the statutory agencies, thereby enabling them to act in the
community's interests.
Critique of the communicative model of knowledge and action revealed that it
overlooked the fact that the local state and welfare professionals were structurally
alienated from the local population. Rather than recognising the structural constraints
limiting the statutory agencies' capacity to act in the community's interests, WHAP
transposed the problem of alienation to a discursive level, to be addressed via the
production of knowledge. However, it was concluded that the problem of alienation
resurfaced during the production and dissemination of knowledge, giving rise to the
conflictual issues of cultural synthesis, subjectivity/objectivity, science/ideology, and
mediation.
Essentially the professionals attempted to overcome their structural alienation by
forming a partnership, or cultural synthesis, with local people, however, their location
within the state meant that they were obliged to produce knowledge in a suitable form
to influence the statutory agencies, rather than to inform autonomous action by the
local population. This contradiction was transposed into a methodological and
epistemological debate about whether the research process should aim to capture the
subjective beliefs of local people, or produce objective data about, for instance, their
health status. It also led to a debate about whether the research report should simply
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articulate the 'scientific' findings of the survey, or whether it should also include
ideological analysis and proposals for change.
It was found that the problem of alienation was not, and indeed could not be, resolved
at the discursive level. This became apparent when WHAP attempted to mediate the
findings of the survey. The local community had simply been the object of study, and
the report aimed to provoke the statutory agencies to act on their behalf rather than
involving them in an active process of change, consequently the public meetings held
to report the findings of the survey were poorly attended and the findings were ignored
by the majority of Thamesmead residents. Similarly, although the statutory agencies
were more attentive to the presentation of results, they were unable, or unwilling, to
act on them, beyond the provision of a minimal amount of funding to enable WHAP to
continue. It was concluded that, in terms of enabling the local community to obtain
greater control over the social and economic factors affecting health, the WHAP
survey had failed.
The failure of the survey contributed to a transformation in the character of the project.
WHAP had begun as a community development project, aiming to: form a partnership
with local people, enable them to identify their needs, and develop a process of social
action. However, the failure of the survey to bring about change led to a lowering of
expectations, and the project increasingly focused on individual psychological
empowerment of the volunteers and the provision of self-help services at the Drop-in
centre.
It was found that the communicative model of knowledge and action was
characteristic of other community development initiatives that attempted to adapt
techniques developed in a context of revolutionary struggle in the third world to the
de-politicised practice of welfare professionals in the west. The result was a failure to
conceptualise the extent to which the relationship of alienation between the state and
the community limited the prospects of emancipatory activity. The welfare
professionals' location within the state also contributed to a second problem, the
failure to adopt a critical social research methodology. Such an approach would entail
historical and structural analysis, deconstruction or critique of phenomenal forms, and
a praxiological orientation that entailed linking the production of knowledge to the
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struggle to achieve social change. The welfare professionals were unaware of critical
social research methodology, and in any case their location within the state obliged
them to adopt a positivist approach instead.
A post-modernist critique was also presented as an alternative reading of WHAP's
difficulty in producing emancipatory knowledge. For post-modernists the assumed
viability of social solidarity, emancipatory knowledge, and collective action,
represents a modernist myth that cannot be recognised under any circumstances.
However, the post-modernist approach was found to be self-contradictory and
generally unsatisfactory. It was, therefore, concluded that whilst the production of
emancipatory knowledge remained a viable project, it could not be achieved within
community development projects like WHAP because the welfare professionals'
location within the state rendered them incapable of objectively 'taking the side of' the
local population - they were therefore unable to address the structural basis of
alienation, or adopt a critical social research methodology.
Chapter 4: The Challenge to Professional Power
It was concluded that the welfare professionals location within the state meant that
their involvement in WHAP was contradictory. On one hand they brought
professional expertise and access to resources, but they were also obliged to act as
agents of social control, exercising surveillance and regulation over their 'clients', and
to resolve 'social problems' within welfarist frames of reference rather than through
autonomous emancipatory activity.
The contradictory location of the professionals led them to experience role conflict.
Subjectively their sympathies lay with the local residents whom they wanted to
empower, but their professional role rendered them incapable of doing so. Although
this contradiction originated in the relationship between the professionals and the
state, it was transposed to the relationship between the professionals and local people.
Therefore, the professionals sought to overcome their alienation, not by seeking
greater autonomy from the state, but by trying to achieve cultural synthesis with
representatives of the local community. This entailed establishing an informal or 'off-
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duty' relationship with the volunteers, building up mutual trust, and providing access
to professional expertise in the non-threatening environment of the Drop-in.
However, it was concluded that although WHAP had succeeded in building a more
trusting relationship between the welfare professionals and volunteers/Drop-in users,
this was not sufficient to diminish the exercise of professional power. It was found
that in order to utilise professional expertise and the resources at their disposal WHAP
was obliged to activate welfarist frames of reference. This became apparent whenever
WHAP addressed an issue or difficulty. Developing an effective organisational form
led to the emulation of the bureaucratic model of authority characteristic of public
administration. The problem of smoking at the Drop-in was addressed by
conceptualising smokers as help'ess victims in need of professional services.
Accusations of racism were used to justify professional dominance of the decision-
making process on the grounds that multi-culturalism was an area of professional
expertise. The disciplining of an aberrant volunteer, provided grounds for resurrecting
the type of contractual relationship that prevails between an employer and employee.
All of which served to reproduce and reinforce the relationship of dominance and
passivity between the state and the 'clients' of welfare professionals.
Rather than empowering the volunteers WHAP embroiled them more deeply in
welfarist frames of reference, subordinating them to even greater professional
surveillance and regulation. It was concluded that, despite contrary intentions, rather
than dismantling professional power WHAP had only succeeded in extending its
exercise.
Different theories of professional power were considered, but it was concluded that the
most appropriate was that which explained the power of welfare professionals as a
function of state-power. Historical analysis of the state form revealed its class
character and its role in the reproduction of oppressive social and economic relations.
However, the WHAP study had revealed that welfare professionals were often
reluctant bearers of state-power, that they might be subjectively committed to•
emancipating local people rather than facilitating their subordination to the state. This
raised the question of why welfare professionals who were subjectively committed to
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emancipatory practice were apparently so unsuccessful in their attempt to avoid
exercising state-power.
It was concluded that the professionals' location within the state meant that the
adoption of a professional self-identity entailed interpellation within welfarist frames
of reference. Welfarist frames of reference were found to be simultaneously ideational
and material in content, both of which were structured by dominant social and
economic relations. To become a welfare professional entailed defining one's self-
identity in terms of welfarist frames of reference, and containing one's practice within
their narrow constraints. To challenge the validity of welfarist frames of reference
would entail denying one's self-identity, in terms of professional values, status, et
cetera, and coming into conflict with an increasingly constraining managerial
structure of control. There were therefore strong incentives for welfare professionals
to structure their practical activity in terms of 'good professional practice',
unfortunately, this meant that even when they were subjectively committed to
emancipatory activity their actions only served to reinforce state-power.
Whilst it remained theoretically possible that welfare professionals could shake off
their professional self-identity and engage in genuine emancipatory activity, this could
not be achieved by attempting to reform the professional role, but only by stepping
outside of the state and welfarist frames of reference, and engaging in autonomous
emancipatory activity.
Chapter 5: The Myth of Community Empowerment
It had been noted in chapter two that WHAP had taken the community development
model as its point of departure, but had evolved into a community empowerment
initiative. The final chapter described the new model and evaluated its emancipatory
potential.
A key aspect of this transformation was found to be a shift in focus away from the
broad project of producing emancipatory knowledge as a basis for social action,
towards the more introspective goals of raising the self-esteem and inter-personal
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competence of the volunteers, and providing social support services to the Drop-in
users. This was partly a response to the statutory agencies failure to act on the
findings of the survey, and also the volunteers desire to conduct charitable activities
and acquire new skills, as a potential route into paid employment.
WHAP improved the self-esteem of the volunteers by enabling them to adopt a quasi-
professional identity, in which they acquired social support and skills such as
counselling and stress management, that could then be used to provide a service to
Drop-in users. However, although this gave a transitory boost to the self-esteem of the
volunteers, it was concluded that it did little to emancipate them or their 'clients'. In
fact the quasi-professional identity was largely a myth; embroiling the volunteers more
deeply in welfarist frames of reference, and subordinating them more thoroughly to
professional surveillance and regulation.
Enabling the volunteers to adopt a mythical quasi-professional identity entailed
positing the remainder of the community as impaired individuals in need of
professional or quasi-professional services to enable them to cope. By positing the
local community as helpless victims of adversity, WHAP lowered expectations of the
community's capacity to engage in autonomous social action. In effect WHAP
reproduced the traditional relationship between the state, welfare professionals and
'clients'. The Drop-in centre fronted by the volunteers provided an informal 'front-
end' bringing sections of the population that had previously been difficult to reach
within the purview of professional surveillance and regulation.
Many of WHAP's professional members felt that the project had failed to address the
social and economic influences on health, so volunteers were still encouraged to
participate in local decision-making agencies. However, it was concluded that such
involvement was largely tokenistic, whilst it entailed the volunteers taking on board
and legitimating the activities and agendas of local statutory agencies, very few
concessions or benefits for the community were obtained. This further lowered
expectations about the viability of change.
Consideration of the literature on empowerment showed that many other initiatives
had adopted a similar model. Community empowerment was found to be based on a
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political theory that stressed a pluralist model of oppression and a subjectivist
conception of knowledge. This legitimated the intervention of welfare professionals,
to directly mediate inter-personal relationships between different oppressed groups,
and led 'clients' to internalise a culture of victimhood, personal risk, self-regulation
and low expectations of the capacity for autonomous collective action.
It was concluded that the ideology of community empowerment provides a 'mask'
which enables welfare professionals to exercise state power whilst deluding
themselves and their clients that they are engaged in emancipatory activity. Rather
than enabling people to obtain greater control over the social and economic forces that
constrain their personal freedom, and limit the satisfaction of their needs, community
empowerment expands the state's capacity to exercise surveillance and regulation of
everyday life, whilst simultaneously giving rise to a culture of personal risk,
dependency on the state, and low expectations of the capacity for autonomous political




The production of knowledge was a central theme of this study, not just in chapter
three where WHAP's attempt to produce an alternative body of knowledge about local
health needs was examined, but throughout the thesis as a whole. Many issues arose
about the relationships between: subjective beliefs and objective knowledge, the
production of knowledge and the exercise of power, and knowledge production and
emancipatory social action. In chapter three the limitations of the positivist
methodology adopted by WHAP were contrasted with an approach described as
critical social research, and it was concluded that the latter was an essential element of
emancipatory practice. Many of the contradictions and difficulties of knowledge
production encountered by WHAP are also pertinent to my own study and the
methodology I adopted. Here I want to explore my attempts to address those issues,
and particularly the difficulty of combining ethnography with a critical social research
methodology.
Critical Ethnography
Generally, the approach I adopted can be described as qualitative, because my
intention was to obtain an in-depth understanding of the meanings and definitions of
the situation of the people I studied, rather than to produce a quantitative
'measurement' of their characteristics or behaviour. This concern to reveal the
subjective beliefs of those being studied is common to ethnography, participant
observation, and the various other strands of qualitative research. For many
qualitative researchers the subjective beliefs of the people being studied have
explanatory primacy over the theoretical knowledge of the researcher, thus Jorgensen
suggests:
While the researcher may have a theoretical interest in being there, exactly
what concepts are important, how they are or are not related, and what,
therefore, is problematic should remain open and subject to refinement and
definition based on what the researcher is able to uncover and observe.
(Jorgensen, 1989, p.18)
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The ethnographer's concern to avoid imposing a theoretical framework of meanings
and definitions perhaps originates from the anthropological study of low technology
tribal cultures in the third world, where the intention was mainly to describe cross-
cultural variations in social behaviour and beliefs. Methodologically this entailed
detailed observation and interaction by the researcher, in order to see the world
'through the eyes' of the people being studied. The same approach has been adapted
to the study of sub-cultures within western society, most notably in the classic studies
conducted by the Chicago School and succeeding generations of neo-Chicagoans. As
Downes and Rock have noted, the primary imperative for such research is to catalogue
and describe a particular woridview without imposing external theoretical schema:
The interactionist takes his job to be the documentation of the social worlds
that constitute a society. He methodically plots the connections between
communication, meaning, symbolism, and action. He would claim that there is
little profit in imposing alien interpretative schemes on a world: people do not
build their lives on the logic of sociology or the sensibilities offoreign groups.
They have their own methods of doing things together. (Downes & Rock,
1986, p.143)
Whilst this approach has yielded a diverse and colourful variety of descriptions of
everyday life, it poses a number of problems or limitations when viewed from the
perspective of critical social research. First, no attempt is made to place the beliefs
and behaviour of the people being studied into a historical or structural context; it is
considered sufficient to simply describe different forms of consciousness without
trying to explain how and why they developed. This leads to a second problem - the
tendency to adopt an uncritical attitude to the beliefs and consciousness of subjects,
without considering their epistemological adequacy or their emancipatory potential.
The result is a form of voyeuristic relativism where everyone's testimony is accorded
equal status, and no attempt is made either to explain or inform the development of
consciousness.
Superficially, such an approach appears to be the epitome of a value-free sociology;
rather than passing judgement on the lives of others the researcher becomes an
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impartial reporter enabling subjects to express their own definition of the situation.
However, the reluctance to address the processes by which different forms of
consciousness are socially and historically constructed, coupled with the absence of
any evaluation of the epistemological status and emancipatory potential of a set of
beliefs, amounts to little more than a passive legitimation of dominant ideology.
Moreover, it is based on an assumed antagonism between social theory and the
immediate experience of everyday life. Rather than the means of obtaining a critical
consciousness of ideological oppression, social theory is conceptualised as an
inevitable part of the dominant ideology - something to be resisted and struggled
against, rather than a basis for emancipatory activity. In short, it is assumed that the
sociologist has everything to learn from the people s/he studies, but that critical social
theory can have no reciprocal role in their emancipation.
In the light of such criticisms a new generation of 'critical' ethnographers
(Hammersley 1992) have attempted to synthesise the traditional focus on the meanings
and definitions of those involved in a social phenomenon with the insights gained
from social critique. The objective is still to access the subjective beliefs of the people
being studied, but rather than accepting such beliefs at face value they are examined
critically in the context of a broader historical and structural analysis. Whilst
Hammersley is keen to distance himself from critical ethnography, he recognises the
value of this shift in emphasis:
we have no grounds for dismissing the validity of participant
understandings outright: indeed they are a crucial source of knowledge,
deriving as they do from experience of the social world. However, they are
certainly not immune to assessment, nor to explanation. They must be treated
in exactly the same manner as social scientific accounts. (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 1983, p.234)
Crucially, appraisal of the testimony of respondents amounts to much more than
simply checking that they are telling the truth, it entails looking at the processes that
shaped their views and assessing the extent to which they may be distorted by
ideology. The intention is not primarily to 'weed-out' unreliable testimony, but to use
historical analysis and sociological theory to get beneath the surface of everyday
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'common-sense' assumptions in order to arrive at a deeper level of understanding that
will not only be of academic interest to the researcher, but will also contribute to the
development of critical consciousness amongst oppressed groups.
In chapter three I described the key characteristics of critical social research as: the
application of dialectical logic which views the material and social world as in a
constant state of flux, the study of phenomena over time to reveal their historical
specificity, the critique or deconstruction of existing phenomenal forms and analytical
categories which delves beneath the superficial appearances available to unaided
common sense to reveal the network of social and economic relations that are the
essential conditions of existence for a phenomenon, the exposure of previously hidden
oppressive structures, and a praxiological orientation in which knowledge is
considered to be inseparable from conscious practical activity in the material world.
To avoid duplication readers are referred to chapter three for a more detailed
exposition of these concepts. Critical social research is diverse and constantly
changing, and many critical ethnographers would not share the above definition,
however, they would presumably agree that critical ethnography entails synthesising
the subjective accounts of the people studied with a broader historical and structural
critique.
This synthesis of the insights that traditional ethnography provides into the subjective
experience of everyday life, with the theoretical insights offered by social critique, is
by no means easy to maintain. The possibility always remains that the analysis will
slide into either a top-down deductive approach in which a pre-existing theory is
simply legitimated by the selective and biased use of ethnographic data, or else into a
superficial and particularistic account of the views of respondents. The aim is to
ensure that the analysis is informed by both strands of inquiry, for example, that issues
emerging from participant observation or ethnographic data can be placed in an
historical and structural context, and that problems identified in the academic literature
can influence the direction of the ethnographic study. As such, critical ethnography
entails a constant inter-weaving of inductive and deductive logic. The researcher does•
not set out to test a pre-conceived hypothesis, nor is an entirely open-ended approach
adopted, instead the researcher begins by observing the field of study, both as a
participant observer and as a reviewer of academic literature. From the synthesis of
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these sources a research agenda emerges that can be pursued, again, by a mixture of
observation and theoretical work.
The key to managing this unstable dialectical relationship between ethnographic
observation and social critique is the practice of reflexivity. Reflexivity refers to the
researcher's conscious self-understanding of the research process (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 1983), or more specifically, to a sceptical approach to the testimony of
respondents (are they telling me what I want to hear?), and to the development of
theoretical schema (am I seeing what I want to see?). The purpose of reflexivity is not
to produce an objective or value-free account of the phenomenon, because qualitative
research of this kind does not yield standardised results, as Janet Ward-Schofield has
suggested:
at the heart of the qualitative approach is the assumption that a piece of
qualitative research is very much influenced by the researcher's individual
attributes and perspectives. The goal is to produce a standardised set of
results that any other careful researcher in the same situation or studying the
same issues would have produced. Rather it is to produce a coherent and
illuminating description of and perspective on a situation that is based on and
consistent with detailed study of the situation. (Ward-Schofield, 1993, p.202)
Thus, reflexivity is not a means of demonstrating the validity of research to an
audience, but rather a personal strategy by which the researcher can manage the
analytical oscillation between observation and theory. To summarise the argument so
far, the methodology adopted in this study has been described as a strand of critical
ethnography that aimed to link the insights gained from detailed observation of the
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of the actors involved in the phenomenon, with the
theoretical insights of social critique. It was recognised that the relationship between
the two strands of the methodology was difficult to manage effectively, but that the
adoption of a reflexive perspective on the research process would help to achieve an
appropriate balance. The account now turns to how these methodological issues were
addressed in practice, from establishing relations in the field to writing up the thesis.
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Selecting and gaining access to a site
Choosing an appropriate site to study, and forging a relationship with its participant
members, is a key issue for all ethnographic studies. Ward-Schofield (1993) has
explored the consequences of site selection for validity and generalisability, and
suggests that both can be maximised either by selecting a 'typical' site or else
conducting a multi-site study. However, there are problems with either option; first,
how can one identify what constitutes a typical site without conducting at least a basic
reconnaissance of all potential sites? Secondly, given that most qualitative studies are
conducted by single researchers or small teams, is it viable to study multiple sites to
the depth required by qualitative analysis?
Other commentators set less rigorous standards for site selection, for example,
Jorgensen (1989) refers to a number of qualitative studies derived from everyday life
experiences, where the researcher literally found him/herself in a fortuitous location to
study a phenomenon. This was the case with my study of WHAP; I became involved
in WHAP as part of my job and I found it to be an interesting phenomenon to study.
Front-end management
My professional involvement in WHAP was both an advantage and a disadvantage.
On one hand it gave me a reason for being there and a pre-defined role in the group,
both of which can be difficult to achieve for an outsider. But on the other hand, my
involvement also led to me being identified as 'one of the professionals' with a
professional outlook and a particular line of argument about how the project should
develop. This close proximity to the phenomenon being studied can be viewed as an
advantage, for example, some feminist writers (Stanley (ed.), 1990) have suggested
that personal experience can be a vital source of inside information to be tapped as
part of the research process. Nigel Fielding has also suggested that there may be




There were three elements to the process of data collection: documentary evidence,
(such as reports minutes of meetings and strategy documents), observation of the
group meetings and Drop-in sessions et cetera, and in-depth interviews with the
professional and volunteer members of WHAP. The documentary evidence was used
to give a detailed description of WHAP, presented as a case study in chapter two.
Whilst this gave basic information about who was involved and what happened when,
it gave little insight into the meanings ascribed to those events by the people involved
in them.
The participant observation was useful because it gave me first hand experience of
WHAP as it evolved over time. Detailed field notes were not taken at the time of the
observation because I felt that it would be inappropriate for the other members to see
me noting down their comments and behaviour. Some post observation notes were
kept, along with early attempts at interpretation and theory. With hindsight these
notes could have been recorded as a much more systematic and formal research diary.
The main emphasis of the analysis was on the in-depth interviews. Most of the
WHAP members involved at the time were interviewed, comprising: ten professionals
(of whom 5 were interviewed twice), and five volunteers (of whom three were
interviewed twice). On average the interviews lasted approximately one hour, and
were all tape-recorded and transcribed by me. The first round of interviews
commenced in November 1993 (by which time the survey had been conducted and the
Drop-in had been open for six months), the second round concluded a year later in
November 1994. The two-stage design, spread over a one year period, enabled me to
capture the change in consciousness that occurred amongst the WHAP members as the
project evolved from a community development initiative to community
empowerment. This capacity to capture the process of change or transformation is an
important aspect of the dialectical logic of critical social research - it reveals, that
social phenomena are always in the process of becoming something else, and
hopefully, the forces that are driving that change.
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For many ethnographers the in-depth interview should be entirely open ended, with at
most a series of topics to be discussed, but certainly no pre-conceived questions, as
this would entail the researcher imposing his/her own definition of the situation rather
than enabling the respondents to structure the research. Thus, Sue Jones suggests that
pre-conceived interview schedules are unacceptable because:
the interviewers have already predicted, in detail, what is relevant and
meaningful to their respondents about the research topic; and in doing this
they have sign zfi cantly prestructured the direction of enquiry within their own
frame of reference in ways that give little time and space for their respondents
to elaborate their own. (Jones, 1985, p.46)
Whilst this may be a valid approach for traditional ethnography, or where the
interview is the researcher's first contact with the respondent, I would argue that
critical ethnography entails a much more focused approach to interviewing, in which
questions are asked about specific issues derived from the broader social critique.
This is particularly the case where, as in my study, extensive participant observation
has already revealed issues to be examined in greater depth in the interviews. For
these reasons, I adopted relatively fixed interview schedules for both rounds of
interviews (see the schedules in appendix II), although I did use them flexibly, for
instance, departing from the schedule to pursue an interesting line of inquiry. Also the
questions were very wide ranging and open-ended.
Data analysis
Nigel Fielding (1993, p.1 63) has summarised a common approach to ethnographic












Harvey (1990) refers to the same process as 'pile-building', in which the ethnographic
data are first read 'vertically', usually in chronological order, to identify common
themes and relations which are then coded. The data are then literally cut up and re-
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ordered into 'piles' that reflect the key themes. Specialist software is available to
facilitate this process, but I found the 'cut and paste' utility of a word-processor to be
adequate for my needs. The re-ordered data are then re-read, enabling a sequential
argument to be constructed, and illustrative quotations from the transcripts to be
selected. Harvey also suggests that critical ethnography also differs from traditional
forms of qualitative data analysis, by bringing the broader critique of social relations
to bear on the structuring of analytical themes. Hence the final analysis is not derived
exclusively from the ethnographic data but from an oscillation between that and the
social critique. As Sue Jones has noted, this inevitably entails going beyond the
concepts and understandings of the respondents:
I know I cannot empathise with the research participants completely. I also
know that I am likely at some points to set my understanding of their
'concrete' concepts - those which they use to organise, interpret, and construct
their own world - within my own and/or an audience's concepts and
frameworks that are different from theirs. When I do this, however, I try to be
clear that I am doing this and why, and to ensure that this 'second level' of
meaning retains some link with the constructions of the research participants.
(Jones, 1985, pp.56-'7)
The identification and selection of themes also raises a fundamental issue about the
validity of qualitative research; as David Silverman has noted:
The various forms of ethnography, through which attempts are made to
describe social processes, share a single defect. The critical reader is forced
to ponder whether the researcher has selected only those fragments of data
which support his argument. (Silverman, 1985, p.140)
Silverman's preferred solution to this dilemma is to introduce simple counting
procedures into the analysis, for example to identify how many people referred to a
specific theme. But this begs the question of how many people must refer to a theme
before it is deemed significant; moreover with a small quantitative study it is unlikely
that a view shared by a majority of respondents could be claimed as representative of
the views of a broader population. In fact, the application of quantitative criteria of
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validity to qualitative data is inappropriate. The rationale for conducting in-depth
interviews is that people involved in a phenomenon may have insights that would not
otherwise be available to the researcher, and it is the quality of the insight that is
important, rather than the number of respondents that share it. This is what
Hammersley meant (in the above quotation) when he suggested that ethnographic data
should be treated in the same manner as social scientific accounts - when we quote the
work of a particular social scientist we do so because of its explanatory power, not
because it represents a commonly held view, and the same logic applies to qualitative
data.
Mays & Pope (1995) have addressed the validity issue by recommending that
qualitative researchers pass their ethnographic data to independent researchers to see if
they arrive at the same analysis. But again this is unsatisfactory. How are we to select
an alternative researcher, and how many should we consult before we can conclude
that the analysis is valid? Again the mistake lies in applying quantitative criteria of
validity to qualitative data. Whilst two statisticians applying the same test of
statistical significance to the same quantitative data-set might stand a good chance of
arriving at the same result, it is extremely unlikely that two ethnographers would
produce the same reading of a case study, for the same reasons that a group of students
reading the same text books would be unlikely to produce the same essay.
As noted above, the researcher can influence the validity of an ethnographic analysis
by adopting a reflexive perspective on his/her work, the problem resides in
demonstrating this validity to the reader. Whilst the quantitative researcher has more
effective ways of demonstrating validity, such as, random sampling and statistical
inference, even here there remains the need for the reader to trust in the integrity of
the researcher not to knowingly engage in deception, and this is doubly true of
qualitative research. Beyond this, the qualitative ethnographer can strive to
demonstrate the validity of the analysis by providing a 'thick' description of the case




In many accounts of the research process 'writing up receives little attention, or else it
is treated as an independent activity from data analysis. Hammersley and Atkinson
(1983) however, claim that writing-up is inevitably a part of the analytical process,
suggesting that the structure of the report influences the type of analysis, or at least the
way it is understood by the reader. They identify four types of report: the 'natural
history (in which the report reflects the different stages of the research process as they
progressed over time), the 'chronology' (also temporally organised, but reflecting the
development or 'career' of the phenomenon being studied, rather than the research
process), 'narrowing and expanding the focus' (in which the analysis moves
backwards and forwards between specific observation and consideration of broader
structural issues), and 'separating narration and analysis' (in which the ethnographic
data are presented first before theoretical issues are addressed).
The 'natural history' approach is a very common format, particularly for presenting
quantitative findings, but I felt that it did not fit well with qualitative research. In fact
it can lead to a form of dishonesty, giving the impression that that the research
followed a tight structure of background reading, hypothesis construction, research
design, data collection & analysis, and discussion of results. In my experience the
research process is less well ordered. The background reading was essential, but
which texts were relevant, and therefore, worth including in the thesis, only became
apparent towards the end of the research process, and the literature review continued
throughout the project. Similarly, the sequence of hypothesis - data collection -
analysis, was not clear cut or linear, but an ongoing and disorganised process.
The other three formats for writing-up are more relevant, but should be seen as
different aspects of the process, rather than discrete types. In my thesis I wanted to
represent the way in which WHAP changed from a community development project
into an empowerment initiative, so I organised the last three chapters in a broadly
chronological order, first reporting the failed attempt to produce emancipatory
knowledge, followed by the re-emergence of professional power, and concluding with
the chapter on empowerment. By the same token, combining the methodologies of
ethnography and critical social research obliged me to oscillate between micro and
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macro analysis; looking in detail at WHAP, but broadening this out to a consideration
of structural and historical issues. In fact it is difficult to imagine a sociological
analysis that does not to some degree broaden and narrow the analysis.
Finally, I also wanted to keep a degree of separation between presentation of the
ethnographic data and the sociological analysis. First, to provide a relatively
transparent description of the phenomenon, uncluttered by theory, and therefore able
to support alternative readings. Secondly, I wanted to show that the analysis really
was led by the ethnographic data; that the findings had caused me to carry out further
reading and construct new theoretical schema. For this reason I preceded the
ethnographic data with a descriptive chapter based on the documentary evidence, with
very little theoretical interpretation. I also divided the final chapters into two parts,
presenting the ethnographic data first, followed by provisional conclusions, and then
tried to deepen the analysis by examining sociological texts and more formal theory.
Again this entails a slight fiction. Although the theoretical analysis was largely a
response to the ethnographic data, the ethnography itself was shaped by my earlier
reading and perspective - indeed the critical research methodology emphasises the
need to situate empirical data in a broader historical and structural context. To
overcome this, I used the first chapter to provide a broad historical and structural
analysis of different modes of empowerment, to provide a context for the WRAP
study, and to show how key themes emerged from the literature as well as from the
ethnographic data. The structure of the thesis is therefore unusual, but it does capture
the complicated oscillation between observation and theory that characterises critical
ethnography.
Generalisability
An important question to ask at the end of this discussion on methodology is the
extent to which the methods employed enable the research findings to be generalised
to other situations. In a quantitative study generalisability is largely determined by
random sampling and statistical inference, obviously such techniques are not usually
relevant to qualitative research, making generalisation more of a problem. In many
respects, the way in which generalisation is conceptualised in quantitative studies is
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alien to both ethnography and critical social research. For the ethnographer what
matters most is gaining an in-depth understanding of the attitudes, beliefs and
behaviour of the people s/he studies; the assumption is that this worldview will be
context specific, and that generalisation to others will therefore be extremely limited.
Similarly, critical social research starts from the assumption that society is in a
constant state of flux, that the social world and our understanding of it are constantly
changing, again limiting the value of generalisation.
However, although ethnography and critical research may question
positivistiquantitative assumptions about generalisability, I would argue that both
approaches aim to produce findings that have relevance beyond the immediate context
of the study. Whilst the production of laws of behaviour is eschewed, there remains
an almost hidden claim that the behaviour found in the study will shed some light on
the behaviour of others, even if this explanatory range is limited in time and space. As
Janet Ward-Schofield (1993) has suggested this claim entails a re-conceptualisation of
generalisability in terms appropriate to qualitative research. She prefers the terms
'fittingness', 'comparability', or 'translatability', reflecting the process of detailed
description of the content and context of a study, so that it can be generalised to
examples that match it closely. The use of 'thick description' to boost the
generalisability of a qualitative study, is important and I tried to achieve this in the
second chapter of my thesis. However, I would go beyond Ward-Schofield's
suggestion, and argue that generalisability depends not just upon detailed description
of a phenomenon, but on revealing the social relations that underpin it. In studying
WHAP I tried to demonstrate that empowerment was an expression of a specific set of
relations between the state, welfare professionals and their clients, indeed that these
relations were the condition of existence for empowerment. I concluded that these
relations limited the emancipatory potential of empowerment, and that this limitation
would apply wherever those conditions prevailed. To move beyond those conditions
would be to move beyond something that was recognisable as empowerment.
Conceptualising a phenomenon in terms of its conditions of existence and the social
relations that characterise it, is a sounder basis for generalisation than the simple
description of immediate appearances. For example, the number of people involved in
an empowerment initiative might change, as might the designation of the
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professionals, the geographical location, even its claimed aims and objectives, but
whilst the conditions of existence and social relations that characterise the
phenomenon remain constant, then the conclusion that its emancipatory potential is
extremely limited remains valid. By the same token, WHAP might retain its outward
appearance, in terms of the people participating, its geographical location, et cetera,
but be transformed into a completely different phenomenon (with a different degree of
emancipatory potential), if change occurs in the social relations that underpin it. In
either instance, defining the phenomenon in terms of social relations reveals whether
or not generalisation is valid.
In conclusion, the methodology I adopted attempted to synthesise ethnographic data
collection with critical social theory. This is an uneasy and in some senses
contradictory combination that requires reflexive management. But it does provide an
opportunity to get beneath the surface of everyday appearances, to produce a
theoretical account of a social phenomenon that is grounded in people's experience of
everyday life, but which takes a critical approach to the categories and forms through
which everyday life is experienced.
365
Appendix 2: Interview Schedules
NB. The interview schedules were only used as a basis for the interviews. Questions
were modified, added or deleted, as appropriate.
First Round:
1. Approximately how long have you been involved in WHAP?
2. How did you first become involved in WHAP?
3. What was it that made you want to take part?
4. When you first started coming to WHAP meetings what did you expect to get out
of it, or what did you think it would achieve?
5. Did these expectations change over time? In what way and why?
6. What do you think you have personally gained from your involvement in WHAP?
7. Has your involvement with WHAP caused you any problems or difficulties?
8. Are you satisfied with WRAP's achievements up to now?
9. Are you happy with your own role in the group?
10. Have you ever wanted to leave the group or reduce your involvement?
11. Do you think that you will continue to be involved in WHAP?
12. Is there anything you would like to say about your personal involvement in WI-TAP
that we haven't discussed yet?
13. What do you think are the main objectives of WHAP; what is it trying to achieve?
14. What does WHAP do in practical terms?
15. What do you think WHAP should do in the future?
16. How do you get on with the professionals involved in WHAP? Are you happy
with the role that they play?
17. How do you get on with the volunteers involved in the Group? Are you happy
with the role that they play?
18. What would you say are the advantages and disadvantages of having professionals
involved in the group?
366
19. Would you like to see the relationship between the professionals and the volunteer
members of the group change?
20. Much of WHAP's decision making takes place in business meetings, general
meetings, and occasional away-days. Does this structure enable you to make your
feelings known to the group? Do you feel it enables you to exert sufficient
influence over decision making? M Are there other ways in which you make your
feelings known to the Group?
21. The WHAP Report made two points, amongst others, about the way in which
existing health services are planned and managed. First, that they are very
bureaucratic and professionally dominated, and secondly, that they make members
of the population feel powerless. Do you think that WHAP has avoided these
problems, either in the way it makes decisions, or in its relationship with the
broader community, through the Drop-in?
22.How do you feel about WHAP's relationship with the broader community?
23. What will WHAP be like in the future; who will be involved and what will it do?
24. Will WHAP achieve its original objectives?
25. Is there anything else you would like to say about WHAP as an organisation that
we haven't covered yet?
Second round:
1. Almost from the beginning WHAP decided to gather information on local people's
attitudes to health and their experiences of illness. Why was that considered to be
important
2. It was decided that the information gathered by WHAP should have scientific
validity. This imposed certain constraints on who was interviewed, what questions
were asked, and the general design of the survey. What do you think were the
benefits and disadvantages of this approach.
3. Do you think that the information could have been gathered in a better or more
appropriate way?
4. How do you think the information gathered has benefited the project, or, the local
population? Was it worth the time and resources invested in it?
5. The report came in two parts: first a brief summary, and then a longer more
detailed version. These questions refer to both. Have you read either? How
much?
6. What did you think of the way the report was written and set out, particularly its
length and the type of language used?
7. How much of the report was meaningful to you? Did you learn anything from it?
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8. Do you feel that you had enough influence over the writing of the report? If you
had written the report how would you have done it differently?
9. Do you think that the report tells the truth? Is it an accurate reflection of the
attitudes and beliefs of local people?
10. Do you think that the report is likely to be read andlor understood by local people?
11. Do you think that the information contained in the report is a sound basis for
action either by local people, or by statutory agencies such as the council or health
authority?
12. The findings of the survey were presented at public meetings and through
presentations to various statutory agencies and groups. Do you think that this
approach was an effective way of getting the message across? How else could it
have been done?
13. To what extent have the findings of the survey been taken on board either by local
people, or by the council and health service? What practical benefits have come
from this?
14. What is the purpose of the drop-in? How would you describe its objectives and
the things that it does?
15. How does this relate to WHAP's original objectives about addressing the social,
economic, and environmental influences on health, and enabling people to
participate in the planning and management of local health and welfare services?
What brought about this shift of emphasis?
16. It has been suggested that the drop-in will eventually lead to a more
critical/campaigning approach. Do you think this will happen? Why?
17. Do you think that involvement in WHAP will change the way in which either the
volunteers or the people attending the drop-in will use health services, and the way
they will relate to doctors and other health professionals?
18.What effect has WHAP had on the way in which health and local authority
services are provided?
19. Shortly after the drop-in had been established a question arose about whether
people should be allowed to smoke either at the drop-in or during meetings. This
caused a degree of conflict. Why do you think that was? What did you think of
the way it was managed?
20. More recently, one of the volunteers became disruptive and engaged in anti-social
behaviour which affected the project. WHAP responded by convening a
disciplinary hearing. What are your views on this incident and WHAPs response
to it?
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21. Some of the volunteers have expressed an interest in acquiring professional skills,
such as counselling and health promotion. What do you make of this?
22. Flow would you respond to the argument that the drop-in provides an inexpensive
alternative to services which should be provided by the state?
23. Flow would you respond to the argument that WHAP provides a means by which
health and welfare professionals can exercise surveillance and social control over
marginalised groups like the poor or people from ethnic minorities?
24. During these two interviews we have discussed: how and why you became
involved in WHAP, what you thought it would achieve, the way WHAP is
organised, the relationship between volunteers and professionals, the survey and
report, the drop-in, and WHAPs influence on those directly involved in it, the
broader population and the statutory services. Is there anything else you would like
to say about any of these issues or anything else relating to WHAP?
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